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No Offensive Realism is Needed to Quell
Eritrea’s Threat: A Critical Overview of Haile Tessema’s Thought-provoking Article on Aiga
Forum Adal Isaw January
3, 2016 I read Haile’s
thought-provoking article on Aiga Forum[1],
titled “A Lesson for Ethiopia to Learn
from Russia–Ukraine Relations to Deter the Looming Threat from Eritrea,”
which prompted me to write this critical overview. And the article is indeed thought-provoking
for a number of good reasons: First; it’s written in a fitting
format and content for mass Ethiopian public consumption—at a time when a
thought-provoking leaderless world appears to have emerged. Not only that, it is also written at a time
when a limited unrest is affecting the Oromo and Amara
Regions of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Second and most importantly; the
article has a sincere nationalist tone—a tone immersed in fervor to protect
Ethiopia from perceived or real national security threats. Highlighting this very point is a report by Global Research, dated November 18,
2015, which argues that the recent military activities of the Gulf Co-operation
Council (GCC) is not only about Yemen but it is also as much about Ethiopia as
well.[2] Third; the article uses the said
looming national security threat as a diagnosis—to prescribe a
thought-provoking military action against Eritrea—in the form of subjugating Assab. It does this
by taking a bipartisan stance that goes beyond political bickering. In other words, the article is mainly about
the looming national security concerns, directed at Ethiopia under the context
of, what a realist calls, the anarchic international political system. It appears that Haile wrote the article to initiate a dialogue and/or a debate
at the think tank level and, to help Ethiopia formulate a new foreign policy
that he proposes is necessary. I
vehemently disagree with his latter proposition. I have no serious disagreement on the evidence the
author uses to formulate his argument, but I vehemently disagree with the
theoretical tool he employs to reach his though-provoking
conclusion of subjugating Assab from Eritrea. Haile is suggesting
a forceful annexation of Assab, by tacitly
classifying Ethiopia as a rising power
and, after being informed by Mearsheimer’s
offensive realist theory that he cites in his piece. And according to Mearsheimer,
“…given the difficulty of determining
how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that
the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus
eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a
misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon
in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive.”[3] And this is
pretty much what Haile had in mind when he boldly
suggested that Ethiopia better subjugate Assab from
Eritrea now. Because, not to do so makes
Ethiopia “…a misguided state [that] would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had
sufficient power to survive.” I
should note here that this theory lacks the empirical data and the ability to
predict whether a war is to unfold, except to suggest that it should if a state
is not misguided “…to pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon.” And according to Pashakhanlou,
such theorizing is flawed since it cannot "…generate the vicious and dangerous
world it presupposes on basis of its underlying assumptions, fear or the
security dilemma…”[4] Furthermore, Mearsheimer’s theory of
international relation fails to take domestic politics into consideration. That is, no attention is given to the
internal political, economic, and social dynamics that play a role in the
decision making process and that which in turn dictates as to how the state
behaves in an international setting.[5]
Moreover, as Snyder argues, the utmost
emphasis given to security by Mearsheimer willfully
ignores non-security interests of the state such as ideology, national
unification, and human rights as an essential aspect of international politics
alongside power competition.[6]
Additionally, Toft asserts that Mearsheimer’s
overemphasis
on military capabilities and issuing state capacity for territorial conquest
"implies a risk that his analyses miss a host of other ways of gaining and
exercising influence."[7]
Similarly, political scientists whose primary focus is bargaining models of
international conflict note that offensive realism ignores the fact that war is
costly.[8] And
much
like the theory of offensive realism that willfully ignores the cost of war, Haile’s article, in a similar fashion, ignores to consider
and discuss the validity or lack thereof of any other contending worldview of
international relations—including liberalism—the archrival worldview of
realism. And by extension, it fails to
show the validity of its own worldview relative to others and especially to
liberalism. That said about offensive realism, some aspects of
the theory of realism are not necessarily weak, especially at a time when a
thought-provoking leaderless world appears to have emerged. This is to say that it is now time for one
worldview of international relations, realism, to meet again the real world
that it has foreboded millenniums back.
And the more so prevalent worldview of liberalism will have to succumb
to what the hard realities of the world are unfolding to be the case—realpolitik. Some points among many illuminating this very point
and informing part of the author’s realist perspective are: ·
The recent and
projected military activities of the Gulf Co-operation Council in Yemen and the
Horn of Africa. ·
A middle east
riddled with violence of proxy wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen that radiates
across the globe. ·
A Sunni/Shia divide that terminally is tearing the social, economic
and political fabric of the Arab and Non-Arab world. ·
A possible
Israeli military strike against Iran and the implications thereafter. ·
The
international entanglement with North Korea and Iran over issues of nuclear
proliferation. ·
The threat posed
by a quasi-state actor named ISIS and many other non-state actors. ·
The daunting
political friction of EU. ·
A possible
large-scale attack on U.S. homeland and/or its ally and the implication thereafter,
especially considering the military actions taken by the U.S. after 9/11. ·
A likely international
financial meltdown. ·
Weaponization
of finance by the U.S. to impact world trade in ways fitting to its own
political and economic ideology. ·
A cyberattack on critical infrastructures of developed and
developing countries. ·
China’s economic
slowdown and a possible armed confrontation in South China Sea (the South China
Sea is one of the busiest shipping routes in the world and it’s believed to
have major untapped natural energy deposits). ·
Russia’s
military assertiveness for the right or wrong reasons. ·
NATO’s
insatiable want to form a building block of allied nations in key geopolitical
areas for better or worse. ·
Global environmental
degradation that may extinct the human race if the recent and future
non-binding international environmental agreements fail to materialize. Imagine all the above mentioned
countries going to war to solve these aforementioned international problems and
ask yourself the consequences that a country will be left with in the
aftermath. Imagine Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Japan, and the U.S. making a war of
choice to quell a real and/or perceived threat posed by China’s reported
expansion in China Sea. Imagine Russia
doing a war of choice against Ukraine, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, and another twenty-three countries including U.S., to quell the real
and/or perceived threat posed by NATO’s expansion. And finally, imagine Ethiopia, a country
known for its tenacity to stay sovereign not only by defending itself but also
by not violating the sovereignty of other countries—doing a war of choice. Ethiopia almost never had a war
of choice but a war of necessity. Those who
chose to violate the sovereignty of Ethiopia have learned that the only outcome
of choosing to engage Ethiopia in a war of their own choice is their own
inevitable defeat. And those who advise
Ethiopia to go to a war of choice fail miserably to understand the validity of
Ethiopia’s long-lived foreign policy, whose doctrine is primarily premised on
co-operation but not on the might of its defense forces. And what is suggested by Haile
in his article not only misses this very point but compares the incomparable—a “war
of choice” by nuclear arsenal brandishing country, with a war of choice of a
country whose only peerless deadly arsenal to date is a very hard work pointed
at defeating poverty. International conflicts don’t
necessarily require war; they’re more likely to require co-operative actions of
mending fences. Co-operative actions and
wars unfortunately are coiled by nature.
And by extension, the coiled actions of states and non-state actors
don’t lend themselves to a meaningful analysis—only based on a singular worldview
of international relations. Hence, analyzing
the actions of state and non-state actors requires the application of more than
one contending worldview. This approach
in turn leads us to identify the more so valid theoretical worldview of
international relations. However, validity of a worldview of international
relations is contingent on empirically proven political and economic findings
that our world is manifesting. For
example, a political turmoil, followed by economic meltdown or vice versa and,
a war of necessity and/or a war of choice may appear to suit one worldview of
international relations (realism) to claim validity over another (liberalism). Similarly, co-operation, peace, and
sustainable development that radiate across national boundaries may appear to
suit another worldview of international relations (liberalism) under the
expense of some other (realism). That being the case and the
nature of what we call appearance being relative at times, I contend that our
world appears to lend itself to a less than complete analysis, by fluctuating
between three worldviews of international relations; liberalism, realism and
world-systems theory. The time lapse of
fluctuation may be longer for one and hence shorter for the others. For this reason, one may see the
international system as a dynamic pendulum of time—switching from sunset to
sunrise and vice versa. And today, for
example, the sun has set for the world of liberalism while it has risen for the
world of realism more so than the world-systems theory. It is daylight so to speak and, one appears
to see the world more clearly today—in light of realism but not liberalism. And by extension, Haile
sees the world as it appears and to an extent as any realist does—with the help
of a theoretical binocular of international relations that highlights the bad
and that which very much darkens the good in all human beings. As far as we Ethiopians are
concerned, we should at all times highlight the good about Ethiopia and any
other country in our world. But we
should do so not under the expense of setting aside the real and impending
national security threat that our country is facing. And as far as I am
concerned, the real and impending national security threat that we should be
highly concerned with today has been brought forth by the unmitigated
corruption of our own making. The
corrupt men and women who join the front not so much for the love of their
people and country but for their own calculated interest, have been vitiating
the planned objectives of EPRDF. And, if
these men and women aren’t dealt with resolute form of legal seriousness, they
may end up hurting our people and country more so than an entire Eritrean army
alongside the Gulf Co-operation Council can.
The crimes that these men and women are committing are convoluted for
they are shielded by many layers of organizational and some other formal
covers. Less of a resolute, tangible and
transparent action by the EPRDF lead government to uncover the shields that
these criminals are using, corruption in our country will be braided into a
crushing chain of economic, political and social disaster. Today, no threat is as impending as
corruption is for Ethiopia. And
overcoming this very threat is what disempowers those
state and non-state actors who wish Ethiopia ill. Therefore, no offensive realism is needed to
quell Eritrea’s threat to ascertain Ethiopia’s
survival. But the need to deal with
corruption resolutely in a transparent manner is. |
[2] Visit http://www.globalresearch.ca/saudi-arabia-and-the-gcc-are-expanding-to-eritrea-geopolitical-implications-for-ethiopia/5489868
[3] Mearsheimer, John (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton. p. 35. ISBN 0-393-02025-8
[4] Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, “Back to the Drawing Board: A Critique of
Offensive Realism”, International Relations 27: 202 (2013): 209-210.
[5]David C. Hendrickson, “The Lion and the Lamb: Realism and Liberalism Reconsidered”, World
Policy Journal 20:1 (2003): 97; Snyder, Mearsheimer’s
World, 172.
[6] See Snyder, Mearsheimer’s World, 171-172
[7] See Toft, John J. Mearsheimer,
384.
[8] On Bargaining Theory see David A. Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing
Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War,” International Security 35:3
(2010/11): 15.