

Settling the Accounts of ‘Revolutionary Democracy’ in Ethiopia after Meles

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Abstract

‘Revolutionary Democracy’ is by far the high watermark of Meles’s contribution for the ontology of Ethiopia’s politics, in particular, those of developing states, in general. Meles and his party came up with revolutionary democracy at the very critical time when liberal democracy was taken for granted by many scholars as the sole post-Soviet global ideology. For this and other reasons, revolutionary democracy remains to be so far the most controversial topic of the Ethiopian elite, sharply divided up for and against. However, revolutionary democracy as a paradigm had to undergo periodic refinements by its authority, PM Meles Zenawi, to adapt it with timely changes of structural scale in side and outside. Revolutionary democracy appears by Meles and his party to be an option over liberal (new) democracy in Ethiopia’s context for the last 25 years. Now, Meles departing us in death, and Ethiopia having been under change in the previous decade, what are the essence, status and fate of revolutionary democracy? How could one settle the account of revolutionary democracy right now and ahead in contrast to liberal democracy and its various branches and brands? This paper is an attempt at investigating into background pre-and-post Meles socio-economic morphosis to test the existing homeostasis of revolutionary democracy and foretell its future ahead.

Introductions

Revolutionary democracy, at face value, is constructed from these two separate words. Both terms were new for Ethiopia’s politics since the advent of Derg in 1975¹. Derg maintained the terms ‘revolution’ and ‘democracy’ as heated politico-ideological rhetoric to the last days of its down fall. That these strange terms were followed by the worst events of brutal treatments of Ethiopians by their own government probably left in the minds of many one of the worst memories of political rule.

The overall crises that prevailed in Derg’s Ethiopia caused a widely bubbling demand among average citizens for alternatives not only to Derg as a regime itself but to all its approaches, phraseologies and vocabularies, including ‘revolution’ and ‘democracy’ etc, that proved but nothing except failure.

The grim fact was that this alternative of rule was EPRDF but yet with these terminologies as its key world view in the era of global capitalist domination. Many citizens could not believe that any post-Derg regime would sloganize again these rhetorical and radicalized dictums. This was and is what makes the controversy over revolutionary democracy extremely intense and heavily polarized. The former PM Meles Zenawi was at the front line of the national epistemological warfare, at least, at elite

¹ Abera Yeman-ab (1987), the Defeat of the Ethiopian Revolution and the Role of the Soviet Union. *Proceedings, II International Conference on the Horn of Africa*, Amy 29-30, 1987, New York: New School for Research.

level, who now is officially known as its key theorizer and reformer. Meles was the number one articulator and debater of revolutionary democracy alternately and in contrast to liberal democracy.

As time went by, one could witness in Ethiopia that there have been partial but expanding elite and grass root recognitions and nodding head to some crucially dubious principles of Meles and his party. Federalism, agricultural-development-led industrialization, micro-enterprise development as a state-sponsored socio-economic project, etc, now have grown one way or another, as part of the daily lives of Ethiopians². Most opposition parties including those known for their ultra-conservative state painfully and hesitantly drink the waters of these values. Revolutionary democracy however is the least topic in causing value retrenchments among opposing positions particularly between the Ruling Party and its Opponents.

At his unexpected death, revolutionary democracy is one of the issues Meles left behind on his table. In parallel, the private press and opposition parties also renew their battles against it after Meles. The question here is: what did Meles precisely mean by revolutionary democracy as opposed to liberal democracy? How is its present situation explained in the absence of Meles while Ethiopia is confirmed globally as one of the fastest growing economies? In what ways do growth and the death of its chief authority, Meles, affect revolutionary democracy? Is it needed any more or shall it persist longer and longer?

In an attempt to answer these questions, this paper shall discuss first divergent background views and the essences of revolutionary democracy versus liberal democracy entirely with Meles in direct perspective.

1. Revolutionary Democracy: Perceptions and Interpretations

I strongly believe that democracy as a manner, norm, and rule of life and relations is the domain of all citizens as people of Ethiopia. It is however the abstract concept and the language that tend to fall within the colony of urban based-elites, not only in our country, but also every where in the world. It is philosophically unrealistic to expect all Ethiopian elites to have unquestioned consensus, if not agreements, over the exact essence of democracy in Ethiopia's reality. Democracy is inherently a unique system, nonetheless, because elite divergence on what it means itself is its essential part than its threat³.

² Addis Re-ay (2009). Bankrupted Politicians Using Religion as a Cover for Hidden Political Interests: *vol. 3. No. 7.*

³ Unfortunately, opposition politics in Ethiopia, except a few groups, is an anti-regime program, possibly unique and strange to many other democratization experiences. What this means is understandable: other opposition parties in other developing states tend to make a sectional difference over, for example, fiscal, trade, investment, etc, policies without challenging the entire political construct; in Ethiopia, despite improvements in recent time, the showdown is over the Constitutional order itself. What an unlucky experience it is for an independent citizen! Anti regime political program as an idea, for me, at least, is horrible to hear particularly after Ethiopia has sneaked into one of the marvelous socio-economic dynamisms since a decade ago. Cyclic theory of social change says: frequent rewritings of the 'rules of the game' are finally writing nothing.

Without delving into discussions on the meanings and underpinnings of these divergent brands of democracy in the context of Ethiopia, let us see the logical qualities and levels of arguments and counter arguments between the two opposite blocks. Both blocks argue consistently that the democracy view of each other does not work in Ethiopia. EPRDF is probably the sole party in Ethiopia and Africa to advance revolutionary democracy as a growth and stability path. Due to its solitude, revolutionary democracy is posed as a common target of opposition parties and their leaders. While we shall see revolutionary democracy in detail latter on, now, let us see Opposition arguments in refusal to it.

The first limitation in the dialogue over what revolutionary democracy means, as implied above, has been the conscious or unconscious logical error made on the part of critics, which scholars call the '*fallacy of association*.'⁴ This fallacy is like thinking this way: Ahmed is a fanatic Muslim; Gebre Micheal is his best friend to death. So, Gebremiceal is also a fanatic Muslim.

To begin with, in the debate for election 2010, I was a bit astonished at hearing one of the former authorities of the principle, Gebru Asrat⁵ saying oddities. Gebru dismissed the very idea of “revolutionary democracy” as an unworkable paradigm in Ethiopia by defining it as a ‘theoretical approach about political rule in a transition period toward socialism’. He criticized EPRDF for holding it so far, which, Gebru reminded, TPLF advanced while they were Marxists-Leninists. This definition, however, surprisingly, by the time of Gebru’s criticism, was already obsolete for Meles and EPRDF leaders because they completely redefined it to mean the opposite.

How can one suspect that Gebru, just after what EPRDF calls “Renewal Movement”, was completely detached both physically and spiritually from his former organization, even not to hear such fundamental changes in basic definitions?

The other case of *fallacy of association*, I remember, was that which I read at the former Amharic private newspaper, Addis Neger⁶. It was technically probably the worst mistake in the attempt to define “revolutionary democracy” where the editor-in-chief argued that it means “the Developmental State”. It is difficult to tell whether this definition was a mockery or a serious one. Despite several commonalities, equating revolutionary democracy with the developmental state amounts to saying all developmental states are necessarily revolutionary democrats in their political values. Addis Neger however did not interpret it that way, or, at least, in tune with Meles’s all-time metaphoric abstraction. For Meles, both revolutionary democracy and the developmental state are results of ‘chewing before swallowing.’

4 Jeffrey Dean, Logical Fallacies in Politics: Appeal to Pity Yahoo! Contributor Network Dec 4, 2007
"Share your voice on Yahoo! website

⁵ Addis Admas, 2010. Gebrue Asrat said s=this during interview on the conduct of the election and debates.

⁶ Addis Neger Weekly (2009) what is Revolutionary Democracy? Feature, December 30, Vol. 2. Number 27

What political scientists call the *fallacy of reductionism*⁷ has also been common in many circles on understanding revolutionary democracy. In his dialogue in 2003 with Addis Ababa university staff for three weeks, Meles was asked about what he meant by revolutionary democracy. I remember that he gave a detailed answer for many more than an hour or so. When participants were asked about their reflections, one teacher raised hand and said: I have now substantially understood by what you mean revolutionary democracy; for me, it is nebulous. By nebulous, the teacher meant ‘forcibly patched combinations of unrelated parts into an amorphous whole.’

Another comment I read on the former Awuramba⁸ weekly where a foreign residing Ethiopian professor said in an interview is also worth citing. I made sense of the *fallacy of reductionism* here, too. In this, he said: I tried understand the meanings of revolutionary democracy; finally, what I discovered is that all what it means is that EPRDF is never ready to share or handover its political power to any one else. Many other private press guests at present also hold similar fallacy in their reductionist interpretations of revolutionary democracy to mean ‘one party domination, affiliation into the Chinese-led new international super-power orbit, public ownership of land and state development corporations, democratic centralism’ and others.

One may examine “revolutionary democracy” out of the various literatures and the several EPRDF documents directed at its own members, before and after what they call “Renewal Movement” in 2002-3. “Revolutionary democracy” as a theoretical and philosophical guideline of EPRDF, though largely an inner party issue, has been refurbished at different phases and encounters of the Organization in the last more than thirty years. The one problem is that, consistent with the established tradition of EPRDF, most ideological and policy documents are absolutely anonymous and devoid of reference lists in that they bear no names of individual authorities.

From methodological and academic points of view, Merera Gudina⁹, an author who has had better opportunities, made another type of logical fallacy, *fallacy of false source*, in trying to fill the above gap. He writes and repeatedly says “revolutionary democracy” of EPRDF is ‘copy of a Maoist dictum’. Merera made not only this source fallacy but also refrained from detailing what the “Maoist dictum” itself means. Another politician, Ledetu Ayalew¹⁰ also committed same logical error, in his, of course, genuine attempt to trace the original and current meanings of revolutionary democracy. He wrote he searched for the meanings of “Revolutionary Democracy” from the Marxist-Leninist

⁷ Sodaro, J. Michael (2001), *Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction*. McGraw Companies, Inc., New-York: USA

⁸ See Awuramba 2011.

⁹ Merera Gudina (2004), *Competing Nationalisms and the Quest for Democracy in Ethiopia: 1960-2003*. Shaker Publishing: Netherlands.

¹⁰ Lidetu Ayalew (2010), *Medlot: Be Ethiopia Ye Sostegna Amarchenet Mena*. Progress Printing Press: Addis Ababa.

Dictionary written by the Derg regime as far back as 1986. This is, in Amharic proverb, like searching for the dung in the absence of the cow.

And, how can one search for its exact meaning? The academic answer is brief and to the point: what “revolutionary democracy” means is what Meles and EPRDF leaders, its authorities, say it is. This is the common practice every where, leave alone a political program of a party. Thus, concepts in social sciences do not have standards like medicines and material products. According to the standard practice, either conceptual or operational definition is the exclusive privilege of the author. In other words, revolutionary democracy in Ethiopia could be subjected to political science enquiries just only from Meles-EPRDF’s angle.

I again observed another logical fallacy made by one of the EPRDF veteran leaders, Tefera Walawa, during election debate in 2005. One of the opposition speakers, Lidetu, accused EPRDF of injecting the doctrine of revolutionary democracy into the education system of the country which was,, he argued, a practice of politicizing the secular establishment of modern education. The issue involved here was that whether the scope and applications of revolutionary democracy was to extend beyond the inner relations of EPRDF to affect other areas of government or not. Tefera replied that there was nothing in Ethiopia that lied out of borders of revolutionary democracy. By extending revolutionary democracy to non-member and non-target elements, Tefera made what scholars call a *fallacy of composition*.

Against this background, however, as said above, Meles repeatedly stressed that revolutionary democracy was a matter of inner party doctrine applicable to its members. No one can find revolutionary democracy in any of constitutional provisions, nor can you find it across all government policy documents. I argue that the heavy influence of revolutionary democracy on state functions is indirect through the behaviors and actions of EPRDF leaders from the chairman down to locality cadres.

2. What Did ‘Democracy’ Mean to Meles?

The quality, extent, manner of implementations and exercise of democracy with its liberal connotation is not only a new thrust but also a dangerous experience in developing states. In poor states where political power goes beyond state-citizen relation; it is also a source of real power and privilege for allocation of both values and the scare resources that it is, in the words of Whisker¹¹ a “life-and-death” matter. The bitter truth is that liberalism-permeated democracy, as evidently seen in many developing states, makes political power a goal in itself rather than a means/tool of rapid socio-economic development. Liberal democracy in poor states, in the words of Horowitz,¹² is nothing but a ‘fantasy’

¹¹ Schramm Wilber (1964), *Mass Media National Development: the role of information in developing countries*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

¹² Donald Horowitz (1993), Democracy in Divided Societies. *Journal of Democracy*: Vol. 4, no. 4.

in which urban elites in the capital cities play casino games excluding the largest agrarian, illiterate and rural majority population.

One can safely say the search for the appropriate typology of working democracy for Ethiopia was Meles's life long worry and project. I find it proper to mention the worst 1989 Chinese challenge in grappling with domestic neoliberal pressures supported by global liberal forces. At this point of time, Meles and EPRDF were militarily making fastest headways to Addis Ababa. As Aregawi Berhe writes, it was time a year after Meles formulated revolutionary democracy as a make-shift ideological guideline both to socialist and liberal democracies. The Chinese leadership which was traditionally strong and formidable was challenged before 25 years by a historically biggest student protest demonstration and unrest involving some 300,000 well coordinated university students¹³.

I realized there were still confusions across the board about what Meles was precisely saying from question-answer and interview releases. A teacher from Addis Ababa university for example asked him whether he was trying to baptize the university staff into accepting revolutionary democracy or not. Meles replied he was simply discussing on the meanings of revolutionary democracy for curiosity in his government capacity. And he said he would be happy if they accepted revolutionary democracy not in his capacity as a prime minister but as only the EPRDF Chairman. The message was clear: revolutionary democracy was an agenda within EPRDF but the debate was between EPRDF officials as Ruling Party with non-EPRDF audience.

Reporter Weekly,¹⁴ the Amharic version, also came up with a puzzled comment over what it calls 'unusually contradictory answers' by PM Meles for a question by a foreign journalist from AFP. The metaphoric comment ran saying: two tongues into one head. The reason was that the journalist asked Meles: what is the type of your democracy? Meles's answer was: our democracy is democracy; it does not bear any adjective. Reporter's confusion came how Meles denied that his democracy was revolutionary democracy. The source of the confusion was also that the Reporter's commentator did not realize that Meles was making the interview not as EPRDF chairman but as a Prime Minister. Democracy, for Meles, as a state leader is what the Constitution says and organizes even though it also bears some basic influences of revolutionary democracy.

At the threshold events that led to the renewal movement in 2002, Meles reiterated for the Central Committee of EPRDF that the Constitution promotes 'white capitalism.' This led many opposition leaders and scholars to making yet other more serious logical blunders.

¹³ These Chinese students were die-hard supporters of one brand of liberal democracy, procedural democracy. Student leaders articulately demanded that established democratic procedures like periodic, fair and free election, timely sequences in the exercise of democracy and due process of law, etc, should be respected first, and then, democracy comes and grows by itself as a value among the people. Promoting democratic values and cultures should be left for citizens themselves through the interplay among free press, political parties, interest groups, the civil society and the like. If these were all constitutionally guaranteed so that democracy protects itself from the overt and covert manipulation of the ruling party or any other social force. The Chinese government replied that these demands did not have all the said social foundations so that the question in Chinese context was absurd.

¹⁴ Reporter (2002), Look Toward the Broad Masses, too. (Editorial) *Vol. 6. Number 14*.

The key question of confusion was: if you say you are revolutionary democrats, how do you argue that the Constitution of your own penning is a liberal document? The black hole in the difficult task of understanding Meles in relation to democracy was a result of failure to distinguish between the descriptive part of the argument and that of the prescriptive section. The Constitution, in short, enlists many prescriptions of revolutionary democracy, which, according to Meles, justifies why there was a need for a transition period toward capitalism¹⁵

.The question is: if Meles said ‘democracy’ as his guide simply as a Prime Minister and ‘revolutionary democracy’ as an EPRDF chairman, what did he mean by this? In his literatures, Meles made liberal democracy a strategic target of his bitter criticism; he identified its major shortcomings as a justification to rather opt for revolutionary democracy as a replacement in Ethiopia by EPRDF. Leaving what he said about ‘democracy with out adjective’ aside for the time being, how did Meles explain and reformulate liberal democracy into revolutionary democracy and made it a party guideline?

This question calls for one logical imperative to be used in the search for the key essence of revolutionary democracy; Meles must have first adequately studied and understood liberal democracy before criticizing it and formulating revolutionary democracy. Thus, the right method is to study Meles himself in light of the essentials of liberal democracy first and to go to revolutionary democracy next.

3. Liberal Democracy and Meles

Meles consistently argued that liberal democracy has many progressive aspects from which one in poor states may take lessons. Liberal democracy however has two fundamental limitations that make it short of structurally fitting and serving as a socio-economic growth demand in Ethiopia: differential in social foundation and inherent weakness borne with it. Meles bitterly argued that liberal democracy can never be for these two limitations as a ‘default preference’ simply and easily to pick it from the shelves of Europe and America. I understand that ‘default preference’ is an argument which goes asking as was the case in Addis Neger in 2009: why do we worry about devising and rewriting another brand of democracy while we could replicate easily the historically tested and proven neo-liberal democracy and apply it to Ethiopia?

By ‘fundamental differential in social foundation’ as directly compared against Ethiopia, Meles meant the following four things, which are consistent with a dozen of critical argument by other scholars:

¹⁵ Samueal Assefa once also challenged Meles arguing this way: neo-liberalism by its nature is elastic; it can stretch like a plastic to encompass newly emerging collective groups and their demands, even agrarian communities, and so on. Ledetu Ayalew used this argument to justify the preference of his party to liberal democracy. The reasoning at the background was once liberalism is established in Addis Ababa, it has an expansionary capacity to engulf the whole of Ethiopia. These arguments were still based on shaky logical grounds because they ignored the imperatives of fundamental differentials in socio-economic structures: liberal democracy in its own natural setting versus liberal democracy in the settings of pre-capitalist societies. The speakers were subconsciously standing on the streets of London or Paris. What Samuel calls ‘the elastic nature liberal democracy’ is rightly to be judged in its stretching all along the space between London versus the remote Ireland or between Paris versus the far eastern French Gaul districts. This is what Meles corrected as a basic contradiction in the discourse over democratizing a developing state.

Firstly, liberal democracy in its origination is the result of a successful bourgeoisie revolution in the context of Europe and America. From the angle of political historiography of liberalism, Meles meant that it was capitalism and the successful *bourgeoisie class* (not group) that surrogated liberalism and not vice versa. There is no a single country in the world that developed a capitalist society through liberalism, which was only its product and never its midwife;

Secondly, for reasons above, liberalism never functions without its natural social base, that is, the liberal and progressive bourgeoisie and a fast grown middle-class antagonized by an equally fast grown working class (not group). As such, liberalism, urban society, middle class within the parcels of a fast prospering bourgeoisie class and industrial economy are inherently intertwined¹⁶. These socio-economic factors are absolutely inseparable that one could never exist and work without the other. No where in the world could one find liberal democracy well functioning by itself without these social forces at its background;

Thirdly, liberal democracy came to the scene in 1668 after the bourgeoisie revolution snatched political power from the hands of the backward monarchical system in England as formulated by John Locke¹⁷. Both John Locke and his liberal philosophy could never logically appear within a pre-capitalist society as this meant nothing but the child before the father or the mother. Liberalism was the spirit of capitalism¹⁸. Liberalism adequately bridged the moral gap created due to the collapse of the moral, philosophical, material and political foundations of the monarchical system. Now the British people had got a value guideline that they could easily marshal their “temporarily fragmented value sediments” into minimum mental baselines quickly evolving into a working “mental order”. All their ideological, political, value and ethical conflicts continue but all within a perfect orbit of “*modus vivendi*” drawn by liberalism;

Fourthly, this does not mean that liberal democracy is a top-down socio-economic growth path. Liberalism is only an intellectual design of how social relations, values and practices of a society of post-bourgeoisie revolution could conform to the new realities. Only capitalist governments in Europe made liberalism the pillar of western moral and socio-political guidance. The United States which was artificially crafted out of the logic of bottom-up state formation as a settler society with the mental implantations of Liberalism, founded its Constitution on the basic pillars of Lockean Liberalism (the US Constitution, 1779). They were able do so because a capitalist class was already established earlier.

¹⁶ Pervile Sqire, James M. Lidslay e.tail. (1997). *Dynamics of Democracy* .Chicago: Brown & Benchmark.

¹⁷ John Locke (1689), *Treatises of a Civilian Government Two*. London, United Kingdom.

¹⁸ Robert Diclerico and Allan S. Hammock (2001) *Points of View: Readings in American Poltics*. McGraw Hill Companies Inc: New York.

The western world speeded up its capitalistic advancement, now armed with liberalism, that began to unfold itself with a set of general trends and proclivities common to almost all classic liberal societies. For Meles, Liberal democracy, sooner or later, grew to become what he calls ‘the hegemonic value system’ of capitalist societies. Meles seemed to have borrowed the concept ‘hegemony’ from the Italian socialist writer Antonio Gramsci who is quoted to use term for the first time).

By ‘inherent limitations of liberalism’, Meles spoke several times, at several national and international forums, through his many writings and public speeches that liberalism produced a type of state whose hands are tied and kept inactive even where the market could not serve serious social demands. Historically, Meles reminds some of the following phenomena for his arguments:

1. The 1930th economic depression in the entire liberal capitalist world was one and probably the major catastrophic event borne out of liberalism’s inherent limitations. It particularly hit hard the United States down to its foundations that the state pondered over different alternatives to mitigate and finally deal with the worst situation.
2. The emergence of the former Soviet Union as a competing and alternate ideological block representing the socialist camp as of 1917. The western liberal world began to worry that the Soviet case might precipitate similar feelings in the major liberal countries where the working class used to lead one of the lowest life conditions.
3. The worst aftermaths of the First and the Second World War left many populations in the major liberal states of Europe to face harsh life conditions, on unprecedented scale. It was the anxiety of the liberal world leaders that the worst after war condition might provoke some populations to stand against capitalism as a system to the detriment of liberalism and advantages of socialism.

These factors combined together called for liberal state leaders to revise liberalism with fundamental principles maintained, to get some loopholes for the state to intervene in economic management in favor of the poor and the disadvantaged that could not shoulder the bitter effects of the overall crises. This convinced American leadership to engage in the management of the market to ease socio-economic malaises through their ‘New Deal’ and ‘Great Society’ programs. In Europe, a dozen of post-liberal democracy brands proliferated challenging, one way or another, the dominance of classical liberalism among the many let us look at one: ‘social democracy.

‘Social Democracy’ is a political argument which has now developed as a fully fledged political approach in Europe has appeared following the fastest socio-economic development in many capitalist countries. Social democracy has been an extension of Marxist socialism by its origin but progressed to revise itself that revolutionary change of the capitalist regime is not important. According to Kenneth Jowet¹⁹, Social Democracy was developed to come to the scene and dominate European politics under the

¹⁹ Khan M.(2005), Review of DFID’s Governance Target Strategy Paper. mines (for DFID)

custodianship of the German Social Democratic Party²⁰ (SDP, in German) which was founded in 1875.

It says capitalism over a century of its development evidently grows by unavoidable socio-political factors more humane, morally balanced and dynamic contrary to the wrong prediction of Karl Marx. It, more over, grows gradually to be more open to participatory citizenship and subservient to citizens' supervision. The most important point of departure in social democracy has been, however, that it has come up with a revolutionary concept of citizenship in a wealthy capitalist country in which wealth has been to be redistributed equitably among citizens in a working "well fare system".²¹

4. Meles and Neo-Liberal Democracy

The era of neo-liberalism set in into motion as a state-level move to reinstating classical liberalism back into life in the 1980s. The coming to office of the most conservative prime minister, Margaret Thatcher in England in the first half of the 1970s followed by Ronald Reagan of the United States in the early 1980s gave a new lease of life for liberalism in its neo-liberal form. This change was a retreat to the principles enshrined by Johan Locke and Adam Smith

After three centuries of liberal consolidations and retreats, ups and downs, rises and falls, neo-liberalism now reasserted itself as keeping loyalties to its classic premises. When Meles and his party EPRDF arrived in Addis Ababa as regime breakers and regime founders in 1991, it was neo-liberalism that was on western tables to challenge them. Meles like Giddens A, and Gilmour²² identified most of the following characteristics as the fundamental features of the western liberal society at the age of neo-liberalism, too.

I. Monetarism

Monetarism is, despite all pragmatic modifications, one of the fundamental values and principles governing relations at the free market enterprise among all socio-economic actors. Every engagement—national growth, economic decision making at all levels, innovation, entrepreneurship, personal development and social achievement , national distribution, production, reproduction and productivity, supplies pricings and consumptions, are all calculated in terms of the monetary advantage and profit that they accrue for the individual. Money becomes the most standardized index of successes and failures, present investments and future promises, all decisions in the market including fundamental social relations like the family, now the nuclear family, joint ventures, even

²⁰ As Michael Sodaro says political parties have no other rationale to exist and function than offering adequately substantiated alternatives to the weak sides of the programs and practices of the incumbent ruling party. For this to happen, the only way is measuring public opinion as a fundamental baseline.

²¹ Korpi, W.(1978) *the working class in Welfare Capitalism*.Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.

²² Giddens A. (1998), *the Third Way: The Revival of Social Democracy*. Polity Press: Cambridge. Gilmour. I (1992), *Dancing with Dogma: Britain and Thatcherism*. Simon and Schuster: London.

friendships and hostilities. Money practically grew along the Lockean social calculus as a matter that determines the extent and social position of the individual personality.

The human element of growth was grossly degenerated and made irrelevant for reasons we discussed above: every thing is dictated by market forces—the rule of the invisible hand in the operation of demand and supply in tandem fashion and rules. Underlying monetarism is “rugged individualism,” that is, now reinforced by the Smithian creation of post-Locke capitalistic individual human personality which borne out from the capability or incapability to exploit the opportunities in the free market to self –help out of the competitive industrial and commercial enterprise. The issue is not only an accepted moral category of the capitalist community but also essentially an economic principle and networking embraced by the majority of the society in a typical liberal capitalist order. Even if the government in power needs to change it, it is absolutely impossible as it goes to mean a social change through regime break by itself, in the retrogressive sense of the term-hindsight. How can then, the poor and the unsuccessful section of the society fare in a monetarist societal arrangement?

“Trickle down Strategy” is the immediate practical answer.

II. “Trickle down Strategy”²³

“Trickle down strategy” holds the basic liberal tenet that differences among human beings, as far as exploiting open opportunities are concerned, in levels of capacity, innovations, entrepreneurship, and business qualities are unavoidable natural phenomena. Thus, the difference in the level of income, wealth distribution and social status is logically the natural reflection of this asymmetric human capacity and distribution. All members of a society can never strike a similar degree of achievement under conditions of free market economy where the better mind secures the better opportunity.

This ‘prevailing inequality of capacity’ logic leads one to the social position that every citizen in a capitalist society can never be equally rich. As a rule, the number of losers in the market is to outnumber the total number of winners. Winners grow to be owners in thrift while losers became their workers, as winners can not do every job by themselves. Owners are individual human beings limited by time and place; they have limited interests to serve as any human creature. As the result, according to liberal arguments, the rich invest by employing as many citizens as possible. This opens a wide conduit of wealth distribution from the few which to percolate in droplets into the pockets of the many poor through trickling down to earth.

With this definition supplied by liberalism, “trickle down strategy” can be equated with the Amharic proverb that goes saying “what the lion leaves over (food from a prey) benefits also the hyena. Because, the lion always does not eat the whole body of a prey animal, and hence, obliged to leave the rest to rotten. The hyena intervenes before it gets rotten, however. Some liberal economists call this law of capitalist development as a

²³ Korpi, W.(1978) *the working class in Welfare Capitalism*.Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.

“life-bout theory” where those who cruised sufficiently dependably risked while those could not sink as an objective course capitalist development.

III. Market Fundamentalism²⁴

President Coolidge of the United States is quoted usually for his remark that “the business of America is business” David Lipson writes. The president’s remark is a perfect representation of the classic liberal thought that capitalism survives only if the market survives. Every thing is under the rule of business. No space is left for any activity except for business. Business is the first and last of liberal vocabulary governing the behaviors, actions and relations of the majority of the society every day and week. The locomotive of business is the free market enterprise which regulates itself by the free operation of the indivisible hand metaphorically referring to the rule of demand and supply, curtailing the need for the intervention of the state in any of its forms and purposes.

VI. Limited State²⁵

The market is the best judge for market fundamentalist liberals because it is absolutely efficient, value-free, impartial except differences in entrepreneurial human capacities, natural and objective. State intervention is artificial, inefficient, partisan, value-led and subjective that it finally undermines the very essence of capitalistic dynamism and progress. State intervention in a free market operation is a betrayal for a conservative liberal of the classic Lockean principle that the state is an agency to play the role of a “referee” in a football game. Thus, its intervention means an open transgression of the natural rights of the individual person and a withdrawal of the terms constituting the “social contract”.

Thus, the market should be free from the interventions of the government which is a collectivity of human beings dominated by sectional interests and values to the detriment of the natural market operation. Human beings, at the actual free market engagement and processes, are much rational than government leaders who are relatively far from it to render the most logical decision at their hands.

V. Modernism²⁶

²⁴ Korpi, W.(1978) *the working class in Welfare Capitalism*.Routledge and Kegan Paul: London. Smelser J. Neil (1966), *The Modernization of Social Relations* in Myron Weiner (eds) *Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth. Voice of America Forum Lectures*.

²⁵ Korpi, W.(1978) *the working class in Welfare Capitalism*.Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.

²⁶ Macionis. John F. (1987), *Sociology*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. Manuel, Frank (1951). *The Age of Reason*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Robert C. Johnson (1980)*The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy*. Princeton University Press: Princeton.

Liberalism also bears the belief that it overlaps with modernity as opposed to traditionalism and egalitarian life conditions. First of all, it predicated all its methodologies of thought more on rational understandings of nature and human society. It heavily banks on human scientific and reasonable discoveries rather than traditional and superstitious cults and practices. A typical liberal is confident in the human capacity to change things and the superiority of reason. Liberalism also encourages technology and continuous automation of human labor for more efficiency and effectiveness.

Liberalism²⁷, as such, though tacitly, is not opposed to overseas expansion of markets and insuring sources of raw materials through colonial, imperialistic and dominant relations with distant, uncivilized, and traditional human communities. Liberalism basically manifests itself in capitalism accepted for granted that colonialism was more of a moral duty to civilize “barbarian” communities for “their own benefit.” The United States, as one of the emerging liberal states of the western world largely refrained from direct colonial controls and possessions for moral dilemma that it was a population undergoing the worst type of oppressive colonization.

Liberalism, per se, continued to guide state and society actions and behaviors well up to 1930th until it slipped to a stand still position. This forced the policy makers and the liberal ideologists to redefine liberalism in the context of the newly emerging demands on global proportions. One can identify three basic catalytic factors in scene:

Liberalism basically is industrialism. Industrialism is different form industrialization. Industrialism is a fundamentally maintained principle and belief in the superiority of industrial economy as the advanced stage of human society at the present age. Industrialism says industrial wealth is dynamic, creative, scientific and utilitarian, where as agriculture is static, monotonous and unrewarding. Industrialism is the mobilization of advanced scientific skill for research, development and mechanical operations. Industrialism asserts that industrial economy is the demonstration of the natural human potential that manifests itself in the innovative capacity to add values to raw materials and natural resources.

Industrialism is a progress forward to human ambitions to understand and discover the secret laws governing nature. It is also a human superiority over the physical environment with the highest most efficiency in harnessing the environment for the betterment of human life. Industrialism is nothing but an efficient use of time, resources, human capacity, and of course, control over non-industrial populations. Industrialism is the socialization of labor that brings millions of people from different backgrounds of life, ethnicity, race, corners of the country and all walks of life together under one roof, sharing the same pay role and under one management.

²⁷ Lipson R. David (1974), *Great Political Issues*. Chicago University: Chicago University Press. Liisa Laakso (1996) *Changing Notions of the Nation State and the African Experience: Montesquieu Revisited* in Adebayo O. Oluckoshi and Liisa Laakso's *Challenges to the Nation State in Africa*(ed). Motala Grafscia: Sweden.

These are by no means the only material and value elements on which the very foundation of liberalism rests. For our purpose, here, however, let us agree that they are fundamental capitalist ingredients out of which liberalism as a school of thought emerged.

VI. Individualism²⁸

Individualism is the other theoretical product of liberalism, which believes in the supreme importance of the individual over any social group or collective body. Arblite²⁹ lists some five points for the rise of individualism as one pillar of liberalism:

1. With western society becoming industrialized and heavily urbanized, the objective foundations of the collective or the group among the society greatly became dissolved. Group identities were fundamentally diluted in a fast process of vast social intermingling leaving the individual person alone as a basic unit of society;
2. The circulation of goods and services as a major occupation of Western society across boundaries of demanding consumers propelled a massive movement of labor from place to place diffusing socio-economic cements binding individuals into collective cores;
3. The group losing progressively socio-economic and psycho-cultural reasons to serve as a provider of protection and security for the individual was largely replaced by the formal institutions of the state, which by their orientations identify the society by its individual members and not by belongingness to groups;
4. With the growing domination of the Lockean ideas of “Limited Government”, the individual progressively fight for personal success by own self which divert the total state concern in theory and practice to the individual as groups lose theory identities and existence; fifth and last even though collectives and groups essentially lose their material basis of existence, concern for the group rather than the individual served as a guise for such systems like Fascism, Soviet communism and, in general, authoritarianism to suppress and violate limitations of privacy of the individual in the name of the security of the group.

²⁸ Anderson Fulton (1962), *Francis Bacon: His Career and His Thought*. University of Southern California Press: Losangeles. Andrew Haywood (2003) *Political Ideologies: An Introduction* (Third Edition) Basingstoke: Macmillan/Algarve Anderson K (1997) *International Relations and the Contemporary World*. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Andre Gunder Frank (1967), *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Brazil and Chile*. *Monthly Review*. Arend Lijphart (1975), *the Poltics of Accommodation*. University of California Press: Berkley. Armstrong Glyn and Harrison J. (1984), *Capitalism Since World War II: the Making and Remaking of the Great Boom*. Fontana: London. Auty R (1979), *World's in the Third World. Area 11*. .Ayon Roys (1995), *Theories of Development*. (eds) Greenwich University Press: United Kingdom. Aya Rod (1979), *Theories of Revolutions Reconsidered Theory and Society*. Vol. 8. No. 1.

²⁹ Albaster. A (1984), *the Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism*. Oxford: Blackwell. Alfred. Gwyn Williams (1985) *The Welsh in their History: When was Wales?* Ithaca: London

4. Meles and Revolutionary Democracy

On the morrow of resolving the crisis within TPLF, Meles released a printed document into a book form, titled: 'On the Affairs of Revolutionary Democracy and Democratization in Ethiopia'. This book of about 200 pages was specifically devoted by him to making a rediscovery and renunciation of revolutionary democracy anew. This book diverged from the previous one, Bonapartism, so substantially with yet abstract debates on the major differences between revolutionary democracy and liberal democracy and their applications to Ethiopian realities. I attended all what Meles was explaining about the essentials of the book while he was discussing with Addis Ababa university staff through television.

Let us now try to investigate into the essentials of revolutionary democracy by studying it against its background social structure as its foundation, nature of political leadership, unit of analysis and defined social goals.

“Revolutionary democracy” strongly emphasizes “social structure” as the most decisive center of gravity for any political theory. It, thus, makes a systematic analogy between a classical neo-liberal social structure against a traditional, agrarian, and hand-to-mouth living social structure. “Revolutionary Democracy” argues that Neo-liberalism was born never out of a traditional agrarian social structure. According to Meles, equally “revolutionary democracy” never gets its birth out of an industrialized, urbanized, and individualistic society, whose members lost their traditional common bonds due to total transformation. As such, neo-liberalism will automatically lose its dynamic inner force as a guideline to meet socio-political problems when it loses its energizing socio-economic base that is a capitalist society, and tried to be applied to non-capitalist society.

In plain English, non-liberal problems can never and ever be inherently solved by liberal democratic principles, EPRDF argues. The solutions of agrarian, traditional and egalitarian social structures are inherently located within the social structure itself, and never outside.

Meles argues that “Revolutionary Democracy” has the vast peasantry class as its social foundation, organically linked to it. Contrarily, liberal democracy’s social foundation is the vast and wealthy Middle Class with high living standards, urban based, and industrialized. “Revolutionary Democracy” has no such a moderately wealthy and dynamic population, as a dominant social class in Ethiopia to base itself on. Meles justifies this by arguing that the rural peasants population is the social basis of revolutionary democracy not by choice but by a choiceness reality as a society dominated by this class. Thus, democracy means nothing without this broadest social class at its center not as a benefiter but also as its maker;³⁰

Revolutionary Democracy heavily emphasizes “class distinction” as its fundamental socio-political basement with the Ethiopian peasantry being its foundation. Meles’s

³⁰ Gebru Tareke (1984), Peasant Resistance in Ethiopia. The Case of Woyane.” *Journal of African History*. Gebru Tareke (1991) Ethiopia: Power and Protest, Peasant Revolt in the Twelfth Century.

argument on this point bore four major reasons: 1. the Ethiopian peasantry is the largest social class with the largest ultimate potentiality of either growth or poverty³¹; 2. the Ethiopian peasantry is the exact seat and location of promise of change forward as the two most important factors of production in any poor state are at its hands—land and labor; 3. the Ethiopian peasantry was a victim of the worst type of oppressions and exploitations in the past; and, 4, the empowerment and positive action of this class means the transformation of the entire system. Thus, EPRDF's, Meles argues, partisanship to this class is the source of its energy, which could be never obtained from any other class unlike what neo-liberalism argues in a country where a capitalist class is absent.

According to Meles, this social grouping is the potent force whose emancipation from all sorts of bondage and oppression insures the emancipation of all. Meles goes on to assert that this peasantry class is, at the same time, a member of this or that nation, nationality and peoples, having a distinct and identifiable cultural identity, which is, technically speaking, the potential source of its empowerment for radical socio-economic change. For Meles, peasantry, as a social form of life, agrarian economy and collective identity are inherently intertwined. This was so because structurally agrarian populations had never undergone socio-economic transformation unlike the case in western Europe and United States, there has no any social stratification so far that could dilute collective identities;

Meles underscores that “Revolutionary Democracy” is, therefore, an approach of political leadership to furnish solutions for a society which lacks every thing that a capitalist society has got. Thus, its zone of operation is between the upcoming capitalist society and the existing agrarian society aiming at dragging the latter to the position of the former, until its true and natural guardian, the capitalist class with one's purse full of capital, emerges. As such, revolutionary democracy bases itself on the peasant social class not as a source of its permanent survival but as a source of its dynamism in leveraging this class toward development;

For Meles, it logically follows that “Revolutionary Democracy” is a principle of political leadership by committed revolutionary leaders raised from the poor social background. However, these leaders think in spirit like a progressive and change-determined liberal. What makes, the principle ‘revolutionary’ is its political goal of creating an advanced capitalist society but by poor leaders devoid of a capital assets, unlike the Euro-American bourgeoisie leaders, in Ethiopian context. One can see that EPRDF leaders have defined and qualified “democracy in Ethiopia” as a system to be borne not out of the struggle to preserve one's class—generated material benefits--but out of “naked commitment” to build capitalism;

Melse once remarked: “because revolutionary democracy is a ruling principle for a specifically designed transitional period to capitalism, attaining its goals, then, it will die,

³¹ Gershenkron, A,(1962), *Economic Backwardness in Historical perspectives*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge Mass. Gerald J. Gill (1974), *Readings on the Ethiopian Economy*. Addis Ababa. Gilkes, Patrick .(1975),*The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia*. London and New York: Julian Friedman/St. Martine Press.

and its death is its best.” The message for his followers and members is this: “We are petty-bourgeoisie leaders but having the task of creating a wealthy bourgeoisie capitalist class, which we ourselves cannot be, and that class will replace us in the foreseeable or unforeseeable future. As liberal democracy can never be led by petty-bourgeoisie peasant-grown leaders, then, an agrarian society, logically concluding, does not have a bourgeois class to lead it to democracy. For EPRDF, “revolutionary” implies to a spirit convincing one: I am like a capitalist with the goal of creating a liberal democracy just only by determination. “Democracy” again means that my behaviors and actions are governed by basic democratic principles.

“Revolutionary Democracy”, according to Meles, is a realistic approach based on the real social arrangement of the Ethiopian peoples both as an individual and collective identity. He argues when it is possible to recognize rights, then “Revolutionary Democracy” goes to the ultimate point like the rights of nations and nationalities to self-determination, including secession. In other area where this is impossible, however, for example, on the question of land privatization, revolutionary refrains from doing so, which makes it closer to the reality on the ground. It was for this justification that Meles once said: land in Ethiopia is to be privatized only on the burial of EPRDF. The logic is clear: privatizing land amounts to breaking your key social foundation apart and handing it over the worst socio-economic exploitation by urban-based and global neo-liberal capital.

The other justification, presented by EPRDF is that the Ethiopian people for the last several years were isolated from the main stream of international interactions that deplorably increased the backlog of poverty which at present requires an intensive government led intervention to lift up the masses to the level where they could begin to act independently. EPRDF criticizes Opposition arguments for freeing the Ethiopian peasant from policy arrests in the guise of public ownership of land turning them into state tenants as failure to adequately understand Ethiopia’s realities. Land for Meles goes beyond an economic asset; it is the ultimate source of total socio-economic growth from which other downtrodden and impoverished social groups, including the urban poor, will benefit, too.

On practical level, Meles argues that Revolutionary Democracy holds that ignoring and suppressing mercilessly whatever collective demand and assertiveness has not been a policy option and preference that was not attempted at all in Ethiopia and other countries. Failure to fix peasant and nationality demands largely leads to diversions of national development resources for security activities and for the state to grow authoritarian, divisive, and discriminatory. According to Meles, collective groups as organized units of the general people have inviolable right to organize the state as they feel conducive for their coexistence and development needs. Ethnic groups can never be instructed from above to live up to elite engineered formulas of national unity which was also attempted but aborted by popular resistances from below.

Meles asserted that Revolutionary Democracy has a positive and cooperative goal with “autonomous, self-help and purpose” oriented civic associations and regard them as “organized establishments” for societal empowerment and social transformation. On multi party democracy, Meles through Revolutionary Democracy nailed down strongly a

threshold principle that it supports such a democratic order, in principle and practice. It however, qualifies opposition parties in the manner mentioned above, in the case of professionals, and stresses relentless peaceful ideological struggle against them supported by objective and tangible changes in the life conditions of the Ethiopian nations, nationalities and peoples so that the people would “bitterly hate” them.

Meles emphasizes consistent victories by EPRDF as a revolutionary democratic party in national “free and fair elections” predicated on sustaining, fast, pervading, and tangible socio-economic development with an undertone emphasis on continuing as a regime. He warned against possibilities of neo-liberal interlude into office as a complete reversal of what have so far been gained. From the close examination of the documents by Meles, Revolutionary Democracy defines the Ethiopian democracy in light of its substantive content where it categorizes all opposition parties as “hear-and-say” neo-liberal agents inside. As some critics argue, democracy without its substantive assertion is an agreed anarchy.

6. Meles and the Formative Years of Revolutionary Democracy

It is not simple to explain changes in the configurations of social forces of a country as large and diverse as Ethiopia in the last ten years now. However, a chain of dramatic events since 2005 in Ethiopia’s politics have a lot in store to tell much to a student of political science. Nonetheless, the problem still is the serious concern for objectivity. As conscious as possible about the grim methodological need for being objective let us make attempts at constructing a rough political map of social forces.

The 2010 election, the news about the official start of building the Renaissance Dam, the announcement of Ethiopia’s double-digit growth by international organizations, adverse inflationary experiences, the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and the smooth power transition that followed are the major national events within the ambit of revolutionary democracy with three spill-over effect functions on the alignments of social forces.

The first is that some of these events by their nature represent socially *cohesive function* as most demanded success stories. The Abay Dam and the news of double-digit growth are examples of this category. The second category of events represents *trying or testing functions* with a trend every where toward socially *disruptive or unsettling function*. The phenomenon of inflationary growth and the death of Prime Minister Meles are cases of this function. The third is the category of events which are known for inducing a good majority of the informed people to act some way positively or negatively to the above causative factors. Election 2010, the honorific funeral ceremony of Meles and the subsequent peaceful power transition are cases that have an *indicative or demonstrative* social function as natural responses to revolutionary democracy.

Without doubt, these shifts in social functions of national events are by no means mute and accidental about their ultimate meanings or interpretations. They surely speak of the overall political mosaic of the various organized and unorganized political actors particularly political parties and their supporters vis-à-vis EPRDF and its revolutionary democracy as the basis of its actions. The most important agenda here is whether there is a

periodic swinging which supporters of political parties make in responses to dominant national events of some kind or not. Political scientists call the parallel straight line across which the programs of political parties and the loyalties of their supporters swing right and left, a political spectrum. This swinging is never a haphazard and irrational mobility; it is a shift heavily dependent on changes in impressions of individual citizens and collective groups about value and material advantages they actually obtained and confidently expect to gain in the future.³²

With delayed development as per its promise having been added to the above urban perceptions, EPRDF suffered landslide defeat in major cities in the 2005 election. Truly speaking, EPRDF and its leaders were pushed to the marginal corner in their social configuration in most cities specifically due to the wide gap between their promise of economic breakthrough and their actual performances. Opposition parties exploited all the above weaknesses of EPRDF as hot urban priorities to have won the upper hand and controlled the dominant center in the social alignments of forces.

However, EPRDF under Meles keenly realized their marginalized location, made internal and external readjustments and reforms and embarked on the development task afresh. They galloped faster and faster than they promised to rapidly affect the established social alignments, which surrogated a peaceful national election in 2010. Logically speaking, alterations of statuses and levels in the main national agenda, that is, rapid, all-inclusive and irreversible socio-economic development, swinging in public opinion and reconfigurations in the alignments of social forces are inherently intertwined. I strongly believe that these alternations became measurably true in Ethiopia at the time PM Meles died. How can one ascertain this development scientifically?

In a prevalent reshuffle across the alignments of social forces, politics must demonstrate a parallel growth of value/mental mismatch between the Ruling Party and Opposition parties as well as between the ordinary people and opposition parties. Change in alignment means nothing but widening value judgments and polarizing social interests between the people and opposition parties.

What Opposition Parties capitalize on as a top national agenda becomes now a history of the past so less attractive and educative. Contrarily, what the ruling party says begins to command a growing trust among common citizens. With this, Opposition parties plunge desperately into conservative poles of politics nostalgically sticking to past and once

³² Habtamu Alebachew .2010. *Ethiopia: Quest for Social Change and Mental Order: Neo-liberalism or Developmentalism?* Mega Printing Press: Mekelle, Tigray, Ethiopia. Ministry of Information (MoI). 2001. Rural Development Policies, Strategies and Tactics of The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (translated from Amharic), Addis Ababa: MOI; Ministry of Works Urban Development (MWUD) .2010.; Plan-Performance Report to the House of Representatives. Addis Ababa; Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. 2010. Annual Performance Report for 2009. Addis Habtmu, Desta and Misfine .2011. (Unpublished) *Women-Run Micro-Enterprises in Tigray Region: Questions of Land Provisions in Five Cities*. Research Paper at College of Law and Governance, the Department of Civics and Ethics. Mekelle

attractive topics marked by increasing fallacies in their arguments and political programs. If these are evidently explained in practice, then, one can safely say there is a shift in the alignments of social forces. The trend is obviously in favor of this assumption.

While Oppositions insist on their arguments saying ‘no development in Ethiopia under revolutionary democracy’, their partners among the vast neo-liberal technocracy every where debates now not over this but on matters of redistribution, secrets of this much fast growth and other issues. The question here is however what has been happening to revolutionary democracy amidst this success story to its design by Meles as a paradigm to serve a transition period.

7. Settling the Accounts of Revolutionary Democracy after Meles

The practice of settling the accounts of revolutionary democracy, like the double entry method of auditing accountancy, requires us of presenting revolutionary democracy as intended and painted with its potential threats versus revolutionary democracy presented as what it caused and brought on the ground.

7.1. Meles and Bonapartism³³

2002 and 2003 in Ethiopia’s politics marked the most momentous events of Meles and his party from the specific angle of theoretical and ideological showdown within and without. These events started with the coming into the hands of readership of the ideologically most complex and unbelievably abstract literature of Meles, Bonapartism. This superb literary work with all its complexities in my level of understanding eleven years ago was a document from which I struggled with myself to discover and rediscover what Meles exactly wanted to do as an Ethiopian, EPRDF chairman and a government leader. This document also gave me an incredibly broad insight into Meles’s advanced stage of methodologically knitting theory into practice, epistemologically, foreign

³³ On December 2 1851, followers of President Louise Bonaparte (Napoleon's nephew) broke up the Legislative Assembly and established a dictatorship. A year later, Louis Bonaparte proclaimed himself Emperor Napoleon III. Marx wrote *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* between December 1851 and March 1852. The "Eighteenth Brumaire" refers to November 9, 1799 in the French Revolutionary Calendar—the day the first Napoleon Bonaparte had made himself dictator by a coup d'etat. In this work Marx traces how the conflict of different social interests manifest themselves in the complex web of political struggles, and in particular the contradictory relationships between the outer form of a struggle and its real social content. The proletariat of Paris was at this time too inexperienced to win power, but the experiences of 1848-51 would prove invaluable for the successful workers' revolution of 1871.

The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte Karl Marx Written: December 1851- March 1852; Source: Chapters 1 & 7 are translated by Saul K. Padover from the German edition of 1869; Chapters 2 through 6 are based on the third edition, prepared by Engels (1885), as translated and published by Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1937; First Published: First issue of *Die Revolution*, 1852, New York; Online Version: Marx/Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org) 1995, 1999; Transcription/Markup: Zodiac and Brian Baggins Proofed: and corrected by Alek Blain, 2006, Mark Harris, 2010.

knowledge into domestic reality at hand, and the individual personality into the group/collective and the state.

Bonapartism as a concept in the French context and as used by Karl Marx³⁴ represents a complex socio-political process from 1799, the coming to power of Napoleon I through coup I to 1852, the crowning emperor of Napoleon III. All the three Napoleons ascended to office by plotting against the progressive bourgeoisie revolution in the names of the far excluded and oppressed class of small-holding farmers who constituted the bulky majority of the French society. Napoleon Bonaparte I broke the first bourgeoisie republic of France still with a wide of support of the French peasantry. What followed was however like what Derg degenerated into a terrifying ghost against the peasant that elevated it to the apex of political office. Karl Marx explained this rise and fall as follows:

After the first Revolution had transformed the semi-feudal peasants into freeholders, Napoleon confirmed and regulated the conditions in which they could exploit undisturbed the soil of France which they had only just acquired, and could slake their youthful passion for property. But what is now ruining the French peasant is his small holding itself, the division of the land and the soil, the property form which Napoleon consolidated in France. It is exactly these material conditions which made the feudal peasant a small-holding peasant and Napoleon an emperor. Two generations sufficed to produce the unavoidable result: progressive deterioration of agriculture and progressive indebtedness of the agriculturist. The “Napoleonic” property form, which at the beginning of the nineteenth century was the condition of the emancipation and enrichment of the French country folk, has developed in the course of this century into the law of their enslavement and their pauperism. And just this law is the first of the “Napoleonic ideas” which the second Bonaparte has to uphold. If he still shares with the peasants the illusion that the cause of their ruin is to be sought not in the small holdings themselves but outside them – in the influence of secondary circumstances – his experiments will shatter like soap bubbles when they come in contact with the relations of production.

This, coupled by the bitter conflict among other social groupings like the new bourgeoisie class, the proletariat, the overthrown land-owning class and others, led to the second revolution which also promised better days for the vast majority of the French peasantry. The second revolution led by Napoleon Bonaparte II commanded an army raised from peasant families and it was of a truly peasant character. However, at taking political office, the social conflict with other classes changed the conditions into the Napoleonic betrayal of this downtrodden peasant mass.

It is exactly at this point of the discourse that one must search for Meles’s analogy of this situation with the situations that prevailed in between 1991 and 2001 in Ethiopia at the

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split of TPLF. Now, let us see how Marx synthesized this stage of social contradictions as follows:

The economic development of small-holding property has radically changed the peasants' relations with the other social classes. Under Napoleon the fragmentation of the land in the countryside supplemented free competition and the beginning of big industry in the towns. The peasant class was the ubiquitous protest against the recently overthrown landed aristocracy. The roots that small-holding property struck in French soil deprived feudalism of all nourishment. The landmarks of this property formed the natural fortification of the bourgeoisie against any surprise attack by its old overlords. But in the course of the nineteenth century the urban usurer replaced the feudal one, the mortgage replaced the feudal obligation, bourgeois capital replaced aristocratic landed property

This Marxist observation reminds one of Meles's syntheses in his Bonapartism where he explained how TPLF nearly degenerated into falling within the embrace of what he calls the 'urban-based parasitic business class' in betrayal of the Ethiopian peasantry. For Meles, this is the strategic danger posed to TPLF just within, which he described as 'organizational decay'. In France's case, the peasant majority did not accept this worsened condition by a government that took office in their names and promising them betterments. Marx continued to remark what the peasant mass progressed to do in defense of their rights.

Therefore the interests of the peasants are no longer, as under Napoleon, in accord with, but are now in opposition to bourgeois interests, to capital. Hence they find their natural ally and leader in the urban proletariat, whose task it is to overthrow the bourgeois order. But "strong and unlimited government" - and this is the second "Napoleonic idea" that the second Napoleon has to carry out - is called upon to defend this "material order" by force. This "material order" also serves, in all Bonaparte's proclamations, as the slogan against the rebellious peasants.

Meles used this analogy to be the predicated case to occur in Ethiopia if the organizational decay (betraying the Ethiopian peasant to corruptively ally with the urban 'parasite capital owner') continued unchecked. The peasant mass would finally rise up against EPRDF and revolutionary democracy, for which it sacrificed for their coming into office as what exactly happened when Napoleon II ordered his rural raised soldiers against their brothers. . However, Meles argued that Bonapartism in Ethiopia's context in 2001 was a real threat but not an actually attained crisis. He mentioned some signs of peasant rebellion in Southern Ethiopia which however were brought under control only by police action than they were articulated class warfare.

For Meles, Bonapartism in Ethiopia's context was the exchange of places between formerly revolutionary democrats who led the peasant revolution to success with the urban capital owner in which political power would be used to enrich what he called both 'parasites' and, in parallel, impoverishing the poor peasantry. For Meles, 'parasitic EPRDF-Urban Capital Owner symbiosis was potentially a total danger for the regime because the petty-bourgeoisie leadership put revolutionary democracy, its final mental

control, to sale. This trend could be compared with the impoverished condition of the French peasantry as described by Marx as follows:

. The peasant's small holding is now only the pretext that allows the capitalist to draw profits, interest, and rent from the soil, while leaving it to the agriculturist himself to see to it how he can extract his wages. The mortgage debt burdening the soil of France imposes on the French peasantry an amount of interest equal to the annual interest on the entire British national debt. Small-holding property, in this enslavement by capital toward which its development pushes it unavoidably, has transformed the mass of the French nation into troglodytes. Sixteen million peasants (including women and children) dwell in caves, a large number of which have but one opening, others only two and the most favored only three. Windows are to a house what the five senses are to the head.

Thus, Meles bitterly warned that revolutionary democracy should guard itself against further degeneration in betrayal of its social foundation, the Ethiopian peasantry by cleaning itself from within. This was probably the surrogate justification that gave birth for what EPRDF calls 'the renewal movement' after the purge of TPLF dissenters.

Studying the matter just from outside, I was and am not sure whether I have and had understood the exact crux of the matter at that time and still now. But I remember my commenting that the renewal movement's key meaning was a 'return to revolutionary democracy from revolutionary democracy.' The implication is clear: it aimed at having revolutionary democracy brushed up again free of its dirt in order to remake it squarely fit its original intents, meanings, color and size.' In other words, revolutionary democracy was intended to create a class of rich and wealthy people without prospering its own cadres. This is so because their prosperities would come only from corrupting and abusing their powers, which they accessed in the name of the peasantry.

Back to Banapartism, Meles painted revolutionary democracy like a delicately balanced but heavily costly project that is always vulnerable to abortion. This is because revolutionary democracy operates and functions to move deplorably poor majority up out of destitution within hostile but vibrant neo-liberal encirclement. Unfortunately, this 'parasitic urban group' is capable to tempt or entice revolutionary democratic leaders and cadres away from their commitments.

7.2. Revolutionary Democracy after Meles

The performance account of revolutionary democracy is to be settled and judged largely by what socio-economic retrenchments are underway in Ethiopia now. The effect of revolutionary democracy and social-economic stratifications are directly correlated as cause and result. 'Stratification' here does not mean bifurcation in income terms between the rich and the poor. This is rather anathema of revolutionary democracy about which Meles and EPRDF paid by far the bitterest cost—growth without poverty. Stratification here refers to the emergence of new social groups and socio-economic clusters as the result of rapid development at the liquidation of old groupings.

The logic here is that with each step that new socio-economic clusters have been emerging as beneficiaries of development, this means that revolutionary democracy is fast dying by achieving its strategic goal. The continuation of old socio-economic clusters without much change refers to slow growth and arrested development so that the continued vibrancy of revolutionary democracy. The most important indicator of the status of revolutionary democracy after Meles is the rate in the expansion of size of the domestic middle class. Under Ethiopia's and EPRDF's condition, middle class expansion means the size of Ethiopians who has managed to uplift themselves from below-poverty line and low-income social brackets.

From multiple sources of official data in side and outside, the growth, distribution and redistribution rate and pattern of development in Ethiopia, one may identify five distinct socio-economic clusters. Some are old while others are new; some are foreign and others are indigenous. The status of revolutionary democracy currently is roughly to be measured by the morphologies of these social clusters.

I. Rural Ethiopia

Rural Ethiopia as the structural justification for revolutionary democracy encompasses a range of complex social structures. Revolutionary democracy and Meles adequately realized that this portion of Ethiopia's population could never be uplifted and transformed through any one brand of liberal democracy. This is because structurally these populations lie outside of the natural operational zones of liberalism. Basically, rural Ethiopia is a composition of pastoral, sedentary agricultural and handicraft household communities. Pastoral Ethiopians inhabit north eastern, eastern, southern and western portions of the country. Sedentary farmers settle in much of northern, central and central southern Ethiopia. Handicraft communities live mixed or separate in fragmented locations of mostly northern and central Ethiopia. Roughly, all these rural populations are constituted by about 20 million household half of whom are women.

Meles and EPRDF labored their level best to touch these communities down to household levels through the exercise of revolutionary democracy as redefined in 2002-3. They extended their structures down to locality and grass roots levels and tried to broaden their leverages in the entire decade since 2002-3. The account of revolutionary democracy with regard to these people could roughly be described as follows:

A. From Cooperative to Promotional Mission

Now, revolutionary democracy has reportedly been able to have caused structural changes that broke down the long entrenched horizontally homogenous socio-economic establishment for centuries. About hundreds of thousands of wealthy famers were created as new social clusters rising up away from the sphere of influence by revolutionary democracy. These wealthy farmers have now been transformed from a situation where they fundamentally depended on EPRDF's support to self-supporting status. They are

financially well-positioned that they are now able to make rational economic decisions not pressured by demands of poverty but by the basic rules of free market.³⁵

Revolutionary democracy therefore is to have to redefine its modes of relations with these successful rural households from supportive and guidance roles to cooperative, promotional and modeling roles. They no more need state intervention but revolutionary democracy still needs them to serve its mobilization tasks as gravity centers. They can do this by setting themselves as living models in order to attract and lift-up other less successful or starting households just as a 'default demonstration' case. However, this cooperative interaction is to persist only as a project to come to an end at the successful transformation of other farmers, on the one hand, and until these wealthy households would attain an irreversible change of social roles like from farm-hood to industry or other occupations.

The overall modality of relations between revolutionary and wealthy famers is also to continue with the changed mission of the later to promotional role. Promotional mission is different from supportive and protective mission as it is a focus on capacity building, market-based information provision, lifting them up to leadership positions and mobilize them for anti corruption battles. They could also be promoted to play intermediary roles in the urban-rural relations where they are to be instructed to protect the rest of rural households from possible urban exploitations, and corruptions around development projects and day to day administrative services.

B. Pairing Supportive and Protective Missions

This change brought a completely new function and mission for revolutionary democracy. While EPRDF is to continue its committed support for the remaining unreached or unsuccessful rural households as before, it has to protect this social cluster against the possible exploitative and controlling hands of the successful ones. Wealthy farmers could exercise their asset/material and knowledge powers through traditional techniques to wrongly sap the labor, land, time, opportunities and assets of the unsuccessful household by dragging them away from leveraging accessing the interventions of revolutionary democracy. They may, as the result, establish a lord-tenancy mode of rural relations in which the rich shall become much richer and the poor shall degenerate down to become much poorer.

Side by side with this new mission, revolutionary democracy has to still grapple with newly emerging or unseen social targets with elevated support. As Meles accurately and

³⁵ World Bank .2009. World Development Report New York. Workneh Nigatu, 2008. Food Security Strategy and Productive Safety-Net Program in Ethiopia. *Digest of National Policies, Strategies and Programs*, edited by Assefa Taye. Forum of Social Science Studies. pp.1-22 Zemen .2011 December Edition. Vol. 4, No, 45

directly implied in his last report to Parliament, this social cluster includes rural women³⁶ and landless and jobless youths. This social cluster is both the result of general land scarcity, a challenge to revolutionary democracy in its principle of public ownership of land and its cause to stick to its supportive mission for long. That public ownership of land could create landless youths is never to be considered as a liability of revolutionary democracy, however. Undoubtedly, this social cluster has two chances to transform itself: one is that it can benefit from the overall rural development, and, second, it itself exploits the supports of revolutionary democracy to transform itself.

On this score, the experience in Tigray³⁷ which aims at leveraging this social sector could be taken as an innovative support scheme of revolutionary democracy. Women in many rural Tigray are targeted as political, social and legal empowerments to be able to claim and insure their share out of the traditionally made dominated fruits of rural development. Young female youths have been brought into the niches of revolutionary democracy through formal education and social capacitating schemes. Environmental intervention, on the other hand, grows to be considerably the largest urban industry absorbing the ever growing landless labor. Green development goal of the developmental state in Tigray is concomitantly served by the human-centered mobilization of revolutionary democracy, where its mission will optimistically transform into protective one in a foreseeable future.

As one could compute from official data show, revolutionary democracy will stay predictably much longer period of exercise with its supportive mission more than its protective mission in most pastoral areas of Ethiopia. Despite, encouraging successes in some parts of Afar and Somali pastoral localities, revolutionary democracy is far from creating wealth pastoral households enough to attract its cooperative and protective missions. Inner structural limitations and environmental factors are taken as responsible factors that obviously prolong the persistence of revolutionary democracy across the pastoral portion of Ethiopia. Unfortunately, the supportive mission in these areas also includes provision of direct humanitarian relief which is the anathema of revolutionary democracy as designed by Meles and EPRDF.

C. From Palliative to Integrative Mission

I argue that this mission of revolutionary democracy is a demand from rural communities encompassing handicrafts and remote sites of modern investment. Handicrafts communities engaging most of rural and even urban produces of home consumption contribute a lot to the GDP. However, they are still structurally constrained by social, psychological and traditional borders which tend to exclude them.

³⁶ Sharp K., Brown and Amdissa Teshome .2006. Targeting Ethiopia's Productive Safety-Net Program. London, ODI. Sosina Demse and Tsehay Yetbark, 2008. Review of National Policy on Ethiopian Women. *Digest of National Policies, Strategies and Programs*, edited by Assefa Taye. Forum of Social Science Studies. pp.1-22. Tenker, Bongor .2005. *Yezariyitu Ethiopia Ediget ena Lemmat: keyet wodeyet?* Addis Ababa: Chamber Printing

³⁷ Tigray Natonal Regional State Council, 2012, Nine Month Performance report. Melele.

This social cluster is five times important for the goals of revolutionary democracy: 1. it is one assured source of rural employment; 2. it encompasses the partial half population of women and dominant demography of rural youth; 3. its technical and technological demand could easily be met by establishing a working rural-urban marketing network; 4. While it is a production sector, it is also a destination of rural consumption that helps to insure faire redistribution of wealth; and, 5. Its demand as a socio-economic sector for land and its impact on environment is negligible.

As reports so far show, the intervention of revolutionary democracy in leveraging these disadvantaged communities has largely been confined to creating socially palliative environment for their improvements. These include attempts to bring them into contact with better production techniques, opening rural financial and infrastructural facilities, introducing regularized rural and nearby marketing opportunities like Sabbath markets and encouraging them toward mass supplies as well as dragging them into modern education and information. Results show that they are mixed. Some households quickly responded while others lagged mainly for psychological and traditional reasons.

Other equally palliative targets of revolutionary democracy are communities in emerging regions like Gambealla and Benshangule who were socially excluded from state distribution mainstream for long by past regimes. The cost in terms of time and material resources for achieving palliative missions among these communities are high but largely successful in some key areas: villgization, intra-regional resettlements, and provisions of infrastructures and creations of self-governing venues. At household and individual level, the efforts of revolutionary democracy are reported to get crowned with success amidst wide neo-liberal uproars of opposition and accusation.

Now, it appears that revolutionary democracy in these two rural areas is to transform its mission from palliative or smoothening situations of change to one of integrative missions. Integrative missions in the first case is concerned with brining fast expanding urban-based small scale industrial and technical training establishments in working contact with handicrafts communities, at least, prioritizing young men and women. Encouraging them to make efforts to penetrate rural and urban markets with a strongly segmented share and helping them access new and old Sabbath markets could serve as tools to achieve structural transformation.

In the second case, what Prime Minister Haliemariam said recently to investors and exporters about cooperative investor-local community relations could be prioritized as an instrument of revolutionary democracy to scale up its missions from palliative to integrative missions in these areas. It is to be remembered that foreign investors engaged in commercial farming, mining and other sectors are not direct social foundations of revolutionary democracy. It, however, can make use of their resources and skills to support its integrative missions by networking the local target communities with them.

In both cases, revolutionary democracy requires prolonged periods of time to insure irreversible social transformation on the proportion it achieved in creating wealthy farmers in sedentary highland agro-ecological zones.

II. Urban Ethiopia

The last decade saw structural transformations in urban portions of Ethiopia, too. Revolutionary democracy in urban Ethiopia caused socio-economic stratifications with the emergence a new map of socio-economic clusters. A boosting private sector, an expanding micro-enterprise and small scale industry, and a public sector under controversially improving reform process have been widely reported to cause a remarkable expansion of the middle class. Revolutionary democracy pushed a big size of its youth target from among the urban poor and job-seeking youth up out of below-poverty and low-income lines.

With all reported difficulties, the emergence of several formerly micro-and-small scale categories of social clusters in manufacturing, construction, services and other sectors is indicative of that trend that revolutionary democracy is paving a way to its gradual declining status. However, the coming to the list of demands by the new generation seems to delay its success to wither away in the foreseeable future. The greatest success of revolutionary democracy in its urban setting has been that it created a vast social capital which increasingly breaks away with the neo-liberal block.

This newly emerging social cluster might increasingly call for neo-liberal rules of the game with each step of its boost. This is a healthy development and, of course, the attainment of revolutionary democracy at its stated goals. This is but true if the newly emerging social clusters of revolutionary democracy cultivate within themselves the value of bottom-up growth, self-confidence, loyalty to the constitution and, above all else, to anti corruption tendencies as they approach neo-liberal demands. This requires them to evidently understand that capitalism in Ethiopia could never be developed structurally through foreign injection under a leadership of limited state. That this popular value has been fast developing is seen by majority allegiance to Meles, the authority of revolutionary democracy.

The economically strengthened position of this social cluster would unavoidably sneak out of the domain of revolutionary democracy but remains within its lasting sphere of influence. With this structural change undergoing, it is clear that the basic missions of revolutionary democracy also demands parallel shifts.

A. From Distributive to Redistributive Mission

Revolutionary democracy got focused with the task of distribution basic facilities of both value and material provisions so far. This distributive mission leveraged a continuous size of urban targets to make upward nobilities with remarkable improvements in their living conditions. Like the condition we saw in rural Ethiopia, this social cluster will gradually revolutionary democracy at three fronts: on the one hand, it may use its acquired new wealth and experience to use for blocking other newly emerging similar social clusters; secondly, it could also find itself in a stiff competition with the already entrenched private capital that could adversely affect its growth; thirdly, in both cases above, this social cluster, in its warmest ambition to solidify its middle class position, may search for corrupt ways and rent-collecting mechanisms.

In the efforts to offset these negative developments, revolutionary democracy is pressured to play a multiple of roles at the same time. It furnishes protective support from the

dominance and influences of the private capital; at the same time, it is to play regulatory support for controlling this social cluster from challenging newly emerging social clusters. The successful management of these missions strategically means that this cluster will be trained and cultivated to act in the free market with strict guidance and control that it discharges its tasks of paying taxes all other duties required by the law. This, in precise terms, implies to the duty for revolutionary democracy to pay attentions more on insuring faire redistribution of wealth.

Failure in erecting a working scheme of redistribution is nothing but widening the door to public corruption. In any of its modern definition, corruption is the natural enemy of revolutionary democracy at any of its stages. Redistribution could face dangers from, first and foremost, from the new successful social clusters created by itself. Poverty for revolutionary democracy is hundred times better than seeing its creations in the new social industry grow through rent-collecting techniques.

B. From Managerial to Leadership Mission

Revolutionary democracy did a lot of things to recreate the public service anew to fit the demands of socio-economic transformation. It propelled Meles to take the reform program away from professionals and place it under political leadership in 2002. his reasoning was at the hands of professionals, the reform lacked energy and committed push forward. Meles and EPRDF were well aware that this social cluster inclines to neo-liberal tastes due to distortions in its professional training. Revolutionary democracy, probably for reasons of principle and technicalities, tolerates the neo-liberal portion of the state bureaucracy to go on its ways. Higher education curriculum basically remains within the shackles of neo-liberalism shaping consciously or unconsciously the youth within Anglo-Saxon white-collar imaginations and fantasies.

I personally strongly support that EPRDF did not have to intervene in curricular and academic matters. That is clear and significant as strategic border between politics and academics has to be always maintained.

However, I equally feel that revolutionary democracy should have exploited its state apparatus to encourage the higher education staff to freely enquire into the logical and appropriate link between neo-liberal epistemology and the demands of Ethiopian realities. Meles repeatedly asserted that higher education and professional training in Ethiopia were not for their own sake, unlike neo-liberal education. Education in Ethiopia has stated goals: to cause in side out oriented socio-economic transformation. This has not happened, for reasons, maybe I do not know. That higher education remains high-jacked by the claws of neo-liberalism has never been without undesired consequences.

The new generation of graduates with purely neo-liberal trainings fail to be quickly and readily used assets of the demand for development in a poor country. From a dozen of student research paper, I feel I have realized that frequent public service reform projects suffer timely wavering forth and back as staff turn over sees off informed experts and replaces them with these ill-informed new entrants. Experience on day to day basis tells me that the temptation toward neo-liberal topics of higher education is almost complete

and structural. I suppose this became the case for the reason that the state confines itself to managerial missions rather than leadership roles.

Similarly, revolutionary democracy largely limits itself to managerial missions in causing unstoppable public service reform by using the state apparatus. It reminds me of a bitter personal experience that the neo-liberal personnel at decision making positions across the public service exploited the troubled situations of 2005-6 to elevate itself as unquestioned Inspector of the development sector. In stead of expanding popular participation as a structural check on the practices of development offices, conditions allowed this neo-liberal block to rise and overwhelm over developmental establishments that operated within the ambit of revolutionary democracy.

A renewed and reenergized public service reform would help revolutionary democracy to keep itself clean from erosions by corruption at four fault lines: rural-urban development projects, urban land provision and urban middle class demand, domestic private business and domestic public service, domestic public service and international capital. the focus on public corruption needs a day to day engagement for two reasons: rent seeking in the context of neoliberal states negatively but functionally affects social welfare; in Ethiopia's context, it structurally hurts of the overall development process; secondly, what corruption in developed states engender is this or that government and party; in Ethiopia, it is against the entire regime erected by revolutionary democracy.

Public service reform intensification is still in demand as a matter of the inherent nature of revolutionary democracy in Ethiopia. Neo-liberal democracy is tasked with the mission of preserving the Statuesque; revolutionary democracy is tasked with the mission of changing and transforming the statuesque. Moreover, revolutionary democracy will continue to unavoidably depend on the huge state machine for the coming three decades, at least, to achieve its transformation goals. In the mean time, we already saw that a self-contained civil society in Ethiopia is a far cry. Such an important machine therefore needs timely greasing for insured efficiency and effectiveness.

Neo-liberal periodic reactivations, I argue, occur when particularly, revolutionary democracy stays within managerial corners than transform itself to leadership missions.

Conclusions

Under present circumstances, one could see that revolutionary democracy is a winner paradigm of political rule with dynamic all-direction expansion in its contentions with neo-liberal democracy. As discussions above showed, revolutionary democracy could not have uniform and horizontally similar stages of success. However, its record at national level is that it is fast on the move forward. The change registered in the last ten years only witness that revolutionary democracy has already began eating itself up. Despite this, it is

also equally without doubt it will continue, for the coming, at least, two decades as the chief paradigm before its phases out substantially.