The “Beijing Consensus” and Implications for Africa’s Development

Getachew Mequanent

Nov 28, 2010

Allow me to seize this opportunity to send a congratulatory message to the leaders and members of the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) on the 30th anniversary of its formation. We thank them for their hard work to support our relatives in their struggle to lift themselves out of poverty. Coined by the former editor of Times magazine Joshua Ramo in 2004, the term “Beijing Consensus” has now become almost mainstreamed in the literature on contemporary China. It is meant to show that China – a rising global power – has different policy thinking and practice in diplomacy, trade and foreign assistance:

• In contrast to the now discredited “we-know-best” approach of the Washington/post-Washington Consensus, the Beijing Consensus puts an emphasis on self-directed development and equal donor-recipient relationships;
• Unlike the West’s discourse that is focused on social, political, economic and environmental crises in developing countries, China talks about history, geography, resource endowment and trade opportunities;
• Unlike the World Bank and IMF officials who fly first class to lecture everybody on predetermined solutions, the Chinese use forums, such as the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, to discuss strategic trade and investment opportunities;
• Unlike Western donors who have made acceptance by developing country governments of political and market reform packages as conditions for their aid, China provides aid with no strings attached except recognition of the one-China policy (no diplomatic ties with Taiwan); and
• Unlike Western donors that select aid recipient countries (based on historical associations, such as colonialism or geo-political importance), China enters almost any country with attractive trade and investment proposals.

Perhaps all this rhetoric understates the efforts of Western donors to reform the international aid architecture. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the expansion of G8 membership (now G20) are notable examples. Still, the author of an influential book The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (2010), Deborah Brautigam, says that the West has a lot to learn from China, such as focusing aid on long-term development and making business simple and easy. In fact, the Chinese have brought badly needed investment, trade and market access to Africa. There are as many as 2,000 Chinese firms engaged in construction, mining, agriculture, manufacture and other sectors. The African Development Bank says that trade between Africa and China is now more than US 110 billion dollars.

However, critics argue that China is simply another patronizing foreign power using African countries to project its global ambitions for power and influence. Many others are genuinely concerned that Africans may not be able to manage the opportunities from China’s engagement. For example, African governments should be able to negotiate how the Chinese companies import their own workers (and not limit local employment opportunities) and ensure that they do not outcompete African manufacturing locally and globally (one study shows that they already have). Second, African governments should carefully study China’s approach of bartering natural resources for infrastructure (getting repaid for their project finances in oil, gas or other raw materials). Third, the Chinese should not downplay the issue of human rights, especially in conflict affected areas. True, Western powers have always supported corrupt and autocratic regimes in order to advance their own geo-political and commercial interests. Although accusing China of doing the same could be taken as hypocrisy, one does not justify ignoring human rights issues which affect the daily lives of men, women and children.

China’s no-interference and no-strings-attached aid and trade policy means that African governments may be getting an incentive, if not an encouragement, to resist pressures from Western countries to adopt reforms that they do not want to implement. This may be true in the area of politics. African political opposition parties traditionally drew their inspiration from neo-liberalism, in many cases as tactical politics. The game is simple: Western donors make multiparty elections, free media, vibrant civil society, human rights and other normative issues part of their aid agenda. Opposition elites adopt such narratives to negotiate political space with ruling parties, which gradually enables them to seize state power. There is no question that donors would continue to do what they have been doing (support for elections, human rights advocacy, civil society, etc), but African governments could ignore them. African opposition elites may then be forced to fend for themselves, which may not be a bad thing, since it can encourage them to be more in-ward looking and articulate politics that focuses on the real needs of ordinary citizens.

In short, the rising influence of the Beijing Consensus, other emerging economies like India and Brazil, as well as new generation of Western diplomats, have changed international development thinking, which in turn requires one to assess the performance of nations on basis of their record in achieving or progress to achieve economic growth and social stability. The November 2010 issue of the conservative Economist magazine wrote that China’s state-owned firms are on “a shopping spree” in the global market and everybody should stay open for their business (state capitalism works). President Barack Obama’s UN speech praised those countries including Ethiopia which have made progress towards achieving MDGs, not those which are indentified by the Washington-based conservative think tank Freedom House as democracies. The fact that the Ethiopian government got defended against the Human Rights Watch (which seriously alleged government misuse of aid) by field representatives of donor country governments shows the reality of diplomacy in changing times. The Ethiopian government has in fact built a reputation as an effective manager of foreign aid. It always acknowledges the existence of local level governance problems and punishes corruption.

Since I wrote this piece to contribute to public knowledge on current affairs, I would like to discuss a few points relation to Ethiopia. We learn from the experience of China that a strong national leadership is important to ensure the implementation of domestic policies while promoting international trade and investment. And the successful Chinese leaders (who now have over US $1.5 trillion cash in foreign reserves) command so much respect that nobody – not even anyone among chauvinist Western journalists - dares to ask them how long they have been in power or how long they intend to stay. The reason, as we have come to know, is that these days elections and rotation of political power among elites, while necessary and important, are no longer exclusive measures of good governance. Development matters more.

In Ethiopia, EPRDF party members and supporters have propagated a party transformation project that will result in Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and other top brainers leaving politics. This is done without even first identifying replacements with strong political zeal and visions to lead the party in this critical period of Ethiopian history. EPRDF may run the risk of capacity erosion. It is understandable that Prime Minister Meles personally got feed up with relentless criticisms coming from the Ethiopian middle class and intellectual elites (who historically dominated society) and foreign journalists (whose sources of knowledge are also the same middle class and intellectual elites). At issue is having a strong national leadership that ensures that implementation of Ethiopia’s ambitious development plans to produce results that help the poor masses lift themselves out of poverty. In fact, the recent rhetoric of “transformation” appears to have raised expectations as if results could be produced over night. The fact that Meles has created ministerial posts for monitoring the implementation of the five-year plan shows the level of anxiety about the daunting challenges ahead. What would be better is lowering expectations starting with re-scheduling Meles’ retirement for 2020 and encouraging other intellectual and ideological heavy weights to stay around a bit more to provide support for the government. The Ethiopian economy and global environment have grown in complexity. EPRDF better not get distracted by its own organizational change, instead of focusing on mobilizing resources and the Ethiopian public to carry out its development plans.

Of course, I would not have taken this position if there is a political alternative that creates a common vision to organize and coordinate progressive forces in Ethiopian society. The current opposition parties, devoid of clear vision and developmental agenda, are fading away from political scene. And the Ethiopian Diaspora opposition is now dominated by hooligans and thugs that have become known for organizing protests and disrupting public meetings. Perhaps all this may be a sign of positive turnaround for opposition politics. We may see the emergence of a dynamic political coalition consisting of former EPRDF members (who leave for the civil service and private sector and then re-enter politics), commercial elites and social and liberal democrats of the current opposition. Present day MEDREK can be a good organizational model except that the MEDREK coalition is dominated by old guard elites and political retirees (including the mighty Seye Abraha) who have no new energy and fresh thinking; these folks have not actually helped the opposition. In any case, my vision is that the future coalition party will have forward looking political and policy agenda with more experience and confidence of engagement with the Ethiopian population at grassroots levels.

Ottawa, Canada