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A
historic step as Somalia’s TFG expands to incorporate Ahlu Sunna
wal Jama’a
On Monday
this week, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ahlu
Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ) officially signed an agreement allowing
for the integration of their administrations and security forces
on the basis of the Transitional Federal Charter and the
Djibouti Agreement. The agreement commits both parties to bring
on board all Somalis who are prepared to renounce violence; to
pool their resources to fight the common enemy: extremism and
terrorism in Somalia; and it provides ASWJ with a significant
presence in government: including several ministers and
assistant ministers, and a number of posts in the administration
and the diplomatic service as well as the deputy commanders of
the armed forces, the police and security. ASWJ forces will be
placed under overall command of the TFG. The agreement will be
implemented in 30 days after the official signing at the
headquarters of the African Union in the presence of numerous
representatives of the international community. Already the two
sides have established a joint committee of nine representatives
each, holding the first meeting on Wednesday. ASWJ high level
representatives will travel to Mogadishu from central Somalia on
26th March to begin the implementation process.
Following the signing by TFG Deputy Prime Minister, Sharif
Hassan Sheikh Aden, and Sheikh Mohamed Yusuf Heefow, Chairman of
ASWJ’s Executive Committee, the Prime Minister of the TFG,
Abdurashid Ali Omar Sharmarke and the Spiritual Leader of ASWJ,
Sheikh Mahmoud Sheikh Hassan expressed their commitment to the
implementation of the agreement and to intensify the struggle
against internal and external extremist elements in Somalia.
They emphasized that the agreement provided the opportunity to
deal with the Al-Shabaab/Hizbul Islam extremist coalition but
fulfillment of the agreement did depend upon quick and
meaningful support from the international community and the
provision of necessary resources from international partners.
The official
signing of this agreement can be seen as the most significant
move since the Djibouti Agreement, signed in August 2008, which
led to the creation of the present TFG, but there was widespread
agreement on the need for prompt and meaningful support from the
international community. The African Union Commissioner for
Peace and Security, Commissioner Lamamra, told representatives
from the African Union, the Ethiopian Government, the United
Nations, the League of Arab States, IGAD and the International
Partners Forum (IPF) that the agreement would consolidate the
Djibouti Peace process. It demonstrated the support of the
international community to Somalia and should encourage other
forces to join the TFG and form a strong coalition against
extremists. Foreign Minister Seyoum emphasized that the
agreement commits both parties to reach out to all Somalis who
are prepared to renounce violence, support the Djibouti process,
and make the Transitional Government more inclusive, allowing
for the mobilization of the people of Somalia throughout the
country and in the Diaspora to fight for the reconstitution of
the Somali nation. Minister Seyoum said the two parties had
agreed the Transitional Federal Charter and the Djibouti
Agreement would be the basis for establishing a new political
framework. They had come to a full understanding of the need to
preserve and promote traditional Islamic practice and the shared
values of the people of Somalia, and to combat foreign
ideologies that pose a threat to Somalia and to the region. The
Minister noted that the integration of ASWJ into all aspects of
the structure of the TFG would create a formidable synergy and
provide for the sort of effective unity that would make it
possible for the TFG to make real headway in keeping extremists
at bay. In the past, a lack of co-operation among groups
committed to peace had meant little progress had been possible.
Now this genuine coming-together of the two parties was a major
breakthrough for laying the foundation for durable and
sustainable peace in Somalia. The implication was momentous for
the region and for the peace and stability of Africa. The
Minister also noted that it would be naive if we believed the
Agreement on its own would bring about a miracle in Somalia, but
it did allow for the forces of peace and sanity to utilize the
opportunities available to move towards peace and stability.
Equally, even though the extremist forces were without popular
support, they did not lack outside assistance, and it was
critical that everyone should redouble their efforts to support
the TFG and the integration of ASWJ into the structures of the
government. Minister Seyoum said it was now the turn of the
international community to do what is expected of it. Time was
of the essence here. There was need for action now. The
situation had changed in Somalia, and the international
community must encourage this emerging development both
politically and in other ways to put the TFG in a position to
defeat extremism, fanaticism and the external agenda imposed on
the people of Somalia.
The UN
Secretary-General Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Charles
Petrie, thanked the signatories, the Government of Ethiopia, the
IGAD and the IPF, for making possible this consolidation of the
Djibouti Peace process. The signing and its implementation
demonstrated there was a government in Somalia committed to
reach out to all those interested in peace. He expressed the
readiness of the UN to continue to face the challenges in
Somalia. Ambassador Stephano Dejak, the Italian special envoy to
Somalia representing the IPF, called the agreement historic, a
defining element in the transitional period marked by
reconciliation; it marked consolidation of the fight against the
barbaric acts of terrorists. The IPF, he said, applauded the
agreement and would support a new start to strengthen the TFG.
The Special Envoy of the League of Arab States, Ambassador Salim
Al Qusaibi, called the agreement a new chapter. He said it was
an opportunity not to be missed. The TFG and ASWJ should not be
left alone to implement the agreement on their own and he urged
the international community to act now. He appealed to Al-Shabaab
to abandon its terrorist acts and follow the path of ASWJ. The
Hon. Arap Kirwa, IGAD Facilitator for the Peace Process to
Somalia, said the crisis in Somalia was a global challenge not
confined to Somalis. It had been marked by a lack of commitment
and resolution but the agreement meant things were changing.
Joint action by internal and external actors was essential and
the international community must now work on the basis of a
shared vision for Somalia. The
Chairperson of the AU, Dr. Jean Ping, took the opportunity to
confirm the support of the AU and encourage other forces in
Somalia to follow this example. This agreement consolidates the
Djibouti process and provides a basis for other Somali forces to
broaden the TFG even further. It provides a real basis for the
restoration of peace and stability in the region, and the
international community must provide the necessary resources and
assistance to help implement the agreement quickly.
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The UN
Monitoring Group Report – plenty of evidence for sanctions
Substantial
publicity has already been given to the latest Report of the
Monitoring Group on Somalia which was forwarded to the UN
Security Council this week by the UN Sanctions Committee in
accordance with resolutions dealing with Somalia and Eritrea.
Much of the media comment on the report has emphasized the
continuing weaknesses of the TFG, the obstruction of
humanitarian assistance to Somalia and piracy. Surprisingly,
less emphasis has been given to the details of Eritrean support
to armed opposition groups in Somalia. It might be noted that
the Eritrean Government, while insisting in several letters that
it was always prepared to meet the Monitoring Group, managed to
find a variety of excuses in refusing multiple requests from the
Group to visit Eritrea throughout the year. The exchange of
letters is provided in an annex.
In fact, the
Report makes it clear that the Government of Eritrea has
continued to provide “assistance to armed opposition groups in
Somalia” in violation of Resolution 1844 (2008). It notes that
the Government of Eritrea has consistently opposed the Djibouti
Agreement of August 2008 and denied the legality and legitimacy
of the TFG, also calling for the expulsion of AMISOM from
Mogadishu: “In support of this policy, the Government of Eritrea
has provided significant and sustained political, financial and
material support, including arms and ammunition, and training to
armed opposition groups in Somalia since at least 2007.” The
Eritrean Government now claims it doesn’t support one party
against another in Somalia, but as the Monitoring Group points
out, this flatly contradicts a whole series of Government
statements (and interviews by President Isaias) over the last
year, portraying the TFG as “illegal, illegitimate and
externally imposed.” The Government of Eritrea has even
described its support for armed opposition groups, including Al-Shabaab
and Hizbul Islam, as “a legal right and a moral obligation”.
The Report
details Eritrean sponsorship of the opposition Alliance for the
Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) in 2007, providing delegates with
money and accommodation. It specifies the role played by
Eritrea’s Minister of Information, Ali Abdu, the head of the
party’s political affairs office, Yemane Ghebreab, and by
Colonel Te’ame Goitom 'Makelle' of Eritrean intelligence, in
making ARS appointments. The senior military commander for ARS
was apparently appointed on the direct “instructions issued by
the Government of Eritrea.” Eritrea also provided passports to
ARS leaders and to “at least one senior Al-Shabaab leader,
Mukhtar Roobow.” After the ARS split and a new TFG
administration under President Sheikh Sharif was set up in
Mogadishu, Eritrea facilitated the creation of Hizbul Islam
headed by Sheikh Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’. The Report, detailing the
evidence that the Government of Eritrea still tries to deny,
notes Sheikh ‘Aweys’ on April 23rd flew from Asmara
to K50 airfield outside Mogadishu. It provides the times and
flight details, and adds that this demonstrated “Eritrea’s
direct and overt support for [‘Aweys’] return and subsequent
reinvigoration of Hizbul Islam in preparation for its offensive
of May 2009” against the TFG in collaboration with Al-Shabaab.
Two plane loads of arms arrived three weeks later.
The Report
does suggest that by late 2009, “possibly in response to
international pressure” including of course the imposition of UN
Resolution 1907, that the scale and nature of Eritrean support
to armed opposition groups in Somalia may have diminished or
become less visible, but it also makes quite clear that such
assistance had certainly not ceased. Eritrea is still a major
supplier of weapons. Much of Al-Shabaab’s weapons come through
the port of Kismayo, or via beach ports between Kismayo and
Merca, or between El Maan and Hobyo north of Mogadishu. Supplies
also come through the airfields of Balidogle and Daynille. In
October last year for the first time the Soviet-made Saxhorn
anti-tank weapon was used against AMISOM forces. Early last
year, the Somaliland authorities recovered ten SA-7b missile
launchers from an arms dealer from a consignment of 18 delivered
by air from Eritrea to Guri’eel in central Somalia. The
remaining eight missiles went to Al-Shabaab. A piratical warlord
in eastern Sanaag region, and using the port of Las Qorey, is
identified as importing weapons from Yemen and receiving
consignments from Eritrea, including 120mm mortars. Some of
these were transferred to southern Somalia and to Al-Shabaab. In
May last year there were reports of Ukranian small arms and
anti-tank weapons arriving in Kismayo for Hizbul Islam. The
Report, however, said it was unable to confirm that material
used for the suicide bomb which killed a TFG minister and a
former ambassador of Somalia to Ethiopia in June last year, had
been supplied by Eritrea.
In addition
to weapons supplied, the Report detailed the training facilities
provided to armed Somali opposition groups since at least 2006,
and adds that Eritrea had also deployed trainers or military
advisers inside Somalia. Originally, the main training center
was at Assab, but after May 2008, two thirds of the training was
moved to a camp near Tessenai in western Eritrea.
The other
main area of Eritrean support identified by the Report was
financial: “In addition to military support the Government of
Eritrea has consistently provided financial support to Somali
armed opposition groups, including ARS-Asmara, Hizbul Islam and
Al-Shabaab”, noting that the provision of cash allowed these
groups to purchase arms. The money was provided directly to ARS-Asmara,
the Ras Kamboni militia (a part of Hizbul Islam), to Al-Shabaab
and to Hizbul Islam, apparently at a rate of between $40,000 to
60,000 a month, with extra payment for specific operations. Some
of the funding also went direct to individuals including last
year to Mukhtar Roobow of Al Shabaab. These cash transfers are
normally done through Eritrean diplomats and intelligence
officers directly to representatives of the groups outside
Somalia, though in July last year, a German national, acting as
a cash courier for the Government of Eritrea, was arrested at
Mogadishu airport. Payments are also sometimes made via Hawala
banking to Somali businessmen and then handed on. In September
2008, an Eritrean government official crossed the border from
Kenya into Lower Juba region to deliver $60,000 to a senior
member of the Ras Kamboni militia which is headed by Sheikh
Hassan Abdullahi Hirsi ‘Al-Turki’. The Report estimates that as
much as $1.6 million may have passed through the Eritrean
embassy in Kenya en route to armed opposition groups in 2008, in
addition to the funds provided through the embassies in Djibouti
and Dubai. In April 2009 when Sheikh ‘Aweys’ left Asmara he had
been given $200,000 to be distributed among Hizbul Islam
leaders.
Given this
detail, it can hardly be a surprise that the first of the
Monitoring Group Report’s recommendations is that the Sanctions
Committee “should proceed without further delay to designate
individuals and entities proposed by the Monitoring Group or
Member States for target measures under Security Council
resolution 1844 (2008) and/or resolution 1907 (2009)”.
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Sanctions cover destabilization efforts against Ethiopia as well
as Somalia and Djibouti
Eritrea’s
activities in Somalia are not the only reason for the
implementation of sanctions under Resolution 1907. Indeed, the
scope of Resolution 1907 appears to be rather larger than
Eritrea has yet allowed itself to realize. It may be that
Eritrea is being more cautious about open support for Al-Shabaab;
it certainly hasn’t yet begun to minimize its support for armed
opposition movements elsewhere in the region even though this is
very clearly prohibited under Resolution 1907. As we have noted
before, the Resolution covers Eritrea’s refusal to co-operate
with earlier resolutions over Djibouti, but in addition, as the
Monitoring Group also underlines, it bans Eritrean support to
other non-Somali armed groups operating in the region.
The Monitoring Group (paragraph 56) notes that “[it] is aware
of past Eritrean support to non-Somali armed opposition groups
in the Horn of Africa, including (but not limited to) the Oromo
Liberation Front, the Ogaden National Liberation Front and the
United Western Somali Liberation Front. Under the provisions
of resolution 1907 (2009), paragraphs 15 (b) and (d), such
activities are now prohibited.” The Monitoring Group
also notes (paragraph 69) that “Eritrea also maintains
training camps for members of Ethiopian opposition groups, which
is prohibited by resolution 1907 (2009).” It is
perhaps worth quoting the relevant passages from Resolution 1907
which do specifically widen the imposition of sanctions to
individuals “including but not limited to the Eritrean political
and military leadership, governmental, and parastatal entities,
and entities privately owned by Eritrean nationals living inside
or outside of Eritrean territory”(paragraph 15) and then
specifies (15 (b) that this covers those “providing
support from Eritrea to armed opposition groups which aim to
destabilize the region”; and in 15 (d) includes those
“harbouring, financing, facilitating, supporting, organizing,
training , or inciting individuals or groups to perpetrate
acts of violence or terrorist acts against other States or their
citizens in the region.” Resolution 1907 (2009)
is quite clear and is summed up in paragraph 16 demanding that
Eritrea, in particular, “cease[s] arming,
training, and equipping armed groups and their members including
Al-Shabaab, that aim to destabilize the region or incite
violence and civil strife in Djibouti.”
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Eritrea’s diplomatic twists and turns
Since the
imposition of sanctions in UN Security Council Resolution 1907
(2009), the Government in Asmara has been trying to use every
trick it can to minimize the impact. The sanctions were imposed
because of Eritrea’s acts of destabilization in the region, its
invasion of Djibouti, its military support for extremist
opposition in Somalia, and, as frequently forgotten, for
supporting armed opposition movements throughout the region. The
Government has made no effort to address the concerns of the
Security Council but has preferred to engage in a series of
obfuscations to try to distract the attention of the
international community from the real issues. The demonstrations
that President Isaias’ supporters in the Diaspora staged in a
number of Western cities last month had nothing to do with the
demands made by the Security Council. They were no more than a
forum where loyal cadres and indeed coerced demonstrators
attacked the international community for daring to try to call a
halt to Eritrea’s unbridled adventurism.
It would be
the easiest thing for the regime to stop its support for Al-Shabaab,
withdraw its forces from sovereign Djibouti territory, and end
its backing for armed opposition movements in Ethiopia.
President Isaias will have none of it. As he made clear in his
recent interview with Al Jazeera, if the world unanimously
believes Eritrea to be in the wrong, that is the world’s
problem, not his. In fact, the Government is doing more than
issuing denials or organizing “spontaneous” demonstrations. But
there is more to what the regime in Asmara is doing than flat
out denial or staging demonstration in Geneva or San Francisco.
There appears to be a newfound passion for diplomacy, something
of a surprise given the record of President Isaias who normally
shuns all forms of diplomatic nicety. Diplomacy has never
appeared to interest him. Equally, Eritrea’s leaders often
display an extraordinary capacity to take up diametrically
opposed positions from week to week, even at the same time. The
capacity to combine isolationism, or supposed self-reliance with
dependence, without any sense of contradiction, has little
parallel. During the Eritrea-Ethiopian war of 1998-2000
Eritrea’s leaders moved from a position of extraordinary
arrogance to one of extraordinary sensitivity within a matter of
days, even hours.
Since the UN Monitoring Group submitted its report last week,
providing the evidence for the imposition of sanctions,
Eritrea’s diplomats have been grovelingly polite to numerous
African states, appealing to their ‘African Big Brothers’.
Pretending to forget that the call for sanctions was unanimously
passed by the African Union, Eritrea’s officials are now
scouring all corners of Africa in search of a country which they
can hoodwink into believing that Eritrea is the victim not the
culprit. This is unlikely to get much credibility with African
states most of which have all-too-often been at the receiving
end of fulminations by President Isaias for failing to agree
with him. Eritrea’s ambassador to the EU, using a semantic
sleight of hand, has tried to claim that the Monitoring Group’s
report about Eritrea’s ‘diminishing military support’ to Somali
extremists vindicates Eritrea’s claim to innocence. This didn’t
prevent Eritrea’s foreign ministry from producing its usual
violent diatribe and invective against the Monitoring Group,
denouncing the Report’s assertion of Eritrea’s continued support
for Somali extremists. Contradictory though the statements are,
both are part of a campaign to try to find some semblance of
support from anywhere at all to water down the united position
that the international community has taken against Eritrea’s
acts of destabilization and the view of Eritrea as a rogue
state. It is not, perhaps, surprising that Eritrea’s diplomacy
demonstrates no sense of shame. It is also symptomatic of the
arrogance of its leadership that it still believes that it will
be able to get away with its wrongdoing by playing one power
against another. That is no more than contempt for the ordinary
notions of civilized behavior and inter-state relations.
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The
African Union Peace and Security Council imposes sanctions on
Madagascar
A year ago,
on March 20th, 2009, the AU Peace and Security
Council suspended Madagascar from participating in the
activities of the AU until the restoration of constitutional
order in the country. This followed the unconstitutional
resignation of President Marc Ravalomanana under pressure from
the civilian opposition and the armed forces, and a transfer of
power to Mr. Andry Rajoelina. A whole series of efforts were
made by the AU and SADC and mediators with the support of
international partners to restore constitutional order in the
country. Under the mediation of President Chissano, agreement
was reached between the four concerned political movements at
Maputo on a Charter of the Transition, not to exceed 15 months,
and the formation of a Government of National Unity. However,
contrary to the Agreement the de facto authorities led by Mr.
Andry Rajoelina unilaterally decided, on 8th
September last year, to form their own "Government of National
Unity" without the participation of the other three movements
who were signatories to the Maputo Agreement.
The AU Peace
and Security Council noted with serious concern the unilateral
measures taken by the de facto authorities born out of the
unconstitutional change of government. On 19 February, at its
216th meeting, the Council decided that if by 16th
March the de facto authorities did not comply with full and
timely implementation of the Maputo Agreements and the Addis
Ababa Additional Act, sanctions would be applied, starting on 17th
March. The Council convened again on March 17th and
reviewed developments and the efforts made to return Madagascar
to constitutional order. Following its deliberations, and taking
into account the failure of the de facto authorities to comply
with previous decisions, the Council decided that the sanctions
listed in its communiqué of 19th February should
enter into force from 17th March. The targeted
sanctions include a travel ban, the freezing of funds and
diplomatic isolation for the de facto authorities. The Peace and
Security Council also requested the Chairperson of the AU
Commission in collaboration with the Executive Secretary of SADC,
the Head of the SADC mediation committee and the International
Contact Group on Madagascar to monitor and ensure implementation
of this decision and to continue to work for the return of
constitutional order in Madagascar.
It is to be
recalled that over the last few months Africa has witnessed a
series of coups. This should be seen as a threat to the peace,
security and stability of Africa and to the continued
democratization of the continent.
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Promoting and Protecting Human Rights in Ethiopia– a National
Action Plan
“Devising a
Road Map for the Development of a National Action Plan for the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in Ethiopia” was the
title of a national consultative workshop held in Addis Ababa on
Monday this week to reinforce government initiatives for
promotion and protection of human rights. The workshop was
organized by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission in
collaboration with the East Africa Office of the United Nations
Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights. Opened by Mrs.
Shetaye Minale, Deputy Speaker of the House of People’s
Representatives, it drew participants from federal ministries
and the judiciary, parliamentarians, and federal agencies and
national institutions, representatives from National Regional
Governments, civil society organizations, academia, UN Agencies,
development partners and the media. The aim was to sensitize all
stakeholders to the need to develop a National Human Rights
Action Plan and adopt a roadmap to implement it.
Ambassador
Tiruneh Zena, newly appointed Chief Commissioner of the
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, reflected on the importance
of analyzing existing mechanisms for the protection and
promotion of human rights as well as devising a road map to
develop a national action plan. Mr. Minelik Alemu, Director
General for International Law and Consular Affairs at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, detailed the successful cooperation
between the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the East
African Office of the United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights in enabling Ethiopia to submit all
its overdue reports to UN treaty bodies and the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights as well as the Universal
Periodic Report submitted to the UN Human Rights Council. Mr.
Ferej Fenniche, the outgoing East African representative of the
office of the UN Commissioner for Human Rights agreed the need
to develop a national action plan. He took the opportunity to
emphasize the cooperation he had received from the Government
and various stakeholders during his time in Ethiopia. Background
documents presented to the workshop included studies by experts
on “The Development and Implementation of a National Human
Rights Action Plan” and “The Human Rights Situation in Ethiopia:
Challenges and Priorities for the protection and promotion of
Human Rights”. The workshop adopted a number of recommendations
including proposals for the Ethiopian Government to consider and
initiate a formal process to develop and adopt a National Human
Rights Action Plan and the establishment of a permanent body to
develop this Action Plan.
The National
Action Plan will involve the coordination of various Government
institutions including the Human Rights Commission and the
Institution of the Ombudsman as well as civil society
organizations and other stakeholders to ensure that human rights
are effectively protected and respected. The plan will guarantee
wider participation from different sectors of society to assist
in the protection and respect of human rights. It will help to
enhance the capacity of national human rights bodies, and
provide a platform to evaluate progress as well as take concrete
measures to guarantee compliance with the country’s
international obligations. It will provide the basis for
dissemination of information about human rights throughout the
country and encourage human rights activity. The plan will allow
for continuous training for law enforcement agencies including
police, security forces and prison officials. It will also
involve programs designed to address the human rights needs of
specific sections of society including children, women, persons
with disability, minorities and other dispossessed or
marginalized groups.
Overall, the
National Action Plan will provide a framework for regular
monitoring of the observance of human rights in Ethiopia. It
will be a challenging exercise. Under the Constitution all
Federal and State legislative, executive and judicial organs, at
all levels, currently have the responsibility and duty to
respect and enforce the provisions of the Constitution on
fundamental rights and freedoms. It is incumbent on these bodies
to include the steps taken to comply with this constitutional
obligation in their implementation reports. The relevant Federal
Government organs routinely comply with this requirement in the
periodic reports they submit to the House of People’s
Representatives. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, of
course, has a particular duty in this regard. At the same time,
all of these reports cover the specific activities, areas and
aims of these different bodies. There is an obvious advantage in
having a streamlined national framework for monitoring respect
for human rights, taking proactive or corrective measures where
necessary, and providing a more informed global assessment of
the human rights situation in the country.
Such a
nationally owned and comprehensive process would also provide a
more accurate account of human rights in Ethiopia than that
given by the recurrent and very negative reporting to be found
in the US State Department Annual Reports or from groups like
Human Rights Watch which never seem to bother to read any of the
reports produced by the Federal and State bodies. An overall
report on human rights in Ethiopia, objective and factual,
detailing all the challenges, opportunities and progress made,
would certainly provide a more accurate picture than the present
usual compilations of unsubstantiated allegations intended to
find fault rather than encourage the further improvement of
human rights. It will be of immense value for Ethiopia to
prepare the ground rapidly for this National Action Plan for
Human Rights in close collaboration with all national
stakeholders and with the necessary technical assistance from
development partners.
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Eritrea
at the UN Human Rights Council
The 13th
Ordinary Session of the UN Human Rights Council, in its meeting
held on March 17th, considered and adopted the report
assessing human rights in Eritrea undertaken by the 6th
session of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review.
The Council will be considering the report on Ethiopia’s UPR
evaluation today. The report, which incorporated questions and
recommendations raised during the Working Group by member and
observer states, exposed numerous violations of human rights in
Eritrea. The Eritrean Government was expected to respond. It
didn’t. Eritrea not only played its usual game of denial; it
also rejected the majority of the recommendations submitted. A
number of states expressed their deep concern over Eritrea’s
failure to reply to the numerous questions raised and the
recommendations made.
Stakeholders
in the Council highlighted Eritrea’s failure to accept many of
the recommendations made during the UPR, underlining the plight
of Eritrean journalists in prison, severely criticizing forced
conscription of youth and the harsh treatment of those who tried
to evade the national draft, exposing the use of torture against
dissidents and critics of the regime, and expressing alarm at
the proliferation of training camps within Eritrea being used
for the training of armed opposition groups throughout the Horn
of Africa. They called on the Council to condemn these
violations.
The Eritrean
delegates not only denied all the charges, they tried to claim
that “Ethiopia’s illegal occupation of Eritrea’s territory” was
the major cause of Eritrea’s failure to implement human rights
in the country. The Ethiopian delegation, exercising its right
of reply, interrupted the statement of the Eritrean delegation
to put on record that Eritrea’s allegations on the border issue
were outside the Council’s agenda. Eritrea’s response to the UPR
process once again exposed its total disregard for accepted
international mechanisms for dialogue and multilateral
engagement on human rights and other issues.
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Ensuring the
integrity of the upcoming elections:
Eritrea
and destabilization
Democratization in Ethiopia has various dimensions. At one level
it is about ensuring the empowerment of the people, putting in
place political formulae to serve as a solid basis for a
national unity. The Constitution is an embodiment of the resolve
to enhance this objective on the basis of mutual benefit and
popular sovereignty, and the last 15 years have seen the
development of various institutions to ensure the fullest
possible participation of the peoples of Ethiopia in managing
their own affairs and cementing their unity while respecting
their diversity. The Constitution also envisages a government
that must remain focused on putting in place policies that will
realize these objectives while at the same time protecting the
Ethiopian state and its peoples from undue interference from
within or without. The pro-poor policies that have been
implemented and the consistent focus of the Government’s Foreign
and Security policy in the fight against poverty are a case in
point. Ethiopia has consistently worked towards good relations,
based on mutual interest and respect for international law, with
all its neighbours. The positive progress made in both respects
is a testament to the success of the democratization process.
Equally, the
process has not always been smooth. There have been challenges
from inside and outside. One such has come from the leadership
in Asmara, once in the form of naked aggression, and after that
failed in the form of attempts at destabilization using all
sorts of rejectionist elements willing to run Eritrea’s errands.
It’s been more than a decade now since President Isaias began to
focus on what now appears to be a life-long quest: wreaking
havoc in Ethiopia through any means. Long detached from its
social base, the preservation of the leadership of the Peoples
Front for Democracy and Justice has become an end in itself,
perpetuation of President Isaias’ Eritrea. And this, according
to PFDJ logic, can only be assured by bringing about collapse in
Ethiopia. Hardly a day passes without the PFDJ government
concocting one scheme after another intended to sabotage
Ethiopia’s peace and stability. President Isaias consistently
goes out of his way to welcome any and all parties prepared to
oppose the Ethiopian Government, no matter how disparate their
ideologies or their objectives.
The obsession
President Isaias appears to have with what he calls Ethiopia’s
worsening domestic political and economic situation is
extraordinary. He invariably describes it as a crisis that has
reached an irreversible stage. Indeed, according to him,
Ethiopia’s political, economic and military position long ago
reached boiling point and should be irreversibly descending into
chaos and disintegration. Eritrean propaganda describes the army
as in total disarray and on the verge of collapse; economic
hardships have become so harsh and disheartening that people
will be tearing each other apart out of sheer desperation; armed
movements of every type have been stepping up highly effective
anti-government campaigns everywhere; the violent demise of the
regime is all but imminent. Whether or not these allegations
have any reality on the ground doesn’t seem to bother the
government in Asmara very much. Eritrean leaders and their
flatterers, at home and abroad, continue to create a fictional
universe, an alternate reality based on the advertising
principle: repeat something over and over again, and you’ll end
up believing it. So Eritrea’s (official) media endlessly repeats
itself. And now Ethiopia’s elections provide Asmara with an easy
opportunity to encourage destabilization.
Indeed, the
government in Asmara has used every means imaginable to try to
create chaos in Ethiopia short of an all-out invasion. President
Isaias is too well aware of the consequences to try that again.
Nevertheless, the intensity of his resolve to achieve his aims
is nowhere more evident than in the curious mix of organizations
he has managed to bring together in his search for
anti-Ethiopian groups. They promote mutually exclusive political
platforms, some even arguing that Ethiopia should take back
Assab and re-acquire a coastline. Nothing seems to worry the
regime in Asmara as long as all of the groups have some quarrel
with the Ethiopian Government. In Eritrea’s campaign to sabotage
Ethiopia’s peace and stability as well as its economic progress,
a veritable alphabet soup of self-styled patriotic
organizations, fringe Diaspora elements, the much divided Oromo
Liberation Front, and the split Ogaden National Liberation
Front, as well as Ginbot 7 and others have made it all-too-clear
they are prepared to join any anti-Ethiopian government
bandwagon, whatever the stakes. The logic holding these strange
bedfellows together is no more than the fact that the PFDJ has
some use for them, whether planting bombs along a road,
attacking local officials or merely spreading anti-government
propaganda. It all helps Asmara’s aims; and they all get some
benefit from it.
However
bizarre this mix may be, they are linked by a common thread -
ill-will towards the incumbent Ethiopian Government. They
cheerfully take orders from Isaias to do his bidding. Despite
the support given by Asmara, none of these ‘Ethiopian’ groups
have the strength even to temporarily seize control of any
military post or village from government forces. They are no
more than a nuisance to the security of the country. President
Isaias has repeatedly urged these groups to unite. His deadline
for the many ‘Ethiopian’ organizations to form a united alliance
before December 2009 wasn’t met, but a new round of feverish
efforts has been going on to cobble up some semblance of unity
among this motley crew. In fact, they have little or no
semblance of any organizational structure either at home or
abroad. All they can manage is an occasional bomb here and
there, minor disturbances here, disturbances there. If one
attempt fails another follows. If one group is detained, another
is immediately dispatched. It is a cascade of efforts to sow the
seeds of violence. Despite his frustration at the complete
failure of many OLF and ONLF efforts at destruction, the
peaceful completion of another election is apparently too much
for President Isaias. He is unprepared to relax his efforts as
long as he has at his disposal such a collection of errand boys
satisfied to take his orders.
Eritrea’s
latest efforts are predicated on the assumption that there are
forces within and without Ethiopia - ostensibly Ethiopian -
willing to join hands in an anti-government campaign. The
leadership in Asmara is merely counting on the zero-sum politics
of many in the violent sections of the Ethiopian opposition to
achieve its own objectives at little or no cost to itself. While
the people and the security forces will certainly foil any of
the measures that President Isaias and these dubious allies may
concoct, we should remain vigilant to minimize any continuing
security threats, however small. Equally, we should work to make
certain the election is as successful as possible, to give the
lie to the aims and claims of Asmara and its renegade allies.
The most effective way, of course, will be to carry on with the
very processes that have elicited their anger in the first
place: democratization and economic development.
******
Talking of
interference in the electoral process, Ms. Ana Gomes has
reappeared, not unexpectedly. She was the highly controversial
head of the EU Electoral Observer Mission to Ethiopia in 2005
whose behavior and less than balanced relationship with
opposition leaders and parties led to a formal complaint by the
Government. Ms. Gomes has been active on a number of occasions
in recent years on behalf of violent opposition movements in the
Diaspora, particularly Ginbot 7. Now with the election coming up
she is looking for the limelight again. This week, as a European
Member of Parliament, she was hosting and opening a “hearing” on
“Human Rights and the Security Situation in the Ogaden”, in
collaboration with the Organization of Unrepresented Nations and
Peoples, a collaboration which, by definition, demonstrates Ms.
Gomes’ ignorance of the political situation in Ethiopia’s Somali
Regional State where Ogaden Somalis are represented and
participate in government. This week Ms. Gomes has been in
London where she addressed a meeting organized by Third World
Solidarity. It appears that Ms. Gomes and the Eritrean
Government have something of a common agenda. Whether they are
working together as some allege, is beside the point. Most of
those at the meeting were former Derg members or supporters
guilty of crimes against the people of Ethiopia. The organizers
claimed the meeting would be attended by MPs but none of those
listed actually attended. One person who did attend was a lady
who is persona non grata in Ethiopia because of the
dubious disposal of property from the Russian Embassy in
Ethiopia in the early nineties. In a few weeks time, in early
April, Ms. Gomes apparently plans to be in Washington to deliver
a “keynote speech” at an opposition organized conference on
Governance, Peace and Security and Development. No doubt Ms.
Gomes will also surface at other meetings before the election on
May 23rd. It would be difficult enough to accept this sort of
deliberate effort to interfere in the electoral process by an
outsider even if Ms. Gomes actually knew anything about the
reality of politics in Ethiopia. Ms. Gomes, however, does not as
she comprehensively demonstrated by her naïve, and frankly
stupid, performance as head of the EU Electoral Observation
Mission in 2005. Her recent efforts show she has not become any
more sensible, or knowledgeable.
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