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Kenya’s role in Somalia clarified as the
two Prime Ministers meet
Last weekend, Somalia’s
Prime Minister, Dr. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali led a TFG delegation to
Nairobi. Accompanying him were the Deputy Prime Minister and Defence
Minister, Hussein Arab Isse; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Industry and Commerce, Abdiwahab Ugas Khalif Ugas Hussein; the
Minister of Interior and National Security, Abdisamad Moalin Mohamud;
and the commander of TFG forces, General Abdukadir Dini. The
delegation met and held talks with Kenya’s Prime Minister Raila
Odinga, who was accompanied by the Minister of State for Defence,
Yusuf Haji; the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, Richard
Onyonka; the Chief of Defence Forces, General Julius Karangi, and
other officials including the Director-General of the National
Security Intelligence Service and the Police Commissioner.
The meeting was a follow
up to the deliberations agreed upon in Mogadishu on October 18th
as part of the creation of a Joint Mechanism to manage security
operations in Southern Somalia. It also followed the concerns
expressed last week by President Sheikh Sharif on the developments
following the start of Kenya’s security activities in pursuit of
Al-Shabaab.
The meeting agreed that
Kenya’s “security operation” inside Somalia was aimed at eliminating
the threat posed by Al-Shabaab to Kenya and it is based on the
legitimate right to self-determination under Article 51 of the UN
Charter. Al-Shabaab is a threat to both countries and must be fought
jointly with support from the international community. The current
operations are being led by the TFG forces with support of the
Kenyan Defence Forces and activities are being fully coordinated. A
joint high level committee has been established to maintain
continuous sharing of intelligence and information. A joint
diplomatic campaign is to be launched to galvanize international
support.
The two sides also
agreed on the need for the international community to assist in
providing immediate humanitarian assistance in liberated areas. As
most of the agencies are based in Nairobi this would be an area in
which Kenya could have considerable impact. The two sides agreed
that AMISOM troops should move into liberated areas to safeguard
peace and security and assist the establishment of local
administration under the guidance of the TFG, and called upon the
international community to support a blockade of Kismayo until
Al-Shabaab leaves the port. The TFG indicated that it was going to
ask assistance from the International Criminal Court to investigate
Al-Shabaab crimes against humanity. The agreement notes that the
Kenyan Government itself will not try to negotiate with Al-Shabaab,
but allows for the TFG to be free to negotiate with any armed
opposition groups within the framework of the Djibouti Peace Process
and the Kampala Accord.
As Kenyan and TFG
forces, including the Ras Kamboni and other pro-TFG militias,
continue their build-up in preparation for attacking Al-Shabaab
centers at Afmadow and Bardera, and their advance along the coast
towards Kismayo, the aim of the joint campaign is becoming clearer:
to remove Al-Shabaab from Middle and Lower Juba regions and drive it
from Kismayo. Once this is achieved, the combined forces will ask
AMISOM to take over control of Kismayo, underlining the prospect of
the Security Council to reconsider re-hatting AMISOM as a proper UN
peacekeeping force and upgrading its numbers to the required 20,000.
It would make obvious sense to hand matters over to the UN as soon
as AMISOM can provide some real degree of stabilization outside
Mogadishu. President Farole of Puntland recently suggested he would
like to see AMISOM in Garowe as well. Any expansion AMISOM
activities would also speed up the deployment of the promised
contingents from Djibouti and Sierra Leone to bring AMISOM close to
its mandated 12,000 strength.
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Somaliland’s President visits Addis
Ababa
Somaliland’s President
Ahmed Mohamed ‘Silanyo’ was in Addis Ababa this week en route to the
United Kingdom. He held talks with Prime Minister Meles on bilateral
and regional concerns on Monday. Discussions covered issues of peace
and security and the issue of piracy in the Indian Ocean. Prime
Minister Meles praised Somaliland’s commitment to fight piracy and
terrorism and said Ethiopia was determined to work with Somaliland
to ensure peace and stability in their border areas. President
Silanyo said Somaliland was working to enhance its relations with
Ethiopia which he described as “in good shape”. He also told
journalists after the meeting that his government had arrested
dozens of suspected pirates and terrorists. Indeed, according to
Somaliland’s Minister for Mining and Energy, Hussein Abdi Dualeh,
talking about Somaliland’s hydrocarbon potential at the Africa Oil
Week series of conferences in South Africa, there are over a hundred
pirates in Somaliland’s prisons.
Pirates, together with
drought, famine refugees, violence and terrorism, are the images
that spring to most people’s minds in considering the Horn of
Africa. But, as President Silanyo said in an article entitled “The
Other Horn of Africa” last month, “such perceptions are not only
tragically one-sided; they are short-sighted and dangerous.”
President Silanyo noted that behind the stock images of a region
trapped in chaos and despair, economies were growing; reform was
expanding and governance improving. He pointed out that Somaliland
had now had three consecutive fair, free and contested presidential
elections, and that Ethiopia had emerged as “one of the world’s
fastest growing economies, with GDP up 10.9% year on year in
2010-2011, rivalling China and leading Africa.” He also noted that
things were looking up in the wider region with South Sudan’s
independence through the ballot box, and Uganda’s oil and gas
discoveries would help to lift its economy. President Silanyo said
all this reflected the fact that the people of the region were no
longer willing to be passive victims of fate and a harsh
environment. They were determined to shape their destinies through
modernization, investment and improved governance. They were also
learning to cooperate and align their interests.
President Silanyo made
it clear that the region still needed to benefit from international
assistance. This might involve food and medicine for victims of
drought or famine, but more important in the longer-term were
pro-growth investments to provide jobs and products and resources
for the world. It was necessary to focus on promoting market
economies and stable government. In this respect, he underlined the
claims of Somaliland to international recognition. Somaliland was
certainly steadily deepening its democracy but despite this it was
getting only a fraction of the aid and development assistance of
Somalia because of the lack of recognition. He added that its
successful democratic experiment was being ignored because of an
outdated ruling about colonial boundaries – and President Silanyo
referred to the
2005 report by Patrick Mazimhaka, a former deputy chairman of the
African Union which cast serious doubt on the application of this
rule to Somaliland. He suggested three basic principles for allowing
a people be able to declare their independence and gain
international recognition: secession should not result from foreign
intervention, and the barriers for recognizing secession must be
high; independence should be recognized only if a clear majority
(well over 50%-plus-one of the voters) freely choose such an option
in an unbiased referendum; and that all minorities must be
guaranteed decent treatment. Somaliland, he said, fulfilled all
these as well as other criteria.
President Silanyo
emphasized that the national interest of most of the world’s powers
required a Somaliland that was prepared and able to provide security
along its borders and off shore. Somaliland was willing to do this,
he pointed out, but it needed “the tools and the international
recognition so that we can finish the job.”
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A Sudanese donation for Ethiopian
development
A high-level Ethiopian
delegation, led by the Minister of Water and Energy, Ato Alemayehu
Tegenu, was in Sudan last week. During a three day working visit,
the minister had an audience with President Omar Al Bashir and held
talks with Sudan’s Minister of Electricity and Dams, Osama Abdullah,
and visited the Meroe Dam as well as State and Atbara dams and the
Roseiris Dam on the Nile. President Omar Al Bashir stressed the
importance of co-ordination between Sudan and Ethiopia in order to
boost development and the minister’s visit was marked by Sudan’s
support for development efforts in Ethiopia with the donation of
about 170 million birr worth of machinery to assist hydropower
projects in Ethiopia. Minister Alemayheu welcomed the gift and said
Ethiopia was looking forward to launch regional cooperation serving
the interests of Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt. Sudan’s Minister of
Electricity and Dams welcomed the start of joint cooperation and
noted that the 100MW power network link between Ethiopia and Sudan
should be completed by the end of the year.
The visit of Minister
Alemayheu is an important step paving the way for the establishment
of a Tripartite Technical Committee to look into concerns over the
Grand Renaissance Dam on the Nile. The Committee will comprise
experts from Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan as well as others from well
known international institutions to evaluate the impact of the dam
whose construction has already started a few months ago. Egypt and
Ethiopia agreed in September to convene the committee.
Ethiopia has made clear from the start that the Renaissance Dam is
purely to generate electricity. It has also given its assurance that
the dam will not be used to irrigate agricultural land or be used
for projects that could cause any harm to the lower riparian
countries that share the Nile River. This visit and discussions
between the officials of the two countries as well as the commitment
of the government of Sudan to assist development projects underway
in Ethiopia underlines the maturity of the relationship. The
establishment of the Tripartite Committee will provide a clear
vision of the benefits of the dam. It will increase trust among the
states involved and contribute to understanding of the fundamental
principle of Ethiopia’s policy – mutual benefit for all the riparian
countries.
The relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan demonstrates a
significant degree of interdependence and could be seen as exemplary
for the Horn of Africa region and more widely. Understanding the
huge potential for joint natural resource management and
agricultural investment projects as well as for the free exchange of
goods and services along the more than thousand kilometre-long
border, both countries are steadily working to strengthen their
relationship to provide mutual benefit.
One aspect of this has been recognition of the indispensable role
that peace and security in the region has for harnessing the
potential of both states and in many different sectors. Ethiopia
strongly supports the need for peace in Sudan and following the
conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it intensified its
effort to maintain cordial relationships with both the Sudan and
South Sudan. This commitment has been manifested through the
deployment of a peace keeping force in the Abyei Region of Sudan.
The Government of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan signed the
Addis Ababa Agreement on Abyei, on June 20th. The main
objective of this was to ensure that the area should be free from
any military activity until properly demarcated, and it called for
the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission with troops
from Ethiopia, as a country trusted by both parties.
Ethiopia quickly started to deploy the peacekeeping force; this is
expected to reach its total of 4,500 troops shortly.
Ethiopia’s commitment to the peace, security and development of
Sudan is not restricted to the deployment of peacekeeping troops to
Sudan. The two countries have close people-to-people relations, and
as they share so long a border there are huge opportunities to share
socio-economic developments. There is a mutually beneficial
relationship in terms of trade and investment, communication and
transport. Sudan is the leading African destination for Ethiopian
exports. The road links between the two countries have been greatly
improved and Ethiopia
imports its petrol from the Sudan. Sudan also supplies various other
industrial products to Ethiopia. The
completion of the power networking project at the end of the year
will underline these links.
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Eritrea’s response to the UN Monitoring
Group’s Report
The Government of
Eritrea is currently involved in a considerable campaign to try to
distract attention from its long-term behaviour and avoid the
imposition of further sanctions by the United Nations Security
Council. President Isaias has been on a diplomatic offensive for
several months now, even asking to address the UN Security Council
which he normally excoriates as a US puppet.
One of the latest
chapters in this effort is the more than fifty pages described as
Eritrea’s Response to the Report of the Somalia Eritrea Monitoring
Group. That report, of course, detailed Eritrea’s involvement in a
wide array of activities aimed at destabilizing the Transitional
Federal Government in Mogadishu and in support of terrorists and
extremists in Somalia, as well as other actions aimed against
Ethiopia and Djibouti. However, the Eritrean response is not just an
attempt to rebut the UN report point by point, as the Eritrean
regime's foreign ministry promises; it is also an attempt to produce
an image of Eritrea entirely different from the one of which most
people are aware. It is not a picture that other states in the
region can easily recognize.
Indeed, in this document
the Government of Eritrea portrays itself as the only power in the
Horn of Africa (and indeed more widely) that has been working for
peace and stability in the region, consistently prepared “to go
against the international current to publicly pronounce its views
and opinions with honesty and candour”. Its regional policy has been
“squarely and firmly rooted on promoting a conducive environment of
good neighbourliness and cooperation.” It identifies Eritrea's
politics as the envy of the world. Its economic system is the most
effective and efficient, lifting Eritreans out of poverty and
setting them on the path to development and prosperity. The claimed
policy of self-reliance has more than proved its value, but it has
also brought about the antagonism of the world’s major powers
towards the government and people of Eritrea.
All this is detailed
without any sign of irony or cynicism, and at the same time the
Eritrean penchant for the superlative is given full rein in the part
of the response defining what the statement calls the fundamental
pillars of Eritrea's foreign policy. Without even the faintest
satirical indication these are defined as the cultivation of
peaceful relations with all its neighbors; the promotion of
development at home; and the pursuit of peace and stability
throughout the region. It seems the government in Asmara is
seriously trying to pretend that it hasn’t heard any of the
numerous, and factually accurate, reports that have been levelled
against it in the last few years, and against which this response is
supposed to be directed. This is, after all, a regime that has
literally gone to war with all its neighbors at various times and
which has consistently armed, trained and supported opposition
forces in Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia. It suggests a quite
extraordinary degree of self-delusion from a regime that has
embroiled itself in conflict throughout the region.
It also underlines the
point that this Response to the Report of the Somalia Eritrea
Monitoring Group is less an attempt to provide a detailed critique
of the report than in detailing its own claims about the right paths
and choices taken and made in apparently trying to bring about peace
throughout the region despite the contrary efforts of all the other
countries around. It becomes rather a game of trading allegations
and recriminations.
The response does also
make some effort to address some of the specific charges made by the
UN Monitoring Group, but one example is essentially sufficient to
demonstrate the style of the replies. Addressing the Monitoring
Group’s detailed evidence for the plot to bomb Addis Ababa during
the AU Summit in January, the statement claims, correctly, that one
of the officers identified as Eritrean was in fact a member of the
Oromo Liberation Front. It then adds that this was ample proof that
the plot could not be the work of the Eritrean regime. In fact, it
hardly proves anything of the kind if only because that officer was
feted in Asmara for his efforts to destabilize the government of
Ethiopia. Nor does the point address the fact that the Monitoring
Group also produced specific details of training in Eritrea and of
direct phone links between those involved in the plot and Eritrean
intelligence officers. These same intelligence officers were also
involved in training of other opposition groups in Ethiopia, Somalia
and Djibouti.
The technique involved
in this response is the one usually employed by the Eritrean
government. It concentrates on minor possible inconsistencies or
exaggerations to try to create the impression that the report as a
whole should be dismissed as implausible. It did this of course with
an earlier Monitoring Group Report, picking up on the claim that
there were 2,000 Eritrean troops in Somalia in 2006. These, in fact,
included several hundred OLF and over a thousand ONLF fighters who
had been trained in Eritrea and who had been sent down to Somalia
during the year. There they joined numbers of Eritrean military
involved in training of the ICU. The intention was that they should
be infiltrated into Ethiopia by arrangement with the Islamic Courts
Union.
Being able to pick up on
a minor error or two doesn’t, of course, negate the details of all
the numerous other charges nor does it weaken the details of the
convincing evidence provided or the overall conclusions. The other
approach that the Eritrean regime adopts, and has again done so
here, is either to simply ignore anything to which it cannot find a
response or alternatively just repeatedly deny the evidence. Neither
actually amounts to a credible response. The evidence, as we have
noted before, is quite simply so irrefutable that no acrobatic
semantics can detract from its veracity.
One other point might
be made. The Response claims that if December 2009, when the
Security Council Resolution 1907 was adopted, is taken as the
reference, then “the conclusion that Eritrea is not in any violation
of Resolution 1907 is starkly clear.” By this it means that much of
the evidence produced by the Monitoring Group pre-dates December
2009 and therefore Eritrea should not be classified as violating
1907. Given that some of these details actually involve payments
made through the Eritrean embassy in Nairobi to people affiliated to
Al-Shabaab, this appears to be somewhat specious. More relevant, of
course, is the fact that much of the Monitoring Group evidence does
actually post-date December 2009.
In one seemingly
innocuous remark, the Response claims that Eritrea is not in
violation of Resolution 1907, and adds that “much that is positive
has taken place since then”, including Eritrea’s acceptance of Qatar
mediation for its problem with Djibouti and Eritrea’s agreement to
redeploy its troops. One might add that for most of the last two
years Eritrea has resolutely denied it has had any problem with
Djibouti or that its troops ever crossed the Djibouti border. Now,
it seems that there was a problem and that Eritrea has acknowledged
it. Equally, one might note that if there has been significant and
positive progress since Resolution 1907 was passed, then logically
it appears there had been earlier problems. It would be rash to
assume that this is an admission though it certainly appears to be
one. Equally, it underlines the fact that the Government of Eritrea
does appear to respond to firmness when action is finally taken. We
would suggest that is a lesson of which the international community
should take note.
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Ethiopia and Djibouti Joint Border
Committee meets
The 17th
session of the Ethiopia-Djibouti Joint Border Administrators and
Commissioners Committee took place in Dikhil, Djibouti, from 27th-29th
October. The Ethiopian delegation was led by Ato Mulugeta Mekonnen,
Director of the Main Department for Immigration and Nationality
Affairs; and Djibouti’s delegation by Mr. Ibrahim Soubaneh, acting
Secretary-General of the Ministry of Interior. Opening the meeting,
Mr. Soubaneh emphasized the excellent relations between the two
countries and hoped the deliberations of the meeting would
contribute to these. He noted that President Ismail Omar Guelleh,
and Prime Minister Meles had laid the foundation for a strong and
solid relationship based on mutual benefit and respect. Ato Mulugeta
emphasized the existing excellent relations and the commitment of
the Ethiopian delegation to work together successfully with its
Djiboutian counterpart.
Discussions covered the
activities of the joint border sub-committees dealing with the areas
of Galafi-Hawili and Galile-Dewale, border security, the movement of
people across the border including both pastoralists and tourists,
the transport of goods, illegal migration and human trafficking,
both contraband and official cross-border trade, human and animal
health and other areas. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to
support and encourage the activities of the joint border
sub-committees in order to make the common border area a place of
peace. Both parties expressed concern about illegal cross-border
migration and human trafficking. The Ethiopian delegation explained
the measures taken in collaboration with the security forces to
control and prevent illegal migration. It noted that several
Ethiopians had been turned back while trying to enter Djibouti
illegally, and a number of human traffickers had been brought to
justice. A national committee, made up of the relevant federal and
regional bodies had also been set up to work to prevent the movement
of illegal cross-border migrants. Both sides agreed to redouble
their efforts to solve the problem in collaboration with other
partners.
Underlining concern of
the effect of contraband trade and smuggling on the national economy
of both Ethiopia and Djibouti, the two delegations agreed to
finalize the pending draft border trade protocol. The objective of
this is to facilitate the availability of consumer goods for the
people residing on both sides of the border and minimize the effect
of smuggling.
The meeting also
discussed a range of additional issues of common interest including
human and animal health and cross-border bus transport as well as
agriculture and livestock. It was agreed that the next meeting of
the committee should be held in Dire Dawa, in Ethiopia, in six
months. During their visit, the Ethiopian delegation also went to
the port area of Djibouti and the site of the future port of
Tadjourah.
The Joint Border
Administrators and Commissioners’ Committee was established in July
1985. It has responsibility for evaluating and settling issues
related to border security, the smooth movement of people and goods
across the border and covers such additional issues as animal and
plant health and immigration with the aim of encouraging the levels
of cooperation between Ethiopia and Djibouti.
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Second annual meeting of the African
Leadership Network
Under the theme of
“Powering Africa’s Prosperity”, three hundred members of the African
Leadership Network (ALN) reconvened in the Sheraton Hotel, Addis
Ababa, October 26th-29th. Those present
included ALN fellows, new members and invited guests. The African
Leadership Network was officially inaugurated last year in Addis
Ababa and during the year it has attracted an additional one hundred
members, nearly a third of them women, from some 35 countries.
Ethiopians make up about four percent of the membership. The African
Leadership Network has its main offices in South Africa and a
significant number of its members come from the southern part of the
continent.
The African Leadership
Network was co-founded by Acha Leke, from Cameroon, and Fred
Swaniker, from Ghana. Both successful young entrepreneurs, they came
up with the visionary idea of creating a platform for the
influential and dynamic men and women who are poised to lead a
positive transformation of the continent. The African Leadership
Network, in fact, aims to engage the collective influence of
Africa’s new generation of leaders to drive prosperity throughout
Africa. It was in this spirit that a number of topical issues that
concern the continent were raised and debated in an atmosphere of
solidarity last week. The conference was also accompanied by a
series of innovative artistic examples of African music and
entertainment.
The sessions covered a
variety of subjects ranging from a show case of “Investment
Opportunities in Ethiopia” to “Presentation of IMF Sub-Saharan
Africa Economic Outlook”, “China in Africa”, “Powerful Ideas for
Transforming Africa” and “Capturing Opportunities in Africa”. A
keynote speech was given by Dr. Donald Kaberuka, President of the
African Development Bank, focusing on critical issues in Africa’s
development, including economic growth, governance and leadership,
and stressing the need for functional institutional building as the
main manifestation of good leadership. An important element of the
conference was the provision of opportunities for networking,
allowing entrepreneurs from all over the continent not only to share
ideas but also to forge new partnerships that will play a major role
in driving the future prosperity of Africa. It was a gathering that
demonstrated the vigour of renewed optimism for the continent and it
was symptomatic that it was held in Addis Ababa, the seat of the
African Union Headquarters and the diplomatic center of Africa.
At a dinner held in the
National Palace to honour the members of African Leadership Network,
Ato Hailemariam Desalegn, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Foreign Affairs, spoke of the elements on which Ethiopia’s Growth
and Transformation Plan is based, in the context of the global
environment and the plans to increase the country’s industry and
infrastructural development. The recently launched Ethiopia-Djibouti
hydro-power interconnection was mentioned as an encouraging
beginning, demonstrating Ethiopia’s commitment and its actual and
potential contributions to larger regional economic integration.
It is clear that new
initiatives like the African Leadership Network have an important
role to play in facilitating the interaction of African skills and
knowledge to solve the common problems and challenges of the
continent. Proven leaders from all walks of life and in every domain
can readily engage with each other and provide the necessary
leverage for collective influence and action. It is a valuable
mechanism to strengthen pan-African relationships as well as
cross-sector and cross-industry links. The African Leadership
Network concluded its successful four day deliberations on
cooperation for a common agenda – “Powering Africa’s Prosperity” on
Saturday. Its next meeting will take place in Accra, Ghana, in 2012.
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Ms. Bruton: now its “earned engagement” not
“constructive disengagement”
Two years
ago Ms. Bronwyn Bruton, an International Affairs Fellow of the
Council of Foreign Relations,
and previously at the National Endowment for Democracy,
came up with a nice catchy, if essentially
meaningless phrase to provide a solution to resolve supposed US
policy dilemmas towards the problems of Somalia: “constructive
disengagement”. Ms. Bruton defined this as a strategy in which the
international community would extricate itself from Somali politics
but continue to provide development and humanitarian aid and conduct
the occasional Special Forces raid against terrorists. This hardly
helpful and certainly impractical suggestion was later glossed to
suggest that the US might pursue development efforts in Somalia
without any regard to governance, co-operating pragmatically with
any group that promised to peacefully deliver benefits to the public
– virtually redefining the suggestion as one of “constructive
re-engagement”.
Undaunted by
the lack of response, and now apparently feeling it might even be
impolitic, Ms. Bruton has made another effort, this time, together
with Dr. Peter Pham, coming up with “earned engagement’. Ms. Bruton
is currently the deputy director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa
Center of the Atlantic Council, of which Dr. Peter Pham is the
Director. She is also a fellow at the One Earth Future Foundation.
“Earned engagement” is defined as allowing “the United States [to]
engage Somali leaders instrumentally, agnostic in regard to the
identity of the potential winners and losers. The various Somali
actors – governmental entities, regional authorities, clans and
civil society organizations – would be accorded equal access to
international resources, but only to the extent that they prove
themselves capable of meeting defined benchmarks and of absorbing
the assistance that would be provided for relief and development.”
This would allow for anyone, including Al-Shabaab leaders who
renounced Al Qaeda, in effect “to earn aid by proving their
legitimacy with constituents.” Ms. Bruton and Dr. Pham apparently
believe this differs from the previous “building block”, “bottom-up”
approaches, claiming that it would put the onus on Somalis
themselves to create the sort of structures that would suit them
without US, or other, pressure.
Ms. Bruton
has also just produced another paper, “Twenty Years of Collapse and
Counting: The Cost of Failure in Somalia”, this time co-authored
with John Norris, from the Center for American Progress and
previously with the Enough Project directed by John Prendergast.
Enough, a part of the CAP, is an advocacy organization which
concentrates on attracting celebrity support for its activities on
Darfur, South Sudan, Eastern Congo, northern Uganda and Somalia.
“Twenty Years of Collapse” is an attempt to provide estimates of the
costs of the problems of Somalia in the last twenty years. Overall
these are put at up to1.5 million lives and a cost of $55 billion, a
figure which includes an international bill for piracy at $22
billion, humanitarian and development aid at $13 billion, $800
million for the cost of AMISOM deployment, and another $444 million
for the cost of the military involvement of neighboring countries.
We haven’t
the time or space to question how these figures were reached though
Ms. Bruton and Mr. Norris do say that they use “a variety of
official and unofficial sources and some educated guesswork”. They
also refer to “the profound lack of reliable data”. This in fact is
underlined by their figures for AMISOM casualties. They estimate
that Uganda and Burundi troops have suffered 750 fatalities since
the start of AMISOM. The real figure, as of August this year, was
335. In this context, the authors also conflated figures from
Somaliland with the estimates from the rest of the former Somali
state. This, for example, has the effect of obscuring the virtual
absence of development funding from southern Somalia by
incorporating recent increases in such funding in Somaliland.
Indeed, overall, the figures suggested by Ms. Bruton and Mr. Norris
should be treated with great care. They must remain no more than
‘guesswork”, educated or not. In fact, they are all-too-often
assertions rather than reliable estimates.
Their
conclusion, not surprisingly, is that conflicts in Somalia must be
approached through “sensible long-term strategies rather than
knee-jerk responses.” No one would surely disagree but the question
remains: can either “constructive disengagement” or “earned
engagement’ be classified as sensible long-tern strategies. Indeed,
whatever strategies the experts and analysts come up with (and what
about Somalis themselves?), the central point is surely that they
must be based on accurate information and factual analysis of recent
events and the current situation. Analysts, for example, often put
forward suggestions for “talking to moderate elements in Al-Shabaab”
as if they are offering something new or unique. They appear unaware
of the fact that this is something that the TFG has frequently tried
to initiate only to come against the intransigence of the
international elements of Al-Shabaab. Ethiopia before it intervened
in Somalia (at the TFG’s request in 2006) made serious efforts to
talk to the Islamic Courts Union to pre-empt the ICU’s stated
attempts to reactivate Somali irredentism and involvement in
Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State. It encouraged the TFG and the ICU
to hold talks in Khartoum, and itself had eight meetings with the
ICU to try and avoid conflict. The first meetings with the ICU made
considerable progress but after Sheikh Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’ and
other hardliners seized control of the ICU in June 2006 it became
steadily clearer that no accommodation was possible, either between
the TFG and the ICU or between the ICU and Ethiopia. This has some
relevance in light of Kenya’s current involvement in the trans-Juba
regions.
In one of
her papers, Ms. Bruton notes that it is important “to understand the
motivations and interests of those actors who benefit from Somalia’s
continuing misery and statelessness.” She lists arms traders,
smugglers, local warlords, and others. Others, of course, include
the leaders of Al-Shabaab and other extremist organizations,
political leaders, clan and religious elders, businessmen, and
humanitarian and advocacy organizations as well as regional states
whose interests vary from Eritrea’s deliberate and continued efforts
to use extremism in Somalia to destabilize Ethiopia to Ethiopia’s
own interests in seeing a functional Somali state which might put an
end to cross border incursions and the influx of refugees. It would,
for example, certainly help if analysts could make a realistic
effort to understand the policies of both Ethiopia and Eritrea
towards Somalia, and refrain, as Ms. Bruton does, from parroting
claims that Ethiopia “invaded” Somalia in December 2006 at the
instigation of the US, destroying the stability that the ICU had
established over much of the country, that Ethiopian involvement was
primarily responsible for the appearance of Al-Shabaab, and that
Al-Shabaab drove the Ethiopian forces out in 2009.
Equally
misleading and unhelpful is Ms. Burton’s view that Eritrea and
Ethiopia “are mired in a long-standing border dispute” and that
Somalia has served as a “proxy battlefield” for the two countries.
It is true that the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia broke out in
1998 when Eritrea invaded Ethiopia to seize the border town of Badme
and that Eritrea has subsequently repeatedly claimed that all its
efforts at destabilizing Ethiopia (and other countries in the
region) are related to its claims that Ethiopia refuses to accept
the border demarcation. Ms. Bruton, however, should certainly be
aware of the fact that Ethiopia has accepted the border demarcation
(in November 2004), and Eritrea’s continued refusal to hold a
dialogue with Ethiopia to normalize relations makes it clear that
the border is not the issue. It has become very obvious that the
core of the problem lies in the continued aggression of Eritrea
against Sudan, Yemen, Djibouti and Ethiopia and its repeated efforts
to destabilize the whole region of the Horn of Africa.
Currently,
the humanitarian situation remains the overriding issue, but Somalia
also remains a matter of major long-term concern for both the
international community and the IGAD states. Ms. Bruton is quite
right to underline the critical need for a realistic response. But
we would return to one central point. Whatever is suggested needs to
be based on accurate perception of events in the region. When
talking at Chatham House a year and a half ago, Ms. Bruton said
analysts and experts as well as governments should be aware that
they had the power to do harm. This is a thought that has
considerable resonance. Analysts and commentators in the US and
Europe all too often seem to forget that Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda
have long been in the front line against terrorist activity
emanating from Somalia. All have suffered severely from terrorist
activity. They have better reasons than most for wanting to put an
end to this scourge and to put a stop to the support Al-Shabaab has
been receiving externally. With Al-Shabaab in disarray, the TFG now
has the opportunity to demonstrate it can govern effectively. Others
can do no more than help and advise, they cannot dictate. It is
Somalis who have to come up with the options and the will to provide
solutions and structures to resolve the fragmentation into which
Somalia has descended. Any engagement or disengagement – earned or
constructive - should bear that in mind.
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