V O T E R S’ R E S P O N S ET O E P R D F ‘S L A N D S L I D E V I C T O R Y

T O

E P R D F ‘S L A N D S L I D E V I C T O R Y

Whatever its disadvantages, the Post-cold war pattern of global politics has set one positive and -- hopefully-- irreversible trend. The disintegration of the Soviet-octopus has certainly unhinged the foundations of several totalitarian satellite states. The unintended consequence of the implosion has not been any less significant. At the very least, it has eroded the ideological ground of Western backing to equally oppressive client regimes of the capitalist metropolis. It is the confluence of these dual external factors and the variegated internal dynamics of the above-cited archetypal regimes that opened up a good part of the world to democratic elections. Thus, Eurocentric and right-wing Diaspora dissidents notwithstanding, elections, as elsewhere, have become the rule rather than the exception in Africa. Not least in Ethiopia that for two-decades exerted unprecedented effort to solidify and deepen the exercise of the democratic principle of ‘One Man: One Vote’. Culminating as it has in a 4^th round national election whose result was roundly embraced by the chief stakeholders as credible: As all citizens do in democracies when an election outcome reflects their aggregated will. At any rate, today few ruling parties on the continent can draw legitimacy from sources other than some variant of globally accepted principles of democratic election. Granted not all African polling are universally accepted as faire and free. Some are scornfully dismissed as pure sham. A few are said to somewhat meet Western expectations. The bulk, however, is often deemed to fall short of international standards. Nevertheless, after everything is said and done, there is no denying that the continent is an emerging democracy. No doubt too future elections in Africa are bound to be more democratic and more credible in the eyes of the citizens of its individual states.

In no small way, the gradation of external reaction to African elections parallels the unevenness of the domestic response. A broad consensus on an election outcome has not been very common in Africa. African elections have not always ended with concession speeches or on a reconciliatory note. In many instances, the key political actors dispute and challenge the result. In worse case scenarios these disputes lead to violent conflicts. The case of Zimbabwe, Kenya and Ethiopia are only recent examples. Neither are these election conflicts resolved by an identical means. Many were settled in court: others, by a power-sharing formula. Again, the case of Zimbabwe and Kenya illustrates the latter. Yet even more markedly different was the manner the 2005 Ethiopian election crisis was settled. Normalcy in Ethiopia was restored after a showdown and subsequent legal prosecution, conviction and eventual pardon of those responsible for the violent outburst.

In this connection, it is useful to keep one thing in mind that has direct bearing on the duration and magnitude of election-related crises. More importantly, on whether it is resolved by a regime change, a power-sharing compromise or by a complete involution of the opposition. Let us explain. Assume for a moment, if you will, a critical mass of the voting population of a country rightly or wrongly feels that it has been cheated of its vote by a governing party. And, let us say it is determined to reclaim its vote through mass protest. Under such a scenario, no amount of heavy-handedness can save the incumbent from an unwanted compromise. Or worse even, from a humiliating ouster. Granted, it could manage to survive by brutal repression. But only at a crippling cost of massive loss of moral credibility, legitimacy- corroding voters’ apathy and even external sanction. Let us reverse the situation and assume that the same number of citizens see no reason to feel robed of their votes. In such circumstances, no frenzied agitations can move the voting public to take street action. No matter the clamor, the incumbent can neither be forced into a compromise solution nor compelled to relinquish its hold on power. If anything it is the rival party that might be at risk in any thusly conceived putsch-like instigation. For, if the voters’ heart is not in it, even an innocuous sounding color-coded revolution is bound to backfire. This may not be a tidy postulate. It is, nevertheless, useful to understand why, unlike its Kenyan and Zimbabwean counterparts, the Ethiopian ruling party emerged intact from the 2005 crisis. Without, that is, having to enter a power-sharing arrangement or suffering voter’s apathy much less erosion of internal legitimacy.

III

No doubt, during the 2005 crisis, the Ethiopian ruling party was rocked by street turbulence and shop closure that paralyzed the capital for almost four days. No doubt too it quelled the violent rioting by stern state measure. But unlike Kenya, the unrest was confined to Addis Ababa alone where ironically the incumbent had conceded defeat. Had it been national in scope, the outcome would have certainly been different. The government would have either been ousted, or forced into an unconstitutional deal of apportioning power to every opposition party that manages to stage a protest demonstration. Worse still, the level and geographic span of its law enforcement action would have been inordinately high. As retaining state power under such circumstance is a daunting proposal, the government would have certainly been compelled to use the full measure of its vastly superior force. So much so that --- even if it were to succeed ---- it would have undermined its legitimacy at home and diminished its standing abroad. But, none of these bleak possibilities occurred. For, as it will be recalled, the scope and intensity of the post-election confrontation was, as it were, controllable. It required no large scale action much less the kind that resulted in mayhem, mass flight or population dislocation witnessed in Kenya and Zimbabwe. No doubt it is tragic that 193 people had to die in the course of state measures taken to restore public order. However, it is more than a consolation that Ethiopia emerged from the crisis without further loss of lives: But most importantly without denting its constitutional system of government.

The reason is not hard to fathom. It primarily has to do with the bulk of the population, particularly the overwhelming majority in the regional sates. These voters had no ground to question the official ballot result. They knew that it reflected which way they voted. Hence, they had no reason to join the rebellious turbulence in Addis Ababa; obviating thereby, the need for an escalated riot-control measure. Had the case been otherwise, a good part of Addis Ababa’s residents would have given up all hope in the country’s electoral process or at least sunk into apathy. Or a large majority might even have silently agreed to boycott all subsequent elections in protest, as the Diaspora opposition thought it would. Admittedly, there was precious little that the government could have done to prevent such a silent protest. Alas, much to the extremist wing of the Diaspora’s chagrin, this too did not come to pass. To the contrary, judging by this city’s voters’ turnout during the 2007 bi-elections and the 2010 returns, the majority seems to envision a bright future with the EPRDF. These election results are signs that, like the rest of the country, this city’s residents are encouraged by the impressive development Ethiopia archived under the current leadership. The visibility of the profound changes that took place, particularly during the last five years has had a sobering effect on many. In consequence, the majority have disabused themselves of their semi-paranoid fear of the EPRDF government that had for years made them vulnerable to those whose stoke in trade is hate-politics. If truth be told, today the only one that the Addis Ababa electorate has given up hope in is the opposition.

There is an interesting parallel worth mentioning here between voters’ attitudes of Addis Ababa and Kiev (Ukraine) during the two countries’ recent elections. Those who followed media coverage of the Ukrainian presidential race would agree with us. In one exit-poll survey after another, Kievians openly said they voted to right the wrong done to the former president and present rival candidate, Viktor Yanukovych. To the very man, to boot, that they themselves unwittingly helped to throw out of office. This was, of course, done by a color-coded revolution, and backed by neoliberal forces ever eager to oust any unwanted ruling party under a smokescreen of government vote fraud. The point we are driving at here is simple but significant, if we may say so ourselves. As much as there are multiple stakeholders whose opinion on election outcomes is important, the decisive say, nevertheless, lies with the voting population. In other words, in the last analysis, what counts is how the electorate of a given state responds to its national election result. No doubt the opinion of competing parties, election observers, donors, media networks or even governments carries weight. But regardless of the saliency of their take, if, after a sober, calm and informed reflection the voting public says so, then, an election is just and democratic, full stop! As the ultimate judge that decides whether or not any election is credible is the voting public, let us now scan its response of to the 2010 EPRDF landslide election victory from the vantage point of the above argument.

It has now been months since, unofficially at least, the election result was known to the public. This is certainly a sufficient time span to gauge the settled opinion of the voting population on the matter. As we have said so in the opening paragraph, from what can be gathered so far, it can be concluded that the Ethiopian people have accepted the election process and the outcome as fair and credible. This conclusion is not only derived from a negative evidence i.e. absence of any violent protest. But from voters’ own positive response expressed through mammoth countrywide demonstrations held a day after the provisional election result was announced. As it will be remembered, over a million people took to the streets across every urban centers of the country. Chanting thunderous slogans, as they did, warning intrusive foreigners against second-guessing their democratic decisions as tabulated in the official provisional election result. The catalytic element that precipitated the angry demonstration was, of course, the arrogant and dismissive May 24 election statement issued by Human Rights Watch. We shall have an occasion to discuss this infamous text penned for no other purpose but to tarnish the 2010 election as a fraudulent exercise. Paradoxical as it may seem, however, this statement was, in a sense, a blessing in disguise. For it is the angry public reaction against its negative content of the statement that first alerted many abroad about the Ethiopian peoples' positive response to the election outcome. Indeed thenceforth only the few with an ax to grind could question the peoples’ stand on the credibility of the election result. In fact, not even the huge Addis Ababa residents who voted for the opposition, notably Medrek, have any illusions about which of the contending parties received most votes. Nor any doubt about the integrity of the electoral process. That is why the reaction to Medrek’s charges of vote rigging has been mute. Had there been any confusion among a sizable number of the urban population on this score, we would have witnessed a few protest demonstrations. This is not a whimsical guesswork. The last election has certainly shown us how even a narrowly-spread urban illusion about aggregate vote tally could easily be converted into street rioting. This time around, however, nothing of the sort happened. This is not surprising. In a climate of opinion marked by overwhelming positive response to an election outcome, it is difficult to raise issues of credibility much less to instigate a riot in the name of vote fraud. If such, then, is the predominant view of the voting public, what of the opposition parties and other relevant actors? It is to this question that we shall turn in our next posting.

July 14, 2010