T H E   M A K I N G

O F

A   L A N D S L I D E   V I C T O R Y

                                                                                                        

GENENEW ASSEFA (Genenewdesta@gmail.com)

I

On Ethiopia’s May 23 voting day marked by a cheery peaceful mood yet tempered by somber deliberativeness, the people spoke with an unequivocal voice. Their resonant voice is destined to reverberate across the land for years to come. For it is at once a resounding reaffirmation of the legitimacy of the Democratic Constitutional Order. A farewell ovation, if you will, heralding the overdue departure of hate-politics from our metropolis: And, of course, a-fourth-term EPRDF incumbency capped by a clear mandate. The unofficial, but accurate vote-tally certainly bears this out.  In fact, the aggregate ballot-count reconfirms the often unappreciated fact about EPRDF’s enormous appeal in the four biggest federal states of its candidacy. Admittedly one-sided as it is, the outcome, nevertheless, contains a cautionary reminder. It reminds us that, albeit rare, a clean-sweep can and does occur in voting systems modeled after Westminster. Granted, some measure of balance in diversity of legislative voice is the norm in this archetypal representative democracy pioneered by the Founding Fathers of English Liberalism. But theoretically at least, under this first-cross-the-post system, up to forty-nine percent of the electorate could be rendered voiceless in deliberative processes of lawmaking that apply on all citizens.  

 Similarly, though rarer even, a dysfunctional hung parliament could also emerge in a Westminster system when no party is able to win the prescribed percentage of the aggregate vote-cast. In such a situation, legitimate government can only be reinstituted by only two alternative constitutional means. Either through a rerun or, as we saw in the recent British election, by a coalition of parties whose combined vote-tally meets the requisite minimum to form government.

  In the Ethiopian case, the long-term implication of the staggering lopsidedness of the election outcome is certainly reason for concern. But what Ethiopia might face in the meantime is the lesser of the two challenges that, in very rare instances, arise in a Westminster voting system. Fortunately, though not waterproof, Ethiopia’s ethno-linguistically federalized political structure and voting regulations, lessens the possibility of a hung parliament.   Be that as it may, though not outside the pale, one cannot deny the rarity of this kind of overwhelmingly one-sided election result. For the gap in the vote cast to the runner-up and the first that crossed the post is phenomenally huge. So much so that it has even surprised EPRDF’s own campaign managers. Not even the most optimistic among them could have imagined that they would win by such a huge margin. Much less expect to defeat their opponents at almost every single election district where each competing party staked a claim.

 Doubtless, from here on, EPRDF’s cleanup would be analyzed and re-analyzed from several perspectives. And, of course, with divergent political purpose and seriousness of mind as the implications are daunting to the incumbent itself much less to the opposition. Undoubtedly too, the Addis Ababa returns would be central to any post-election research that would shed better light on the matter than can be expected from this paper. Since it is here where the most dramatic reversal of electoral fortune occurred in the 2010 polling.  It was indeed in Addis Ababa that the incumbent suffered a rout in the 2005 election. Crushed as it was by a landslide rival victory, smug pundits and complacent opposition figures had the temerity to rule out any possibility of an EPRDF comeback. But, their facile certitude notwithstanding, the tables were dramatically upturned in the present election in ways few could have anticipated.  For, up until the early hours of May 24, this chartered city was generally considered as an impregnable opposition stronghold:  An island, to use a geographic metaphor, inhospitable to even EPRDF fellow-travelers and sympathizers alike. Despite undergoing a remarkable urban renewal in recent years, this citadel of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia was still seen as an inexhaustible reservoir of support to the anti-federalist opposition. This was no doubt because its resident population was believed to be hostile to the notion of self-determination --- the hallmark of the ruling party’s defining political platform.  Thus, curiosity abounds as to how the EPRDF managed to penetrate this city once perceived as the last redoubt of the Derg-cum-revanchist opposition. And, how a party which was roundelay defeated at this epicenter of rent-seeking political entrepreneurs in 2005 could clinch all but one out of its twenty-three parliamentary seats in 2010.      

II

At any rate, any serious inquiry into EPRDF’s landslide victory has to take stock of the changes that occurred in the 2005- 2010 interregnum. As pointed out in a previous posting, crucial among the causal factors responsible for EPRDF’s clean sweep include the following: The visibility of the incumbent’s development effort and the rising indicators of the beneficiary population. This was by far the weightiest of the factors that drastically tipped the balance in the incumbent’s favor.  In the last election, for instance, few urban voters could scarcely point at any visible symbol that signified EPRDF’s commitment to lift this country out of its abject poverty and end its dependency on food aid. Between the last and recent elections, however, tangible material evidence, visible even to the casual observer, abound that corroborates EPRDF’s resolve to end poverty in the not too distant future. At any rate, as the election-day approached, no informed-voter could have ignored that, as attested by all relevant international organizations, this country has been approximating several of the Global Millennium Development Goals. Moreover, the fact the Ethiopian economy was listed as the fifth fastest growing in the world, may have also been a potent source of widespread hope. In fact, even among those who still toil to make ends meet, there has been a palpable sense of confidence in the direction the governing party has been stirring this country.  Further still, there has been widespread belief that there is light at the end of the EPRDF-led mobilization against the dark shadows of the legacy of Ethiopia’s perennial deprivation. No wonder, then, the pendulum of favorable public opinion has been shifting towards the incumbent’s end of the spectrum.  One thing bears out the truism of this observation. Put succinctly, given the rapidity of the changes that occurred in the years leading up to the 2010 elections, the urban voting public was already showing signs of leaning towards the EPDRF. Conversely, unlike 2005, no opposition campaign rhetoric of discrediting the incumbent’s performance could sway the electorate. If anything, judging by the opposition’s poor showing at the polls, denial of EPRDF’s glaring development results may have backfired.   

III

  A no less crucial element that any post-election researcher can ill-afford to overlook is the vigor with which the EPRDF organized and conducted its election campaign.  As it has obviously learned a valuable election lesson from 2005, the EPRDF was unwilling to take anything for granted. Not least the flawed assumption that the party’s manifest achievement would on its own accord translate into majority urban vote. Its election officials, therefore, allocated a decent budget and promptly mobilized the party’s 5,000,000 strong members for the campaign and ballot casting.  Nor were they to pass up the opportunity of networking with several occupation-based mass associations and notably, with the huge Youth and Women Forums of this country. No doubt as EPRDF’s Youth and Women development packages have begun to show encouraging signs, these segments of the voting public was responsive to the party’s election bid. This has also a lot to do with the EPRDF’s commitment to peace and its leadership’s record on the issue of gender equality. So, it is not surprising that women played a huge role in swaying the previously opposition-voting urban public to throw its lot with the incumbent.

 

IV

In this regard, mention has to be made of the impact that the Election Code of Conduct has had on the peacefulness of the voting process and possibly on the outcome. For one thing, its provisions have been pivotal in disciplining the electioneering campaign, the televised debate, and the media coverage of the election activities. In marked contrast to the 3rd national election, this was helpful in fostering a level playing climate, particularly in the urban centers of the country.  In other words, in ways unanticipated in 2005, poisoning the polling atmospherics by hate speech, mudslinging, character assassination and circulating mendacious rumor was strictly prohibited. In no small measure, this positive preventive intervention has significantly improved the civility of the 2010 election behavior.   As many will recall, one of the biggest gaps in the last election that the opposition deftly exploited to great advantage was the absence of a clearly-laid and a widely-accepted terms of electoral engagement. This lacuna was a boon to the opposition in that it afforded it a free hand to pollute the urban election mood by fanning inter-ethnic tension, sawing seeds of suspicion, creating mistrust, spreading fear and hysteria. Naturally, under such a scenario, citizens tend to be vulnerable to false propaganda and even demagogy that plunges many into mindless mob hysteria against their better judgment. On a less drastic level, circumstances like this rob voters of their faculty to think for themselves, including the courage to openly express their settled opinion. Such, then, was the 2005 muddied urban climate where glittery appearance was given pride of place over substance.

 Driven to the point of frenzied indignation by unremitting canard, the urban public was unable to weigh the election issues of the time with any sense of sobriety. No doubt this was in large part because the 3rd national polling was Ethiopia’s first exposure to a robust competitive multiparty election. Understandably, voters were bewildered by a confusing whirlpool of campaign rhetoric that suffocated the urban political landscape. Compounding voters’ quandary was, of course, unfamiliarity with the democratic rules that govern election speechmaking, political advertisement, and pamphleteering. For instance, many had no way of determining the truth content of the damning anti-EPRDF disinformation that the opposition routinely disseminated through the shrill tabloids and foreign media.  Needless to say, given the murkiness of the situation, the incumbent’s effort to clarify and defend itself through the little uncluttered channel there was, inevitably fell on deaf ears. The opposition, on the other hand, was keenly aware that its decisive advantage lay in exploiting the unevenness of the urban public’s pre-conceived attitudinal disposition to the contending parties. For it knew that long before the official campaigning period of the 2005 elections had begun, the arena of the bout for voters’ attention was tilted in its favor.  Besides, unencumbered by any sense of civic duty as it was, it had the luxury to cater to the baser instinct of the marginalized segment and mislead the inadequately informed public. That is why too its febrile election campaign found a ready echo among its lowest and most riot-prone street fans. Thus, the opposition’s double-edged campaign rhetoric that concurrently demonized the incumbent and mesmerized the urban voter paid off handsomely. It took years before the majority of the spell-bounded urban voters realized that the opposition had nothing positive to offer: Except perhaps two things. Emotion arousing rosy promises that, under normal circumstances, even a child could easily see through and dismiss as wishful thinking. Or the kind of cheap-thrill that only its rowdiest fans sought to derive from vandalism and rampage during the 2005 urban lawlessness.  

V

 Whereas in the present election, a level playing field obtained in terms of voters’ openness to competing ideas and unbiased receptivity to compelling arguments.  By all reckoning, every party had an equal public hearing and an opportunity to submit its case unhindered by visible or hidden disadvantages. Likewise, in marked improvement over the 2005 clamorous election, the urban voters followed the claims and counterclaims of the contending parties in characteristic Ethiopian calmness marked by inquisitive attentiveness. Alas, in a climate shot with voter levelheadedness, the EPRDF was able to communicate its message and build a persuasive case for another term of office. And, as we can deduce from the election result, it effectively used the opportunity to turn its achievements into a sensational landslide victory. If, therefore, there was anything uneven in this election, it could only have been in the quality of leadership that the contending parties rallied behind.  The irony here is it is only recently that the urban public discovered that the EPRDF has seasoned leaders that have demonstrated their ability as state ministers. But from the vantage point of this election in particular, the incumbent’s powerful asset laid with its chairman.

VI

 An intensely austere personality whose intellectual and political versatility the opposition could never match. As it will always be remembered, his public acceptance rating begun to revive with the riveting speech he delivered to the nation on the auspicious occasion of the Ethiopian Millennium. Through his subsequent regular media interviews, public addresses, and speaking tours, Meles was able to persuasively communicate to millions of Ethiopians EPRDF’s strategic policy -direction and the virtues of the constitution. Why he was effective in rallying countless citizens around his party’s core policies and the constitutionally sanctioned principle of living in unity with diversity is no secret. For, as well known, Meles has an enviable way with language that renders complex doctrinal matters and state policies intelligible even to the least initiated. It is these qualities, then, that account for the prime minister’s equally brilliant performance on the international stage. To end a long story short, the continent-wide consensus today is that there is no more qualified head of state on the continent that can best speak for Africa than the prime minster of Ethiopia.

 One can never, therefore, overstate the importance of the Meles factor as the intellectual force behind the country’s achievements in enhancing voters’ confidence in EPRDF’s leadership capabilities. The odd one out is, of course, the loudmouthed self-exiled Ethiopian Diaspora. Blinded by visceral hatred to the point of virtual madness, these fringe elements are the only exception that are disconsolately dejected by Meles’ soaring global stature. That is why these remnants of the discredited past devote much resource and energy in the futile attempt to demonize Meles as ‘Ethiopia’s Worst Enemy’. One proof that the Ethiopian people hold the opposite view is the 2010 election returns. It is, of course, too early to tell what percentage of EPRDF’s total vote was cast on Meles’ account. Going by his widespread public appeal, we can only speculate that it could well be more than what some opposition parties received in the May 23 election. Likewise, though all the pre-polling forecasts had the EPRDF ahead of its rivals, one can only conjuncture as to why the figure turned out to be so amazingly high. According to one educated guess, it may have to do with the notion of ‘protest vote’ --- only in this instance -- the opposition was at the receiving end.

VII

 In a manifestly celebratory mode, we have so far emphasized the incumbent’s development performance, vigorous campaigning and the weight its general-secretary’s stature added to its election bid as crucial factors behind the landslide victory. If we are pressed to speak in quantitative terms, we would say somewhere in the vicinity of 75% of this tally might have been due to these factors.  But, from whence came the rest? As it has an almost direct bearing on our response to this question, it is important to begin first by stressing the determinative ground why the 2010 election was peaceful. Generally speaking, any upcoming African election is often preceded by fearful apprehensiveness. In our context too, since the 2005- post-balloting tragedy bore heavily on some citizens, there was similar concern as the 2010 election year approached. However, within a few weeks into the voting year, election-anxiety dissipated into thin air as none of the foreboding signs that presaged the 2005 crises were anywhere to be seen.  In fact, as early as nine or ten months before the voting day, there were palpable indicators of widespread public confidence that none of the 2005 confrontations would be repeated in the 4th round general elections. Indeed the 2010 voting began and ended as peacefully as any election would in any of the mature democracies. No doubt there was a concerted attempt, mostly by foreign media, to discredit the peacefulness of the election environment. This was conducted through exaggerated (often false) reporting of isolated violent incidents that occurred here and there. When that failed, the tacit shifted to second-guessing the outcome as if the integrity of an election process is measured by its results.

 In a nutshell, all the negative media write-ups against this election points to one thing. An unwillingness to come to terms with the fact that the Ethiopian people have indeed learned an enduring lesson from their previous election experiences. If the civility of their participation in the current polling is any indicator, it can well be said that the Ethiopian people are close to internalizing the cardinal democratic precepts that A) it is only by strict adherence with the provisions of the constitution that they can exercise their right to vote. B) That their voice only has meaning so long as the electoral process is conducted in accordance with the provisions of the constitution.  C) That any disaffected party in such a process has to take whatever grievance it claims to have to the constitutionally established competent bodies.  And, D) perhaps most importantly, they have learned that the only lawful channel available for changing their government is through a constitutional process.

 This heightened public awareness of the inviolability of the constitution deserves closer attention. Not least for it hints at the advent of constitutionalism in this tormented country whose citizens only recently began to enjoy the fruits of democracy.  But for our immediate purpose, suffice it to point out that it is this sea change that explains why the 4th national election was peaceful from start to finish.   That is also why, unlike 2005, that parties which felt aggrieved in either the process or the outcome of this election were compelled to seek legal redress through the competent institutional expressions of the constitution.  One can even go as far as to say that it is the measure of the Ethiopian people’s reverence to the Ethiopian constitution that that opposition has fallen in line. This behavioral change cannot be overemphasized. For, these parties had for years tried to unhinge and delegitimize the supreme law of the land by targeting the crucial provisions that hold this once war-torn country together. Henceforth, therefore, we can confidently declare that constitutional legality would be streamlined at all levels of political opposition. We can also say that from here on the opposition would have little latitude to reactivate the destabilizing element it willfully inserted into the structure of multiparty competition in Ethiopia. For gone it seems is casting every EPRDF policy deemed objectionable by the opposition as a self-evident manifestation of the illegitimacy of the federal order. Hopefully too, we will be spared the cheap and shameless posturing of those who couch every election campaign as a national struggle for “Freedom.’’ As if the Ethiopian electorate is not a universally franchised and right-bearing citizenry. Or as if it is not empowered enough to exercise its constitutional right of casting its vote to either endorse or change policy directions and programs within the constitutional framework of the Federal Democratic Republic. 

 

VIII

 Let us now turn to the seemingly puzzling question we raised above regarding where the extra 25% or so of EPRDF’s vote came from. In anticipation of this question, we have hinted earlier that this may well have been a function of ‘protest vote’ against the opposition. Anyone who followed the post-2005 election events would agree that many among the Addis Ababa voting population have solid reason to be angry at the opposition.  As it would be recalled, the 2005 crisis was a direct result of the opposition leaders’ refusal to take up the parliamentary seats they campaigned for and won. There is no question that their intention was to capture state power. No less by circumventing the constitution through a cunning color-coded stratagem of mob action couched in the name of retrieving ‘stolen vote.’ At any rate, with time the population of Addis Ababa realized that it was grossly mislead by the opposition’s seductive public-relation gimmicks.  As it gradually understood the political importance of holding parliamentary seats regardless of the number, it felt betrayed by the opposition’s unwillingness to represent its interests in the legislative chamber.  As the electorate had no other means of showing its indignation, it may, therefore, have decided to punish the opposition’s stupendous abdication of responsibility by casting its vote to the ruling party. Nonetheless, though understandable, this somewhat spiteful-sounding motive can by no means explain the whole story. A more plausible explanation for the bulk of the ‘protest vote’ must lie elsewhere. A likelier reason is the manifest decline of public confidence in the so-called opposition in Ethiopia whose leadership is neither able to offer any clear-cut alternative. Nor capable of avoiding bickering within itself over matters, no less, of little public interest. 

Finally, let us recap our main contention. Throughout the text we have consistently maintained that, though surprising, EPRDF’s landslide victory is explainable by analytical isolation of a set of factors. From our vantage point, these are: accelerated development, greater public understanding of the country’s constitutional process, effective campaigning and loss of confidence in the opposition. From here on, a profitable way of continuing this discussion would be scanning the chief actors’ response to the election result.  Such a follow-up discussion would, we believe, contribute to a better understanding of the pattern of democratic election behavior in Ethiopia.