U.S. would not consider Ethiopia an important ally

While we have corrected Prime Minister Meles's

misperceptions on night vision goggles and informed him of

our efforts to discuss and correct problems noted in our

human rights report, the continued raising of these issues

underscore the anxiety by the Prime Minister and his

government that the U.S. posture toward Ethiopia would become

tougher or worse, and that the U.S. would not consider

Ethiopia an important ally in the region.  It is also clear

that while Meles desires improved relations, he also wants to

establish bilateral relations on his own terms in which the

U.S. would give Ethiopia space as it advances human rights

and democracy as well as economic development according to

its own policy objectives.



General Samora and Getachew Assefa lack confidence in U.S

Prime Minister Meles Zenawi called in Ambassador

February 25 to discuss Ethiopia's perception that the U.S.

has taken a tougher policy shift towards Ethiopia, stressing

human rights concerns over shared objectives on regional

stability, counterterrorism and development.  The meeting

reinforced Foreign Minister Seyoum's February 20 demarche to

the Ambassador (reftel), protesting Congress's listing of

Ethiopia among 20 countries, including Sudan, Zimbabwe and

Iran, requiring congressional notification before development

and other types of assistance can be disbursed.  The Prime

Minister said Ethiopia wants predictability in the bilateral

relationship and clarity on where Ethiopia stands with the

U.S.  The Prime Minister went so far as to say that the head

of the military, General Samora, and Intelligence Service

chief, Getachew Assefa -- two hawkish, yet significantly

influential, ruling party members on foreign policy -- lack

the confidence that the U.S. shares Ethiopia's security

concerns.

Analysis of Meles's Behavior

Finally, Meles desperately

wants recognition and public accolades for his achievements,

consistently focusing us on his accomplishments while being

relatively more willing to forego appreciation while efforts

remain in process.

We hope that this analysis provides useful insights

for USG interlocutors who will engage the Prime Minister.

Meles's ISTJ type suggests very clearly that the most

persuasive arguments to make with the Prime Minister to sway

his decisions will be those that are delivered privately,

focused on an end objective that he supports or values,

highly specific and detailed, and delivered in a clear,

linear fashion.  Further, if our message is one that he is

likely to oppose, our arguments will be much more effective

if delivered in a way that emphasize the objective -- Meles

particularly understands and appreciates arguments that

clearly reflect the explicit pursuit of national interests.

Further, USG interlocutors must be thoroughly prepared with

details to retort Meles's detailed responses to initial USG

points.

TORTURE INSIDE ETHIOPIA'S JAILS

Recent interviews with individuals who have been held

in non-traditional detention facilities have shed anecdotal

light on beatings and abuse by Ethiopian security officials

against civilians in country.  While we cannot confirm the

scope or persistence of such mistreatment, these first-hand

reports do offer a unique insight into abuse of detainees and

dynamics regarding Ethiopia's non-traditional detention

facilities.  A handful of released political and other

prisoners in Ethiopia have recently reported to PolOff that

they and other  detainees have been tortured in police

station jails in attempts by security officials to elicit

confessions before cases go to trial.   Depending on the

detainee, abuses reported include being blindfolded and hung

by the wrists for several hours, bound by chains and beaten,

held in solitary confinement for several days to weeks or

months, subjected to mental torture such as harassment and

humiliation, forced to stand for over 16 hours, and having

heavy objects hung from one's genitalia (males).  Based on

what our sources have reported, torture seems to be more

common at police station detention centers (most notably

Ma-ekelawi police station in Addis Ababa), while less is

reported at Kaliti prison.  Released prisoners have also

reported to PolOff cases of prisoners being detained for

several years without being charged and without trial,

prisoners held in jails despite having been released by the

courts, and police interference with court proceedings.

US calls Meles's development "mythic economic growth"



After a brief meeting with Senator Inhofe and his

delegation on April 7 (septel), Prime Minister Meles took

Ambassador to the side and privately raised three issues: 1)

the need to "improve" the State Department Human Rights

Report (HRR), which he felt was filled with errors; 2)

allegations that the U.S. Embassy leaked Ethiopia's draft

counterterrorism law to Human Rights Watch (HRW); and 3) the

need for senior-level bilateral meetings to resolve

misunderstandings and enhance U.S.-Ethiopia relations.

Meles' increasingly aggressive responses to pro

forma USG actions (such as the HRR, language in the 2007

appropriations bill, etc.) in recent months almost certainly

stems from GoE anxiety over how the Obama Administration may

engage Ethiopia.  At the same time, the Prime Minister's

obstinacy on cases like Birtukan's, the CSO law, mythic

economic growth, and Ethiopia's human rights practices -- to

name but a few -- genuinely reflect the GoE's entrenchment in

the country's current trajectory which is increasingly at

odds with U.S. interests and values in both the political and

economic realms.  As such, we continue to advocate for senior

level bilateral meetings as soon as the AF Assistant

Secretary is in place.  They make sense and would help ease

Ethiopia's anxieties and underscore our concerns as well as

reinforce our support for the relationship.

ATTEMPTED COUP OR OPPOSITION ROUND-UP?



The Ethiopian Government (GoE) announced on April 25

that it had arrested 35 individuals affiliated with the

overseas-based opposition movement "Ginbot 7" who were

planning a "terrorist attack" in Addis Ababa.  The Government

was quick to clarify that it disrupted a "terrorist attack"

not a "coup" as had been reported by some media outlets.

Without any specific information or evidence substantiating

the allegations, we -- and many diplomatic colleagues with

whom we have spoken -- assess the move as another crackdown

by the GoE on pro-opposition individuals within the military

and civil service consistent with other such acts in recent

years. 



While the GoE's claims may ultimately prove true, in

the absence of specific and credible information, this latest

round of arrests strikes us and many Ethiopia watchers in

Addis as another move by the GoE to justify the arrest of

political dissenters.  The GoE has a robust record since

December 2006 of doing so within the military.  Ref. A offers

insights into GoE moves to purge the civil service of those

who support the opposition, and even those who do not

explicitly support the ruling party, and Ref. B details a

late-October 2008 series of arrests of ethnic Oromos

allegedly for being involved in plans by the Oromo Liberation

Front (OLF) to conduct terrorist attacks in Ethiopia.  Apart

from his fiery rhetoric, we have no reason to believe that

the asserted links between Berhanu Nega and the alleged plans

for attacks are credible.  Pol/Econ Chief spoke with

Berhanu's AmCit wife, Dr. Nardos Minassie, who claimed to be

completely unaware of the allegations or media reports

surrounding her husband and reported being fine, staying at

home, and unaffected by the incident.

(C) As have many within the Embassy, our counterparts at

the British Embassy also assess that this current round of

arrests are likely a variation on the theme established with

the arrests reported in Ref. B.  Despite the GoE's claim of

having disrupted such a large alleged plot to terrorize the

capital city, we have not observed any overt increase in the

security presence around the capital.  While we will continue

to track this case as it develops, we expect that the current

case will prove to be more one of political retaliation to

further entrench the stifling of political opposition as

Ethiopian eyes shift toward the 2010 national elections

rather than one of a legitimate effort by the opposition to

disrupt life in the capital or target the regime.

As Birtukan's statements

In the most overt case of harassment of the

political opposition since the April local elections, the

Ethiopian Government (GoE) has detained Birtukan Mideksa,

Chairperson of the Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ)

party, three times in the three weeks and today arrested her.

Birtukan is a former political detainee who, along with over

100 other opposition figures, was convicted and sentenced in

the aftermath of the May 2005 elections and later pardoned in

July 2007 through intensive efforts by the U.S., other

donors, and the "Ethiopian Elders."  While on a outreach tour

of Europe in November, Birtukan (technically correct) told

reporters that she and the other political detainees "did not

request any pardon of the government."  Apparently offended

by the statement which effectively denies the GoE the

appearance of being compassionate by attributing the pardon

to the Elders, the GoE is now on the brink of rescinding

Birtukan's pardon, an act which could place our 2009

International Woman of Courage nominee (Ref. A) in prison for

15 years.



As Birtukan is the most recognized leader of

Ethiopia's political opposition, this harassment sends a

clear message to the broader opposition community.  The

detentions, harassment, and arrest of Birtukan represent the

latest and most blatant incidence of a string of arrests and

harassment of opposition party officials in the past few

months (Ref. B).  As Birtukan's statements to the European

press are factually true, the GoE has little excuse for this

current harassment.  As the international community clearly

associates the July 2007 pardon of Birtukan and the other

political detainees as heavily influenced by the USG, her

re-arrest will likely be viewed by many as an affront to the

USG.  If the GoE pursues charges against Birtukan along with

today's arrest, or if the GoE rescinds her pardon, we

strongly urge Washington to release a strongly worded

statement condemning the move and resuscitate language from

our January 6, 2006 public statement noting that "steps that

appear to criminalize dissent impede progress on

democratization."

China and Ethiopia: WE'RE FOLLOWING CHINA'S MODEL



At a hail and farewell on August 19 for Chinese

Economic and Commercial Counselor Liu Yunbiao (reftel) and

his replacement, Qian Zhaogang, Ethiopian State Minister for

Trade and Industry Tadesse Haile extolled the close and

growing commercial relationship between China and Ethiopia

and said "We have to sustain high (economic) growth so we can

be like China.  We're following your (China's) model."

Tadesse said that bilateral ties are entering a "mature"

phase where both countries will be able to maximize the

benefits of the trade relationship.  For his part, Qian

listed his priorities as facilitating

government-to-government communication, working on behalf of

Chinese companies, and increasing bilateral trade and

investment.

Alemshet Degiffe and his view

Alemshet Degiffe, an Oromo

Major-General purged in 2006 while serving as commander of

the Ethiopian Air Force, told the Ambassador on May 12 that

the Ethiopian military suffers from ethnic division and

Tigrayan dominance.  Alemshet said Ethiopian Prime Minister

Meles cannot afford to fight a war against Eritrea because

the military lacks the will to fight and a war would

exacerbate the growing cracks in the Ethiopian state. Lastly,

he noted based on his continuing contacts with some military

officials that the Ethiopian military was limiting itself to

small-scale tactical operations in Somalia only and was not

conducting any major offensive operations.

Alemshet's comments about the Ethiopian military

provide a rare insight into an institution that is by nature

secretive and difficult to access for outsiders. His

reporting of widespread dissatisfaction for the Tigrayan

dominated government within the military is consistent with

the views of the government held by the broader non-Tigrayan

population.  The morale problems within the military are

certain to worsen in the next several years unless the

government changes course and becomes more inclusive,

something that at present they appear to have little interest

in doing.

On Mayor Kuma Demeksa, 





Following its landslide victory in the April 2008 local

elections, the ruling Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic

Front (EPRDF) appointed Defense Minister Kuma Demeksa, an

opportunistic 50-year old party loyalist, as mayor of Addis Ababa.

In a conference held at the City Hall on May 20, the EPRDF also

selected the Deputy Mayor, as well as the Secretary General, the

Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the City Council. 



Kuma's critics describe him as a colorless party-hack who

has "been everywhere and has reached nowhere."  Kuma is quite and

reclusive and rarely meets with non-party members.  However, he is

committed to the party and very loyal to Prime Minister Meles.  Kuma

is said to be a survivor because he respects authority, is reclusive

and keeps a low profile.  He is not well regarded in Oromiya region,

where he served as President for over six years, and has been

labelled indecisive and ineffective.  Kuma's appointment as Mayor

has puzzled many residents of Addis Ababa.  Observers expected that

the EPRDF would appoint a sharper and more apt Mayor to address the

multi-faceted social, political and economic problems of the city in

order to win the hearts and minds of residents who voted

overwhelmingly in favor of the opposition in 2005, and largely

stayed home during the 2008 local elections.

US Frustrated by TPLF


A paradigm shift must occur in the United States'

discourse with Ethiopia on foreign assistance.  Over the past

year, the USG has delivered on all GoE claims of "broken

promises" in order to enhance the security of the Ethiopian

state and to help Ethiopia combat terrorism.  However, even

as the USG met its promises, Ethiopia consistently rebuffed

USG efforts to pursue other priorities, notably political and

economic reform, and also turned down a significant number of

programs designed specifically to enhance trust,

communication and security cooperation between our

militaries.  The GoE rejected many of the programs it

specifically requested.  Effectively, the Ethiopian

government cherry-picked areas and programs for cooperation

at a time where the cross-cutting nature of political,

economic and security concerns has never been more evident.

At the same time, the ruling EPRDF moved forward with

increasingly statist and authoritarian policies and

practices, to the potential detriment of Ethiopia's long-term

stability (and thus USG interests).  As a result, the foreign

assistance conversation must now be framed as "Ethiopia's

broken promises."

¶ 10. (S/NF) Comment Continued: Embassy Addis Ababa will make

it clear to the Ethiopian government at the highest levels

that the U.S.-Ethiopia strategic partnership requires

reciprocity and that, for the United States, counterterrorism

and security cooperation does not occur in a vacuum.

Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) Central Committee

members, as well as ENDF leadership, often criticize the West

for placing human rights and other conditions on the

provision of military and economic programs to Ethiopia.

They cite Israel, China and Russia as (more) reliable

partners who provide affordable equipment, always deliver and

never raise conditionality.

¶11. (S/NF) Comment Continued: The Ambassador will take every

opportunity to highlight for Ethiopian leadership the linkage

between democratic governance/free market economy and social

cohesion and stability, and urge the GoE to reconsider the

current statist and authoritarian trajectory of its policies.

If the GoE persists in rejecting United States priorities in

such critical areas as transparency (especially AML and CFT),

governance (especially civil society support for political),

market reform (especially necessary diversification) and

security cooperation, the long-term risks to USG interests

posed by robust support for the EPRDF government, as well as

the level and breadth of our foreign assistance programs, may

have to be reassessed.

US Embassy Suggesting to State Department Change of policy

This is the first in a series of cables outlining

policy options on U.S.-Ethiopia relations in light of recent

restrictions on political and democratic space

The precipitous decline in political space has

continued over the past two years. While placating donors by

holding interparty dialogue on contentious issues, the ruling

party effectively rejected recommendations by established

opposition parties. When the lack of serious engagement

forced an opposition walk out, the ruling party leveraged

rubber-stamp endorsements by EPRDF-fabricated opposition

groups to ram through a new National Electoral Board (NEB), a

repressive media law, and a political party financing law

that restricts and denies space to the opposition. In the

past two years the clearly-partisan NEB has rendered suspect

administrative rulings stripping the opposition Coalition for

Unity and Democracy Party (CUDP) and Oromo National Congress

(ONC) labels from their freely elected and recognized leaders

(Addis 145). Ruling party cadres' harassment and

intimidation of opposition candidates in the run-up to the

April local elections precluded them from registering for the

April local elections (Addis 596 and Addis 667).

Additionally, the NEB's bureaucratic delays -- and refusals

-- in approving domestic election observers prevented

credible organizations from observing the elections (Addis

1065). Together these efforts guaranteed an overwhelming

marginalization of any political opposition in the 2008 local

elections. Ultimately, the opposition took only three out of

3.6 million contested seats in April's local elections. In

our assessment, the local elections significantly increased

voter apathy and deep frustration over the chances of

building on the political gains of the 2005 campaign period

and election results.
Embassy Addis Ababa views this precipitous

narrowing of Ethiopia's political space as undermining

Ethiopia's stability which could affect the entire Horn of

Africa region.

Revolutionary Democracy  by Sibhat, Bereket, Hailemariam and Tekeda 





Sabhat Nega's views represent the ideological extreme

-- albeit still tremendously influential -- among the TPLF

elites.  EPRDF Central Committee members from non-TPLF

component parties shed much of Sabhat's rhetoric while still

clinging adamantly to the top-down imperative approach of

bringing democracy to the people.  Hailemariam Desalegn,

chairman of the Southern Ethiopia People's Democratic

Movement (SEPDM), has argued to Post that due to poor

education and illiteracy the Ethiopian public is too

underdeveloped to make a well reasoned, informed decision,

and so Revolutionary Democracy is the political bridge by

which the "enlightened leaders" can lead the people to

democracy.  Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO)

Deputy Chairman, and Trade Minister, Girma Birru emphasizes

the "necessary" state role in the economy to establish an

economic incubator fostering "agricultural-industrialization

led development" and growth as the necessary pre-condition

for democracy.  On his part, Amhara Nation Democratic

Movement (ANDM) Executive Committee member Bereket Simon

emphasizes the merits of the EPRDF's Revolutionary Democracy

by arguing that the opposition, writ large, is not ready for

democracy because it is bent on street action, all-or-nothing

politics, and rejecting the political system rather than the

ruling party.  The future of multiparty democracy in 

Ethiopia, Bereket told AF/E Office Director James Knight on

April 11, lies with "the sons of the private sector" and the

EPRDF "must nurture the private sector so that it can

establish its own political party to move the country

forward." 



Sabhat Nega's point that Ethiopia will disintegrate in

the absence of the TPLF's revolutionary democracy strategy

highlights the rigidity within the ruling party.  In the

TPLF's collective mind-set, any alternative to its top-down

approach of "democracy" threatens the existence and future of

the Ethiopian state.  The opposition presents even more of a

threat to the state -- in the TPLF/EPRDF's eyes -- in light

of their view of the opposition as being infiltrated with

Eritrean government hacks, bent on all-or-nothing politics,

or (in a most generous interpretation) simply committed to a

populous-driven bottom up view of democracy.  Some GoE

officials now are beginning to acknowledge that a functioning

state much differentiate between its ruling party, the

government, and the state.  Still, there is no historical

basis in Ethiopia or understanding in the public (or ruling

party leaders') psyche of such a separation of roles in

Ethiopia.  Without such a distinction, ruling party elites

appear genuinely to view threats to the ruling party -- such

as those posed by otherwise legitimate political opposition

groups -- as being threats to the state.  The late 2005

"Treason" charges against scores of opposition leaders is

only the most overt demonstration of this perception.  The

challenge in moving Ethiopia's democracy forward, therefore,

is to identify a strategy that acknowledges the EPRDF's

commitment to democracy, work with the opposition to present

less of a threat to the EPRDF, and find the delicate balance

whereby the mutually exclusive approaches to democracy can be

vetted with, and subjected to the will of, the Ethiopian

people.  Post will soon propose a road-map for engaging the

GoE and Ethiopia to advance democratic reforms while

navigating this delicate balance.

PRIVATIZATION OR MONOPOLIZATION BY AL AMOUDI IN ETHIOPIA


An examination of available information on privatized

enterprises in Ethiopia shows that companies owned by, or affiliated

with, Ethio-Saudi billionaire Sheik Mohammed Al Amoudi have

purchased the vast majority (in terms of value) of enterprises.

Nearly every enterprise of significant monetary or strategic value

privatized since 1994 has passed from the ownership of the

Government of Ethiopia (GoE) to one of Al Amoudi's companies.  While

the privatizations of these enterprises were for the most part

competitive tenders, the dominance of Al Amoudi brings into question

the true competitiveness of the process.

According to information provided in December by EPA, 254

enterprises have been privatized to date, 21 of which went to Al

Amoudi companies.  EPA declined to give price information to post.

While companies related to Sheik Al Amoudi have

purchased a small number of the total privatized entities, the Sheik

has cherry-picked the best of the companies sold to date.  For

example, Legedembi is the only large scale gold mine in the country,

and Wush Wush is the sole plantation-style tea producer.  There are

no overt indications of impropriety in the bidding process, and the

Sheik is likely the wealthiest entity to have a significant interest

in the Ethiopian economy.  However, Al Amoudi is known to have close

ties to the ruling TPLF/EPRDF regime, and rumors persist of

favorable treatment.  Regardless of these unproven accusations, the

Sheik's influence in the Ethiopian economy cannot be underestimated.

Post will continue to track privatization and monitor future awards

for any indications of a more inclusive process.

CUD leaders' Charges "Political Offenses" not Criminal

Post, and other diplomatic missions and

international NGOs repeatedly called for the immediate

release of these prisoners and have publicly labeled them

"political detainees." 



While some of the charges were eventually thrown out

by the court, including "High Treason" and "Attempted

Genocide," and some of the lower-profile detainees released,

the leaders of the CUD were convicted on June 11, 2007 and

sentenced to life in prison on July 16.  These four

applicants were among a larger group convicted of "Outrages

Against the Constitution," "Obstruction of the Exercise of

Constitutional Power," and "Impairing the Defensive Power of

the State."  Most defendants, including the CUD leadership,

chose not to defend their case on the grounds that they felt

that the court was under the influence of the GoE and was

"illegitimate." Despite this, in Post's opinion, the

evidence presented by the federal prosecution did not in any

way prove that the defendants had any role in leading,

organizing or taking part in the demonstrations of 2005, and

that the verdicts concluded what was an entirely political

trial for the CUD leadership.

TPLF not EPRDF against release of CUD leaders


The Tigrayan People's Liberation

Front (TPLF) Central Committee on June 23 reluctantly

approved the PM's proposal to release the prisoners, but

forced a two-week delay in the announcement.  This gives

hard-liners in the TPLF, as well as those in the CUD, who

oppose any deal with the PM, more time to "deep six" the

agreement.  Post urges no public statements during this

sensitive period.

During a previously scheduled meeting of the central

committee of the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary

Democratic Front (EPRDF) on June 23, PM Meles presented his

plans to release the CUD detainees on the basis of their

statement acknowledging mistakes and agreeing to uphold the

constitution. During the meeting, Meles faced sharp

criticism from the hard-liners of his own TPLF Central

Committee, many of whom vehemently oppose release of the CUD

detainees.  They pointed out that a release at this point

would amount to circumventing the judicial process, given

that the detainees had been convicted, but not yet sentenced

(ref B).  They further noted that negative attention coming

from American media, as well as from the U.S. Congress, makes

any action at this point appear that the GOE capitulated to

public pressure.  In the end, after a prolonged debate, PM

Meles was able to secure agreement from the Central

Committee, but the apparent difficulty he faced in doing so

is evidence that the TPLF is not the one-man show that some

believe it is.

In order to secure agreement from the TPLF Central

Committee to release the CUD detainees, PM Meles agreed that

Ethiopia's High Court would first be permitted to complete

the sentencing of those found guilty, scheduled to take place

on July 9.  Following that, the detainees who signed the

document are expected to be released, and the GOE will issue

a statement explaining the move.  PM Meles asked Professor

Ephraim to return to Ethiopia at that time, when the Elders

are also expected to issue a statement on the release and the

need for national reconciliation.

Pastor Daniel Most Neutral Ethiopian Exposing Torture


In a recent meeting, respected local NGO

leader Pastor Daniel Gebraselassie (strictly protect)

confirmed reports by Amnesty International of arrests and

police beatings of a group of teachers.  However, he told

Poloff and officials from European Embassies that the numbers

were much larger than originally thought, and that the

prisoners, who are all also supporters of the opposition

Coalition for Unity and Democracy party, had been tortured by

police using methods commonly utilized by security forces

under the Derg regime.  Though most of the prisoners were

eventually released thanks to efforts by Pastor Daniel

Gebraselassie, he fears their arrest is part of a larger GoE

program to identify and suppress (illegal) opposition groups

in the Oromiya and Amhara regions since the start of

operations in Somalia.  Pastor Dan suggested that such orders

are not coming from senior leaders, but rather that these

practices exist among lower-level security officials.  Post

is still trying to assess how widespread torture has been and

to what extent senior officials were aware of it.  In any

case, Post intends to elevate human rights issues as a point

of concern in all official Embassy meetings.
Pastor Dan sits on the President's pardon board,

and through his work with his NGO Prison Fellowship, is often

given access to visit prisons when no other outsiders are

allowed.  Though some opposition figures believe he is too

close to the GoE, Post has found him to be one of the few

Ethiopians who can be truly be considered politically

neutral.  (NOTE: He is also one of the "Elders" that are

leading negotiations with the CUD detainees.  END NOTE)  Post

deems him to be a reliable source and his decision to brief a

group of Embassy officials on this highly sensitive subject

is noteworthy.  During the brief, Pastor Dan was visibly

upset in describing his discoveries and while he notes the

need to act on this information, he recognizes that this is

particularly difficult.  Post and other Embassies, if

addressing the issue, cannot name Pastor Dan as a source for

such information without compromising the level of access he

maintains.  The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission may be the

only institution that can hold the government's feet to the

fire for such activity.  However, many do not believe the

Commission is independent and that it would never implicate

the GoE for torture.