(Part one)

P O L I T I C A L P A R T I E S

&

T H E 2010 E T H I O P I A N E L E C T I O N R E S U L T

GENENEW ASSEFA

I

Retrospect

In our last posting we advanced, though not a terribly original, but in our eyes a compelling argument. Notably that the credibility of any election is ultimately measured by the electorate’s calm and settled response. From this vantage point, we weighed the evidence of voters’ reaction to EPRDF’s landslide victory and reached one conclusion. That, despite the lopsidedness of the outcome, the 2010 voting is as credible as in any robust democracy. This is neither to deny the existence of other voices nor to downplay their take on the matter. Those who read our Voters’ Response would recall that we were careful to avoid such a manifestly warrantless oversight. In fact, we acknowledge that, albeit ancillary, the views of all those with legitimate stakes in the election is important. Theoretically, this can be inferred from, at least, two commonly known but mutually exclusive post-election reactions. For instance, it is a universally accepted axiom that an election process is ideal and considered flawless when there is an all round consensus on the outcome. However, an election need not be flawless to be credible. If that were the case, the 2000 US presidential election and, to a less extent, the 2010 British parliamentary variant would have been found wanting. The point, nonetheless, underscores the weight that the opinions and claims of all election stakeholders must carry.

II

Conversely, the fact that grave consequences could potentially follow whenever competing-actors hold a dissenting opinion on an election outcome also indirectly reinforces our point. Indeed, Ethiopia’s own experience shows that violent conflicts could ensue when relevant actors --- mistakenly or otherwise --- seriouslyy contest and vigorously campaigns to alter an election result. Though, as we have repeatedly pointed out, such a possibility is contingent on the perception of the majority of the voting public. If an election outcome is credible in the eyes of the bulk of the electorate, the result stands without any commotion, or murmur, if any. Under such a scenario, no disgruntled party can go far by questioning or challenging the outcome. Much less altering the result by the kind of confrontational strategy the opposition employed in 2005. In a nutshell, therefore, it is precisely because of voters’ positive reception of EPRDF’s landslide victory that peace and tranquility prevails up and down the country. Amid, one must add, widespread public excitement spurred by Ethiopia’s promising proximity and closeness to terminate its dependency on food aid. All this is possible due to the tremendous effort that went into building a solid enabling environment. In which, among other things, political competition could play itself out with none of the disturbances that followed the previous election. Nevertheless, a commentary on the 2010 elections is deficient unless, salutary or not, it includes a survey of where the relevant organized actors stood vise-a-vise the election and their response to the outcome. Below, therefore, placing emphasis where it is due and in installments, of course, we shall do exactly that.

III

Concession

In this connection, what perhaps should be briefly discussed first is the concession speech delivered by leaders of fourteen, mostly region-based political parties. No sooner the provisional election results were released, than these parties went on air and surprised the public. In a refreshing departure from the recent past, each one of these leaders congratulated the EPRDF on its spectacular victory. And pledged to work harder and do better in future elections. Given that the opposition in this country is a sour loser, the grace with which these parties accepted the election outcome ought to have been applauded. Cynical as our pundits are, however, this exemplary democratic gentility was dismissed as a disingenuous self-serving exercise. Granted, these parties were defeated by a huge vote margin. It could, therefore, be argued that they had little to gain by challenging the election outcome in court. Or in Fenji Woreda, as Meles often describes the extra-legal zone of adversarial engagement. From which, at least as our recent experience shows, only the fit with solid grassroots support come out alive. Thus, the argument goes, these parties had no choice but to admit defeat in the hope that their concession would ingratiate them with the ruling party. Insincere and/or self-serving motive aside, there is a weighty and important reason why the leaders of these fourteen parties quickly and willingly accepted the election result.

IV

This has to do with the ethnic identity of the composition of these parties and constituencies they tend to cater to and seek to rally behind their election bid. As it is apparent, most in leadership positions, including the rank-and-file membership predominantly come from historically disadvantaged nationalities. Their campaign platform is, therefore, largely designed to appeal to voters in the newly empowered self-determining regional states. In the knowledge, of course, that the peoples of these regions are loyal to the nationality-based constitutional federal political order. That is why they have little tolerance to opposition parties that tried to circumvent the constitution in the name of, say, retrieving stolen vote. For they have no reason to distrust the rulings of any of the governing institutions of the federal state let alone the National Election Board. Indeed why would they suspect that this impartial federal institution that recognizes their right to secede, would fudge the regions’ ballot count and skew the result against their choice. Besides, they know that the ruling party -- itself a coalition of nationality-based fronts --- does not, contrary to what its detractors say, feel disadvantaged if these regions administer themselves through any party that they think represents their interest best.

v

A good illustration of this spirit is the fact that the EPRDF has so far never run for election in four out of the nine regional states that constitute the Ethiopian federation. The weight that should be given to this stance becomes readily apparent when viewed against one possibility that could theoretically cost the EPRDF its government. Let us say, for instance, this country is in a tight ballot race in which the outcome hinges on as few as fifty or less seats. And, that in five regions of its candidacy the EPRDF is dead even at the polls with a rival national party. Or a coalition of parties that runs candidates in every single election district, including in the four regions where that EPRD voluntarily avoids competing. Under such a scenario the EPRDF would face a serious dilemma. For the only way it could retain office is by forming a coalition government with some combination of the allied governing parties of these four regions. No doubt these are not swing-vote regions. But it is possible that the voting populations in these four regional states could be swayed to cast the balance of its vote to the rival party/coalition. Or, as they have every right to do so, the allied parties themselves could, though highly unlikely, switch sides leaving the EPRDF in an impossible bind. In that event the ruling front would have no choice but to step down. Surely, this self-consciously taken risk by itself should spur even the skeptic to appreciate one thing. Namely, the EPRDF’s strict adherence to the principle of self-determination of nations and nationalities, including the right to unseat and elect any new government that they deem fit to govern. It should also have been sufficient to bring to rest the groundless accusations that the EPRDF would, through the Election Board, rig theses regions’ elections. And, subsequently impose its own ‘satellite’ organizations on their regions against their will. The whole point here is not to suggest that all the country’s national communities are totally happy with everything under the EPRDF-led federal government. Or have no issues that they would like to be addressed.

VI

They certainly do, particularly considering that Ethiopia has yet to live up to its constitutional promises of universal parity in all social and economic development indicators. It is a small wonder, then, that like their compatriots in the rest of the country, voters in these formerly marginalized regions are not closed to what local-based dissenting parties have to offer. As they have shown in the past, they occasionally vote for region-based opposition parties although never in sufficient number to cause an upset. Ideally, what they expect from an opposition party is to voice their concerns and negotiate on their behalf for better region-specific polices. Or, if that fails, to peacefully unseat the regional incumbent, including, if need be, the federal government. And, as opposition parties do elsewhere in democratic nations, to take the responsibility of administrating the country until the next election. With, needless to say, strict conformity with the constitution and unequivocal obedience to the decisions and rulings of the competent legal bodies as well as the judiciary and legislative branches of government. Thus, whatever their political agenda is, region-based parties scarcely question the legitimacy of the federal constitutional system or defy its institutional expressions. No doubt, they challenge the incumbent as some did vigorously at least during the last election. But in a manner that resonates with the definition of a loyal opposition that we tried to describe above. Unlike their counterparts who resent the responsibility that a loyal opposition has to shoulder, these parties reacted differently to the official announcement of the 2010 ballot returns. As they have trust in the system, they were indeed the first to endorse the announcement with no ifs and buts. Unfortunately, though somewhat understandable, theirs was overshadowed by what the major three opposition parties had to say in response to the 2010 election and its outcome.

VII

We are referring here to Ledetu Ayalew’s EDP, Hailu Shawel’s AEUP and, of course, Medrek. A coalition of several parties and individuals led by, among others, Gizachew Shiferaw, Hailu Araya, Beyene Petros, Bulcha Demeqsa, Merera Gudina as well as the former president of Ethiopia, Negasso Gidada. Later they were joined by TPLF former stalwarts: Siye Abraha and Gebru Asrat. The last two were, of course, deeply implicated in the 2000 intra-party factional feud that imperiled the TPLF-EPRDF leadership. Fortunately, this internal schism was checked and rectified before it bulged into an uncontrollable crisis. In time, as it were, before it unraveled the very thread that binds the recently popularly reelected coalition of four fronts that govern the Federal Democratically Republic state. Whereas, those we listed under the above subheading were, to varying degrees, directly involved in the instigation of the 2005 post-election street turbulence. This too was diffused with comparative ease before it snowballed into, say, Kenyan or Zimbabwean proportion. Bothersome as their political conduct has been in the recent past, these opposition leaders, nevertheless, seem to have been somewhat tempered by their experience. For instance, none of these parties has seriously tried to challenge the 2010 election result by violent means or color-coded revolution. This is not without good reasons. First, unlike 2005, public reaction to this year’s vote tally is not amenable to even contemplate such tactic. And second, the opposition appears to have learned from its 2005 experience that dangerous consequences follow from lawlessness and blind defiance. Especially against a legally established state whose power is limited by a written constitution. That, among other liberties, provides for organized opposition and for change of government by an orderly and peaceful transfer of power.

EDP

VIII

In this regard, the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP) has gone the furthest. It alone has grasped before any of its counterparts the folly of extremist politics in Ethiopia. That is why it broke away from the CUD coalition and chose to do its battles in parliament. At a time no less, as it will be remembered, when serving the public in the House of Representatives was considered a sacrilege among opposition parties and their vocal urban fans. Undoubtedly, EDP’s decision to conduct itself in a responsible fashion has a lot to do with the relative youthfulness of its leadership. And the kind of following it attracts: notably job-seeking college graduates, high school teachers, imported- goods retailing shop-owners, low- and middle-level civil-service employees and the young urban unemployed. In other words, unlike others in the ranks of the opposition, the EDP and its supporters are least encumbered by the dead weight of chauvinism, hollow vainglory or bellicose-like sentiments encapsulated by the pre-1991 deafening political slogan, ‘Mother Land or Death!’ No doubt, the EDP at times backslides on certain issues that divide parties that reject and defend the federal constitutional order. But on the whole, the party bears the mark of a loyal opposition. One that is willing to engage the incumbent in areas of commonality of interest. And, that prudently maintains ironic distance in areas where differences outweigh. But, always ready to articulate bold criticism against what it sees as faulty official policies. Yet, bearing in mind that criticism has to be tempered by responsibility, preferably in the guise of a better alternative policy recommendation. In sum, a loyal opposition is against wholesale denunciation of the government and the federal state alike as the anti-systemic opposition parties do in Ethiopia.

IX

At any rate, as it could be imagined, the EDP was subjected to seemingly endless negative campaign for departing ways with the opposition. For almost five years, the party was denounced as a wishy-washy turncoat. Not only for its active participation in parliament, but also for occasionally voting with the EPRDF. Notably, as it would be recalled, during the debate around the question of sending a defensive military expedition against the Jihadists in Mogadishu. Although overblown, Ledetu Ayalew’s role during the crisis lent some credence to the anti-EDP campaign. Leery of being outdone by his no less firebrand CUD colleagues, he scaled his incendiary rhetoric that exasperated the volatile 2005 faceoff. To its credit, however, the leadership brought Ledetu back into line where he could vent his pent-up anger through parliamentary oration. While this decision saved him from the fate that awaited those who pushed their luck too far, it nevertheless shattered his tough public image and intensified the attack against the EDP. But the EDP leadership did not take the hostility directed against the party with folded arms. It tried to counter the hate campaign by redefining its stand and the guiding principle of its future actions as the --- Third Line--- which the party subsequently propagated by all means at its disposal.

X

EDP’s new line, however, is essentially a variant of what we briefly described above as loyal opposition. For instance, the Third Line renounces the binary legacy of ‘blind support and blind opposition’ in our political culture. Conversely it purports to promote a new approach. One predicted on the rational principle of praising the merits and criticizing the demerits of all government programs, policies, laws or directives. Lofty as this principle is, but there is scarcely anything that can be construed as startlingly new in it. If anything, it is the oldest cardinal rule that governs all parliamentary opposition parties in stable democracies. As a matter of convention opposition parties are not hesitant to credit what they find worthy of support in any official policy. Nor sparing in their attack against what their constituencies dislike. But, as they always do, with unfailing allegiance and loyalty to the constitutional state and the laws of the land. Nonetheless, it is a sad commentary on our political culture that so a commonplace rule of conduct in even emerging democracies is advertised as a new discovery. This is by no means to downplay EDP’s efforts. To the contrary, the party deserves credit for propagating this theory. For it may have helped to lessen the polarization between the ruling party and the opposition in Ethiopia.

XI

Unfortunately, for all its moderation this theory did not bring EDP any respite from unrelenting extremist attack. It was only in the build-up to the 4^th general election that the public begun to give the EDP a faire audience. Culminating as it did in a measure of popular support during and after the televised election debate. In which, as many would agree, the EDP demonstrated its greater ability relative to any of the other opposition parties. Commendable as its debating performance has been, however, it did not translate into vote. Not at least as much as the party had come to expect towards the latter part of the election campaign. In fact, like every other opposition party, EDP lost all the parliamentary seats it had won in the previous election. On the other hand, judging by a careful breakdown of the total vote tally, it appears that EDP could have done much better than its polling results shows. Had it not, as it were, been forced into wasting valuable time and energy on otherwise needless matter. Chiefly in trying to prove its autonomy and independence from the EPRDF, which itself ironically played no small part in demonizing. Be that as it may, let us turn to EDP’s response to the 2010 election result. Since that is one critical starting point where one can begin to differentiate the doves from the hawks among the opposition parties.

XII

As it will be recalled, the EDP was the last party to release a written statement containing its response to EPDRF’s landslide victory. In this rather longish document, the EDP neither gracefully concedes defeat, like the fourteen parties discussed above. Nor, unlike AEUP and Medrek, does it reject the outcome as evidence of things unseen’ i.e. vote-rigging. A close reading of the text in fact betrays two things. The shock the party leadership must have felt by EPRDF’s sweeping victory and, the tension that must have arisen within its ranks. Between principally those who quickly recovered from the shock and those that remained bitter to the very day of the drafting of the document. At any rate, EDP’s response as expressed in this document is two-fold though it may not strike everyone as a specimen of coherence. The first part rehearses the disadvantages the party faced before and during the election campaign. On the text’s analysis, this prolonged delay played undeniable part in limiting the grounds that the party could have otherwise covered and possibly win more votes than it did. In any event, the chief disadvantages that the party claimed to have faced are: delay in government disbursement of campaign fund, delay in the provision of equal media access as well as delay in addressing grievance cases of candidate-harassment. No doubt the EDP would have done better had it had the benefits of these facilities at the commencement of the election campaign. But neither the EDP nor anyone, for that matter, can claim that ample and timely access to media and party financing would have altered the overall election outcome. That is perhaps why the second part of the EDP statement ends by congratulating the elected EPRDF candidates. And, wishing them well and success when they take-up their legitimately won parliamentary seats in October. Obviously, the EDP leadership is distraught by the loss of its legislative seats. However, given its ability to rebound from setbacks, this is not the end of the line for the party. Above all, as its core politics is sound, we are likely to hear more from EDP in the not too distant future. Unfortunately the same cannot be said about the All Ethiopian Unity Party (EUP) which we listed above among the three major opposition parties.