A Growing Opportunity: Measuring Investments in African Agriculture
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Farmers from Liberia’s Feed the Future programme are taking their acquired knowledge at the community farm and applying it to their own farms and teaching their children so they will produce better yields.

Photo by Morgana Wingard
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To the millions of people who work and campaign tirelessly to make progress toward agriculture development and food security, thank you. The perseverance and commitment of those working both inside and outside governments is truly inspiring.

Errors And Omissions

This report went to print on 8 March 2013. The information in this report was, to the best of our knowledge, current up until 8 March 2013. We acknowledge that events that occurred after this point may mean that some of the figures and commitments in this report are out of date.
Annie is part of a Feed the Future training programme in Nimba in eastern Liberia. The programme is teaching the community of farmers how to improve production and decrease environmental impacts.
Introduction
Unlocking Africa’s agriculture potential would also unlock its development. Farming is Africa’s predominant livelihood: more than two-thirds of Africans depend on agriculture for their incomes. Investing in agriculture is one of the best ways to reduce poverty in Africa. According to World Bank analysis, growth in the agriculture sector is 2.5 times as effective at reducing poverty as growth in other sectors. Yet Africa is far from realizing this potential. For too long, Africa’s agriculture sector was neglected. African governments failed over many decades to invest adequately in the agriculture sector and to create a policy and regulatory environment in which smallholder farmers could flourish. Compared to a sharp rise in domestic spending in Asia, public spending on agriculture in Africa stayed stagnant and low throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Meanwhile, donor assistance to agriculture was slashed 72% between 1988 and 2003. As a result, Africa’s cereal crop yields today are nearly as low as they were several decades ago, and just a fraction of those in Latin America and South Asia. Today, Africa is a net food buyer, looking outside the continent to feed its growing and urbanising population. Facing poor infrastructure, expensive fertilizer, poor access to extension and financial services, unreliable and unpredictable markets, inadequate utilisation of technology and improved seeds, and limited land security, Africa’s smallholder farmers have been left unable to produce enough food to feed their families, nor to sell surplus to markets to generate income.

Sub-Saharan African agriculture could, and should, be thriving. According to the World Bank, the region has the right conditions to feed itself: enough fertile farmland, enough water and enough favourable climates. According to the International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD), the Africa Progress Panel and others, Africa has the potential not only to feed itself, but also to become a major food supplier for the rest of the world.

Turning the Tide: New Commitments

In 2003, African leaders took a first step towards reversing decades of neglect with a bold commitment to increase investments in agriculture. Through the Maputo Declaration at the July 2003 African Union (AU) summit, African heads of state made a historic promise to their people: to allocate 10% of national budgets to agriculture and seek 6% annual agricultural growth by 2008. With the Maputo commitments, African leaders pledged to reverse the underinvestment that held the agriculture sector back for so long.

Reaffirming the need for ownership of their own development agenda, leaders in the African Union adopted the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) as a common programme to be implemented by member states to systematically eliminate hunger and reduce poverty through agriculture. An entirely African-led and African-owned programme, CAADP addresses policy and capacity issues across the entire agriculture sector in Africa. CAADP is premised on country ownership, with plans leveraging the resources, leadership and input of Africans. As of January 2013, 24 countries have signed CAADP compacts and held their business meetings, launching solid, costed and technically reviewed plans to accelerate agricultural development.

Following this leadership from African countries, donors stepped up their own commitments to agriculture and food security. In 2009, in the aftermath of a sharp spike in food prices, donors pledged to act with scale and urgency to achieve global food security. At the 2009 G8 summit in L’Aquila, Italy, donors pledged $22 billion over three years to support sustainable agriculture and food security. They also agreed to a set of principles to deliver more effective and strategic assistance, including commitments to invest in country-led plans and provide predictable long-term financing and strategic co-ordination.

In 2012, G8 leaders at the 2012 Camp David summit launched the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, building on the work of Grow Africa, a partnership born in 2011 between the AU, New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the World Economic Forum to accelerate investments in sustainable agriculture. The New Alliance is a partnership between the G8, private companies and national governments, which set an ambitious goal of lifting 50 million people out of poverty over 10 years. Companies have agreed to invest in countries that have committed to make policy and regulatory reforms to enable more investment and agriculture productivity. Through the New Alliance, more than 60 companies, half from Africa, have committed more than $4 billion in private investment.
The renewed emphasis on agriculture over the past decade, and especially in the last several years, has yielded important results. Overall, poverty in sub-Saharan Africa fell by almost five percentage points between 2005 and 2008—the largest fall since the international community started calculating poverty rates. For the first time, the absolute number of people living in extreme poverty in Africa has fallen despite rapid population growth, from 395 million in 2005 to 386 million in 2008. Underpinning this success story are several standout countries that have experienced historic agriculture growth. Malawi transformed from one of the worst-performing agricultural economies in sub-Saharan Africa 2000-2006 to achieving an impressive annual growth rate of 6.5% from 2006-2009—though recent travails underline the importance of consistency in policy implementation.4

Despite record improvements by select African countries, Africa overall is still far from realizing its agricultural potential. What African agriculture needs now more than ever to unlock its poverty-reducing potential are substantial and targeted investments to create viable food production and marketing systems. For African governments, donors and the private sector alike, 2013 is the year to deliver on these building blocks that impact farming and expand economic opportunities for farmers.

The Maputo commitments are set to expire in 2013, giving world leaders an opportunity to take stock of progress made over the past decade and lay out a bold new plan with time-bound targets to accelerate the implementation of CAADP regional and national investment plans. Last year, 2012 African Union Chairperson and President of Benin Yayi Boni declared that 2014 will be the year of agriculture in Africa. This presents a once-in-a-decade opportunity for a review and renewal of African leadership and commitment to another African-led decade for agriculture, which seriously learns from the successes and shortcomings of the previous decade to accelerate the pace of progress. In 2013, momentum is building to assess the lessons learned from the past decade of CAADP, identify opportunities to build on and improve it, and to marshal continent-wide political will to review and revitalize the Maputo financing commitments for the next 10 years of agriculture.

2013 also brings important opportunities for donors to bolster their support for African-led agriculture. In response to pressure from UK NGOs and the IF campaign, UK Prime Minister David Cameron has pledged to host a major “food and nutrition” event just days before the 2013 G8 summit in June, drawing on participation of G8 countries and a broad range of stakeholders from the private sector, philanthropy, developing countries and donors. At this forum, it is crucial that the G8 and international community step forward with financial commitments to help fill the remaining funding gap of national agriculture investment plans and reinforce CAADP. Prime Minister Cameron has also committed to take forward and expand the G8’s New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition and to enhance its focus on nutrition and smallholder farmers, especially women.

Holding Leaders to Account

Teeing up for this critical year, this report holds governments accountable to their past commitments on agriculture and food security and looks ahead to future opportunities for growth. Building from ONE’s 2011 report – Agriculture Accountability: Holding Donors to Their L’Aquila Promises – this report includes the major addition of coverage of African governments’ efforts to invest in their own agricultural development. ONE looked at the 19 African countries with vetted, signed national agriculture investment plans, developed through CAADP. For each of these countries, we looked at progress on their commitments to reduce poverty, to spend 10% of national expenditures on agriculture, to implement national plans, and to include citizens in decision-making.

We continue to assess donors’ delivery of their L’Aquila commitments. This year, we looked at eight donors (Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) and evaluated the quantity and quality of their agriculture assistance.

In addition, this year the report hones in on the first Rome Principle of country ownership. For donors, we look at four different indicators of country ownership of national agriculture plans, from inclusion of non-state actors to donor support for these plans. For African governments, we look at whether budgetary and programme information is available to citizens and whether a country’s national agriculture plan includes a structure for the participation of non-state actors. We also include case studies from Benin, Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania to help illustrate the concept of country ownership and its impact on the CAADP national process.

Finally, given that this year is a turning point for both African and donor governments, we offer some targeted recommendations on how to improve commitments to agriculture and food security moving forward.
The Chitedze Research Station in Lilongwe, Malawi focuses on developing improved seed varieties for tropical legumes – soybeans, cassava, pigeon peas, chickpeas, groundnuts, beans – and grains such as maize and sorghum. As important sources of protein to millions, legumes help improve food security and nutrition.

Photo by Morgana Wingard
Executive Summary
In 2003, African leaders took a first step towards reversing decades of neglect with a bold commitment to investing in agriculture. Through the Maputo Declaration at the July 2003 African Union (AU) summit, African heads of state made a historic promise to their people: to allocate 10% of national budgets on agriculture and seek 6% annual agricultural growth by 2008. Following this leadership from African countries, donors stepped up their own commitments to agriculture and food security. At the 2009 G8 summit in L’Aquila, Italy, donors pledged $22 billion over three years to support sustainable agriculture, food security and nutrition. They also agreed to a set of principles to deliver more effective and strategic assistance, including commitments to invest in country-led plans and provide predictable long-term financing and strategic coordination. The commitments have been made, and the plans have been laid. What has been delivered? This year it is vital we assess progress and remaining challenges as the Maputo Declaration hits its 10th anniversary, the AU hits its 50th anniversary, and the region embarks on its “Year of Agriculture.”

Executive Summary

Unlocking Africa’s agriculture potential would unlock its development. Investing in agriculture is one of the best ways to reduce poverty across the developing world, especially in Africa. According to World Bank analysis, growth in the agriculture sector is 2.5 times as effective at reducing poverty as growth in other sectors.¹

Key Findings

African leadership, backed by donor support, is helping turn CAADP momentum into real progress. The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), born out of African leaders’ Maputo pledges a decade ago, has put in motion an African-led vision and process that is delivering important progress. Twenty-four countries have signed, technically-vetted, inclusively-developed national agriculture plans, while another six countries have committed to start the process and develop them. This commitment has translated into tangible gains. Eight out of the 19 countries with agriculture investment plans that we assessed in this report are on track to meet Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 1a of halving extreme poverty by 2015. Thirteen of the 15 countries with available data have achieved annual agriculture growth of 6% or more.

Despite progress, Maputo financing commitments are off track. Disappointingly, our analysis shows that only four of the 19 African countries examined in this report have met their Maputo target of spending 10% of their national budget on the agriculture sector. Many others are making progress: two more countries are close behind, and a further six are at least halfway there. Seven countries are seriously off track, with less than 5% of total expenditure on the agriculture sector. In fact, these seven countries have actually lowered their agriculture expenditure. Summed up, these funding gaps amount to a $4.4 billion shortfall in 2011 in these 19 countries alone. In partnership with donors, African leaders must act with urgency to fill remaining gaps in their Maputo funding commitments.
Donors have met their L’Aquila commitments, but disbursements and support for CAADP and country-led plans are seriously off track.

Collectively, donors have legally obligated the entirety of their $22 billion pledge for the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI). However, only half of pledged AFSI financial commitments have been disbursed. Since 2008, donors have made some progress toward their pledge of a more country-led approach in their food security and agriculture-related programmes. However, the share of donor agriculture assistance allocated to countries with country-led, costed agriculture plans has been low, including with those plans developed through the CAADP process, and more robust donor support is needed. Today, there is up to a 50% shortfall in funding for country-owned and led agriculture plans. Donors must act with urgency to do their share in filling the financing gap of national agricultural investment plans, including by fully funding the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP), the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund, and working with the CAADP secretariat and national stakeholder platforms to identify and fill funding gaps in national agriculture plans.

Transparency is insufficient in all countries. African governments should redouble efforts to open their books to their citizens. At least half of the countries analysed had major flaws or gaps in their budget documents, and less than half of countries had a “citizen’s budget” available online. To enable their citizens to follow the money and monitor that services and results are delivered, all countries should publish and make available online easy-to-understand and accurate citizen’s budgets that disaggregate the entire sector’s budget by programme. Governments should also either adjust existing reporting structures or create transparent reports that allow citizens to aggregate agriculture sector spending overall. The system must be better designed so that especially those at its edge, female smallholder farmers, for example, are fully able to access information on local government services and expenditures.

Consultative participation of non-state actors has been mixed. African governments should involve non-state actors – such as farmers, private businesses and civil society organizations – in the design, implementation and monitoring of plans, and donors should help to support this inclusion. Moreover, greater commitment is needed by African governments to involve non-state actors in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of implementation of plans. At the same time, civil society and the private sector must rise to the challenge of participation by improving their analytical capacity.

Most plans are missing a clear focus on women farmers. Nearly half of the plans do not have gender-disaggregated outcome indicators at all that specifically focus on women, and only three had all of its indicators gender-disaggregated. While women farmers contribute up to 50% of labour on farms in sub-Saharan Africa, women do not have the same access, credit or inputs as men and own only 1% of land. More secure property rights for women, and indeed more transparent legal ownership of land overall, would help facilitate access to services as well as responsible investment. According to the Montpellier panel of agriculture experts, women could raise the yields on their farms between 20 and 30% just by having the same access and control over resources as men. If this were to happen across the developing world, total agriculture output could be bolstered by 2.5 to 4% – enough food to reduce the number of hungry people in the world by 100 million. Where possible, countries should include gender-disaggregated impact, outcome and output indicators.

Plans need a greater emphasis on nutritional outcomes. Many plans make a start at emphasizing nutritional outcomes, progress which should be further deepened. All but one plan analysed in this report include some reference to nutrition. Encouragingly, 12 plans contain time-bound and measurable nutritional outcome objectives. However, more plans should have a nutrition component, and all plans should detail how nutrition is to be mainstreamed within the CAADP process.

2013 is critical year for African agriculture.

In 2013, historic donor commitments have reached the end of the three-year L’Aquila period. Ten years after African leaders pledged to revitalize agriculture in Maputo, momentum is building to marshal continent-wide political will to review and revitalize the Maputo commitments, ahead of the 2014 African Union “Year of Agriculture”. African leaders have the opportunity to deliver on their goals of lifting millions from extreme poverty and hunger and preventing chronic malnutrition by meeting these commitments. Four years after G8 donors put food security on the agenda at the L’Aquila summit, African agriculture will again be a focus at the G8 summit in Lough Erne and the related food and nutrition event in London in June 2013. Leaders should deliver on and go beyond past promises made at previous G8 summits and at the same time do their fair share to back African governments’ agriculture plans with the resources required. Doing so would deliver a shared development vision defined by accountability, transparency, economic empowerment and partnership between governments, citizens, the private sector and civil society.
Growing sweet potatoes in Tanzania.

Photo by Morgana Wingard
African Leadership Assessment
African Leadership Assessment

Agriculture remains the backbone of many African economies. Across the continent, agriculture represents 15% of GDP\(^1\) and over half of all rural employment.\(^2\) With rapidly increasing populations, rural to urban migration, frequent and severe droughts and floods, and vulnerability to global food price fluctuations, it is crucial that African leaders put a greater focus on agriculture investments. African governments need to follow through on their pledges to commit the public resources needed to transform the agriculture sector. They also need smart policies and regulatory environments to encourage a thriving agricultural economy and unleash the potential of smallholder farmers. And on a regional level, policy changes are necessary to enable regional markets to thrive. The commitments have been made, and the plans have been laid. What has been delivered? The following assessment takes stock of the progress made by African governments to revitalise their agriculture sector and invest in country-led national plans.

CAADP: A bold new African-led vision

The African Union’s Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme is at the heart of the promise of African leadership on agriculture. The launch of CAADP in 2003 represented a fundamental shift in African agriculture. For the first time ever, African leaders presented their comprehensive vision for cutting hunger and poverty on the continent, through a framework led by African technical experts, grassroots farmer organisations, agribusiness companies and politicians. It was the first truly home-grown, pan-African road map for the development of any sector.

CAADP grew out of the 2003 Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security, through which African governments promised to spend at least 10% of their annual expenditures to implement national agricultural investment plans, with the ultimate goal of reducing poverty and ending hunger.\(^3\)

Through CAADP, governments also set the ambitious interim target of expanding the agriculture sector by 6% per year. CAADP is framed conceptually around four policy pillars, and involves participatory and technical stocktaking of the agriculture sector in each country. As a core AU framework on economic development, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)\(^4\) facilitates technical reviews of country plans. Meanwhile, non-state stakeholders – such as civil society organisations and private companies – feed into the process through consultations, outreach and implementation at the local, national and regional level.

Support for CAADP accelerated following the food price crisis of 2007-08. As of November 2012, 30 countries have signed agreements, known as compacts, to develop and implement national agriculture investment plans; of those, 26 countries have developed their plans (most of which have been independently reviewed by technical experts); and of those, 24 countries have held “business meetings” to formally endorse the plan and find funding for implementation from potential donors and investors.\(^5\) In this report, ONE chose to analyse 19 of the 24 countries that have gone through the entire CAADP process, based on available data and timing (some countries only recently had their business meetings). Representatives from government ministries, civil society, the private sector, farmers’ organisations and development partners (i.e. donors and public lenders) are signatories to the compacts and participate in the formulation of the plans. Through this process, AU member states and their partners have committed to working together to reach their hunger and poverty-reduction goals.

NOTE: Throughout this report, unless otherwise stated, figures are quoted in US dollars.
Taking Stock: What has been achieved?

In 2013, Africa will celebrate the 10-year anniversary of the Maputo Declaration. Therefore, this report provides a timely examination of progress to date. ONE’s African Leadership Assessment is a stocktaking exercise to evaluate achievements across five primary commitments made by African leaders: (1) eliminate hunger and reduce poverty, (2) spend 10% of national expenditures on national agriculture plans, (3) implement national agriculture investment plans, (4) enable the participation of citizen stakeholders, and (5) reach agricultural growth rates of 6%. From examining these commitments, five main conclusions and recommendations emerged across all areas:

1. The Maputo targets are significantly off track. African governments need to recapture the spirit of Maputo and fill the large gap in their funding commitments in order to harness the potential of African agriculture to reduce poverty and create wealth. According to ONE’s analysis, only four of the 19 countries in this report have met or exceeded the target of 10% total expenditure on the agriculture sector. Of these, two countries are on track to halve extreme poverty by 2015 (MDG 1a). Two more countries are close behind, and somewhat on track to meeting MDG 1a. A further six are at least halfway there, with mixed progress on MDG 1a. Seven countries are seriously off track, with less than 5% of total expenditure on the agriculture sector. Aggregated, these funding gaps amount to a $4.4 billion shortfall in 2011 in these 19 countries alone. African leaders must act with urgency to fill remaining gaps in their Maputo funding commitments.

2. Budget transparency is insufficient in all countries. African governments should redouble efforts to open their books to their citizens. At least half of the countries analysed had major flaws or gaps in their budget documents, and just over half had a “citizen’s budget”. To enable their citizens to track agriculture spending, all countries should publish and make available online easy-to-understand and accurate citizen’s budgets that disaggregate the entire sector’s budget by programme. Moreover, published budgetary allocations should account for all government projects and programmes (i.e., the disaggregated figures should add up to 100%). Governments should also simplify the structure of budgets or create transparent reports that allow citizens to aggregate agriculture-sector spending.

3. Participation of non-state actors in consultations has been mixed. African governments should involve a broader array of actors - especially farmers and women - in the design, implementation and monitoring of plans. At the same time, donors should work to improve civil society capacity. Small-scale farmers and women, in particular, should be involved at a high level. Nearly half of agriculture investment plans had no gender-disaggregated outcome indicators at all, and only three country plans included gender disaggregation in all indicators.

4. Implementation plans need to be clearer about achieving nutrition targets. Many country plans make a start at emphasising nutritional outcomes, progress which should be further deepened. Only one plan analysed in this report did not reference nutrition. Encouragingly, 12 plans had some time-bound and measurable nutritional outcome objectives. However, in most plans, it is unclear how agriculture programmes will translate into attaining those objectives.

5. Most countries have achieved target growth rates. Thirteen of the 15 countries with available data achieved an average annual agriculture growth rate of 6% or more. These achievements are encouraging.
What did ONE measure?

To evaluate this commitment, ONE compared progress on Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 1a: to reduce poverty by half by 2015.

Where are we now?

Eight out of the 19 countries with agriculture investment plans assessed in this report are on track to meet MDG 1a for halving poverty by 2015. These 19 countries also perform better overall than the average of all sub-Saharan African countries. Although there is no proven causal link, commitment to the CAADP process and to agriculture more broadly does appear to be correlated with a sustained decrease in poverty. Two of the four countries that have committed to the CAADP process and have met their Maputo commitment to spending 10% of government expenditures on agriculture, are also on track to meet the MDG goal of halving poverty by 2015. The two countries in this report that are somewhat on track to meet their Maputo commitments - Senegal and Sierra Leone - are also on track or somewhat on track to meet the MDG goal of halving poverty.

Many investment plans made a good start at emphasising nutritional outcomes. Encouragingly, 11 plans had some time-bound and measurable nutritional outcome objectives, but eight did not.

What’s next?

With the MDGs deadline now less than three years away, governments, the private sector and other non-state partners should work together immediately to meet their Maputo spending commitment and implement agriculture investment plans. These plans have the power to lift millions of people out of poverty and reduce hunger on a large scale. With 200 million Africans undernourished, African governments should take steps to deepen the nutrition sensitivity of agriculture programmes in the implementation and monitoring of investment plans.
**FIGURE 1: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRY PROGRESS ON MEETING MDG1A.**

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<td>86.1%</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
<td>65.8%</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
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<td>65.6%</td>
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<td>70.0%</td>
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<td>44.6%</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>60.5%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Somewhat on track</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>62.8%</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>83.1%</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not on track</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
<td>67.9%</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>84.2%</td>
<td>81.3%</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
<td>68.0%</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Insufficient data</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.3%</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td></td>
<td>83.8%</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td></td>
<td>38.7%</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Poverty rates are for extreme poverty, or the share of people living on less than $1.25 per day. The figures shown are the most recent data available. The timelag in this data brings to light the need for better and more regular reporting, which could reveal shifts in progress and help identify success stories and lessons to be learned.
**COMMITMENT 2:**

**Spend 10% of national expenditures on agriculture**

In July 2003 at the Maputo AU Summit, AU leaders promised to allocate 10% of their national expenditures toward national agriculture plans developed through the CAADP process.

---

**What did ONE measure?**

Currently, a centralised African agriculture expenditure data source does not exist. As a result, ONE analysed available public budget expenditure and allocation statements from individual countries and surveyed Agriculture Ministries with the opportunity for feedback and verification. See the methodology note for additional detail. Unfortunately, because there is no standard system for reporting data, information must rely upon documented assumptions, sources and caveats.

**Where are we now?**

Across the 19 examined countries, the Maputo expenditure commitment translated into a total of $7.7 billion in 2011. In contrast, these countries spent a combined total of $3.3 billion (excluding amounts spent over 10%), resulting in a $4.4 billion shortfall for 2011 in the 19 countries alone. Out of the 19 countries assessed, only four spent at least 10% of their budgets on agriculture in 2011: Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Malawi, and Niger. Two other countries, Senegal and Sierra Leone, were very near to the target. Fewer than half of the countries allocated or spent 5% or less of their budgets on agriculture. Nigeria, Ghana and Liberia had the biggest shortfalls, with less than 2% of their public expenditures allocated to the agriculture sector. Alarmingy, nine countries’ budgetary allocations to agriculture actually decreased compared to the 2003-2009 time period.44
FIGURE 2. SHARE OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ALLOCATED TO AGRICULTURE IN 2011, BY COUNTRY

Note: ONE used estimated execution figures from the country’s Ministry of Finance or, if such backward-looking expenditure estimates weren’t available, budgeted allocations for the year. Many countries’ expenditures include budget support from donors. However, general budget support is often difficult to account for, and it is not always disaggregated within sectoral budgets. Where possible, ONE adjusted the budget execution figure to remove donor projects from the total and noted this adjustment. If it is not noted, it should be assumed that the total may incorporate donor budget support that is considered part of the country’s total budget. Niger, Kenya, and Burkina Faso’s expenditures include rural development.
**FIGURE 3: COMPARISON OF PREVIOUS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE VS. CURRENT EXPENDITURE ON AGRICULTURE, BY COUNTRY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2011 Share of Government Expenditures to Agriculture</th>
<th>2003-09 share</th>
<th>Progress since 2003-09</th>
<th>MDG 1a Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Somewhat on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Insufficient data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Somewhat on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Somewhat on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>Insufficient data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>Insufficient data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>Insufficient data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COMMITMENT 3:
Implement national agriculture investment plans

The July 2003 Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa states that AU members will “implement, as a matter of urgency, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and flagship projects and evolving Action Plans for agricultural development, at the national, regional and continental levels.”

What did ONE measure?
To assess whether governments are implementing the priorities in their agriculture investment plans, ONE compared the top programmes in the medium-term investment plans with the top agriculture-related budgeted expenditures in the most recent year (2011, in most cases). While this approach is not definitive, it offers a general approximation of the extent to which governments are translating their commitments into planned budgetary allocations and/or expenditures.

Where are we now?
Without timely and complete implementation, ambitious plans cannot translate into results. Governments ONE examined have identified approximately 72% of the required financing for agriculture investment plans through domestic, private and external sources. However, they are at varying stages of the implementation cycle. In most countries, programmes appear to be funded at lower levels than the investment plans specify, indicating shortfalls in funding. Although several countries appear to broadly prioritise the same sub-sectors in their budgets as are prioritised in their investment plans, many others appear to prioritise programmes that were not part of the plan, which likely diminishes the resources available for the originally agreed projects.

Reasons for implementation lags may include:
- Lack of high-level political buy-in
- Changes in political administration
- Competing or emerging priorities
- Inadequate oversight
- Lack of transparency
- Corruption
- Inadequate Ministry capacity
- Emergency or disaster response
- Lack of funding

What’s next?
National governments and local civil society should identify and remove bottlenecks to plan implementation and accelerate progress ahead of the 2015 MDG deadline. Ultimately, civil society and private-sector groups in each country should be able to monitor implementation closely and hold governments to account for timely and comprehensive execution. National stakeholders should conduct further in-depth studies of implementation as part of the mutual accountability framework, guided by a committee based in the CAADP Partnership Platform, and action should be immediately taken.
### FIGURE 4. TOTAL COSTS OF NATIONAL AGRICULTURE INVESTMENT PLANS AND TOTAL FINANCING GAP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Plan length (years)</th>
<th>Total Plan Costs</th>
<th>Financing Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(in USD, millions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$982.5</td>
<td>$706.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$2,700.0</td>
<td>$729.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$974.7</td>
<td>$584.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>$250.0</td>
<td>$129.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$18,000.0</td>
<td>$3,600.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$296.7</td>
<td>$200.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$799.2</td>
<td>$536.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$3,100.0</td>
<td>$8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$948.0</td>
<td>$742.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$1,752.0</td>
<td>$614.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$792.0</td>
<td>$510.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$1,100.0</td>
<td>$341.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$13,500.0</td>
<td>$1,500.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$848.0</td>
<td>$325.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$2,700.0</td>
<td>$1,344.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$403.0</td>
<td>$156.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$5,400.0</td>
<td>$2,900.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>$1,100.0</td>
<td>$737.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$1,000.0</td>
<td>$225.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$56,646.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>$15,889.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Investment plans from CAADP website (http://www.nepad-caadp.net/library-country-status-updates.php) and Nigeria’s technical review
What did ONE measure?

Using transparency as a prerequisite to meaningful participation and engagement by citizens, ONE examined several indicators to gauge whether agriculture-related budgetary and programme information is openly available to citizens. These indicators include the country’s Open Budget Survey score (and progress against the 2010 survey), whether a citizen’s budget is available online, and the online availability of both aggregate agriculture-spending data and disaggregated data on programme details (such as a general description, target outcomes, focal regions and programme budget). ONE also looked within national agriculture investment plans at the provisions for non-state actor participation. The next chapter looks more closely at participation in four specific countries (Benin, Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania).

Where are we now?

None of the countries assessed provided sufficiently transparent budget information online. Some countries publish citizen’s budgets, but they are of varying quality. Other countries provide access to technical budget documents, but which lack key details. Around half of countries assessed had major flaws or gaps in their budget documents – including the lack of any historical expenditure data.

Within investment plans, nearly half of the plans do not have any gender-disaggregated outcome indicators, and only three plans fully disaggregated their indicators by gender. This indicates that CAADP has not appropriately integrated women and their unique needs into the process to date.

What’s next?

Governments should take steps to open budgets to their citizens and enhance the transparency of their agriculture spending and plan implementation. They should publish easy-to-understand and accurate citizen’s budgets so that civil society and the private sector can track how taxpayer and donor money is spent. Gender disaggregation of indicators is important to ensure that women are being reached by agriculture programming, budgeting and reporting. Countries should also follow through on their plans to disaggregate indicators by gender or revise their indicators to provide for this.
FIGURE 5. TRANSPARENCY OF ONLINE BUDGET DOCUMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUFFICIENTLY TRANSPARENT</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOMEWHAT TRANSPARENT</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOME PROGRESS BUT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COMMITMENT 5:

Achieve an annual growth rate of 6% in the agriculture sector

In the wake of the Maputo Declaration in 2003, CAADP laid out a vision for African agriculture that included improving agricultural productivity, including an average annual growth rate of 6%. CAADP further specified that growth should happen primarily through small-scale farmers, women and the adoption of technological upgrades. Only then, it asserted, would Africa reach its extreme poverty and hunger-reduction goals.

What did ONE measure?

According to the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS), the pre-eminent technical knowledge hub for African agriculture, the annual agriculture growth rate in Africa averaged around 5% for the 2003-09 period. The overarching hope for national agriculture investment plans is that their implementation will sustainably accelerate growth rates in the run-up to the MDG deadline and beyond.

Where are we now?

Thirteen of the 15 countries sustained, on average, an annual agriculture growth rate of 6% or more during 2008-2011. Of the countries that failed to reach the target rate, high volatility in the sector was a major contributing factor. The task of sustaining high growth rates in the agriculture sector presents immense challenges, especially in Africa, where droughts and severe weather are increasingly common.

What’s next?

To accelerate growth, African countries should fully implement their plans. African agriculture will only begin to reach its potential with smart policies, infrastructure investments and regional linkages. There is broad consensus that public investment in agricultural research provides high returns and is a key driver of agricultural growth. Governments need to develop or obtain the appropriate technology and put it in the hands of small-scale farmers and processors. Local research institutes, bridging international research with local knowledge, are vital to reaching Africa’s small-scale food-producing population and increasing productivity. Land and water resource management help ensure that productivity is sustainable for the long haul. Finally, roads, market infrastructure and reduced border-crossing times can help build demand for regional produce, drive intra-Africa trade and raise incomes. These elements are included in investment plans in most cases and, when implemented, will drive inclusive agricultural growth in Africa.
FIGURE 6. AVERAGE VALUE ADD BY AGRICULTURE, 2008-11


Note: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, and Malawi do not have sufficient data to calculate an accurate average growth rate in the agriculture sector.
Funwe produces seeds for maize, groundnut, pigeon pea, soybeans and beans in addition to raising cattle for brush management, fertilizer and income diversification. CashPlus sells seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, other types of crop protection products and farm supplies to smallholder farmers. Funwe receives funds from AGRA (Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa).
African Country Report Cards
Benin's Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries incurred expenditures in 2011 of CFA 22.4 billion ($44.8 million), or 2.3% of total government expenditures. Between 2003 and 2009, Benin spent an average of 6% of the budget on agriculture. Although the value of Benin’s PSRSA national agriculture investment plan, or PNIA (in French, Plan National d’Investissement Agricole), is vastly more than the budgeted allocations during the same period, most Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries expenditures do not appear to be aligned with the PNIA. For example, a look at the 2011 accounts record shows that the government of Benin prioritised cotton above all, incurring at least three times the expenditures on cotton than on projects in the PNIA (roughly CFA 8 billion to CFA 2.5 billion), which are primarily focused on food crops. Indeed, the ministry reported that the value chains benefiting most from public agriculture programmes are cotton, rice and pineapple juice. Of these, the PNIA prioritises only rice. Other PNIA priority value chains include maize, beef, and eggs. The districts benefiting most from the Ministry’s activities are Borgou/Alibori, Atacora/Donga and Mono/Couffo.

Benin’s Ministry of Agriculture was very responsive to ONE’s inquiries regarding the PSRSA and other agriculture programmes in the country, and it has a detailed spending report for 2011. However, there is no formal public meeting in which the Ministry of Agriculture reports on budget information to Parliament, and the submission of an annual performance report to the Chamber of Accounts of the High Court does not imply a public debate. Most pressing, without a citizen’s budget or a Ministry website, there is no way for average citizens to obtain information about the Ministry of Agriculture’s expenditures and programmes.

### Transparency – Needs Improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transparency Indicator</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBP Open Budget Index Score</td>
<td>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>1/100 (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture expenditure transparency and access</td>
<td>SOMEWHAT TRANSPARENT</td>
<td>Some information is available online in technical documents. For example, the 2011 Compte Administratif Gestion shows incurred expenses and payments by programme in the agriculture area. For forward-looking budgets, Benin’s 2011 Budget Law does not include a table with allocations by ministry, but 2012 does.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture programme transparency (online)</td>
<td>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>There is no website for the Ministry of Agriculture, and there is no information available about agriculture programmes on the government’s website.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s Budget (2012)</td>
<td>NOT AVAILABLE</td>
<td>No citizen’s budget available for any year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Financed**: $44.8 million  
**Shortfall**: $148.1 million  
**Total**: $192.9 million
• **Programmatic focus:** Priority value chains include maize, beef, eggs, and rice. The plan is organised into four programmes: agriculture, livestock, fishing and aquaculture, and administration.

• **Participation of non-state actors:** The government has committed to systematically involving and giving responsibilities to non-state actors, the private sector and civil society in the implementation process. The Beninese government has committed to establishing a system of national, participative and consensual planning that will take into account the context of decentralisation.

• **Gender:** Both agricultural capacity-building and nutrition programmes will target women and youth, and the statisticians in the Ministry will increase their usage of gender-disaggregated impact indicators. However, specific indicators have not been specified publically to date.

• **Outcome specificity:** The PNIA includes multiple clearly-defined objectives, including: an average GDP growth-rate target of 8.9% and an agricultural GDP growth-rate target of 14.3%; GDP per capita to increase by 5.7%; poverty rate to be reduced by 63%; the number of poor people to be decreased to 12.2% of the population by 2015; and cereal production (corn and rice) to gradually increase on average by 150,000 tonnes a year, to reach 2,285,000 tonnes in 2015.

• **Nutrition:** Certain objectives of programmes #1 (Développement de l’Agriculture), #2 (Développement de l’Élevage) and #3 (Développement de la Pêche et de l’Aquaculture) are to ensure food and nutritional security, including quantitative targets.
For 2012, budgeted allocations\(^7\) for Burkina Faso’s rural sector\(^8\) were CFA 31.1 billion ($62.2 million), or 2.5% of the total budget\(^9\) – significantly less than in past years. Between 2003 and 2009, Burkina Faso spent an average of 19.2% of the budget on agriculture.\(^10\) Burkina Faso is one of the few countries to have met the Maputo agriculture expenditure goal since 2003 and between 2006 and 2010 the rural-sector budget was reported to be around CFA 136 billion annually, or 14% of the state’s budget, including external aid.\(^11\) Despite the relatively low level of allocation for 2012, the Medium-Term Budget Framework for 2013-15 asserts that the government can mobilise CFA 1,378 billion in 2013, including CFA 976 billion of its own resources. No information was available online for 2011, and the CAAPD Focal Point did not respond to ONE’s questionnaire, so no additional explanation was available.

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### TRANSPARENCY – NEEDS IMPROVEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRANSPARENCY INDICATOR</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>RATIONALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBP Open Budget Index Score</td>
<td>SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS</td>
<td>23/100 (2012) up from 5/100 (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture expenditure transparency and access (online)</td>
<td>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>No simplified information is available, nor is a recent, full year of technical expenditure data, although total budgeted allocation figures for 2010 and 2012 are available. There are no posted budget execution reports for 2011, and such reports are available only for the first three quarters of 2010 and 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture programme transparency (online)</td>
<td>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>Programmes are named, but no information on geographic focus, value chain focus or allocated costs is available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s Budget</td>
<td>NOT AVAILABLE</td>
<td>No citizen’s budget available for any year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Burkina Faso**

**DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS**

Proportion of population living in extreme poverty (2009)\(^1\)

44.6%

Progress to meet MDG 1a by 2015:

ON TRACK

Agriculture sector growth rate (2008-2011 average):\(^2\)

NO DATA AVAILABLE

**MAPUTO PROGRESS AND SHORTFALL**

FY2012 Agriculture Allocation

- 25% Financed: $62.2 million
- 75% Shortfall: $182.5 million

Total: $244.7 million
**Programmatic focus:** The most prioritised PNSR programmes by cost are those focusing on sustainable water management, sustainable agricultural development, access to drinking water, livestock products and ministerial capacity.

**Participation of non-state actors:** Selected representatives from producer organisations, private companies, civil society organisations, regional and local agriculture officials, and financing entities will be a part of the PNSR steering committee, and a larger group will feed their views into the national Comite technique interministerial du PNSR and its regional arms.

**Gender:** Gender is a cross-cutting principle and the plan instructs the Burkinabe government to keep in mind gender in analyses and strategic programmatic choices. It is mentioned specifically in the management of water. Only 3 out of nearly 100 indicators are related to gender or disaggregated by gender.

**Outcome specificity:** The PNSR has a monitoring framework with nearly 100 output and outcome indicators to monitor progress. However, it does not articulate a clear link to achieving the plan’s overarching goals.

**Nutrition:** The plan’s focus on livestock is linked to nutrition, as is the overarching goal to reach MDG 1b. It references the National Strategy for Food Security (NAHS) developed in 2003, which aimed to cut hunger and malnutrition in half by 2015. However, nutrition does not feature as a theme or indicator in the results framework.

- **National government:** $837 million (CFA 379.14 billion)
- **External resources:** $740.8 million (CFA 370.4 billion)
- **NGOs:** $146.6 million (CFA 73.3 billion)
- **Farmer-based organisations:** $62.8 million (CFA 31.4 billion)
- **Beneficiaries:** $20.8 million (CFA 10.4 billion)
- **Financing gap:** $729.5 million (CFA 364.74 billion)
Expenditures for the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock in 2011 were BIF 43.2 billion ($30.2 million), or 3.2% of total government expenditure, up from BIF 16 billion in 2010.13 Between 2003 and 2009, Burundi spent an average of 4.7% of the budget on agriculture.14 Funding to the sector includes projects within various strategies, including the 2008 Stratégie Agricole Nationale (SAN), the 2009 Programme National de Sécurité Alimentaire (PNSA) and those related to CAADP. Priority value chains include rice, banana, potato, corn and manioc. Other significant programmes include price grants for chemical fertiliser and livestock assistance in the areas of Isabu, Mahwa and Rukoko, with future projects planned for Gitega, Rumonge, Mahwa and Ngozi. The National Agriculture Investment Plan 2012-17 (PNIA) was elaborated in late 2011, and thus may shift the direction of programmatic activities for 2012.

Overall, detailed information about Burundi’s agriculture programmes, allocations and expenditures was difficult to obtain. Budget documents, including expenditure reports, did not include detail below the ministry level, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock’s website was not active at the time of writing, and Burundi’s CAADP focal points did not respond to ONE’s inquiry and questionnaire. For the average citizen, top-line budget information on the sector would be difficult to interpret and understand, as a citizen’s budget was not readily available.

### TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY – NEEDS IMPROVEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRANSPARENCY INDICATOR</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>RATIONALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBP Open Budget Index Score</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture expenditure transparency and access (online)</td>
<td>SOMEWHAT TRANSPARENT</td>
<td>This information is not available online, except through technical budget papers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture programme transparency (online)</td>
<td>SOMEWHAT TRANSPARENT</td>
<td>There is no functioning website for the Ministry of Agriculture. On the main government website, some information is available summarising the Ministry’s 2011 programme of activities and indicating geographic locations of some future projects, but no information on objectives or financial allocations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s Budget</td>
<td>NOT AVAILABLE</td>
<td>No citizen’s budget available for any year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Financed: $30.2 million
- Shortfall: $64.1 million
- Total: $94.3 million
• **Programmatic focus:** The largest programmes in the PNIA are for the professionalisation of producers, the development of agribusiness and agro-industries, the diversification of farm products and the protection of existing land and water resources.

• **Participation of non-state actors:** Local partners will participate in planning forums co-ordinated by DPAE as the Groupe de Coordination des Partenaire (GCP) and the Groupe Sectoriel Agriculture et Développement Rural (GSADR). Political and strategic issues between the government and its partners will be discussed with the Second Vice President presiding at a Political Forum of the GCP. An annex to the plan contains extensive guidelines on forums and the participation of partners.

• **Gender:** The plan recognises the role of women in food production and household management, and the participation guidelines require reporting the gender breakdown of forum attendees at the provincial level. Women are targeted in programmes on innovation and entrepreneurialism, but outcome targets are not gender-disaggregated.

• **Outcome specificity:** The plan contains a robust and detailed results framework.

• **Nutrition:** The plan references the 2003 Politique Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire (National Food Security Policy), which has its own objectives, some of which are related to nutrition.

**Agriculture Investment Plan**

**Plan National d’Investissement Agricole (PNIA) 2012-17**

**Total cost:**

**$974.7 million** (BIF 1,452.3 billion) over five years

- **Available resources:** $390 million (BIF 587.6 billion)
- **Financing gap:** $584.7 million (BIF 864.7 billion)
According to the Ministry of Rural Development, the share of government expenditures allocated to agriculture in 2011 was CVE 2.27 billion ($26.8 million), or 10.1% of total government expenditures. This includes direct investments in agriculture only, and excludes the fishing industry, the environment and rural infrastructure. The Ministry of Rural Development reported that the islands of Santiago, Sto Antao and S. Nicolau are the largest beneficiaries of the Ministry’s work, and the three most important value chains are vegetable crops, fruit trees and livestock farming/processing. Within the National Agriculture Plan, water management is by far the highest priority, while market access also receives significant attention. ONE was unable to verify that water management and market access are top priorities within the budget because, although the Government of Cape Verde was very responsive to ONE’s questionnaire, there was a lack of current and complete budget and expenditure data on the Ministry of Finance and Planning website.

Cape Verde

DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS
Proportion of population living in extreme poverty (2002)
21.0%

Progress to meet MDG 1a by 2015:
NO DATA ON PROGRESS

Agriculture sector growth rate
NO DATA AVAILABLE

MAPUTO PROGRESS AND SHORTFALL
FY2011 Public Agriculture Expenditure

100%

Financed: $26.8 million
No Shortfall
Total: $26.5 million

TRANSPARENCY – NEEDS IMPROVEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>RATIONALE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBP Open Budget Index Score</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture expenditure transparency and access (online)</td>
<td>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>For 2011, expenditure data is available on the Ministry of Finance and Planning’s website by trimester only and budgets are posted only through 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture programme transparency (online)</td>
<td>SOMEWHAT TRANSPARENT</td>
<td>The Ministry of Rural Development has made several strategic plans available on its website, including the 2010 National Agriculture Investment Plan. However, aside from the strategic plans, details for current and future projects do not include geographic focus, expected outcomes or allocated resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s Budget</td>
<td>AVAILABLE</td>
<td>Not found online</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Programmatic focus:** The plan is divided into five focal areas. The first sub-programme, which is almost five times the size of the second-largest, is for water management, including small-scale solutions, dams, reservoirs and irrigation. The second is for agricultural outreach and market access, including farm management technical assistance, the diversification of products, and commercial skills. Other, much smaller sub-programmes include soil conservation, forestry, fishery modernisation, and livestock sanitation.

**Participation of non-state actors:** The plan states that non-state actors will be represented on a PNIA implementation steering committee, but details of their role, who the specific representative organisations are, how often they will meet or how they will feed into the implementation process are not included.

**Gender:** Gender is mentioned as a cross-cutting theme and specifically within the market access programme. However, details on how programmes will be implemented in a gender-sensitive manner are limited.

**Outcome specificity:** The PNIA includes a results framework tied to the objectives of each programme and sub-programme. Elsewhere in the plan, it lists 13 output and outcome indicators with targets for 2016. Outcomes do not appear to be disaggregated by gender.

**Nutrition:** The plan references Cape Verde’s 2004 National Food Security Strategy (ENSA), and sets out a sub-programme to prevent food security crises, which will increase nutrition surveillance and manage any future crises. A rapid response system will contain linkages to the National Nutrition Programme and national health-related agencies. However, agriculture-related programmes do not appear to have nutrition-related linkages.

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**TOTAL COST:** $250 MILLION (CVE 20.1 billion) over six years

**National government share:**

- National government: $38.8 million (CVE 3.3 billion)
- Beneficiaries: $26.3 million (CVE 2.2 billion)
- Development partners: $55.4 million (CVE 4.7 billion)
- Financing gap: $129.4 million (CVE 10.9 billion)
The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development indicates that the Ethiopian government spent ETB 21.2 billion (or $1.15 billion) on the agriculture sector in 2011, or 19.7% of total government expenditures. Between 2003 and 2009, Ethiopia spent an average of 13.7% of the budget on agriculture. This follows historically strong commitments to the agriculture sector (averaging roughly 15% during the 2000s). Budgetary funding distribution is broadly aligned with the national agriculture plan, which was developed through the CAADP process. According to the 2011 budget, the top programmes by investment amount are: 1) Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP); 2) disaster risk reduction and preparedness; 3) natural resource management; 4) agricultural development. According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the top three regions by investment amount are Oromiya, Amhara, and the region of the Southern Nation Nationality. This review benefitted from extensive consultative involvement by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, including detailed responses to ONE’s inquiry and questionnaire. At the same time, information publicly available on its website is not extensive or detailed.

**Ethiopia**

**DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS**

Proportion of population living in extreme poverty (2005): 39.0%

Progress to meet MDG 1a by 2015:

ON TRACK

Agriculture sector growth rate (2008-2011 average): 24.4%

**MAPUTO PROGRESS AND SHORTFALL**

FY2011 Public Agriculture Expenditure

- **$582.2 million**
  - Financed: $1.15 billion ($564.2 million over)
  - No Shortfall
  - Total: $582.2 million

**TRANSPARENCY – SOMEWHAT TRANSPARENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRANSPARENCY INDICATOR</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>RATIONALE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBP Open Budget Index Score</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture expenditure transparency and access (online)</td>
<td>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>Expenditure information is not available online, except through technical budget papers for certain years (FY2012, FY2008, FY2002 and FY2001).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture programme transparency (online)</td>
<td>SOMEWHAT TRANSPARENT</td>
<td>There is descriptive information for several projects, with objectives and geographic focus in some cases and cost allocations in one case. However, the information coverage does not seem comprehensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s Budget</td>
<td>AVAILABLE</td>
<td>Basic budget figures are made available to local councils.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Programmatic focus:** The largest PIF investments focus on disaster risk reduction and food security for vulnerable populations exposed to frequent droughts. There are also significant allocations for sustainable land and water management, irrigation and, to a lesser extent, farmer commercialisation.

**Participation of non-state actors:** There is no structure specified for how non-state actors will participate in the implementation process. The plan describes civil society organisations as “stakeholders and implementing bodies” and private sector organisations as “stakeholders and beneficiaries,” but the specific roles of these groups are not detailed. The development of the plan included a national consultation workshop to review the draft document with representatives of the private sector and farming communities in attendance.

**Gender:** Gender is included as a cross-cutting theme in the plan. It aims to balance the participation of men and women in the plan’s programmes, and all outcomes in the results framework are to be gender-disaggregated.

**Outcome specificity:** The PIF’s results framework is very detailed and specific, and each outcome has a corresponding list of milestone indicators, which include quantitative targets that will be gender-disaggregated. Institutional and policy considerations are also outlined for each targeted outcome.

**Nutrition:** The plan refers to the National Nutrition Policy as an important complement that will help to realise the objectives of the agricultural and rural development sector. Initiatives to improve household nutrition will be mainstreamed into all programmes and projects implemented under the plan. The plan also refers to the outcome of reducing child malnutrition, as indicated by a milestone of 3% annual reduction in stunted and underweight children in rural areas.

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**AGRICULTURE INVESTMENT PLAN**

**AGRICULTURAL SECTOR POLICY AND INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK (PIF) 2010-20**

Total cost: **$18 BILLION** (ETB 333.3 billion) over 10 years.

- **National government:** $11.8 billion (ETB 195 billion)
- **Donors:** $2.54 billion (ETB 47.0 billion)
- **Private sector:** no estimate included
- **Financing gap:** $3.66 billion (ETB 67.8 billion)

---

19%  66%  20%
The Gambia’s 2012 Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure show that for 2011, $1.9 million, or 0.8% of total government expenditures, was approved for the Ministry of Agriculture. However, estimates for 2012 are $11 million, while, in the 2012 budget speech, the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs indicates that the Ministry of Agriculture’s budget for 2012 will be $14.8 million, or 6.3% of the overall budget. Regardless of which is correct, either would indicate a major increase over previous levels. Between 2003 and 2009, the Gambia spent an average of 5% of the budget on agriculture. Detailed programmatic budget allocations for 2012 were not forthcoming, but the Ministry of Agriculture’s website points to project implementation in the areas of livestock, early warning (locusts) and horticulture. These projects, however, do not appear to be aligned with the national agricultural investment plan, which is focused more on marketing, natural resource management in rice-growing areas, and fisheries management. However, only a fraction of the plan’s financing has been secured to date. Based on limited information, it appears the Gambia’s current expenditures do not reflect priorities in the investment plan, and that the Gambian government hopes to fill the substantial financing gap through external sources (e.g. foreign assistance). Although the government provided the 2012 Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure to ONE, it did not complete our questionnaire or offer to clarify questions related to how government programmes and expenditures relate to their national agriculture investment plan.

TRANSPARENCY – NEEDS IMPROVEMENT

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBP Open Budget Index Score</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture expenditure transparency and access (online)</td>
<td>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs makes the official 2012 budget speech available for public download. However, no comprehensive annual budget or expenditure report is posted for 2012 or other years, with the exception of monthly reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture programme transparency (online)</td>
<td>SOMEWHAT TRANSPARENT</td>
<td>Four specific projects are listed, including information on objectives, geographic focus and financial allocations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s Budget</td>
<td>NOT AVAILABLE</td>
<td>No citizen’s budget found online.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Gambia

DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS

Proportion of population living in extreme poverty (2003)¹ 33.6%

Progress to meet MDG 1a by 2015: ON TRACK

Agriculture sector growth rate (2008-2011 average):² 22.2%

MAPUTO PROGRESS AND SHORTFALL

FY2012 Agriculture Allocation

- Financed: $14.8 million
- Shortfall: $8.6 million
- Total: $23.4 million
• **Programmatic focus:** The GNAIP’s largest focus areas are agricultural marketing, land and water management in rice-growing areas, fisheries and risk reduction for vulnerable populations. Within agricultural marketing programmes, seven value chains have been identified to benefit from investments in feeder road construction, financial services and other enabling actions. Increasing rice productivity is also a top priority.

• **Participation of non-state actors:** The plan describes a structure involving the active engagement of non-state stakeholders in the planning, implementation and monitoring of the plan. This includes the private sector playing a primary implementation role and local governments as the primary co-ordinator of plan activities. A chart details the relationships and roles of the various stakeholder committees, although particular groups or associations are not mentioned.

• **Gender:** While there is no specific gender programme within the plan, women are specially highlighted beneficiaries of many of the proposed programmes, often in the context of “vulnerable groups” (along with youth). The plan also refers to the National Policy for Advancement of Gambian Women, which aims to reduce the “drudgery” of rural women and increasing their contribution to household welfare and food security.

• **Outcome specificity:** The plan has six objectives, which each relate to a specific GNAIP programme. However, for the most part these do not include quantitative targets or indicators. Overall the plan aims to significantly reduce poverty (to 44.6% in 2015) by accelerating agricultural growth to 8% by 2015, and to increase self-sufficiency in food production by one-quarter.

• **Nutrition:** Nutrition objectives are specified throughout the GNAIP. Programme 1 (Improvement of Agricultural Land and Water Management) and Programme 3 (Development of Agricultural Chains and Market Promotion) aim to increase nutritional status of beneficiaries, especially women and youth; for example, through achieving the year-round availability of vegetables. Programme 4 (National Food and Nutritional Security) focuses on achieving adequate nutrition levels, especially in vulnerable groups. It will strengthen capacity to monitor malnutrition through the national Food Security and Nutrition Information System.
Excluding donor resources, the Government of Ghana appropriated GHC 84.2 million ($44.3 million), or 1.1% of its total budget, for its agriculture and food sector in 2011. Between 2003 and 2009, Ghana spent an average of 8.7% of the budget on agriculture. The country’s Ministry of Agriculture and Food is quite decentralised and thus appropriations are delineated by geographical department as opposed to programmes, so it is unclear whether the budget aligns with the investment plan. However, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food was very responsive to ONE’s inquiries. It posts extensive programme-level information on its website, which suggests a focus on irrigation, commercialisation and food crops. Programmes dealing with cash crops appear to be more prominent than the Medium-Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan (METASIP) planned for. More information on the government’s responsiveness to non-state actors can be found in the Case Studies section.

Ghana

DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS
Proportion of population living in extreme poverty (2006) 28.6%

Progress to meet MDG 1a by 2015: ON TRACK

Agriculture sector growth rate (2008-2011 average): 17.1%

MAPUTO PROGRESS AND SHORTFALL
FY2012 Agriculture Allocation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRANSPARENCY INDICATOR</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>RATIONALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBP Open Budget Index Score</td>
<td>PROGRESS REVERSED</td>
<td>50/100 (2012) down from 54/100 (2010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture expenditure transparency and access (online)</td>
<td>SOMEWHAT TRANSPARENT</td>
<td>Budget and appropriations documents were available online for recent years (2011, 2012, and 2013), however, they did not show programme areas or actual expenditures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture programme transparency (online)</td>
<td>EXEMPLARY</td>
<td>A database of projects is housed on the Ministry’s website. Detailed programme descriptions are provided, including objectives, geographic focus and, for some programmes, total budgeted cost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s Budget</td>
<td>NOT AVAILABLE</td>
<td>No citizen’s budget is currently available. One was produced but not published in 2009.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Financed: $44.3 million
Shortfall: $346.9 million
Total: $391.2 million
Programmatic focus: The largest priority areas include irrigation and water management, new crop product development, mechanisation and the commercialisation of horticulture, fishing and livestock.

Participation of non-state actors: There is a comprehensive structure mandating the participation of specific umbrella networks for the private sector, civil society, farmers and traditional leaders on a steering committee and advisory board, which advises ministers on policy directions, planning objectives and operational strategies. A Policy Dialogue Forum, comprising Advisory Board members and other representatives, will review work plans, guide implementation and facilitate grassroots participation. Additionally, stakeholders are slated to be a part of a participatory monitoring and evaluation system.

Gender: Most projects have separate objectives for men and women, and the results framework is gender-sensitive. There is no standalone gender programme, but women are the primary beneficiaries of nutrition and micro- and small-enterprises support programmes.

Outcome specificity: The plan aligns with Ghana’s Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy and the agricultural performance targets of the National Development Planning Commission. The overarching priority outcomes are “Food Security & Emergency Preparedness” and “Increased Growth in Incomes,” with specific percentage change targets included on a range of issues.

Nutrition: Nutrition is a component of “Programme 1: Food Security and Emergency Preparedness” (allocated 2% of the programme’s expenditure). Nutrition will be enhanced through increased production and distribution of food, fortification during processing, and increased research, advocacy and education concerning the choice of foods in terms of macro-nutrients and micro-nutrients. The key outcome metric is reducing stunting in children and vitamin and iron deficiencies in children and women by 50% by 2015.

National government: $197.7 million (GHC 376 million)

Public-private cost recovery: $83.6 million (GHC 132 million)

Other domestic sources: $4.7 million (GHC 9 million)

Financing gap: $536.3 million (GHC 1.02 billion)
The Government of Kenya spent 5.1% of its total government expenditures, or KES 47.1 billion ($532.4 million) on agriculture and rural development in 2011. Between 2003 and 2009, Kenya spent an average of 4.7% of the budget on agriculture. Programme allocations within the budget reflect some priorities in the Medium-Term Investment Plan for Agriculture (MTIP), but not the largest priority. Within the investment plan, sustainable land and natural resource management along with helping farmers achieve greater productivity and commercialisation represent around three-quarters of the planned investments. Actual expenditures align with the latter and focus on increasing productivity through extension and improved technology, along with a mandate to “ensure sustainable resource management” (although it is not clear that this is a priority). Significant expenditures were made in the area of “Lands,” but this refers to land administration and titling – not the prevention or rehabilitation of degraded land. Thus, it appears there may be some divergence between the MTIP priorities and the expenditures laid out in the budget. The national headquarters of the Ministry of Agriculture was not responsive to ONE’s inquiries; however, district and regional representatives provided invaluable input into the separate Kenya case study on the CAADP process. Moreover, government budget documents are relatively transparent and very detailed.

The national headquarters of the Ministry of Agriculture was not responsive to ONE’s inquiries; however, district and regional representatives provided invaluable input into the separate Kenya case study on the CAADP process. Moreover, government budget documents are relatively transparent and very detailed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRANSPARENCY INDICATOR</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>RATIONALE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBP Open Budget Index Score</td>
<td>NO PROGRESS</td>
<td>49/100 (2012), remaining constant with 49/100 (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture expenditure transparency and access (online)</td>
<td>SOMEWHAT TRANSPARENT</td>
<td>Technical “sector reports” provide a comprehensive, backward-looking picture of sectoral expenditures by programme. However, actual budget documents do not provide the basics related to sectoral spending.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture programme transparency (online)</td>
<td>EXEMPLARY</td>
<td>Programme descriptions, including objectives, geographic focus and financial allocations, are provided, including a downloadable spreadsheet listing all projects and their financial allocations for each district. However, some project hyperlinks are broken or lead to non-government websites. Kenya participates in BOOST.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kenya

DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS
Proportion of population living in extreme poverty (2008) 43.8%

Progress to meet MDG 1a by 2015: NOT ON TRACK

Agriculture sector growth rate (2008-2011 average): 16.4%

MAPUTO PROGRESS AND SHORTFALL
FY2011/12 Public Agriculture Expenditure

- Financed: $532.4 million
- Shortfall: $501.7 million
- Total: $1034.1 million
**Programmatic focus:** Sustainable land and natural resource management, along with productivity and commercialisation of farmers, represent roughly three-quarters of the planned investments, while encouraging private-sector participation and increasing market access also features prominently in the MTIP.

**Participation of non-state actors:** A framework has been designed to facilitate active participation of non-state actors. This will involve a biennial national forum to engage sectoral stakeholders, a Technical Committee including private-sector representatives, and district co-ordination units at the local level. This framework will be operationalised through the Agricultural Sector Co-ordination Unit, which has the responsibilities of creating a forum for sector-wide consultation (including grassroots) and promoting increased private-sector participation.

**Gender:** Only one of the projects to be funded under the investment strategy focuses specifically on women. However, gender is one of the cross-cutting themes and gender analysis and budgeting will be integrated within each of the Investment Pillars. The monitoring and evaluation system (currently under development) will articulate indicators to track progress toward gender equality in resource allocation and associated impacts.

**Outcome specificity:** Specific objectives are outlined across the six investment pillars, including quantitative targets. Outcomes and activities are also differentiated according to agro-ecological regions (arid, semi-arid and high-rainfall). Overall, targets include an 80% annual increase in agricultural contribution to GDP, poverty reduction of 25% and food insecurity reduction of 30%, all by 2015.

**Nutrition:** The investment plan supports the National Food Security and Nutrition Policy, increasing community resilience to ensure that household nutritional status is not impaired. One of the six thematic areas of the investment strategy is Food Security and Nutrition. This cross-cutting theme plays a role in all of the six investment pillars.

**Total cost:**

$3.1 BILLION (KES 247.0 billion) over five years

- **National government:**
  $1.8 billion (KES 161.2 billion)

- **Development partners:**
  $870 million (KES 77 billion)

- **Private sector:**
  $30 million (KES 2.6 billion)

- **Financing gap:**
  $8.1 million (KES 6.2 billion)
In 2011/12, Liberia spent LRD 495 million ($6.8 million), or 1.4% of its total budgeted expenditures, on its agriculture sector. Between 2003 and 2009, Liberia spent an average of 5.1% of the budget on agriculture. Liberia’s Agriculture Sector Investment Programme (LASIP) constitutes an ambitious integrated approach to agricultural development and includes substantial investments, such as expanding road networks and increasing crop productivity and post-harvest storage capacity. In contrast, the 2011/12 budget represents divergent priorities with two-thirds of its modest budget being allocated towards administration and management. However, the FY2012/13 budget, which sees a 500% increase from 2011/12 - mainly from donor support - may manage to fill the large programming gaps.

**TRANSPARENCY – SOMEWHAT TRANSPARENT**

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBP Open Budget Index Score</td>
<td>SOME PROGRESS</td>
<td>43/100 (2012) up from 40/100 (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture expenditure transparency and access (online)</td>
<td>SOMEWHAT TRANSPARENT</td>
<td>Liberia’s budget papers are available for 2012/13, and they show analysis by programme within each sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture programme transparency (online)</td>
<td>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>Website is up, but no programme information is yet available, with the exception of a few press releases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s Budget</td>
<td>AVAILABLE</td>
<td>Citizen’s budget available for 2012/13: <a href="https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&amp;pid=sites&amp;srcid=bW9wZWEuZ292LmxyfG10ZWYtYnVkZ2V0fGd4OjU3ZjhkMTBiMTco4ZTBmMTY">https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&amp;pid=sites&amp;srcid=bW9wZWEuZ292LmxyfG10ZWYtYnVkZ2V0fGd4OjU3ZjhkMTBiMTco4ZTBmMTY</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Financed: $6.8 million
- Shortfall: $42.0 million
- Total: $48.8 million
Programmatic focus: Food-crop productivity, rural roads and agro-forestry are the most prominent sub-programmes within the LASIP. Food-crop productivity is particularly large and encompasses extension, market-based inputs, diversification of crops and value addition.

Participation of non-state actors: Periodic meetings are mandated at the national and local levels to consult with farmers, farm-based organisations (such as the Liberia Farmer Network and National Federation of Co-operative Societies), as well as private-sector operators along the agricultural value chains. The Agricultural Co-ordination Committee (which provides input into planning, implementation and evaluation) includes the Liberia NGOs network and national CSOs. The President of Liberia will chair the national Stakeholders’ Forum, held periodically to share information on the implementation of the plan. The inter-ministerial Food Security and Nutrition Technical Committee (the highest decision-making body) includes representatives of the Liberian Business Association, the Liberian Bankers Association, the National Federation of Co-operative Societies and the Liberia National Farmers Union.

Gender: One of the sub-programmes is a Special Women and Youth Initiative. The gender element seeks to empower women as agricultural producers and value chain creators, including supporting participation in new economic areas and strengthening the institutional framework to address gender issues and social barriers. This sub-programme is allocated $10 million, approximately 1% of the total budget (but this also includes the youth element). “Gender and Youth” is also a cross-cutting issue of the plan.

Outcome specificity: Outcomes are numerous and specific; for example, to enhance access to food and facilitate improved food utilisation; to rehabilitate, upgrade, and maintain at least 1,200 km of rural roads between 2011 and 2015 in the five main food-producing counties; and to improve access and quality of agricultural education and training. Some outcomes have associated quantitative targets; others are more general. A monitoring and evaluation section lists each expected outcome and what kind of indicators and data sources will be used to assess progress.

Nutrition: One of the sub-programmes aims to improve nutritional status, focusing on children under five and lactating women. This includes developing and implementing a multi-sector nutrition strategy, promoting child growth and saving acutely undernourished children as well as addressing the nutritional needs of those affected by HIV. The LASIP also promotes local production and consumption of micronutrient-dense crops, fortification and dietary diversification. Reduced food and nutrition insecurity will be measured (using Nutrition Reports and other sources of data) through indicators such as the Dietary Diversity Score and Share of Food Expenditure.
In Malawi's 2011/12 budget, the agriculture and food security sector was allocated MWK 38.3 billion ($111.1 million), representing 12.6% of the total budget. Between 2003 and 2009, Malawi spent an average of 9.8% of the budget on agriculture. Around half of this allocation was for the purchase of inputs, mostly fertilizers, within the Farm Inputs Subsidy Programme (FISP), which has received criticism for its large share of the budget. In a promising move, recent efforts by the government seek to improve the programme’s targeting and cost-efficiency. A strong focus on maize self-sufficiency through input subsidies is consistent with the Agriculture Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp), Malawi’s investment plan for agriculture, although the ASWAp also focuses on reducing post-harvest maize losses, which is not mentioned in the budget statement. Another prominent component of the investment plan is sustainable agriculture and water management, called the GreenBelt Initiative, which is financed out of the Department of Irrigation and Water Development. Malawi’s budget is relatively informal and vague about what sub-accounts (from the ASWAp) are funded, and by how much.
• **Programmatic focus:** Maize productivity, reduction of post-harvest maize losses, and the sustainable management of land and water.

• **Participation of non-state actors:** The plan envisages significant roles (including subcontracting) for the private sector, farmers’ organisations and civil society. However, governance structures for this are not defined and analysis is ongoing (as part of wider institutional reform) to establish the most appropriate roles for both the government and non-state actors.

• **Gender:** There is no specific gender programme, but the plan commits to ensuring participation and access for women. The plan refers to working with the Ministry of Women and Child on nutrition education, and women and youth are targeted beneficiaries of the promotion of small-stock animal production and fish farming.

• **Outcome specificity:** An appendix contains a comprehensive table specifying all strategic objectives in each focus area, linking each to a specific field outcome indicator, and describing what actions are planned to achieve the outcomes.

• **Nutrition:** The plan supports Malawi’s National Nutrition Policy, and nutrition security is a focus area. The plan seeks to achieve nutrition security through increased production of high nutritive-value foods (entailing agricultural diversification), improving nutrition education and building institutional capacity for nutrition programmes. It refers to a range of data on nutrition issues and also draws attention to the links between malnutrition, food insecurity and HIV/AIDS.
Between 2003 and 2009, Mali spent an average of 11.8% of the budget on agriculture. According to a Malian government official, 2011 agriculture expenditures including livestock programmes were approximately 7% of total expenditures. However, in its Citizen’s Budget, the government reported spending CFA 157 billion, or 11% of its total expenditures on agriculture (presumably including livestock and fishing) in 2011. It is likely that the Citizen’s Budget includes external budget support and the aforementioned official’s estimate does not. As a result, we utilise the government official’s estimate of total expenditures.

Technical budget documents are available online only for 2009 and the first three quarters of 2012. Thus, complete budget and expenditure figures for Mali were unavailable for both 2011 and 2012, and the 2011 figure could not be independently verified. The Ministry of Agriculture reports that meat, milk, fish, maize, millet/sorghum and rice are the priority value chains, along with the regions of Kayes, Sikasso and Koulikoro. These value chains seem broadly aligned with the national agricultural investment plan (PNISA). However, not enough budget and expenditure data was available online to verify this.

### Mali

**DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS**

Proportion of population living in extreme poverty (2006): 51.4%

Progress to meet MDG 1a by 2015: ON TRACK

Agriculture sector growth rate (2008-2011 average): 7.7%

**MAPUTO PROGRESS AND SHORTFALL**

FY2011 Public Agriculture Expenditure

- **Transparency – Some Progress, But Needs Improvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRANSPARENCY INDICATOR</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>RATIONALE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBP Open Budget Index Score</td>
<td>SOME PROGRESS</td>
<td>43/100 (2012) up from 35/100 (2010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture expenditure transparency and access (online)</td>
<td>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>The availability of technical expenditure and budget reports was very limited and no detailed information was found.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture programme transparency (online)</td>
<td>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>Nine projects are listed, but only two have detailed descriptions including objectives, geographic focus and financial allocations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s Budget</td>
<td>AVAILABLE</td>
<td>Citizen’s budget available for 2012: <a href="http://www.finances.gouv.ml/documentation/BUDGETCITOYEN%202012%20FINAL.pdf">http://www.finances.gouv.ml/documentation/BUDGETCITOYEN%202012%20FINAL.pdf</a> and for 2011. Citizen’s budget is available in 11 different languages.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Financed**: $172.1 million
- **Shortfall**: $73.7 million
- **Total**: $245.8 million
**Programmatic focus:** Rice, milk/meat and fisheries are the value chains set to benefit most from the investment plan. The largest programmes are for fertiliser, the modernization of slaughterhouses and lowland (rice) land management and development.

**Participation of non-state actors:** The implementation plan specifies roles for civil society and the private sector in the steering committee and value chain development/financing. However, details on the specific structure of this participation are limited.

**Gender:** With the exception of a small maize marketing programme, there are no gender-specific programmes and only 5% of hectares targeted for improvement belong to women and youth. The plan’s focus on milk, fish and marketing is expected to reach women. However, result indicators are not disaggregated by gender.

**Outcome specificity:** A results framework exists, and specific outcomes are given for increased crop, dairy, meat and fish production by 2015. However, targets related to overarching development impacts (e.g., poverty and malnutrition) are not specified.

**Nutrition:** Cross-cutting activities including better information, education and communication aim to improve the population’s nutritional status. Nutrition education is allocated approximately $6 million.
The Government of Niger reports that its rural sector budget was $381.4 million (CFA 190.7 billion) in 2011, or 18.9% of the national budget. These rural development expenditures for 2011 are relatively high – up from $37.4 million in 2010 and $67.2 million in 2009. Between 2003 and 2009, Niger spent an average of 15.5% of its budget on agriculture. Although these figures include programmes within the Ministries of Agriculture, Livestock, Environment, Hydraulics and Nutrition, it appears that a substantial portion may have been directly related to agriculture in 2011. A programmatic breakdown of expenditures is not available for the agriculture budget, and thus it is impossible to verify whether budgeted resources align with the investment plan. Expenditure and budget data was difficult to verify online, and the country scores were very low on the International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index. However, there are signs of potential change: the Government of Niger was responsive to ONE’s inquiries, agriculture officials report to their Parliament once a year in November/December, and a local NGO is working to make budgeting a more participatory process in Niger.

### TRANSPARENCY – NEEDS IMPROVEMENT

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TRANSPARENCY INDICATOR</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>RATIONALE</th>
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<tr>
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<td>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>4/100 (2012) up from 3/100 (2010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture expenditure transparency and access (online)</td>
<td>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>The National Statistical Institute makes some budget and expenditure data available to the public, but they are not disaggregated by sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture programme transparency (online)</td>
<td>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>Websites for the Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock were not found.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s Budget</td>
<td>FORTHCOMING</td>
<td>Although not yet available, the organisation Alternative Espaces Citoyens (AEC) has begun hosting information sessions on the 2013 budget and has plans to publish a citizen’s budget.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Niger

**DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS**

Proportion of population living in extreme poverty (2008)¹

43.6%

Progress to meet MDG 1a by 2015:

ON TRACK

Agriculture sector growth rate (2008-2011 average):²

4.9%

**MAPUTO PROGRESS AND SHORTFALL**

FY2011 Public Agriculture Expenditure

- **$202.3 million**
  - 189% Financed: $381.4 million ($179.1 million over)
  - No shortfall
  - Total: $202.3 million
Programmatic focus: Water management in its various forms, including for both agriculture and drinking, is the focus of the largest projects in the plan. Other large projects deal with soil and reforestation, livestock, community development and food crisis prevention.

Participation of non-state actors: Plans to involve civil society and the private sector do not appear well-developed to date, aside from consultative dialogue with a steering committee.

Gender: Several donor-partnered programmes include gender objectives. However, the plan’s overall approach does not include a strong gender focus and outcomes are not disaggregated by gender, although increasing the share of women in producer organisations is an objective.

Outcome specificity: A results framework with specific quantifiable indicators for each programme is included; however, it does not indicate sources, targets or baselines.

Nutrition: Nutrition is a common theme in the plan, and there are specific impact indicators and programmes that address it, including the large drinking-water and sanitation programme.
The Nigerian government allocated NGN 78.1 billion ($492.2 million) for the agriculture sector in 2012, representing roughly 1.7% of the total budget. Between 2003 and 2009, Nigeria spent an average of 3.6% of the budget on agriculture. Appropriations are made to local research institutes rather than to national programmes, thus it is unclear to what extent budgeted allocations align with the National Agricultural Investment Plan. However, a review of the 2012 Budget Proposal shows that certain links between the plan and the budget may be tenuous. Land titling and cash crops are the largest programmes in the plan, but there is no land titling programme in the budget. Research institutes have various focal crops, and it is difficult to determine the share of resources that are focused on cash crops specifically. However, the purchase of agricultural inputs swallows more than one-third of the 2012 agriculture budget.
• **Programmatic focus**: A national land cadastre is the largest programme planned in the NAIP. The promotion of cash crops (cotton, cassava, palm oil, cocoa, groundnut, cowpea, soyabean and sesame) is the second-largest programme, while seed industry development is also an important focus area.

• **Participation of non-state actors**: The NAIP utilises a public-private partnership framework for promoting private-sector involvement; select projects are “public-private” collaborations where both sides invest, own and manage the respective ventures. No participation governance structures for other non-state actors are defined in the NAIP, but it does state that there will be consultation with villagers and traditional leaders to mobilise all segments of the rural community. There is provision for a major publicity campaign to popularise the projects and stimulate participation.

• **Gender**: The Co-operative Revitalisation Project aims to mobilise and organise smallholder farmers, especially women. In particular, the project will establish co-operatives for the provision of micro-finance, supply of agricultural inputs, marketing of produce, and micro-enterprise development. Gender is also mainstreamed in the NAIP to ensure that all project documents demonstrate inclusiveness, including a concrete target that vulnerable groups (including women) account for 30% of total project beneficiaries.

• **Outcome specificity**: Outcomes are well specified, and include concrete targets.

• **Nutrition**: The NAIP includes a target for increasing the number of households with adequate dietary nutrition by 30%, measured by the Household Dietary Diversity indicator through the National Nutrition Survey Reports.
According to its Citizen’s Budget, Rwanda’s 2011/12 budget allocation to the agriculture sector was RWF 67.1 billion ($107.4 million), representing 6% of the total budget.38 Between 2003 and 2009, Rwanda spent an average of 3.7% of the budget on agriculture.39 The budget’s specific resource allocations appear to be broadly aligned with that of the Agriculture Sector Investment Plan (ASIP), which includes increasing long-term productivity through sustainable land management, irrigation and crop diversification. In the 2010/2011 Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources’ Annual Report, expenditures on chemical inputs and irrigation appear to have been given the highest priority, as well as a milk subsidy for schoolchildren and post-harvest storage infrastructure. However, investments in land management may have been less pronounced than suggested by the ASIP. Looking forward, Rwanda’s Parliament recently established a Public Accounts Committee to audit national financial statements beginning in 2013.

### TRANSPARENCY – SOMEWHAT TRANSPARENT

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRANSPARENCY INDICATOR</th>
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<th>RATIONALE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBP Open Budget Index Score</td>
<td>NEEDS</td>
<td>8/100 (2012) down from 11/100 (2010)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture expenditure transparency and access (online)</td>
<td>SOMEWHAT TRANSPARENT</td>
<td>Other than a citizen’s budget for 2012-13, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning does not provide any budgetary information on its homepage. Detailed budget documents, including execution reports, can only be found on the National Budget Directorate’s webpage in a difficult-to-access format, although some detailed information on allocations and execution can be found in the Ministry of Agriculture’s Annual Report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture programme transparency (online)</td>
<td>EXEMPLARY</td>
<td>Programmes and projects are listed, almost all with detailed information on objectives, geographic focus and financial allocations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s Budget</td>
<td>AVAILABLE</td>
<td>Citizen’s budget available for 2011/12: <a href="http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/webfm_send/2269">http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/webfm_send/2269</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• **Programmatic focus**: Rwanda’s ASIP prioritises efforts to increase long-term productivity and soil quality. Investments include conservation agriculture strategies and crop diversification, including livestock development to improve farmer resilience.

• **Participation of non-state actors**: There is no participatory governance structure established in the plan. The ASIP does refer to the importance of private-sector involvement, particularly in some programmes where the private sector will be called upon to take over initiatives after their initiation by government. The plan also contains programmes focused on improving monitoring and evaluation of projects – including Citizen’s Report Cards – but little additional detail is publically provided at this time.

• **Gender**: There is no major gender-specific programme. However, one sub-programme focused on promoting co-operatives and farmers’ associations refers to an opportunity to support rural women’s organisations. Another sub-programme will include the design and implementation of a new gender strategy. Moreover, the new monitoring and evaluation system will enable the measurement of impact on targeted groups, including women-headed households.

• **Outcome specificity**: Outcomes (with varying degrees of specificity) and associated quantitative outputs are listed for each programme.

• **Nutrition**: Nutrition security is included in the three “absolute priorities,” and the ASIP commits to diversifying agriculture and ensuring that all Rwandans have access to adequate proteins (55g per day) and lipids (23g per day) as well as calories. The nutrition security of school-age children will be targeted through home-grown school feeding initiatives, which link school feeding programmes with local small-scale farmers.
The government of Senegal reports that agriculture expenditures – not including external resources, livestock, forestry or fishing – represented CFA 54.8 billion ($109.6 million), or 9.5% of its total national expenditures for 2011.40 Between 2003 and 2009, Senegal spent an average of 12.1% of the budget on agriculture.41 The Programme National D’Investissement’s (PNIA) focus on food crop productivity, water management and natural resource management seems to be broadly reflected in the country’s top programme areas by expenditures, which the government reported were water management, horticulture and cereal value chains. According to the ONE questionnaire completed by the government, Senegal Valley, Casamance Valley and the Central areas of Senegal were the top three districts benefitting from agriculture programmes. Senegal presents its agricultural budget figures to Parliament twice a year during national budget discussions (June and December).
**Programmatic focus:** Crop productivity – addressed through distribution of seeds, fertilisers and tools – represents the majority of planned PNIA resources. Sustainable natural resource management and adaptation to climatic risks also receive substantial emphasis.

**Participation of non-state actors:** Non-state actors have a role in the programme’s steering committee, although no groups are named and particular roles and relationships are not outlined in the plan.

**Gender:** The plan has one women-specific rice programme, which is budgeted a total of CFA 1.8 billion. Most programmes target both males and females, but no details are readily available on how gender will be balanced. Indicators within the results framework are not disaggregated by gender.

**Outcome specificity:** The plan lists 13 outcome indicators; however, the indicators are not part of a comprehensive results framework. Specifically, targets, baselines and sources are not specified.

**Nutrition:** In its design, the plan takes into account the existing decentralised nutrition policy, and it expects that the focus on food crops will lead to decreased hunger and malnutrition in poor households. However, there are no malnutrition indicators included in the monitoring plan.
Agriculture-sector budget allocations in 2011 were SLL 130 billion ($26 million), or 8.9% of the government’s budget. Between 2003 and 2009, Sierra Leone spent an average of 2.8% of the budget on agriculture. The budget seems broadly aligned with the Smallholder Commercialization Programme (SCP) Investment Plan, which emphasises social protection programmes, including social safety-net programmes that target under-five child malnutrition through school feeding. In addition, infrastructure improvements like feeder roads to increase market access and irrigation expansion are substantial in the plan. In the budget, recurrent expenditures prioritise food security and extension services, with development expenditures supporting the SCP. However, the majority of resources for the SCP come from donors.

**Sierra Leone**

**DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS**

Proportion of population living in extreme poverty (2003)

53.4%

Progress to meet MDG 1a by 2015:

SOMEWHAT ON TRACK

Agriculture sector growth rate (2008-2011 average):

20.9%

**MAPUTO PROGRESS AND SHORTFALL**

FY2012 Agriculture Allocation

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<tr>
<th>TRANSPARENCY INDICATOR</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
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<tr>
<td>IBP Open Budget Index Score</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>39/100 (2012)47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture expenditure transparency and access (online)</td>
<td>SOMEWHAT TRANSPARENT</td>
<td>Several detailed budget documents are available for review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture programme transparency (online)</td>
<td>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>No information available - there is no website for the Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s Budget</td>
<td>NOT AVAILABLE ONLINE</td>
<td>A citizen’s budget is available, but a direct link was not found.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Total: $29.2 million

Financed: $26.0 million

Shortfall: $3.2 million
Programmatic focus: The largest programme areas are social safety nets, feeder roads, small-scale irrigation, and support to producer organisations.

Participation of non-state actors: There is a clear and robust provision for participation by non-state actors. The highest decision-making body is the Presidential Task Force on Agriculture, and membership includes the President of the Chamber of Agriculture and the President of the National Federation of Farmers of Sierra Leone. The second layer of governance for implementation is the Agriculture Advisory Group, which includes members of the NGO forum, the Chamber of Agriculture, the National Federation of Farmers of Sierra Leone, and the Director-General of the Sierra Leone Agriculture Research Institute. Finally, at the field level, the District Co-ordinating Committee will include representatives of the National Federation of Farmers of Sierra Leone and the district NGO forum.

Gender: There is no gender-specific programme. However, “women and youth” are expected to comprise half of the beneficiaries of planned food-for-training activities.

Outcome specificity: Each programme component includes outcomes, though these are mostly descriptive rather than quantitative or with associated targets and indicators. The three overall objectives are: increase annual agricultural sector growth from 4% to 7.7% by 2015; increase farm household incomes by 10%; and increase household food security by 25%.

Nutrition: The critical rate of child malnutrition is given as one of the plan’s rationales. One of the five major programmes aims to increase food security and nutrition levels of vulnerable households, with a focus on children and pregnant and lactating women. Nutritional support packages will be combined with training sessions on food and nutrition at the community and institutional levels.

Agriculture Investment Plan
National Sustainable Agriculture Development Plan: Smallholder Commercialisation Programme (SCP) Investment Plan 2010-15

Total cost: $402.6 million (SLL 1.75 billion) over five years

- Financing gap: $156.2 million (SLL 780 billion)
- Development partners: $246.3 million (SLL 1.23 trillion)
According to the citizen’s budget produced by the Ministry of Finance, Tanzania’s agriculture budget in 2011/12 was TZS 926.2 billion ($555.7 million), or 6.8% of the entire national budget. Between 2003 and 2009, Tanzania spent an average of 5.2% of the budget on agriculture. The Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP), which began in 2011/12, focuses primarily on production and commercialisation. However, there are no publically-available budget and expenditure documents that detail agriculture-sector expenditures at the programmatic level for 2011/12 or for 2012/13. The Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Co-operatives published an Annual Report for 2010/11, but this pre-dates the TAFSIP. Thus, due to a lack of transparency, it is unclear whether the government of Tanzania is reflecting the TAFSIP in its annual budgeting process and allocations.
• **Programmatic focus**: The TAFSIP is focused on production and commercialisation, which includes transferring technology and subsidised inputs to smallholders, as well as public-private partnerships in the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania.

• **Participation of non-state actors**: Although the government envisages that farmers and the private sector will undertake most of the investments under the TAFSIP, either individually or through public-private partnerships, they are not given a role in the related steering committee. At the same time, the TAFSIP promised to consult with them through the Technical Committee of Directors - which approves implementation work plans, the annual national co-ordination meeting, zonal co-ordination meetings, and in the monitoring and evaluation system.

• **Gender**: “Promoting gender equity” and “empowerment of vulnerable groups” (including women) is a cross-cutting theme in the plan, yet mechanisms for these are not specified. The monitoring framework indicates that metrics will be gender-disaggregated “where possible.”

• **Outcome specificity**: Each programme has a set of strategic objectives and associated outcomes, with varying degrees of specificity across them. Each outcome has associated progress indicators (e.g., “number of enterprises engaged in high-value activities along the value chain”). However, no numeric targets or data sources are provided for these indicators.

• **Nutrition**: One of the plan’s seven programmes is dedicated to Food and Nutrition Security. The strategic objective is to achieve universal household and national food and nutrition security. The results framework lists several nutrition-related outcomes, including reduced prevalence of micronutrient deficiencies and diversification of farming for improved diets. Each area includes specific milestone indicators. The TAFSIP also mentions the link between HIV/AIDS and poor nutrition – noting the importance of household nutrition to curb the spread of the disease.
In 2011, the government of Togo’s expenditures on agriculture, livestock and fishing were CFA 13.6 billion ($27.2 million), or 3.0% of total government expenditures. Between 2003 and 2009, Togo spent an average of 4.7% of the budget on agriculture. The national plan for agriculture and food security (PNIASA) focuses heavily on irrigation and agricultural inputs, targeting five regions, including Savanes, Kara, Centrale, Plateaux and Maritime. According to Togo’s budget allocations for 2011 and 2012, the Kara and Maritime regions are the primary geographical beneficiaries. The three largest expenditures in 2011 were the purchase of fertiliser, the implementation of a rice project in Kara and the budget for the Institute for Technical Advice and Support. Irrigation, unless it is the focus of the Kara rice project, seems to be underfunded.
• **Participation of non-state actors:** The General Secretariat is the chief convener of the PNIASA steering committee and is responsible for ensuring the participation of partners in inter-ministerial dialogues. The plan specifies the participation of several umbrella producer, agribusiness and civil society networks, as well as participating Ministry and lender representatives. A detailed organizational chart and accompanying text articulates the roles and relationships within the institutional framework of the programme.

• **Gender:** The plan mentions gender as a cross-cutting theme, but it does not outline how gender will be integrated into its various sub-programmes. However, the plan’s extensive list of over 300 indicators requires that several related to political governance, common development indicators, and access to ICT, credit, and agricultural education are disaggregated by gender.

• **Outcome specificity:** Many indicators are listed, but the methodology to achieving overarching goals is not made explicit. With over 300 indicators included in the PNIASA, its results framework may prove to be overly ambitious or fragmented.

• **Nutrition:** One of the plan’s sub-programmes focuses on improving food and nutrition security, including good governance in the sector, with an allocated budget. Nutrition education activities are also planned and budgeted in the fisheries sub-programme.
According to data supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture, Uganda spent UGX 477.2 billion ($190.9 million) in 2011/12 on the agriculture sector, or roughly 5.0% of its national budget (excluding donor projects). Between 2003 and 2009, Uganda spent an average of 2.6% of the budget on agriculture. Reflecting the sector’s Development Strategy and Investment Plan (DSIP), agricultural advisory services were the top priority, with agricultural research also receiving significant budgetary allocations. For the most part, however, agriculture budget categories do not match up with the DSIP sub-programmes. For example, while the DSIP indicates very specific allocations for improving market access, value addition and the management of land, water and pests, the national budget does not include allocations for these areas.

In contrast to the rest of the countries examined in this report, ONE was able to calculate the proportion of agriculture spending that went to support investments in Uganda’s investment plan (e.g. DSIP) and CAADP process. Based on information received directly from the Ugandan government, 62% of agriculture spending went towards programmes and principles laid out in the DSIP.

### Development Progress

**Proportion of population living in extreme poverty (2009)**

38.0%

**Progress to meet MDG 1a by 2015:**

ON TRACK

**Agriculture sector growth rate (2008-2011 average):**

16.3%

### Maputo Progress and Shortfall

**FY2011/12 Public Agriculture Expenditure**

- **Financed:** $190.9 million
- **Shortfall:** $193.5 million
- **Total:** $384.4 million

### Transparency – Somewhat Transparent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRANSPARENCY INDICATOR</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBP Open Budget Index Score</td>
<td>SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS</td>
<td>85/100 (2012) up from 55/100 (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture expenditure transparency and access (online)</td>
<td>SOMEWHAT TRANSPARENT</td>
<td>Comprehensive budget and expenditure-related information is available for most years, and is broken down by sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture programme transparency (online)</td>
<td>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>Objectives for programme areas listed on website, but no financial allocation details or geographical information included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s Budget</td>
<td>NOT AVAILABLE ONLINE</td>
<td>A citizen’s budget is available, but only in hard copy.</td>
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**Programmatic focus:** The largest DSIP sub-programmes relate to agricultural advisory services, value addition, land and water resource management, pest and disease control, and policy capacity.

**Participation of non-state actors:** The DSIP does not contain a clearly delineated governance structure for non-state participation. At the district and sub-county levels, local council officials will be responsible for mobilising and empowering farmers, farmers’ groups and organisations. Local council officials will also be responsible for establishing linkages with stakeholders such as CSOs, private-sector organisations (including through public-private partnerships) and farmers.

**Gender:** There is no gender-specific programme, and monitoring and evaluation indicators are not disaggregated by gender. However, gender is one of the DSIP’s cross-cutting themes, and a few programmes target women as priority beneficiaries, such as cash-for-work programmes for women and other vulnerable groups.

**Outcome specificity:** A clear summary matrix lists out specific outcomes under each programme, as well as the broader, overarching development objectives. However, targets, baselines and data sources have yet to be established for the indicators.

**Nutrition:** One of the two overarching aims of the DSIP is to improve food and nutrition security. The plan refers to the National Food and Nutrition Policy (2003) and the National Food and Nutrition Strategy (2005), which are still in the process of being implemented. The sub-programme on “Agricultural Research and Technology Development” includes initiatives to develop nutrient-dense crops, and the sub-programme on “Planning and Policy Development” provides for nutrition policy to be operationalised and nutrition-related activities to be increased.
A man harvests wheat alongside women at the Sene Mariam Women’s Beekeeping Group in Ethiopia, which provides training and job creation in beekeeping for disadvantaged women. This facility is operated within the Agricultural Cooperative Development International/Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI/vOCA) and the Ethiopian government’s Agricultural Growth Programme (AGP), and is funded by the US government through Feed the Future.
African Case Studies
African Case Studies Introduction

The report cards of African countries provide a stark assessment of progress towards meeting their Maputo commitments and CAADP targets. These were mostly quantitative evaluations based on available data. But some of the most important goals of the CAADP process, including broad consultations with various non-state actors, are harder to quantify. Although the previous assessment finds almost across the board that transparency of national budget information was insufficient for proper citizen participation, this only measures one aspect.

The following case studies of Benin, Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania attempt to explore the CAADP consultative process in more detail. By interviewing key stakeholders in each country - including non-governmental organisations, business associations, farmers’ groups, and local and national government representatives - we are able to provide an in-depth look at how consultations fare in a variety of contexts. The countries all have CAADP compacts in place, with varying levels of implementation of their agriculture investment plans. All countries have measures in place to consult with non-state actors in the implementation of these plans. The following countries mainly differ across three areas: (1) formality of the consultation process; (2) the types of groups included in the process; and (3) how well non-state actor feedback is integrated by the government into agriculture plans and implementation. The experiences represented within should provide some important recommendations for these governments and others to consider when implementing CAADP plans in order to best represent the public’s views.
**SUMMARY**

- Benin has seen a large upsurge in CAADP civil society participation since 2009, when a group of non-state actors refused to pass the government’s initial national agriculture investment plan and a new, more inclusive process of plan development began.

- As a result, there is now an approved plan and significantly more open communication and collaboration between the Ministry of Agriculture and farmers and civil society organisations. However, many voices are still left out of the consultation process, most notably agribusiness and women’s groups.

- For Benin’s agriculture sector to reach its potential, women and agribusiness should be included in the implementation of the country’s strategic plan for agriculture and, to verify inclusiveness, government-registered civil society actors should publish a list of their membership annually.

**GOALS:**

- By 2020, the PSRSA aims to achieve the following:
  - National GDP growth rate of 8.9% and agricultural GDP growth rate of 14.3%;
  - 5.7% increase in GDP per capita;
  - Decrease in the number of poor people to 12.2% of the population from 33.3% (2007), a 63% reduction;
  - Gradual, average increase in cereal production (corn and rice) by 150,000 tonnes a year, to reach 2,285,000 tonnes

- The PSRSA aims to develop 13 value chains through both family and commercial farms.

**DONOR SUPPORT:**

Total (bilateral) ODA to agriculture = **$59.6 MILLION (2011)**

**GOVERNMENT SUPPORT:**

Total Government Expenditure towards agriculture = **$44.8 MILLION (2011)**

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**KEY STATS:**

Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) = **37%** (2012)

Annual agriculture growth = **6%** (2012)

Employment in agriculture (% of total employment) = **43%** (2003)

Agricultural products: cotton, corn, cassava (manioc), yams, beans, palm oil, peanuts, cashews and livestock

**CAADP COMPACT:**

Signed in October 2011, following a consultation process that included small producer organisations, the farmers’ union, and other civil society organisations.

**INVESTMENT PLAN:**

The Strategic Plan for Agricultural Sector Revival (PSRSA), finalised in September 2010 and approved in 2011, will be operationalised through the National Programme of Investment in Agriculture (PNIA).
Comian Pedro of PASCIB, one of the main civil society organisations, and Martin Houndonougbo, the Beninese government’s CAADP Focal Point, believe they are working toward mutual goals.

In general, most civil society organisations are pleased with the final plan. PNOPPA (the national umbrella farmers’ association) and Oxfam, for example, have stated that the PSRSA is the best strategic document they could have written and that they have open lines of communication. However, many civil society representatives, such as Damien Djodjo-Kouton of PNOPPA and Nestor Martin, SG of Synergie Paysanne, feel that some issues—such as empowering outside actors to influence Ministry of Finance budget allocations and timelines—are beyond the scope of the national agriculture plans and need to be addressed.

Informal lines of communication appear to be very open for groups that are registered with the ministry and participated in the drafting of the plan, but less so with those that do not participate constructively. For example, representatives from REDAD, PASCIB and PNOPPA said that before the consultation process, they had no contact with the Ministry, but now the Ministry regularly answers their emails, returns their calls and invites them to meetings. For PNOPPA and PASCIB, the government maintains this openness and discussion even when they disagree. However, direct relationships with the government, says Parfait Patrice Sewade, Programme Manager of Réseau de développement d’agriculture durable (REDAD), require an organisation to be “diplomatic” and “reasonable.” Meanwhile, Babatunde R. Ollofindji, a Tunde company, feels that the government does not listen to their suggestions.

Large increase in participation

According to CAADP guidelines, the Ministry of Agriculture’s initial draft had to be approved by a wide range of non-state actors in Benin; though the Ministry convened a roundtable of various stakeholders to approve the plan, representatives from civil society, producer organisations and agro-processors were not invited to participate. As a result, they refused to approve the government’s initial proposal.

The group, which includes small producer organisations, Synergie Paysanne (Benin’s main farmers’ union), other civil society organisations and government representatives, began to elaborate a new plan in a consultative process led by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fishing (MAEP). This process resulted in the Strategic Plan for Agricultural Sector Revival (PSRSA), a nine-year, $986 million plan, which was approved in October 2011.

Though several interviewees admitted that the three-year process was time-consuming, as a result, the Benin government’s consultative framework for agriculture policy and programmes is now well established. In addition to hosting meetings with smallholder farmers and civil society representatives several times each year, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries organises and sponsors an annual review of the sector that involves donors, producer organisations, academics, NGOs and civil society organisations.

The government committed to establish the Conseil National d’Orientation et du Suivi (CNOS), that will convene non-state actors and representatives from several ministries to lead, co-ordinate and monitor implementation of the agriculture plan. Ernest
Under-representation of key constituencies

One major shortcoming of the consultative framework in Benin is the lack of private-sector participation. With the exception of the Agriculture House (a group of agribusiness leaders), private companies do not participate in consultations. This is largely because the group of non-state actors forced the government to choose between an agribusiness focus and their involvement in the consultative process, fearing that the involvement of major private companies would undermine benefits to small-scale farmers. “Agribusiness is a word that non-state actors do not want to hear nor consider,” says Sylverstre Fandohan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH. As a result, many business representatives feel that the final plan does not address large-scale private-sector issues related to agriculture, and relations between civil society and the private agribusiness sector are tense.

Even the involvement of the Agriculture House is limited. Ousmane Kadiri Boukary of the Agriculture House said that although they participate in some of the government-sponsored consultative dialogues and participate in one-on-one discussions, they do not believe that the government is implementing their ideas. Officials do not often return calls, invite them to meetings or implement their ideas, although the Agriculture House has been invited to participate in the implementation process.

According to Pascaline Babadankpodji, a gender specialist from the Forum of African Women Educationalists (FAWE), female farmers, processors and traders have also been left out of the consultation process. Very few women’s organisations participated in the consultative process and, as a result, very few gender-sensitive ideas were included in the final plan. It is possible that the lack of female participants could be due to the internal dynamics of different organisations and capacity issues. Amongst the standard non-state actors interviewed, there was variation in both technical and advocacy capacity. As a possible indication that the government is attempting to better address women’s issues, the Ministry recently organised a workshop and invited its Women Integration into Agriculture and Rural Development unit.

Implementation: to be or not to be?

Implementation of Benin’s investment plan was set to begin in October 2012 with a series of government-sponsored meetings to educate the public at the national, regional, departmental and community levels. The CNOS will be the main co-ordinating and monitoring entity and will involve the Ministries of Finance, Development and Agriculture, along with non-state actors represented by PNOPPA and PASCIB. Business will be represented by the Agriculture House. Though the government approved the CNOS on 24 October 2012, at the time this report went to print no other steps had been taken towards implementation.

Several of the groups interviewed question whether the implementation will proceed as planned. Their fears are bolstered by scepticism that the government will implement a plan that favors the voices of the small over the more financially influential; and by the fact that the Beninese government, at even the highest levels, is completely consumed with the cotton crisis due to low world prices. Interviewees such as Codjo Bernadin Toto of PNOPPA expressed concern that the PSRSA will not be followed by the government, and thus has suggested that the government move forward with the establishment of the steering and monitoring committee (CNOS) at once so that the group of non-state actors and the various ministries can monitor implementation of the plan in parallel to dealing with the cotton crisis.

Benin has made impressive strides towards including non-state actors, especially civil society and smallholder farmer organisations, in agriculture policy development, and should in some respects serve as a model for other countries. However, recommendations for improvement include:

- Benin must move forward with establishing the national steering and monitoring committee (CNOS) as planned, before positive collaboration loses momentum.
- For Benin’s agriculture sector to reach its potential, women and a diversity of domestic agribusinesses need to be represented within the implementation committee.
- The Beninese government should prioritise transparency and monitoring (of resources, implementation and impacts) moving forward to ensure that development outcomes are achieved.
- Donors should consider funding the CNOS meetings.
- The government of Benin should incorporate input from non-state actors into budget planning.
In recent years, the Ghanaian government has created new opportunities for non-state actors to participate in agriculture policy planning and implementation, especially through its efforts to open up the policy dialogue and consider input for the direction of Ghana’s Medium-Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan (METASIP).

Through the METASIP, the Ghanaian government also took steps to institutionalise inclusion by stipulating the creation of a platform for private-sector and civil-society participation. The plan executes this through consultative meetings, plan publication, a participatory regulatory review, formal communication channels and a participatory monitoring and evaluation system.

Despite its efforts to better engage outside actors over the past few years, the Ghanaian government could still increase participation around agriculture policy by decentralising the decision-making process and accelerating implementation of the METASIP.

Ghana should better engage the private sector and build capacity of private-sector actors, especially to support implementation. One key component of this is equipping private-sector associations with more information about relevant policies.

Development partners could help increase participatory policymaking through funding workshops, consultations and capacity-building. In addition, they could support monitoring efforts by non-state actors, especially those that need more technical capacity.

To improve understanding of CAADP, the government should translate laws and policies that relate to CAADP into local languages, and utilize technology to help disseminate different messages (for example, through radio programmes).
In recent years, the Ghanaian government has created new opportunities for non-state actors to participate in agriculture policy planning and implementation. According to the various stakeholders interviewed during this exercise, the Ministry of Agriculture has significantly shifted its attitude toward non-state actors, making efforts to open up the policy dialogue and consider input for the direction of Ghana’s Medium-Term Agriculture Sector Investment Programme (METASIP). As Nana Ayim Poakwah of the Ghana Hunger Alliance said, “The government now realizes that policies and programmes without consultation do not work and that, in a local saying—, “one head does not form a council.”

**Increased inclusivity**

Ghana’s previous agriculture plan, the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDP), was developed with the input of only one or two civil society organisations. However, its 2009 CAADP compact was endorsed by a wide range of non-state actors. Civil society groups felt that the METASIP reflected the interests of small-scale farmers by prioritising issues such as food security, emergency preparedness, and increasing incomes. Post-harvest issues, which would affect non-producer groups and companies, were largely left out of the plan, but added later at the request of the Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF).

The METASIP also took steps to institutionalise inclusion, most notably by stipulating the creation of a platform for private-sector and civil-society participation that includes consultative meetings, plan publication, a participatory regulatory review, formal communication channels and a participatory monitoring and evaluation system.

The METASIP also provides for a four-part governance system to guide implementation. The secretariat is responsible for day-to-day implementation of the plan. The steering committee includes representatives from ministries, parliament, civil society and the private sector as well as donors and traditional leaders. The policy dialogue group (essentially an expanded version of the steering committee) is responsible for outreach and the plan’s participatory monitoring and evaluation mechanism. The Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKSS) is comprised of think tanks and national research institutes, and provides technical support.

Many new, formal avenues provide access to the Ministry of Agriculture. The METASIP steering committee meets regularly, though participation is limited to umbrella and network organisations. The first two formal METASIP consultations were held in 2011. They were organised and widely attended by civil society groups, the government and donors. In addition, the government hosts an Agriculture Sector Working Group that meets monthly and is widely attended by donors, the government and non-state actors. The government has also championed a thorough and participatory “joint sector review” of agriculture policies. However, one area where participation continues to be stifled is during budgetary meetings, in which only one farmer organisation is permitted to attend.

In addition to these formal channels, informal communication around agriculture policy is also vibrant. The Ministry of Agriculture is very accessible to advocacy groups. Almost all groups interviewed felt that they could invite Ministry officials to events and that the Ministry invited them to events when appropriate.

Several policy accomplishments have come out of the new engagement and communication between state and non-state actors. For example, PEF’s engagement has resulted in an agriculture sector fund and some progress on commodity price transparency, which is essential to agribusiness planning. Moreover, Development Action Association (DAA) and the Dix Cove Fishing Association have seen a new fisheries law enacted, and because of their advocacy, there has been movement to translate the law into local languages and standardise weights and measures to provide a more equitable environment and a fair platform for fish trading.

Non-state actors have also taken steps to improve their own communication and organisation, forming a Non-State Actor Task Force, which includes private entities. They have identified shared goals and developed a consensus document and are currently looking for funding to roll it out. The action plan focuses on policy research, advocacy and monitoring METASIP’s implementation.
Next steps: Beyond participation

Despite its efforts to better engage outside actors over the past few years, the Ghanaian government could still increase participation around agriculture policy. First, many stakeholders believe that decision-making remains overly centralised within the Ministry of Agriculture. All of the non-state actors interviewed felt that, while their voices and opinions are heard, they are not necessarily integrated into the Ministry’s policy and plans. Additionally, they feel that the Ministry headquarters does not co-ordinate sufficiently with the local and regional levels (as noted in CAADP’s Highlighting the Successes Report). Though district-level representatives from the Ministry exist, according to interviewees, decision-making authority seems to be consolidated in the Minister’s office.

There are also significant concerns around implementation of the plan. None of the actors interviewed could confidently say how much of the METASIP had been put into action. In addition, there is a sense that consultations do not seem to be influencing the policies. Tom Gambrah of Premium Foods explained that the METASIP is at risk of becoming one of “many paper tigers that have not performed on the ground.” In addition, PEF says that the private sector has not jumped in to invest because there is no credit risk coverage, agricultural insurance or technical assistance. At the same time, input subsidies do not advance smallholders because they have nowhere to store their produce and nowhere to sell it.

Another issue is representation and access. Despite the government’s perceived openness to outside viewpoints, several groups interviewed recognised that “transparency depends on who you are,” often acknowledging that their organisation was granted informal access and participation because of their size, their funding or their relationships. Premium Foods, for example, pointed out that the government returns their phone calls “one hundred percent, because we are [a big company]; but what about the small guy down the street? We want to bring them into the structure.” Nana Ayim Poakwah, however, believes the issue is more with farmers as “farmers do not have courage. We need to empower them.” What is clear is that both representatives, and all the stakeholders we spoke with, want to further engage small-scale farmers into formal political and economic structures.

Finally, there is a sense that outside of those directly involved with METASIP consultations, there is little awareness about the plan and its contents. Industry groups organised for export, including the Cashew Alliance and the Shea Alliance, were unaware of the METASIP and its relevance to them. The leader of the Private Enterprise Foundation estimated that agribusinesses’ comprehension of CAADP is “0.1 on a scale of 1 to 100.” Similarly, a group of researchers from the International Food Policy Research Institute in 2011 surveyed nearly 500 farmer-based organisations and found no evidence that any of them integrate with the national-level networks involved with the METASIP or are aware of their right to advocate on behalf of themselves. To remedy this, the Peasant Farmers of Ghana suggested that the Ministry focus on the education of farmers to ensure greater understanding of the CAADP principles and what they can expect from the government as a result.

Recommendations:

• Through the METASIP, Ghana’s focus should now shift from high-level consultations to implementation and monitoring.

• The Ghanaian government should be more inclusive of the private sector and build capacity of private-sector actors in order to further support implementation. An important aspect is improving the communication of relevant policies to private-sector associations and ensuring that farmers and agribusinesses are well informed.

• Development partners can play a role by building capacity of non-state actors to monitor progress on the METASIP; specifically through funding workshops and consultations, and providing technical assistance.

• In order to strengthen understanding of CAADP, the government should translate laws and policies relevant to CAADP into local languages, and utilise technology to help disseminate different messages (for example, through radio programmes).
SuMMArY

- The Kenyan government has created significant opportunities for civil society and the private sector to engage at the local, regional and national levels.

- While private-sector input is dominated by large agribusinesses, one national farmer association, KENFAP, has earned itself a strong role in the consultation process.

- For many groups, successful engagement is hindered by the government’s selectivity in choosing consultation participants, as well as NGOs’ own technical and policy capacity limitations. As a result, many adept groups feel they are left out of the consultation process; others believe they could engage better with more policy capacity and technical skills.

AGRICulture IN KENya

KEY STATS:
Agriculture accounts directly and indirectly for 51% of GDP.

Annual agriculture growth = -1% (2012), 2% (2011)

Employment in agriculture (% of total employment) = 75%

Agricultural products: tea, coffee, corn, wheat, sugar-cane, fruit, vegetables, dairy products, beef, pork, poultry and eggs

DONOR SUPPORT:
Total (bilateral) ODA to agriculture = $138.4 million (2011)

Feed the Future, New Alliance and Grow Africa Partnership country

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT:
Total Government Expenditure towards agriculture = $532.4 million (2011/12)

CAADP COMPACT:
Signed in July 2010, following a consultative process that involved sector ministries, donors, the private sector and civil society

OTHER KEY PROGRAMMES:
Vision 2030 was launched in 2008; Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) was launched in 2010

GOALS:
Vision 2030 aims to transform Kenya into a middle-income country by 2030.

- ASDS aims for a food-secure nation with an annual agriculture growth rate of 7% by 2020.
- The government has committed to allocate 8% of its total budget toward agriculture by 2013.
- Agriculture-related ministries have proposed an agricultural development fund, with annual funding equivalent to 2.8% of projected average government expenditure over the next three years.

SUMMARY
The Kenyan government has created opportunities for civil society organisations and the private sector to participate in implementation of the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) at the local, regional and national levels. At the national level, this engagement takes place during the biennial agriculture sector stakeholder forum. Although some civil society organisations (such as PELUM, Farmers’ Voice Radio and Kenya Cooperative Alliance) claim that access to the forum is limited, others believe it is quite open, especially compared to pre-2008 policy dialogues, when government consultative processes were much more exclusive.

**Space for participation**

The regional forums include representatives from ministries, local governments and donor agencies. At the local level, decentralised government agencies meet with local stakeholders, including private-sector representatives and farmers. Both representatives at the national level and in the four districts visited for this study (which included Likipia East, Kitui, Nzambani and Nakuru) praised the effectiveness of these local and regional agriculture forums. However, the quality of communication between the regional and national levels is less certain; none of the people interviewed at lower levels know how their views are communicated at the national level or who represents them beyond the regional agriculture forum. In light of these constraints, recent changes to the Kenyan constitution attempt to create a more decentralised policy environment, one which may increase the influence of local stakeholders and better represent their voices in policy implementation.

Other consultation forums include a quarterly agriculture-focused roundtable, which is hosted by the Prime Minister; the Presidential Private Sector Forum, which receives the proposals from the aforementioned roundtable and helps to unlock bottlenecks requiring Presidential intervention; and a Parliamentary Forum on policy reform processes.

**Major voices, minor voices**

In Kenya, large-scale private-sector players are automatically represented in CAADP-related policy processes through the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), which is signatory to the CAADP compact. The government and main donors are also signatories, but small-scale business representatives, farmers and civil society are not. As a result, large agribusinesses tend to dominate the private sector’s input into the process. This has led many smaller groups to feel left out of the national-level process, though some have developed creative and dynamic approaches to assert their influence. Other groups feel they lack the capacity and technical skills to engage in a meaningful way.

Elite forums such as the Presidential Private Sector Forum exclude small players, leading many to believe that larger actors have been able to negotiate favourable terms. The only representation for smaller companies is through the Private Sector Alliance, within which only members of Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers (KENFAP) are represented. KENFAP’s members include various farmer-based organisations, community associations and producer co-operatives. Smaller, non-producing players elsewhere on the value chain should be represented more directly in policy processes, since small players are large contributors to Kenya’s agricultural economy. At the national level, KENFAP and the Private Sector Alliance enjoy unparalleled influence, thanks to their size and financial resources.

KENFAP has used its massive membership, as well as its technical and political savvy, as a rationale for securing itself a spot on 15 different government committees. According to George Odhiambo of KENFAP, the organisation has managed to effectively exert influence as a result of: (1) very clear lines of representation, which give accurate feedback on how policies impact farmers; (2) technical competence through on-going capacity-building for members; and (3) a targeted political strategy. Yet, according to Odhiambo, individual farmers’ concerns are often left out of the dialogue. He suggests that they could be incorporated more if CSOs and commodity-based co-operatives had a stronger voice.
When groups do not have access to the formal decision-making process, lobbying and informal working relationships are the only option for influencing policy; Farm Africa, Agricultural Conservation Trust (ACT), and Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA) rely primarily on these channels. For example, Farm Africa’s proactive relationship-building resulted in Kenya’s new aquaculture policy. Farm Africa’s Susan Otieno reports, “We were there early. We brought the missing link when there had been stagnation in the aquaculture shop policy, and now the policy on Aquaculture Licensing is on the Permanent Secretary’s desk - fresh idea, technically well-designed, right timing did the trick.”

On the other hand, some non-state actors believe that there is space in the agriculture policymaking processes for CSOs to engage - it is just not well exploited. A representative of Eastern Africa Farmers Federation (EAFF) attributed this to a lack of information, internal organisational constraints (such as technical capacity to collate and synthesise information), and ineffective lobbying skills. He argues that CAADP is a technical process and stakeholders must have necessary technical competencies to engage with it effectively. Some organisations, such as EAFF, have made it a priority to build their members’ capacity to engage.

Unnatural selection

There is a widely held perception among stakeholders that the government favours groups which do not challenge it. Within consultations, some civil society actors believe that government officials invite participants who are not conversant with the issues and therefore have no impact on the discussion. “It happens. People with challenging ideas and who might ask awkward questions are avoided. This is what is dragging us behind. If this is repeated, you lose interest,” says Joseph Ngondi, a climate change expert from Kenya Climate Change Working Group (KCCWG). Some organisations are brought in for political reasons but lack the capacity to occupy or use the space, stated Ngondi, citing some co-operatives that, by law, are mandated to engage but in reality are ineffective.

As a result, there is a sense that some stakeholders have lost interest in attending meetings because “legitimate representatives” are continuously disregarded in favour of groups with political connections. Thus, unless issues of fair representation are addressed, the integrity of the CAADP process may falter and the process itself may lose momentum.

When it comes to the government’s selection of policies and programmes to fund, farmers’ organisations are not clear how decisions are made. While consultations occur regularly, a respondent who participates in most meetings said that often the text agreed upon collectively is not the final text presented to Parliament or other approving authorities. As a result, there is a sense among stakeholders that the Ministry of Finance “has its own priorities” when it comes to agriculture.

Small-scale farmers stand to lose the most from a politicised or unfairly selective process. Theopista Nabusoba of Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (Farmer Voice Radio) pointed out that smallholder farmers are suffering post-harvest losses due to a lack of navigable roads in the Mount Meru region, which has not been given priority even though it is a highly productive area. Austin Okez of Farm Africa also reports that the government gives preferential access to water and arable land to large-scale fruit growers, while the water needs of many smallholder farmers remain unmet.

Opportunities for increased inclusion and balance

Under Kenya’s new constitution, counties have fiscal and programme implementation powers. This means that CAADP policy and implementation will be significantly more decentralised. To prepare for this shift, Kenya’s CAADP team should undertake a comprehensive review of how to effectively decentralise decision-making processes while improving transparency and communication across all levels. Such a review should consider the following recommendations:

- Stakeholders invited to participate in the CAADP process should meet minimum standards of representation (i.e. an ability to show evidence that a clear feedback mechanism exists and that there is a well-organized system for transmitting farmer concerns to the highest levels).
- On national policy issues, the linkages between regional and national levels should be improved.
- To build trust with non-state actors, the government should address the perception that the Ministry of Finance has its own priorities. This could be achieved by publicising technical agriculture budgets and expenditure review reports.
- The government should make the process for finalising legislation and policies more transparent; if it makes changes after the consultation, it should publicise the basis of those changes, including new investment decisions.
- Donors should support capacity-building (in particular, technical assistance), for CSOs, farmers’ groups and small-scale private-sector representatives to better organise, conduct relevant technical analysis and communicate with policymakers.
Agriculture in Tanzania

Key Stats:
- Agriculture accounts directly and indirectly for more than 25% of GDP.
- Annual agriculture growth = 4% (2012).
- Employment in agriculture (% of total employment) = 75%.
- Agricultural products: coffee, sisal, tea, cotton, cashew nuts, tobacco, cloves, corn, wheat, cassava (tapioca), bananas, fruits, vegetables, cattle, sheep, and goats.

Donor Support:
- Total (bilateral) ODA to agriculture = $119.0 million (2011).
- Feed the Future, New Alliance and Grow Africa Partnership Country.

Government Support:
- Total Government Allocation towards agriculture = $555.7 million (2012).

CAADP Compact:
Signed in July 2010, after a roundtable conference with more than 300 participants.

Key Programmes:
- Agriculture Sector Development Programme (ASDP) was launched in (2005/06);
- Kilimo Kwanza was launched in August 2009 to give impetus to ASDP implementation and modernize and commercialize the agriculture sector;
- Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP), aligns CAADP and the ASDP.

Goals:
- President Kikwete has publicly committed to allocate 10% of Tanzania’s budget to fund agriculture in the 2013/14 fiscal year; the allocation is 9% for the 2012/13 budget.
- ASDP aims at achieving a sustained annual agricultural growth rate of 5% (primarily through the transformation from subsistence to commercial agriculture and through the growth of existing commercial enterprises);
- ASDP, which incorporates the Kilimo Kwanza vision, aims to strengthen public-private partnerships across all levels of the sector and implement District Agricultural Development Plans (DADPs).

Summary:
- The Tanzanian government’s process for engaging non-state CAADP stakeholders is strong, especially at the level of district planning and the ward or village.
- Use of local research groups helps improve monitoring and inclusion of grassroots organizations.
- While the government has shown willingness to listen to alternative points of view, it struggles to accept criticism as a way of shaping policy.
- According to civil society, the government has implemented many ideas from the large-scale private sector, but has been more selective in implementing ideas from CSOs.
- The government should give reviewers a minimum of three to four weeks to comment on critical policy documents.
- Civil society actors should annually publish a list of their membership, and if appropriate, their recommendations to government.
Structure and engagement: strengths

Since signing its CAADP compact in July 2010, the Tanzanian government has created opportunities for civil society organizations and private sector stakeholders to give feedback on agriculture policies and programmes at the national, district and local levels. In particular, there is a strong framework for district and local level implementation of the Agriculture Sector Development Programme (ASDP) through the development and implementation of District Agricultural Development Plans (DADPs). Civil society organizations and farmers groups are regular participants in this planning.

At the ward and village levels, small producer organizations participate in planning meetings, submit written statements, and play active roles in DADP thematic committees. This structure evolved from existing exchanges between village members and the local government’s Ward Facilitation Teams. Select civil society organizations are also regularly invited to participate in consultative meetings at the district level, where they draw on groups like The Agricultural Non-State Actors Forum (ANSAF) and Mtandao wa Vikundiya Wakulima Tanzania (MVIWATA) - the National Network of Small-Scale Farmers Groups in Tanzania - for technical feedback and advice.

Donors and non-state actors have also created opportunities for civil society to participate and give feedback on agriculture policies, most notably through the Joint Sector Review each year. In addition to tracking Tanzania’s progress towards the Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan’s (TAFSIP) poverty reduction target, the Joint Sector Review also monitors donor alignment to the TAFSIP, the government’s progress on policy changes and consultation with private sector investors, and investment commitments from the private sector. There is also an Agriculture Sector Working Group, which brings together donors, the private sector, and CSOs every two months.

Farmers and members of the private sector also organize annual agriculture shows in Tanzania, with official government support and participation. Representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, private sector companies and civil society organizations agree that Nane Nane (Swahili for August 8th, the date of the show) is an excellent place to share information and showcase progress in Tanzanian agriculture.

In addition to these forums, large private sector companies have more formal opportunities to influence the government. The Tanzania National Business Council, for example, brings together 20 government ministers and 20 private sector representatives selected through the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF). The group meets twice a year, is chaired by the President, and has an executive committee that is co-chaired by the Chief Secretary and the chair of the TPSF. The TPSF, which meets monthly, consists of six private sector representatives and six Permanent Secretaries.

Salum Shamte, the chair of both SAGCOT and the Agriculture Council of Tanzania, reports that the Kilimo Kwanza and SAGCOT (which includes a growth corridor and fund for long-term agriculture financing) were the result of large private sector actors’ unique, high-level access across multiple ministries. Shamte notes, “I am very happy that we [the private sector] agitated for an increased share of agriculture in the national budget from 2.2% that it was in 2005 and now it is approaching 9%... We have also managed to convince government to reduce [the number of] nuisance taxes from 55 to 12.6 While there is still room for improvement, this is an excellent response to our demands.”

ANSAF has proven to be a particularly reliable, constructive and inclusive resource for the government. It is a forum for debate, and its members are smallholder farmers, international NGOs, local NGOs and private companies. One-third of ANSAF’s members are from grassroots organizations that encourage their members to participate in the organization and village level processes. ANSAF has partnered with the Sokoine University of Agriculture for analytical work. At the national level, ANSAF is given the opportunity to view and comment publicly on the budget before it is published. Although the extent to which ANSAF influences the final budget is unclear; representatives did not express concern over their views not being considered. Audax Rukonge, Executive Secretary of ANSAF, explained, “For the past two years we have been invited to accompany the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture when it is delivering its policy statement and defending its budget. Government sends us the information we need.” Such access is not granted openly in Tanzania, however ANSAF’s participation is a signal that the government is open to participation by well-organized, constructive, and rigorous civil society groups.

Some groups, such as ANSAF, feel overwhelmed by the number of meetings related to implementation of the national agriculture strategy; however, Ministry of Agriculture officials report that the government is harmonizing its parallel processes. Officials also say they are contracting Food, Agriculture, and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN) and the Economic and Social Research Foundation to conduct forums and “stocktaking” assessments on how to improve CAADP and make it more inclusive. Though this indicates that the government is attempting to make the process work for smaller non-state actors, it is not clear whether the private sector and civil society tracks will be merged.
Challenges

Although the CAADP/TAFSIP process brings together actors at various levels and continues to improve its mechanisms for inclusivity, there is also evidence that the process and its parallel structures have marginalized the views of some CSOs and farmers groups, while providing large companies the opportunity to lead policy plans.

As mentioned above, large agribusiness companies engage with the government separately through representative forums such as the Private Sector Foundation (PSF). The Private Sector Foundation sends representatives to the Tanzania Business Council, which does not include smallholder farmers’ associations, where they interact with various Ministry officials. As a result of this high-level engagement, the PSF has been able to push many of their ideas into action, including Kilimo Kwanza, the agriculture growth corridor (SAGCOT), and the agriculture fund. SAGCOT, for example, has mobilized local and international companies to invest in a specified area of the country.

However, groups like MVIWATA, which represents 100,000 smallholders across Tanzania, criticize SAGCOT for allocating scarce public resources to the benefit of large investors and businesses while cutting off smaller farmers’ access to land and water.

In addition to this perceived sense of favoritism towards the large-scale private sector, there is also a sense that the government has limited tolerance for unguided criticism (which does not offer viable constructive solutions) and is selective in which groups it allows to participate in consultations (especially those, such as MVIWATA, that are considered anti-large-scale private sector). A MVIWATA representative said that although they are regularly invited to village, ward and district planning meetings and the government is generally open to alternative viewpoints, it is less receptive to criticism. “Ironically,” stated a MVIWATA official, “our (smallholder) farmers are most listened to when there are no contentious issues.” In particular, criticisms around the “big private sector players that encroach on access by the poor to more land and traditional seeds are not always taken on board,” said the MVIWATA official.

Evidence also suggests that the government is selective in who it invites to consultations. “If you are not in good books, you are left out. This makes those invited ‘play it safe’ and deliver constructive proposals in an acceptable tone,” reported ANSAF.

Some representatives of civil society claim that some of the organizations picked by the government to participate are not well-known or considered to have legitimate constituencies. The government’s continued involvement of MVIWATA in the process may be owed to donors who, although they consider MVIWATA less accepting of the private sector positions, are keen to know whether government has sought MVIWATA’s views and the extent to which MVIWATA views and concerns have been addressed.

Constructive feedback from groups like MVIWATA may be hampered by a lack of information. While ANSAF receives information from the government often and in a timely manner, MVIWATA either obtains documents from ANSAF or reviews them “2 to 5 minutes” before the consultations begin. This inadequate and untimely release and receipt of information by government and civil society, respectively, has led to frustration within the government and private sector as well, which considers many civil society organizations anti-government, overly critical, and misinformed.
Ideas for going forward

This analysis suggests several recommendations that, if implemented, might help increase constructive collaboration, contribute to true agricultural transformation, and achieve the TAFSIP’s goals to reduce poverty. With this in mind, the government might:

• Circulate public meeting agendas, proposed policies, and draft plans ahead of consultations to provide stakeholders ample time to prepare thoughtful analysis and input.
• Ensure that civil society stakeholders have a representational structure; organizations could upload or post their structures in the public domain while donors could provide organizational strategy consultants to assist improvement of structures.
• Accelerate plans to streamline consultation processes to lessen burden on non-state stakeholders. Merging parallel tracks of consultation would put civil society and small businesspeople on the same footing as larger agribusiness companies.
• Enhance transparency and inclusiveness in all forums in an effort to reduce mistrust related to financial management and land deals.
• Ensure that representative bodies are conveying authentic views of the members - or at least ensuring that an organization has a voice proportional to its constituency and that there are clear lines of representation to its national level deputies.
• Key policymaking forums should have balanced representation for smallholder farmers, larger farmers and other stakeholders in the value chain. Similarly, the ward and village consultations should ensure the same possibilities of influencing policy without feeling they will be victimized or marginalized. Government should be mindful of the fact that “large scale change in agriculture, as in any other aspect, will happen only through bottom-up action by citizens themselves”, said Rakesh Rajani, head of Twaweza.

“Governments are rigid and if I wait for them to put all policies I want in place, I die.”

- CEO of Tanseed on the importance of making do with the policies in place while advocating for new ones and participating in planning processes.
Farmers at Booker Washington Institute (BWI) – a technical school for agriculture in Liberia. FED (Food Enterprise Development), a Feed the Future implementor, is assisting them with developing training programmes to better teach Liberia’s youth how to build farms.
Donor Progress: Three Years after L’Aquila
Donor Progress: What ONE measured

Since the global food price crisis of 2007-08, there has been an upsurge in donor resources for, and attention to, agriculture and global food security. At the 2009 G8 Summit, donors spearheaded the $22 billion L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI) to reverse the trend of decreasing aid and national financing to agriculture and food security. They sought not only to increase the size but also the effectiveness of donor investment - at the World Summit on Food Security later that year, donors agreed to the Rome Principles, a series of new commitments to improve aid effectiveness in agriculture and food security. These new commitments complemented existing, broader aid-effectiveness commitments. In this report, ONE is measuring the extent to which donors have delivered their commitments - in both the quantity and quality of their assistance, in terms of country ownership. We focus on the broad L’Aquila financing commitments, which span a multitude of sectors from agriculture research to rural development and infrastructure, and also look specifically at donors’ prioritisation of agriculture within their portfolios.

Measuring Donor Investment

Collectively, the 13 L’Aquila donors - Australia, Canada, the European Institutions, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Russia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States - pledged $22 billion in support for agriculture and food security in 2009. About $6 billion was pledged as new money, or funds that were additional to previous commitments. Another 16 countries and 14 international and regional organisations endorsed the AFSI and promised to provide technical support and co-operation.1 Agriculture was central to the initiative, and donors pledged to use their funds to align their programmes with country-owned processes and agriculture plans.

While most donors agreed to report their financial progress in disbursements, the US, Germany and Japan specified that their pledges would be measured in budgetary appropriations, or commitments. About half of the primary financial AFSI commitments were due to be delivered by the end of 2011 and the rest by the end of 2012. Donors pledged nearly half of the funds - $9.2 billion - to agriculture, forestry and fishing, and the remainder was split among multilateral channels and other development assistance sectors, including nutrition, infrastructure and development food aid.

To uniformly measure donor financial promises and progress: ONE assesses each donor’s commitments and disbursements as of May 2012 against their pledged amounts. ONE considers disbursements to be the ultimate measure of political will and bureaucratic expediency and thus, for pledges that were not made in disbursements, ONE notes the resources it would require for the donor to disburse the entire pledged amount.

"We therefore agree to act with the scale and urgency needed to achieve sustainable global food security."  

2009 L'Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security
2. **Priority of agriculture and its related industries:** To reflect the prioritisation of agriculture within the donor’s overall bilateral aid portfolio, ONE also notes the share of bilateral official development assistance (ODA) that was allocated specifically to the agro-industries and agriculture, forestry and fishing sectors during the period 2009 through 2011. In addition to agriculture and its related industries (agro-industries, forestry and fishing), the L’Aquila financial pledges included financing for several additional sectors that are related to food security, including nutrition, transport and storage, development food aid, safety nets, rural development and certain core multilateral contributions. Thus, the indicator “priority of agriculture and its related industries” refers specifically to agriculture-related investments, and does not represent the full share of a donor’s ODA that is allocated toward its L’Aquila pledge.

3. **Investment in countries with National Agriculture Investment Plans:** Through the L’Aquila commitments and the Rome Principles, donors pledged to align their development assistance with country-owned processes and agriculture investment plans. Donors singled out CAADP as an effective vehicle for country ownership, and pledged to provide resources in support of CAADP and other similar regional and national plans. CAADP is a continent-wide, home-grown agriculture initiative of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which is the strategic economic development framework of the African Union. CAADP helps interested countries to formulate costed, technically vetted national investment plans in agriculture in agreement with public, private, non-state actors and development partners. To track progress toward this commitment, ONE examines the share of bilateral agriculture-related development assistance that each donor allocates to a set of 30 low-income countries with national agriculture plans. Most of these were developed through the CAADP process, however others were developed in Asia and Latin America through their own regional processes. It was beyond the remit of this report to examine all developing countries’ agriculture investment plans. To measure donors’ alignment efforts with country-led agriculture plans more broadly, we examine the legal, policy and implementation frameworks that donors use to align with agriculture plans and make a qualitative assessment. In addition and where possible, we took into account figures directly provided by donors on the share of agriculture projects aligned with relevant country plans.

4. **Contributions to the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund:** ONE also compares donor contributions to the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), since donors also pledged to advance capacity-building and ownership through their support for CAADP. The MDTF is an innovative mechanism for building African capacity to implement the CAADP process. Contributions to the MDTF are a transparent signal of donor support for the CAADP process.

“In Africa, NEPAD’s Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) is an effective vehicle for ensuring that resources are targeted to a country’s plans and priorities. Local ownership must begin with the national political will to develop and implement comprehensive food security strategies, based on sound scientific evidence, inclusive consultation, domestic investment and clear directions. We commit to provide resources - whether financial, in-kind or technical assistance - in support of CAADP and other similar regional and national plans in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia”
Measuring Commitment to Country Ownership

Though the $22 billion financial pledge captured food security headlines from the L’Aquila summit, donors’ commitments on how they would spend new funds were just as important. Through the L’Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security and the subsequent Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security, donors made commitments to improve the effectiveness and quality of their aid to agriculture and food security. These commitments drew upon a series of global agreements through which countries pledged to enhance overall aid effectiveness, including the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2011).

In this report, ONE focuses particularly on the concept of country ownership, which is the essence of the aggregated commitments made at these global events. Country ownership, or the practice of enabling developing countries to set their own development agenda, is critical to creating a foundation for effective investments in the agriculture sector. Country ownership helps ensure that programmes are responsive to the unique economic, social and cultural environment within each country. More importantly, it recognises the necessity of developing country leadership to help put developing countries on a path towards self-sufficiency. With budget constraints growing in many countries, these efforts to maximise the impact of every aid dollar are becoming even more imperative. To measure donor progress towards supporting country-led development, ONE identified four areas where donors can take specific actions to encourage country ownership in agriculture and food security programmes:

1. **Alignment with national priorities:** The L’Aquila statement mentions country-led co-ordination in several places, echoing commitments made in Paris and Accra. For example, the first partnership commitment of the Paris Declaration is that “donors commit to respecting partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it.” This commitment was later re-affirmed in Busan, where donors promised allegiance to the shared principle of ownership of development priorities by developing countries and stated that “partnerships for development can only succeed if they are led by developing countries, implementing approaches that are tailored to country-specific situations and needs.” They agreed that donors should play a supportive role in planning and development in particular, and must plan their actions in co-ordination with national governments and other local actors.

2. **Support for national agriculture investment plans:** At the L’Aquila Summit, donors pledged “support for country-owned plans and processes.” Subsequently, the November 2009 World Summit on Food Security committed to “invest in country-owned plans, aimed at channelling resources to well-designed and results-based programmes and partnerships.” Specifically, signatories singled out CAADP as an effective vehicle for country ownership and promised to “intensify international support to advance effective country-led and regional strategies, to develop country-led investment plans, and to promote mutual responsibility, transparency and accountability.” As outlined above, ONE also looks at the percentage of agriculture-related bilateral assistance that each donor provides to a set of 30 low-income countries with country-owned, reviewed national agriculture investment plans developed through CAADP or other regional mechanisms, during the period 2009 through 2011 (the most recent year for which data is available). To measure the extent of alignment with other countries’ agriculture policies, ONE reviews donor strategy, programme documents and additional figures provided directly by donors.

3. **Non-state actor input into national and local policies:** In the L’Aquila statement, donors recognised the importance of local governance for food security and that “the increased involvement of civil society and private sector is a key factor of success,” specifically acknowledging the importance of inclusive consultation through the CAADP process and committing to help countries develop and implement food security strategies. Signatories to the Rome Declaration further elaborated this point by promising to promote “a genuine bottom-up approach based on field-level experiences and developments.” These commitments were in step with pledges within the Accra Agenda for Action to “support efforts to increase the capacity of all development actors - parliaments, central and local governments, CSOs, research institutes, media and the private sector - to take an active role in dialogue on development policy...”
4. **Non-state actor input into project and programme design:** In Busan, donors and partner countries committed to the shared principle of inclusive development partnerships, recognising “the different and complementary roles of all actors” in support of development goals. In Accra, donors promised to support capacity-building of all development actors to participate in dialogue on the role of aid in contributing to countries’ development objectives” and to deepen “engagement with CSOs as independent development actors in their own right whose efforts complement those of governments and the private sector.”

In each of these four areas, ONE investigated donor actions across several levels of public administration, spanning legislative action, development and food security strategies, guidance provided to programme managers, and implementation-monitoring. In theory, implementation within these major areas determines how major shifts in government policy reach programmatic decisions in the field. In the absence of frequently gathered, readily available and attributable development results indicators, these process indicators are important intermediary measures of whether donors are on the right track and are indeed shifting the way they administer their assistance programmes. At each administrative level, ONE reviewed publicly available information (including documents and data) and then consulted with donors directly to clarify questions and obtain additional documentation. Particular attention was paid to whether changes are being implemented from the strategy level down to the mission or delegation level, as well as whether a mechanism is in place to monitor progress on that change.

**Transparency and accountability:**

Cutting across and underpinning ONE’s methodology are the principles of transparency and accountability, which were articulated and agreed upon in Busan as follows:

“**Mutual accountability and accountability to the intended beneficiaries of our co-operation, as well as to our respective citizens, organisations, constituents and shareholders, is critical to delivering results. Transparent practices form the basis for enhanced accountability.”**

The cross-cutting incorporation of this principle means that when donors failed to provide documentation of a particular practice, process or result, ONE was unable to include that practice, process or result in our scoring.
Donor Progress: Findings

Overall, AFSI donors have legally obligated, or “committed,” the entirety of their $22 billion pledge and have made progress toward a more country-led approach in their food security and agriculture-related programmes. However, only half of pledged AFSI financial commitments have been disbursed. Alignment with country-owned, reviewed, costed national agricultural investment plans - as judged by the share of donor ODA for agriculture allocated to countries with such plans - has been low, including with those plans developed through the CAADP process. In order to help countries meet the Millennium Development Goal to halve hunger and poverty by 2015, donors will need to accelerate implementation of programmes and processes that support African-led development in the near future.

Findings - Financial indicators

AFSI financial commitments

Together, the 13 primary AFSI donors have formally committed (legally obligated) the full value of their $22 billion pledge. This commitment represents a major accomplishment for which donors should be commended. However, not all of the individual donors have met their commitments and they are balanced by those who have exceeded their commitments. In addition, disbursements have fallen short to date - in total, AFSI donors have disbursed only $11 billion, or 49.5%, of the total pledged amount.

The eight donors featured in this report, which include the G7 plus the European Union institutions, represent $18.6 billion, or 84%, of the total $22 billion L’Aquila pledge. These eight donors have formally committed 98.9% of their pledges, but have reported disbursements of just 40.3% ($7.5 billion) of their pledged amounts. This record means that the eight donors have performed slightly worse on disbursements than the larger set of AFSI donors. Japan and the US, which have disbursed the lowest proportions of the eight donors, may be dragging them down.

When donors made their pledges, they varied the form of their pledges: Canada, France, Italy and the UK pledged disbursements; while Germany, the EU institutions and Japan pledged in commitments; and the US in appropriations (Congressional budget allocations). They did this to account for variations in political, bureaucratic and budgetary differences, but it can make accountability more complicated. ONE noted the form of governments’ pledges in their respective report cards and also notes disbursement levels for all donors, regardless of their pledge form. Disbursements are a way to observe bureaucratic expedience as well to gauge the velocity at which impacts will accrue.

Progress on pledges and disbursed amounts varies between donors. Although the EU institutions and France have committed nearly the entirety (98%) of their pledged amounts, the US fell short of its pledge, with only 87% of the pledge appropriated. The disbursements of Canada, Italy and the UK have exceeded their pledged amounts. In contrast, Japan and the United States have disbursed only 10.9% and 22.6% of their pledges, respectively. While such time lags may be built into the budgeting and procurement processes of these donor governments, it begs the question of when related poverty reduction and economic growth impacts will be seen. The EU institutions may also be similarly behind, but they have not published their disbursements. In fact, they are the largest laggards in terms of reporting disbursement data among the eight examined donors.

The differences in pledge forms, periods and reporting make it difficult for the G8 to be held accountable for their commitments. Future pledges should be made with accountability mechanisms in mind, and include comparable pledging and reporting formats.
Prioritisation of agriculture and related industries

Taken together, agriculture and its related industries make up around 40% of the AFSI commitments. However, within donors’ overall bilateral aid portfolios, agriculture makes up a much smaller proportion. During the period 2009-2011, agriculture and its related industries made up only 5.6% of the bilateral ODA commitments from the G7 and EU. Some donors made agriculture more of a priority than others, varying from a little more than 2% of ODA in the UK to just over 9% in the EU (see Figures 7 and 8). This represents a 28% increase on the previous period (2006-08) in which agriculture and its related industries made up 4.3% of the ODA commitments from the G7 and EU. However, not all donors increased prioritisation of agriculture and its related industries. Between 2006-08 and 2009-2011, France, Japan and the UK actually decreased their share of ODA going to agriculture and its related industries. The UK increased the total funding to agriculture, but not as much as in other sectors and thus the portion of UK aid to agriculture fell during that period. Italy and the EU institutions more than doubled their previous level of prioritisation within their respective ODA envelopes, while the others increased the prioritisation more modestly (see Figure 7).

**FIGURE 7. SHARE OF ODA TO AGRICULTURE AND ITS RELATED INDUSTRIES.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Share of ODA allocated to agriculture and related industries for 2006-08</th>
<th>Share of ODA allocated to agriculture and related industries for 2009-11</th>
<th>Change over earlier period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5.11%</td>
<td>8.70%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU institutions</td>
<td>3.57%</td>
<td>9.08%</td>
<td>154%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>4.32%</td>
<td>-14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.75%</td>
<td>4.08%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.45%</td>
<td>7.31%</td>
<td>198%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6.41%</td>
<td>4.47%</td>
<td>-30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2.50%</td>
<td>2.18%</td>
<td>-13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>4.30%</td>
<td>5.54%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7 + EU institutions</td>
<td>4.32%</td>
<td>5.55%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Alignment with national priorities and support for costed, technically-reviewed national agriculture investment plans

From the beginning of their pledge periods through 2011, it appears that the donors examined in this report allocated only 23.4% of their agricultural development assistance to the low-income countries with country-owned, reviewed national investment plans for agriculture. In fact, the UK, the EU, Italy and France all invest less than 11% in these countries. Canada, the US, Japan and Germany performed relatively well in this regard, allocating 55.4%, 30.0%, 27.4% and 22.9%, respectively. While donors may have reasons to support agriculture in additional countries other than the 30 we focus on, there is as much as a 50% funding gap in these country-led, costed, vetted plans waiting to be implemented. Part of the responsibility for this financing gap in country investment plans lies with the countries themselves and the other part lies with donors, who pledged in 2009 to support CAADP and invest in these plans. With the 10-year anniversary of CAADP on the horizon, donors should deepen efforts to invest in and align with country-owned national agriculture plans and to support more countries to initiate national CAADP processes.

CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund

Several donors, including Canada, Germany, Italy and Japan, have not yet made contributions to this fund, despite having pledged to support CAADP in the Declaration on World Food Security and to support various forms of country ownership. The EU has been the strongest supporter, allocating almost $20 million to the fund, while the UK, France and the US have also made contributions.

Figure 8. Prioritisation of agriculture assistance and investments to 30 low-income countries with technically-reviewed agriculture plans

From 2009 through 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of ODA to agriculture-related sectors</th>
<th>Size of bubble is share of agriculture-related ODA allocated to 30 low-income countries with reviewed national agriculture plans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>EU institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings – Country ownership review

It appears that the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 and the Rome Declaration on World Food Security in 2009 have been sources of catalytic energy for many donors, and of rhetorical speech for others. Overall, donors have made progress, but there is more they can do to improve country ownership. In several cases, aid effectiveness commitments - in particular alignment with country-owned processes and plans - feature prominently in donors’ policies and strategies. However, it is not always clear how these commitments translate all the way to the ground, or how the donors hold themselves accountable to make that happen. ONE recommends that donors enhance their efforts to monitor and report their alignment.

While aligning with partner governments’ policies is an important step towards achieving greater country ownership, true “country ownership” is best guaranteed if those policies have been developed in an inclusive way—by meaningfully consulting with stakeholders, including civil society, local governments and the private sector. Donors should support these consultative processes and similarly involve local stakeholders when designing direct assistance programmes.

Some donors, such as Canada, are more progressive than others. Not only has Canada prioritised agriculture and countries with costed and reviewed agriculture plans, it stands out as an exemplar in almost all areas of country ownership that were examined in this report. Its Aid Effectiveness Action Plan has instituted reforms across the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), making public reporting a cornerstone of the strategy, and the Plan’s footprint is highly visible at all levels of the agency. On the other end of the spectrum, Japan has made much less progress in changing the way it does business. However, there is room for improvement across the board.
Development assistance to agriculture
Canada puts a heavy emphasis on agriculture within its development assistance envelope, allocating almost 9% to agriculture, agro-industries, forestry and fishing in 2009-11. In fact, agriculture comprised the entirety of Canada’s L’Aquila pledge, which Canada met in 2011. Canada has been a leader in its contributions to the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP), which fills financing gaps in national agricultural investment plans. Following overall cuts to the International Assistance Envelope in the 2012/2013 budget, it is yet to be seen whether the government will maintain food security funding at L’Aquila levels going forward.

Support for national agriculture investment plans
Canada is a leader in bilateral and multilateral alignment with national agricultural investment plans. Twenty-two percent of Canada’s L’Aquila agriculture commitments are allocated to the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP). Bilaterally, Canada sends over half of its agriculture assistance to low-income countries with national agricultural investment plans developed through CAADP and similar processes. In addition, they require that country-level strategies align with local priorities, including country-owned plans. Additionally, CIDA has internal guidelines, training and reporting requirements to ensure such alignment.

Alignment with country priorities
Canada holds itself accountable for joint planning with partner governments. Per Canada’s Official Development Assistance Accountability Act, CIDA must “track and report to Canadians progress on aid effectiveness through Country Report Cards and the reports to Parliament ... and report to Canadians, in easy to understand language, the concrete contribution of CIDA’s aid programme to development results.” The law states that development assistance must be consistent with the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and CIDA’s Aid Effectiveness Plan includes monitoring progress on several objectives related to host country leadership, alignment, consultation, use of country financial systems and co-ordination.
Non-state actor input into local and national policy
The ODA Accountability Act does not address non-state actor dialogue with host governments. The Aid Effectiveness Action Plan tracks CIDA’s progress in engaging multiple stakeholders for better local governance; however, it is not clear to what extent Canada is doing so in the agriculture sector. Additionally, Canada has not yet made a contribution to the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund, which is focused on strengthening the CAADP process.

Non-state input into project design
Canada has instituted policies, programme guidance and accountability mechanisms to ensure that non-state views are incorporated into its planning processes. Consultations are documented and referenced in programme documents, which are shared publicly on a periodic basis. Additionally, CIDA’s Results-Based Management system tracks engagement with local stakeholders, beneficiaries and other non-state actors. Several other tools exist for facilitating the process of participatory programme design. However, high-level ministerial consultations with Canadian CSOs, governments and international organisations are required only every two years.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- **Canada is a model for transparency and accountability:** The reporting requirements of Canada’s ODA Accountability Act and clear objectives of CIDA’s Aid Effectiveness Plan should be a model for donors considering ways to increase the transparency and accountability of their development assistance.
- **Extend L’Aquila commitment and increase agriculture assistance:** Canada should maintain or increase its food security and agriculture funding, making a forward-looking pledge.
- **Ministerial-level consultations with non-state actors should happen more frequently:** Currently, consultations are required by the ODA Accountability Act every two years, which is not sufficient.
- **Contribute to CAADP MDTF and support civil society:** Canada should make a contribution to the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund, and should also consider how it might increase civil society engagement in local and national policy-making.
Development assistance to agriculture
The EU institutions nearly met their pledge to commit $3.8 billion for food security assistance during the first two years of the pledge period, but their progress on disbursements remains unclear. The EU institutions disburse according to schedules agreed upon with partner governments, which do not necessarily correspond with the AFSI time window. For that reason, the European institutions have not reported on AFSI disbursements. One recommends that all donors report both commitments and disbursements so as to facilitate accountability and comparability. The EU institutions’ AFSI pledge was channelled partially through its rapid response to the 2008 food crisis and its 2010 MDG Initiative.

Of all eight donors, the EU institutions channelled the highest share of ODA to the agriculture sector between 2009 and 2011. However, only 10% of the EU institutions’ agriculture aid was directed towards low-income countries with technically vetted plans for agriculture. It is the largest donor to the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund.

The EU institutions are currently debating the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2014-2020, and this presents a unique opportunity for the EU institutions to significantly and sustainably increase annual allocations to agriculture and food security. The EU institutions have already indicated their desire to increase the number of agriculture partner countries, including those which have already developed country-owned, reviewed agriculture plans.

Alignment with country priorities
Government-to-government dialogue and consultation is at the heart of the Cotonou Agreement, a binding legal agreement between the EU institutions and its Member States and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States. Programme guidance includes details on organising consultations. Internal monitoring systems, such as the Office Quality Support Groups, check whether the guidelines have been fulfilled at various points in the programming, financing and execution phases, but these guidelines only apply to programme-based approaches.
Support for national agriculture investment plans
The Cotonou Agreement legally binds EU development partners to align their aid programmes with the development strategies of ACP states. However, it is not always clear whether these requirements are applied in practice. In its 2012 aid effectiveness peer review, the OECD concluded that the EU had made some progress on supporting partner countries’ ownership, but that efforts are still needed to increase the effectiveness and alignment for project-based assistance. EU institutions provide only 10.86% of total bilateral agriculture assistance to partner countries with vetted national investment plans. EU institutions run long-term programmes, many of which were decided before 2007, and are constrained to supporting the focal sectors they decided jointly with partner countries at the time. In the next programming cycle, the EU should work with its partner countries to ensure that existing investment plans developed through CAADP are funded.

Non-state actor input into local and national policy
The Cotonou Agreement legally binds EU institutions to consult with and inform non-state actors, where appropriate, on co-operation priorities, policies and strategies. This entails involving civil society, farmers’ organisations and the private sector in public planning, budgeting and policy reviews. However, it is less clear how project officers, for instance, receive guidance and are monitored for implementing this guiding principle.

Non-state input into project design
The involvement of non-state actors is a “clearly established principle” of the Cotonou Agreement. In 2012, the European Commission published a new staff guidance note, which details how to work more effectively with civil society organisations in partner countries.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Increase support for agriculture:** The EU institutions should continue increasing the share of its agriculture funding in its 2014-2020 programming cycle.
- **Improve monitoring:** To ensure ownership and sustainability, the EU institutions should ideally channel these investments into bilateral programmes that are monitored ex-post for alignment with those countries’ plans.
- **Ensure participation:** EU institutions should encourage partner countries to develop and implement their national agriculture plans in a participatory manner. The EU institutions should also improve the involvement of non-state actors in programming design, implementation and evaluation.
- **Strengthen accountability:** To improve accountability, the EU institutions should provide more systematic guidance and monitoring of aid effectiveness commitments across funding envelopes and aid modalities, and make these documents public.
- **Report disbursements:** The EU institutions should report disbursements to the AFSI working group to ensure greater comparability with other G8 donors.

**Source:** Draft AFSI Commitments and Disbursements table, December 2012
KEY AID STATS:

Share of bilateral ODA that goes to agriculture, forestry, fishing and agro-industries (2009-11):

4.32% (DOWN)

Pre-AFSI share of bilateral ODA that goes to agriculture, forestry, fishing and agro-industries (2006-08):

5.00%

Share of agriculture-related ODA to low-income countries with investment plans (2009-11):

10.57%

Contributions to the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund (as of May 2012):

$1.3 MILLION

Development assistance to agriculture

At less than 5% of total development assistance, agriculture and its related industries are one of France’s five programmatic priorities. Almost two-thirds of France’s AFSI pledge has been allocated toward agriculture, agro-industries, forestry and fishing. Going forward, an early draft of the Strategy for Rural Development and Food Security (2013-2016) sets a goal of allocating 15% of Agence Francaise de Développement (AFD) commitments to food security and rural development by 2016. As a result, France will likely continue to meet or even exceed its AFSI funding levels for food security and agriculture in 2012 and beyond.

Alignment with country priorities

Nearly all French investments are pursued based upon the partner government’s request. They are delivered through country systems and implemented and supervised by national authorities. The AFD’s Operational Procedure Handbook includes guidelines for joint planning and dialogue with partner governments. For fiduciary reasons, partner governments are required to consult with the AFD at the crucial steps of the project implementation.

Support for national agriculture investment plans

Alignment with country plans is firmly rooted in AFD’s approach to rural development. France is also bound by the EU Cotonou Agreement, which stipulates that European Member States should align their development aid to partner countries’ national policies. Additionally, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs includes “supporting strategies and policies implemented in the countries and regions concerned” as one of the top eight commitments of its Global Partnership for Food Security. Alignment with government plans, although not vetted national agriculture investment plans specifically, also forms part of the project approval process. In terms of implementation, AFD reported to ONE that 39 of its 43 current agriculture projects align with country plans. However, during the first two years of France’s AFSI agriculture projects align with country plans. However, during the first two years of France’s AFSI pledge period, only 11% of its agriculture-related assistance was allocated to the 30 low-income countries with vetted agriculture investment plans that we focus on in this report.
Non-state actor input into local and national policy
AFD recognizes that co-ordination and consultation with non-state national actors is a key factor of agricultural policy implementation, and AFD plans to establish and consolidate consultative frameworks to ensure on-going dialogue between the host governments and non-state actors. France supports, among others, the West African Peasant and Agricultural Producers Network (ROPPA) and the Partnership for Pastoral Development in Africa.

Non-state input into project design
The 2011 French Development Cooperation Vision recognizes that non-state players are key in bilateral co-operation, and pledges to strengthen consultation and knowledge-sharing. Currently, there is an internal review of AFD procedures, which seeks to reinforce the sustainability of projects via improved participation of non-state actors. In most projects, non-state actors - in particular producer organisations - are part of project steering committees. However, it would be useful for local non-state actors to have more information about the way they can provide input into the design and implementation of French-supported projects.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

• Increase support for agriculture: France should increase agriculture and food security-related assistance to 15% of its foreign assistance per its draft Strategy for Rural Development and Food Security (2013-2016).

• Strengthen civil society capacity: France should increase its support of local advocacy capacity, including local civil society.

• Increase support for CAADP and agriculture investment plans: France should increase its support to agriculture investment plans developed through CAADP and make a higher contribution to the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund.

• Enhance transparency: France should further institutionalise and increase transparency around the consultation and participation of non-state actors. It should also increase transparency on how it monitors the implementation of its strategy, especially the country ownership principle.
**Development assistance to agriculture**

Germany’s Budgetary Law for 2013 stipulates that it will continue or increase its L’Aquila funding levels from the 2010-12 baseline, committing at least €700 million annually for the next three years. Many of those investments were focused on rural energy supply, governance and environmental protection. The German government has introduced a tracer to ensure that only investments in these three areas that support agriculture and food security are included in funding statistics. Between 2010 and 2011, bilateral commitments to core investments in agriculture increased from $133 million (€100 million) to $218 million (€164 million).

**Alignment with country priorities**

According to legally binding Bundesministerium Für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (BMZ) guidelines, German development co-operation intervenes only on the basis of a bilateral treaty with the partner country’s government. Consultation and joint planning is mandatory for all sectors and individual programme managers are evaluated on this. The partner country’s initiation of co-operation is also a fundamental aspect of BMZ’s Rural Development Strategy. In terms of implementation guidance, the extensive “Capacity Works” manual of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH prominently references jointly agreed objectives and results, but it does not go into detail about how programme managers should arrive at jointly agreed-upon results and objectives.

**Support for national agriculture investment plans**

The BMZ agricultural strategy launched in January 2013 has country ownership as a guiding principle, calling local and national strategies and investment plans the “standard” for German development co-operation in this sector, recognizing CAADP as the central guiding process for selection of its co-operation activities. Further, GIZ’s primary monitoring framework evaluates potential programmes for whether they align with partner countries’ sectoral policies and strategies. Since 2008, GIZ has been advising the NEPAD Planning and Co-ordinating Agency on the CAADP process. However, just under one-quarter of Germany’s ODA to agriculture is allocated to low-income countries with vetted agriculture investment plans. Germany should continue supporting the CAADP process, particularly its extension to other countries, and increase support for the agriculture investment plans that are ready to be implemented.
Non-state actor input into local and national policy

The BMZ’s recently launched agricultural strategy calls for mandatory participation of the private sector and civil society when German development co-operation advises on policy decisions concerning agriculture. Additionally, a GIZ briefing note on CAADP recommends that programme officers act to facilitate “more extensive and efficient participation of key actors, such as the private sector and civil society.”

Non-state input into project design

German development guidelines strongly encourage private sector input in the design of Public-Private Partnerships, but they do not mention other types of non-state input. However, the Project Progress Review process evaluates programme officers on, amongst other criteria, whether and how the programme prioritises partner-country institutions and civil society.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

• Extend L’Aquila commitment and increase overall agriculture funding: Germany has exceeded its L’Aquila pledge goal and should maintain or increase its funding for agricultural and food security programmes.

• Increase support of CAADP: Germany has been a strong supporter of CAADP, and Germany should continue supporting the CAADP process and particularly its extension to other countries and the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund.

• Scale up proven interventions: In the context of strategic portfolio adjustments, Germany should focus on scaling up proven and effective food security interventions.

• Diversify funding instruments away from narrow bilateral focus: Allocation to different instruments should become more flexible. In particular, Germany should consider a contribution to multilateral vehicles that directly support the development and implementation of agriculture investment plans.

• Increase support for civil society and private sector actors: While German development assistance has a very substantial emphasis on capacity-building, it does not systematically support and build the advocacy capacity of civil society and private sector actors. Germany should consider strengthening such investments.
KEY AID STATS:

Share of bilateral ODA that goes to agriculture, forestry, fishing and agro-industries (2009-11): **7.31% (UP)**

Pre-AFSI share of bilateral ODA that goes to agriculture, forestry, fishing and agro-industries (2006-08): **2.45%**

Share of agriculture-related ODA to low-income countries with investment plans (2009-11): **10.94%**

Contributions to the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund (as of May 2012): **$0.0 MILLION**

**Development assistance to agriculture**

With the smallest pledge amongst G8 donors, Italy met and exceeded its L’Aquila financial pledge in 2011, which was primarily allocated to agriculture, forestry, fishing and agro-industries and to voluntary core multilaterals, such as the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation. Given the ease with which Italy met its L’Aquila pledge, it should increase annual allocations for agriculture and food security going forward.

**Alignment with country priorities**

Italy’s various guidelines for development call for supporting countries’ efforts to define their poverty reduction plans, helping to build statistical, monitoring and analytical capacity, and additional guidelines for shared responsibility and transparent co-operation. For at least one country’s plan (Senegal), Italy worked in close contact with local governments and civil society. Few other plans are available for review; however, Italy uses an aid-effectiveness checklist that ensures the host country is involved in decision-making, that the host country’s systems are used and that a joint project evaluation is completed.

**Support for national agriculture investment plans**

According to Italy’s Guidelines on Agriculture, Food Security and Rural Development, Italian agriculture assistance is based on the principles of the Paris and Accra Aid Effectiveness declarations and the five Rome Principles of the Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security. More broadly, their development guidelines state that Italy will align its co-operation plan with the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). It is unclear whether this translates to a given country’s national agricultural investment plan, which theoretically would have the same aim as a PRSP.
Non-state input into local and national policy
There are only a few brief references in Italian guidelines and programmatic strategies to the importance of soliciting input from non-state actors such as civil society and private businesses. However, within the Poverty Reduction Guidelines, there are several places in which dialogue with various actors of civil society, local communities and decentralized levels of the state is seen as a best practice on the part of national governments, and it is suggested that recommendations from such dialogues be incorporated into national strategies. However, no other mention or implementation plan was noted for this dimension.

Non-state input into project design
The Italian development agency emphasises a bottom-up approach underpinned by decentralisation and participation of local authorities, civil society, private enterprise and Italian NGOs, recommending that Italian programmes “promote wider participation of all social actors, public and private, into the phases of planning, implementation and control activities.” More specifically, the Guidelines on Food Security, Agriculture, and Rural Development recommend that potential projects should be evaluated based on several marker questions, including whether the initiative plans to consult local communities to determine their needs and priorities. The Italian plans for Senegal, Mozambique and Ethiopia stress local non-state participation in project planning and implementation, but the Italian actors involved in a development project are only required to meet annually with their local counterparts to discuss the result achieved so far and to adapt the plan/project to the changed context.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
• Extend and increase L’Aquila commitment: Italy exceeded its financial pledge, and it should increase food security investments for the 2013-15 period.
• Invest in CAADP and support GAFSP: To increase the impact of its investments and ensure greater alignment with agriculture investment plans, Italy should make contributions to the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund and the GAFSP.
• Improve consultation with local partners: Italian development implementers should meet more often with their local counterparts to discuss progress, lessons learned and improvements to programme design.
Development assistance to agriculture
Japan has exceeded its L'Aquila pledge to commit $3 billion for global food security. However, its disbursements lag significantly behind commitments. In fact, they are the lowest amongst the G8 as a percentage of the original pledge. In regards to its agricultural assistance, Japan has honed in on the rice value chain. Its L'Aquila pledge was entirely in the areas of agriculture, forestry, fishing, agro-industries, transport and storage.

Support for national agriculture investment plans
As part of Japan’s Action Plan on Implementing the Paris Declaration, it promised to deepen and expand the use of programme-based approaches. Currently, it is not clear if this has filtered down to food security programmes. TICAD IV’s three food security pillars are broadly aligned with CAADP, though this does not imply specific alignment with country plans. Most of Japan’s food security assistance is centred on the rice value chain and the CARD partnership. However, the CARD Steering Committee has recommended that these rice strategies are better aligned with national plans for agriculture developed via CAADP.

Alignment with country priorities
Respect for developing country leadership legally underpins Japan’s development assistance. Japan’s Action Plan on Implementing the Paris Declaration has prioritised working with partner countries to discover their capacity-building needs, and the TICAD IV strategy is based on principles of African ownership of development, partnership and south-south co-operation. However, Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) does not monitor and publish systematic evaluations of these principles. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) does support countries’ development of National Rice Development Strategies (NRDS) through the Coalition for Africa’s Rice Development (CARD) secretariat and monitors their progress.
Non-state actor input into local and national policy
TICAD IV includes action items on the participation of small-scale farmers. However, TICAD progress reports do not track these indicators, at least publicly.

Non-state input into project design
Within the CARD initiative that JICA strongly supports, farmers feed into the CARD general meetings but are situated largely outside of the governance structure. However, a short-term goal of CARD is to network with various private players, while a long-term goal is to bring private stakeholders into the governance structure. There is no indication of whether this effort has been successful or is being tracked.

L’AQUILA FOOD SECURITY INITIATIVE FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS (USD MILLIONS)*

PLDGE
$3000.0 MILLION

COMMITMENTS
$3137.0 MILLION
104.6%

DISBURSEMENTS
$326.0 MILLION
10.9%

Conclusions and recommendations
• Accelerate disbursement: Japan’s low disbursement level indicates that programmes are not yet being implemented. JICA should increase the pace of implementation.
• Improve reporting: TICAD ceased reporting on its progress indicators after 2009. It should report on its existing progress indicators for the L’Aquila period. For TICAD V, the monitoring framework should include indicators on alignment, joint planning and non-state input.
• Support CAADP and GAFSP: Japan could rapidly increase its focus on country ownership and diversify its agriculture investments beyond the rice value chain by making contributions to GAFSP and the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund.
• Align with national plans: Japan’s rice value chain activities vis-à-vis CARD and national rice strategies should be better aligned with national agriculture investment plans that were developed through the CAADP process.

*Source: Draft AFSI Commitments and Disbursements table, December 2012
Development assistance to agriculture

The UK’s Department for International Development’s (DFID) agriculture spending as a share of its total development assistance (2.18%) is the lowest amongst the eight examined donors. The UK is expected to reach its aid target of 0.7% of gross national income this year, which could present an opportunity to close this gap and mobilise additional resources for the agriculture sector. With the exception of its response to the food price crisis of 2008, DFID does not have a central, overarching global food-security strategy. This remains the decentralised responsibility of country-level advisers. It is expected that DFID will meet or exceed its AFSI funding levels post-2012.

Support for national agriculture investment plans

During the period 2009-11, less than 11% of the UK’s aid to agriculture goes to low-income countries with investment plans for agriculture, indicating that such plans were not a priority for DFID. However, a positive step in this direction is that the UK recently made a contribution to the Global Agriculture and Food Security Fund, which finances gaps in national agriculture investment plans. The UK should continue in this direction. The primary determinants of project selection at DFID appear to be poverty-reduction impacts, the human rights environment, the country’s financial controls, and whether a programme is aligned with certain country-defined objectives, although such objectives may not stem from inclusively developed national agricultural investment plans. Unit operational plans must explain how they align with a given country’s national agriculture plan, but they are only monitored for self-determined objectives, which may or may not include alignment.
Non-state actor input into local and national policy
While DFID does not prioritise non-state consultations in its agriculture policy narrative, it is one of the largest funders of the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund. Some DFID programme guidance recommends increasing public action, but without much detail, follow-up or context within a monitored framework.

Non-state input into project design
The UK’s approach to food security places strong emphasis on the Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition, which promotes a genuine bottom-up approach based on field-level experiences and developments. However, headquarters could do more to support and encourage bilateral grant managers in the area of participatory programme design.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
• **Increase agriculture assistance:** The UK should significantly increase its assistance to agriculture.
• **Help fill CAADP funding shortfall:** The UK should help fill the funding gap in national agriculture investment plans. This could be done through additional contributions to GAFSP and the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund or by increasing bilateral agriculture support to countries with agriculture investment plans.
• **Take action to empower non-state actors to participate in the CAADP process:** The UK should increase its efforts to build the capacity of civil society and the private sector to engage with donors and governments around their interests.
• **Make mandatory the monitoring of alignment with national agricultural investment plans:** The UK should require that programme managers track their alignment and funding of projects listed in investment plans.
KEY AID STATS:

Share of bilateral ODA that goes to agriculture, forestry, fishing and agro-industries (2009-11): 5.54% (UP)

Pre-AFSI share of bilateral ODA that goes to agriculture, forestry, fishing and agro-industries (2006-08): 4.30%

Share of agriculture-related ODA to low-income countries with investment plans (2009-11): 30.01%

Contributions to the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund (as of May 2012): $8.6 MILLION

Development assistance to agriculture
In the wake of making its L’Aquila commitment, the US launched a global food security initiative called Feed the Future (FTF), which is focused on agricultural development, poverty reduction and child nutrition. The US does not count global food security funding outside of Feed the Future as part of its L’Aquila pledge, excluding most development food aid, and nutrition programming and assistance channelled through the Millennium Challenge Corporation. The US continues to lag in converting its commitments into disbursements, largely due to its budgetary system. The US AFSI pledge primarily consists of agriculture, agro-industries, forestry and fishing, and transport and storage.

Alignment with country priorities
The US approach has considered country ownership from the outset of Feed the Future. It includes building capacity for partner governments’ statistical and programme-monitoring activities. USAID missions participate in agriculture sector working groups and joint sector reviews, which are intended to bring donors, civil society, the private sector and the national government together to implement the agriculture investment plan.

Support for country agriculture investment plans
A programme’s alignment with national agriculture plans is not a criterion for a project’s funding; rather, such plans are considered a sign of a country’s “readiness” for US funding. However, Feed the Future conducts strategic reviews at the outset of its planning for focus countries. They include an assessment of the agriculture investment plans and many include funding recommendations based in part on the contents of those plans. Additionally, the US is a leading supporter of GAFSP, which directly supports country investment plans. The 2012 Feed the Future Scorecard includes government-wide alignment indicators, and tracks GAFSP pledges, support for national agriculture investment research priorities, and the number of countries that have conducted joint sector reviews. Further, the Office of Management and Budget has ordered FTF to track its performance against the Rome Principles, yet indicators do not directly measure the degree to which US projects align with agriculture investment plans.
Non-state actor input into local and national policy
The 2010 Feed the Future Guide states that “investing in... robust stakeholder consultation is a key component of our approach.” Since inception, Feed the Future has organised 12 non-state actor CAADP engagement workshops to facilitate networking and programme guidance. The programme has not provided follow-up support and guidance to help non-state actors implement their action plans. An update to the Feed the Future Guide will be published in 2013, and an early draft includes four pages on how USAID could encourage and better support multi-stakeholder consultations.

Non-state input into project design
At a global level, Feed the Future is measuring the number of its global learning events and the number of USAID missions that regularly hold consultative meetings with US NGOs. Feed the Future does not consistently or prominently guide or monitor to ensure that participatory project design methods, which would incorporate the views of beneficiaries and local civil society, are used by its implementers.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

• **Extend L’Aquila commitment and increase food security assistance:** The US should maintain or increase current levels of global food security funding, while carefully considering the sectoral balance of its investments.

• **Better tracking:** The US should directly track projects and funding that are aligned with national agricultural investment plans developed through the CAADP process.

• **Support local participation:** The US should develop a more strategic approach to supporting non-state input into the CAADP process.

• **Codify Feed the Future:** Feed the Future has dramatically overhauled how USAID supports global food security. Congressional authorisation and codification of the programme into law would help ensure its sustainability and political longevity.
A woman beekeeper at the Sene Mariam Women’s Beekeeping Group in Ethiopia, which provides training and job creation in beekeeping for disadvantaged women. This facility is operated within the Agricultural Cooperative Development International/Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance ACDI/VOCA and the Ethiopian government’s Agricultural Growth Programme (AGP), and is funded by the US government through Feed the Future.
Looking Forward
The promise of African agriculture is at an inflection point. Four years after G8 donors put food security on the agenda at the L’Aquila Summit, African agriculture will again be a G8 focus in 2013. Ten years after African leaders pledged to revitalize agriculture in Maputo, momentum is building to marshal continent-wide political will to revitalize the Maputo commitments in the run-up to the 2015 MDG deadline. Will African leaders and donors seize this opportunity to set African agriculture on the path to deliver its poverty-reducing potential in the decade ahead?

Progress over the past 10 years is undeniable. The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, born out of African leaders’ Maputo pledges a decade ago, has put in motion an African-led vision and process for achieving ambitious objectives. Twenty-four countries have signed, technically vetted, inclusively developed national agriculture plans (ONE examined 19 in this report), while another six countries have committed to start the process and develop them. At least four countries examined in this report have met or exceeded their Maputo government-spending commitments, and another eight are at least halfway there. Donors, for their part, have committed the entirety of their L’Aquila commitments to food security, although disbursements have lagged far behind.

Where political will, domestic investment, increased aid and effective plans have been combined, impressive results have been produced that have demonstrated the poverty-reducing potential of agriculture. As of today, at least eight of the 19 countries that are actively seeking financing for their technically vetted and endorsed investment plans are on track to meet their MDG goal of halving extreme poverty by 2015. Three more are somewhat on track. Agriculture growth rates in countries like Ghana, Ethiopia and Malawi have been rapid, and in some cases outpacing growth in other sectors. Thirteen countries analysed in this report have met the CAADP goal of achieving an average annual agriculture growth rate of 6% or more.

Notwithstanding this progress, the full poverty-reducing potential of African agriculture still has not been realised. As this report details, African leaders and donors alike have made significant progress on some commitments, but have fallen short on others – in both the quantity and quality of investments in agriculture.
African Governments: An Agenda for Reinvigorating Maputo

African Union President Yayi Boni has declared that 2014 will be the “Year of Agriculture” in Africa. This presents a once-in-a-decade opportunity for a renewal of African leadership, this time to truly transform African agriculture and seize its potential.

Renewal must begin with a serious recommitment to adequately resource national agriculture plans. With a few notable exceptions, African leaders are lagging in meeting their Maputo agriculture financing commitments. To fast track the implementation of these plans, all African leaders should allocate at least 10% of their national budgets in support of agriculture and rural development. Some nations will need more than 10% of the budget allocated to agriculture, depending on the size of that nation’s agricultural potential. For smallholder farmers to move from food insecurity to prosperity, African governments need to increase investments in agriculture - supporting infrastructure, provide incentive to develop inputs and output markets as well as actively promote agro-processing and manufacturing across the agriculture value chain. Only this combination of investments and policy interventions will ensure that smallholder farmers shift from survival to success.

African leaders should also redouble their efforts to engage their citizens in designing, delivering and realising their agriculture vision. To do so, all African governments should open all components of their agriculture spending to the public by posting easy-to-understand budgets online - enabling farmers, stakeholders and citizens at large to track the impact of the investments. Realisation of this vision requires a deepening of government commitment to engaging farmers, business, civil society and other non-state actors in the design, implementation and monitoring of agriculture plans. Greater clarity about what precisely counts as an investment in agriculture versus other development priorities should be attained, so that there is greater consistency across African countries’ accounting processes.

This report shows that transparency lacks in most cases, and that the experience of non-state actors in the CAADP process has been mixed, although in some cases, such as in Ghana and Benin, much improved. Through increased participation, governments can better serve their populations and make the sector more dynamic and sustainable.

2013 also gives African leaders an opportunity to take stock of the past decade of CAADP and identify key areas to strengthen the effectiveness and design of agriculture investment plans. They should establish specific building blocks in the design of investment plans to allocate clear implementation responsibilities and ensure effective programme delivery with measurable results. Two important areas that should be prioritised in the investment plans are a focus on women small-scale farmers and the enhancement of the nutrition sensitivity of agriculture. Despite the widespread consensus that women are crucial to unlocking African agriculture growth, the building blocks for this are not thought through, and few plans set clear targets and track their impact on women. Key to this is securing property rights for women. More secure property rights overall will also facilitate greater transparency over agricultural investments by domestic and international partners. Such investments are essential if Africa is to fulfil its agricultural potential.

A renewed commitment through Maputo can tighten up national processes to ensure all those living on the land are consulted and consent to the investment, so responsible investors are not deterred by lack of legal clarity over land ownership. To ensure that women farmers are empowered through agriculture investments, monitoring systems should disaggregate indicators by gender and make sure that gender-specific objectives are prioritised in the implementation of plans. National budgets should transparently show which investments and services are going towards supporting increased productivity of women.

Similarly, despite the fact that over 200 million Africans are undernourished, the analysis in this report highlights the missed opportunity to reverse this situation, including by adopting nutrition targets in most agriculture investment plans. Many plans fail to delineate specific nutrition-sensitive activities needed to reach any related outcome targets.

Agriculture must also be seen more strategically within the region’s economic integration, trade and transformation strategies. Regionalising and integrating infrastructure to facilitate trade, above all agricultural trade, will help develop markets. A system of commodity exchanges will also help farmers seek better market prices, as will improved seed distribution systems such as those developed by the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, and the development of local markets through innovations like the Purchase for Progress (P4P) initiative of the World Food Programme, with support from the Howard G. Buffett Foundation and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. These investments must be made within the overall agricultural transformation strategy.
Donors: An Agenda for Supporting African-led Agriculture

The G8 Summit in Lough Erne and the related food and nutrition event in London in June 2013 present historic opportunities for the international community to contribute to African nations’ goals of lifting millions from poverty and preventing chronic malnutrition. Leaders should deliver on past promises made at previous G8 summits and at the same time back African governments’ agriculture plans with the necessary resources. Doing so would deliver a shared development vision defined by accountability, transparency, economic empowerment and partnership between governments, citizens, civil society and the private sector.

The June meetings, held just months before the start of the African Union’s “Year of Agriculture,” provide an important platform for the international community to help African governments realise the promise of the AU’s CAADP programme. To support CAADP, G8 donors must meet their agriculture commitments made at Camp David (2012) and L’Aquila (2009), help to fill remaining funding gaps in national agricultural investment plans, build on progress with the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, and make their own bilateral commitments more transparent. The credibility of the G8 rests on being accountable for past promises like these.

At the 2009 summit in L’Aquila, Italy, the G8 pledged to invest $22 billion by the end of 2012 to support sustainable agriculture, food security and nutrition. In the future, L’Aquila must be a floor, not a ceiling, for investment in this area. At the summit this June, the G8 should agree that the L’Aquila commitments are a minimum baseline for future spending and ensure all new financial commitments are in addition to the 2009 promise.

Finally, G8 donors should support the efforts to enhance CAADP for the next 10 years of agriculture. Specifically, the G8 should endorse and provide support for the inclusion of a stronger focus on nutritional outcomes in national agriculture investment plans and through GAFSP. As the primary multilateral vehicle to fund CAADP plans, GAFSP has an important role to play in reaching the goals set out by African governments in their investment plans, including nutritional outcomes. This may require an enhanced linkage between plans’ agriculture programmes and their overarching nutritional outcomes. The G8 can also improve poverty reduction by expanding the New Alliance, thereby increasing the sustainability of agricultural sector growth. Looking forward, donors should strive to improve the quantity and quality of nutrition-sensitive agriculture investments, aiming to improve and measure impacts on micronutrient deficiencies, stunting, and other health indicators.
A turning point in 2013

There is little doubt that African agriculture can – and should – be thriving. The natural resource endowments, from soil to water and land, are there. In no fewer than 24 countries, the plans are in place. The objectives across the continent are ambitious. And the issue is high on both the African Union and donor agenda. Will 2013 be the year that the political will is secured to put African agriculture firmly on the path to prosperity? This report shows how this is possible, and that it is possible, if African leaders and donors seize the opportunity.
INTRODUCTION
4. Ethiopia, Malawi, and Cape Verde
6. Africa’s agricultural development is both a vision and a policy framework for Africa. NEPAD is spearheaded by African leaders to address critical challenges facing the continent: poverty, development and insecurity. NEPAD provides the required trajectory.
7. The “rural sector” goes beyond agriculture and includes the Ministries of Agriculture, Animal Resources and the Environment/Sustainable Development.
8. NEPAD provides the required trajectory.
9. The World Bank and CAADP recommend using the UN Classification of Functions of Government (COFOG) definition of agriculture, which includes crops, livestock, fishing, forestry, water-for-production, and issues related to agricultural land.
10. Many countries had insufficient transparency for their agriculture expenditures, known as actual budget execution, on their websites. When possible, ONE used actual budget execution figures. Many countries had insufficient transparency for their agriculture expenditures, known as actual budget execution, on their websites. When possible, ONE used actual budget execution figures.
11. For many developing countries, a score of 0.5 is assigned to those countries that achieve at least 50% of MDG targets set unrealistic expectations for many developing countries, a score of 0.5 is assigned to those countries that achieve at least 50% of the required trajectory.
12. The index score is calculated by aggregating country performance across the MDG poverty target. If a country’s rate of improvement is above the required trajectory, then it receives a score of 1. To address the criticism that the MDG targets set unrealistic expectations for many developing countries, a score of 0.5 is assigned to those countries that achieve at least 50% of the required trajectory.
14. The index score is calculated by aggregating country performance across the MDG poverty target. If a country’s rate of improvement is above the required trajectory, then it receives a score of 1. To address the criticism that the MDG targets set unrealistic expectations for many developing countries, a score of 0.5 is assigned to those countries that achieve at least 50% of the required trajectory.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2. Actual quantitative data on funding aligned with countries’ agricultural investment plans has been difficult to obtain.
5. Most investment plans were written with the explicit, overarching goal of reaching MDG 1a, even in cases when this was not feasible.
6. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, a strategic framework developed by the African Union (AU) for pan-African socio-economic development, is both a vision and a policy framework for Africa. NEPAD is spearheaded by African leaders to address critical challenges facing the continent: poverty, development and insecurity. NEPAD provides opportunities for African countries to take control of their development agenda, to work more closely together, and to co-operate effectively with international partners.
7. Countries that have signed CAADP compacts as of November 2012 include Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Seychelles, Uganda, Zambia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Togo, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mauritania.
8. The index score is calculated by aggregating country performance across the MDG poverty target. If a country’s rate of improvement is above the required trajectory, then it receives a score of 1. To address the criticism that the MDG targets set unrealistic expectations for many developing countries, a score of 0.5 is assigned to those countries that achieve at least 50% of the required trajectory.
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on its budget and expenditures twice per year to Parliament, and more often if it is requested by MPs.

The version referenced is the 15 December 2010 “Version provisoire de la synthèse du document national”


Total for the budget excluding donor resources was GHC 7.44 billion (the sum of Central GoGL IFG and other fund expenditures).


668.6B/$250 million, or 5.0% of the budget. ONE calculated the share of government budget allocated to agriculture excluding donor projects based on a spreadsheet provided by the Ministry of Agriculture.

AFRICAN CASE STUDIES

BENIN
1. World Bank, World Development Indicators
2. World Bank, World Development Indicators
3. World Bank, World Development Indicators
5. OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System; combines total bilateral ODA from all donors in the categories 'Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Total' and 'Agronomy, gross disbursements, all types, all channels, current prices'
6. Individual companies, including interviewees Tunde S.A. and CSFT-YAVEDEJ-BENIN, are not represented in the consultations just as individual smallholder farmers are not represented.
7. "Non-state actors" refers to the initial group who opposed the Ministry's original investment plan and includes small producer organisations, Synergie Paysanne (Benin's main farmers' union), and other civil society organisations.

GHANA
2. World Bank, World Development Indicators
5. OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System; combines total bilateral ODA from all donors in the categories 'Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Total' and 'Agronomy, gross disbursements, all types, all channels, current prices'
6. The only interviewee that identified itself as involved with FASDP was the Hunger Alliance; Foodspan, another network of advocates, was also involved.
7. "Non-state actors" refers to the initial group who opposed the Ministry's original investment plan and includes small producer organisations, Synergie Paysanne (Benin's main farmers' union), and other civil society organisations.

KENYA
2. World Bank, World Development Indicators
5. OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System; combines total bilateral ODA from all donors in the categories 'Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Total' and 'Agronomy, gross disbursements, all types, all channels, current prices'
6. KENFAP is a member of the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), but its views are diluted by the many other groups who are members.

TANZANIA
2. World Bank, World Development Indicators
5. OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System; combines total bilateral ODA from all donors in the categories 'Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Total' and 'Agronomy, gross disbursements, all types, all channels, current prices'
6. Nuisance taxes refer to levies that the government (either at the national or local level) applies to private sector operations, which the private sector considers unnecessary as they add to their cost of doing business without raising commensurate revenues for the government. An example is CESS tax, which is a big disincentive to farmers, especially smallholder farmers.
7. "Non-state actors" refers to the initial group who opposed the Ministry's original investment plan and includes small producer organisations, Synergie Paysanne (Benin's main farmers' union), and other civil society organisations.

DONOR PROGRESS

Endorsers of the L’Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security include the G8, Algeria, Angola, Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Libya (Presidency of the African Union), Mexico, The Netherlands, Nigeria, People's Republic of China, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Spain, South Africa, Turkey, Commission of the African Union, FAO, IEA, IFAD, ILO, IMF, OECD, The Secretary General's UN High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, WFP, The World Bank, WTO, who attended the food security session at the G8 Summit in L’Aquila on 10 July 2009 and by the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), Boverisvity/Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, Global Forum on Agricultural Research (GFAR).

Statistics specific to the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI) pledge are not currently available through the OECD's DAC database on aid flows. However, several L’Aquila donors are working to develop a way to track L’Aquila-related funding through the database.

These include: Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cape Verde, D.R. Congo, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda.

Actual quantitative data on funding aligned with countries' agricultural investment plans has been difficult to obtain.

To calculate agriculture spending, we looked at the Creditor Reporting System of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, and aggregated the level of funding coded in agriculture and agriculture-related industries such as forestry, fishing and agro-industries. Our methodology does not include other sub-sectors of the AFSI pledge that might be considered food security broadly but that are not directly agriculture as we define it, including rural development, food aid and food security programmes, renewable natural resources research, and agricultural and fishery research. Because of the way donor funding is classified in this system, it is possible that these particular funding codes are an imperfect measurement of donors' precise contribution to agriculture.

This figure does not take into account multilateral commitments.


There are 30 low-income countries with country-owned, reviewed, costed agriculture investment plans: Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cape Verde, D.R. Congo, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda.

Low-income countries with plans are those low-income countries that have vetted plans for their national agriculture sector.

The EU does report disbursements to the DAC in accordance with required DAC reporting, as do all other donors featured in this report. However, DAC disbursement data lags by up to two years.

Low-income countries with plans are those low-income countries that have vetted plans for their national agriculture sector.

The table is not available online, but upon request. The AFD has a specific process and email address in place for such information requests.

Low-income countries with plans are those low-income countries that have vetted plans for their national agriculture sector.

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Total funding increased during the period from 2009 to 2011, but not as much as funding in other sectors.

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Allocations represent Congressional budget approval in one year, which agencies then have two years to obligate. These obligations are then followed by a longer disbursement period that depends on the specific contract or grant.

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