The death of Al-Shabaab’s leader Ahmed Abdi Godane….   (MoFA) Sep 12, 2014 - On Monday (September1) a US Special Forces operation using Hellfire missiles and laser-guided bombs from drones and manned aircraft, killed Ahmed Abdi ‘Godane’, the leader of Al-Shabaab. The strike destroyed two vehicles and killed six people one of whom was Godane. The others have not been identified but Somali sources have suggested that at least two or three other significant Al-Shabaab commanders may have died, including Muhammad Abu Abdullah and Sheikh Muhammad Dulyaden. The attack came at the end of a meeting held in the area of Sablaleh where Al-Shabaab had training facilities for its fighters, some 170 kms south of Mogadishu, and 40 kms from the port of Barawe, one of Al-Shabaab remaining strongholds.   The Pentagon finally confirmed on Friday (September 5) that the strike had killed Godane, one of Washington’s eight “world’s most wanted” terror leaders. Rear Admiral John Kirby, the Pentagon’s press secretary, said in a statement that “Removing Godane from the battlefield is a major symbolic and operational loss to Al Shabaab.” It was not the first time that the US has managed to remove an Al-Shabaab leader: Godane’s predecessor, Adan Hashi Ayro was killed by a US missile in May 2008, three months after the U.S. State Department declared Al-Shabaab a terrorist organization. A statement from the White House confirming the death of Godane described Al-Shabaab as the "largest al-Qaeda affiliate in Africa" and noted that his death reflected years of painstaking work “by our intelligence, military and law enforcement professionals." The statement noted that Godane had publicly claimed responsibility for the Nairobi Westgate shopping centre attack last September, and that under his leadership, Al-Shabaab had claimed responsibility for many bombings, including various types of suicide attacks, in Mogadishu and in central and northern Somalia, typically targeting officials and perceived allies of the Somali government as well as the former transitional federal government of Somalia. It noted that he had also continued to oversee plots targeting Westerners, including US persons, in East Africa. The White House said the US would continue to use all the tools at its disposal, "financial, diplomatic, intelligence and military", to address the threat of Al-Shabaab and support the Somali government's efforts to "build a secure and stable future for the Somali people".   Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud issued a statement welcoming the death of Ahmed Abdi Godane and thanking “the US government and individuals in the Somali security forces who helped the operation.” The statement said “After cooperation between the Somali and the American government during this week, the American forces targeted a convoy transporting the Al-Shabaab terrorist group leader and some of his coworkers,” adding that “We are confirming that no one in that convoy survived the attack.” President Mohamud said “The government and the people of Somalia greatly value the support of our international allies whether it be direct intervention such as on this occasion or longer term capacity building through the training and equipping our reconstituting Somali security forces.” Offering an amnesty to Al-Shabaab members, he said: “While an extreme hardcore may fight over the leadership of al-Shabaab, this is a chance for the majority of members of al-Shabaab to change course and reject Godane’s decision to make them the pawns of an international terror campaign.” He said the government recognized that  many al Shabaab members had no choice in that decision and it was also aware that many joined al Shabaab for money and to support their families or were tricked. He therefore offered a 45 day amnesty for Al-Shabaab members who rejected violence and renounced their links to Al-Shabaab and al Qaeda. The President added that those who chose to remain in Al-Shabaab would know what would happen to them. Al-Shabaab, he said, was collapsing. He added that “our own troops, assisted by the AMISOM forces as part of Operation Indian Ocean, are clearing the remaining pockets of Al-Shabaab out of the countryside and allowing the population to see good governance in action. Security is improving in Mogadishu and in other cities: education, health care, justice, thriving businesses, construction but most of all freedom. We are offering life, not death.”   Godane’s record as leader of Al-Shabaab was, in fact, surprisingly poor and he presided over major splits in the organization, notably in June 2013, when he ordered the execution of a number of senior Al-Shabaab commanders who disagreed with him. Those killed included Ibrahim al-Afghani and Abul Hamid Hashi Olhayi; others fled to escape assassination, among them Muktar Robow and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. Over a dozen senior commanders were arrested and a purge of other elements carried out, including Godane’s own security element, the Amniyaad, a force built up as his personal intelligence, security and commando force.  Sheikh Aweys ended up in government hands, and Muktar Robow apparently withdrew from active participation in Al-Shabaab activities during the past year. This was particularly significant as he controlled the largest number of experienced fighters in Al-Shabaab, drawn from the Rahenweyne clan in Bay and Bakool regions. The whole episode meant that Al-Shabaab lost a significant number of its more experienced battlefield commanders just as AMISOM and the SNA reached a point at which they were able to go on the offensive on a substantial scale.    The purge was Godane’s response to accusations that Al-Shabaab’s series of defeats after 2010 (in the Ramadan offensive in Mogadishu in 2010, its enforced retreat from the city in 2011, and the loss of Kismayo to the Kenyans in September 2012) were caused by his dictatorial leadership. According to Ibrahim al-Afghani, a co-founder of Al-Shabaab, Godane indulged in tyrannical actions, demanded for blind obedience and failed to consult with other leaders. Indeed, he disbanded the shura, the council of commanders, in 2011. His refusal to allow humanitarian relief during the famine of 2011 also seriously damaged Al-Shabaab’s credibility. His coup in June 2013, in fact, realigned Al-Shabaab with the most extreme elements and with the terrorist tactics which had already begun to alienate most of Al-Shabaab’s more moderate sympathizers, the vast majority of its support, who were becoming tired of Al-Shabaab’s abuses and excesses.      Following the killings, Al-Shabaab’s activities became more and more confined to terrorist activity, the other main strand of Godane’s strategy. This was, in part, used as a method of control as well as a means to demonstrate Al-Shabaab could continue to operate effectively through terrorist and suicide attacks on Government and AMISOM in Somalia, despite its battlefield defeats. The tactic was also employed externally, in 2010 in Kampala when over 70 died in two bombings, and in Kenya, most violently at the Westlands Mall in Nairobi a year ago when 67 people were killed. Kenya has also suffered, directly and through associates, from over a hundred attacks in which some 400 people have died. These provided the publicity to persuade both its supporters and its enemies, and the international media, that Al-Shabaab remains a significant danger, as well as build a screen to conceal its battlefield losses. It also allowed Godane to claim that any withdrawals from territory were no more than strategic, and ignore the fact that Al-Shabaab has been on the defensive for the last year, with most the organization’s estimated 5,000 or so fighters avoiding direct combat with SNA or AMISOM forces.   ….and the future of Al-Shabaab   Al-Shabaab announced the appointment of Ahmed Omar Abu-Ubeid (Ahmed Dirie) as the successor to Godane on Saturday (September 6). Ahmed Omar is in his early 40s. He was born in Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State and is from the Dir, and his mother is from the same Isaaq sub clan as Godane, and indeed was closely related to Godane’s mother. He himself was a close associate of Godane, identified by hardliners in the organization as the right choice to succeed Godane and apparently enjoying the endorsement of Godane as a possible successor. As a trusted lieutenant, he was involved in the removal of those who fell out with Godane, in 2012/2013, including the US born Omar Hammami ‘Al-Amriki’, one of the more prominent foreigners fighting for Al-Shabaab and in the arrests and killings of possible rivals last year. He also appears to have supported Godane in his efforts to make Al-Shabaab a regional guerrilla threat. However, though he had a close relationship to Godane and has something of a reputation inside Al-Shabaab as an efficient operator, he has neither Godane’s stature as a militant nor the strong clan support that some of his potential rivals.    Godane’s intolerance for dissent and his removal of all rivals and internal opposition meant he had been the main decision-maker in Al-Shabaab for some years. His death could certainly result in a shift in tactics or strategic focus, but this would depend upon who is able to consolidate control over the organization. In fact, there is no evidence that Al-Shabaab commanders might intend to change their approach. The people in change appear to be those handpicked by Godane for their loyalty to him personally and presumably largely share his aspirations, including his interest in the link to al Qaeda, his insistence on a draconian style of control and his deliberate policy of killing civilians despite the effect this has had in alienating many former sympathizers. The Al-Shabaab statement on Ahmed Omar’s appointment said "Avenging the death of our scholars and leaders is a binding obligation on our shoulders that we will never relinquish nor forget no matter how long it takes,” adding that "By the permission of Allah, you will surely taste the bitter consequences of your actions".  Significantly, it also renewed Al-Shabaab’s pledge of allegiance to Al-Qaeda.   Godane's death will undoubtedly have an impact on the morale of the fighters on the ground but it is not the end of Al-Shabaab either in the short or medium term. Al-Shabaab will continue a real danger to the region, posing an ongoing terrorist threat. It will continue to have the capacity to carry out suicide attacks both inside Somalia and in neighboring countries. It also has affiliated networks of supporters in Kenya and Tanzania. In the immediate future Ahmed Omar is certainly likely to want to stamp his authority on the organization, to show that Al-Shabaab is still relevant, and that could most obviously be through a large spectacular attack, or attacks, both in Somalia and in the neighboring countries. Al-Shabaab has already threatened the US with retaliation, and it has, of course, recruited from the US in the past.   Al -Shabaab will retain a role in Somali politics, even if this has already been degraded in the last year or so. As it loses more and more territory and its popularity continues to dwindle, it is likely to be forced into further terrorist action. Other clan-based local and regional groups are already becoming more relevant in the political debates over the future government, federalism, state formation and the decentralization/centralization debate. As Al-Shabaab’s territorial control weakens, local clan militias will be able to re-establish control of their own territories again. This threatens the resumption of some long term clan disputes, interrupted when Al-Shabaab established itself as a controlling authority in some areas.  Equally, it allows the Somali national Army (SNA) and AMISOM to shift their role from the purely military towards greater emphasis on the building of effective governance structures, helping the Federal Government deliver services, the most urgent current necessity. As the Government widens its control, it is now beginning to provide governmental structures for the liberated areas. These will be critical in establishing support for the administration in the future.    The scene of the ground, of course, is changing and the SNA is now significantly better equipped and trained and AMISOM has been increased in size (even though it has yet to receive the ‘force enablers’ it needs). For the immediate future, the SNA and AMISOM will continue their advances in Operation Indian Ocean, expanding their efforts to drive Al-Shabaab out of smaller towns and villages inland where it is still present, and isolate it from the ports along the coast from which it has derived much of its income. The advance is also aimed to capture any remaining ports as well. Al-Shabaab’s major source of income was the charcoal trade from Kismayo prior to 2012. Worth millions of dollars, this helped keep it organized, and provide the resources to buy support and enforce control. More recently, it has been moving into the ivory poaching trade from Kenya, though a larger slice of its income still comes from sugar smuggled into Kenya.    Following battlefield defeats and “tactical withdrawls”, Al-Shabaab has been concentrating on straightforward criminal activities, including protection rackets, "taxes" on local businesses and NGOs operating in the area, and extortion as well as illegal trade in charcoal, sugar or ivory.   It also uses supporters abroad to raise funds especially through the Gulf, both from al-Qaeda-affiliated groups and from Somali sympathizers within the Diaspora. The Eritrean government has supported Al-Shabaab and other extremist organizations linked to it. This was one of the major reasons for the imposition of UN Sanctions in 2009, and in 2012 the U.S. also sanctioned some Eritrean military officers who had worked closely with Al-Shabaab.   While sanctions may have limited direct support from Eritrea, Al-Shabaab still has significant resources. There is every reason to believe it will continue to direct its focus towards the more violent, terrorist end of the spectrum, becoming more dangerous, both internally and externally,  if less politically relevant, in Somalia. It is not surprising that General Khalif Ahmed Ereg, Somalia's National Security Minister, though it necessary to warn last week that the Somalia government had credible intelligence Al-Shabaab was already planning further terrorist attacks: “Security agencies have obtained information indicating that Al-Shabaab is now planning to carry out desperate attacks against medical facilities, education centers and other government facilities,” he said, adding that the security forces were ready to counter attacks.   It is worth underlining that it is hardly possible to engage with the sort of violent extremist represented by Al-Shabaab leadership. It can only be eliminated. For this, the international community needs to remain properly involved. Al-Shabaab’s earlier development originally occurred because its activities were ignored by the international community, allowing it the space to become established on the ground in Somalia. It is important not to make the same mistake again.