SECRET BALLOT
By: Netsanet Tessema
Thanks to the Ethiopian Television! We
witness it, we trust it, and we support it.
Unless we are woolgathering or intended to rebuff, the Ethiopian
election on May 23, 2010 manifested us that filling in the ballot and putting it in the
ballot box was a confidential act, and under no circumstance, not even with the
connivance of the voter, should it be possible to deduce for whom or for what the
voter cast or did not cast votes.
The voters exercised the freedom to express her/his will without the
risk of repercussion. To guarantee this, nobody should be able to discover for
whom or what she/he voted or did not vote. We also observed the procedure to
prevent so-called improper influence" of voters, which includes the buying
and selling of votes. Consequently it should not be possible, even with the cooperation
or connivance of the voter, to deduce the vote. For this reason, it is of the utmost importance
that, during the marking and casting of the ballot, no proof or receipt is
created which could be linked to a vote inside the ballot box, since this would
permit coercion and the buying and selling of votes.
In order to guarantee the secrecy of the ballot, in all voting centers there
exists a private space, the voting booth, where the voter can tally the ballot.
This requirement could be reformulated by stating that the only information
that may leave the voting booth is the vote as tallied in on the ballot, but
nothing else. The
voter can verify her/his vote, that she/he created a valid vote, and can revise
her/his vote before committing.
After having created her/his vote but before actually casting
(relinquishing) it, the voter should have the right to
check her/his vote is recorded as intended and that it is valid. She/he should
have the opportunity to correct or revise her/his ballot. (Ballot will be tallied) The voter can convince
herself that her/his vote is included in the set of votes tallied.
In every country and election, there is a tension between the requirement
of verifiability (and audit ability) on the one hand, and the secrecy of the
ballot on the other, which makes the design of election systems satisfying both
requirements without using ballots or other physical objects extremely tricky.
Implicit in each election is a sub-procedure that shuffles votes, to protect
the anonymity of the voter, but destroys the link between the ballot and the
person. This procedure, trivial when dealing with physical objects such as
ballots or playing cards, is difficult to simulate in the virtual world. The
problem is made more difficult by the verifiability requirement: it should be
possible to ensure that the virtual shuffle did not add, subtract or replace any
of the shuffled items.
In Ethiopia, we observed a solution to the verifiability problem, while
not requiring the voter to trust any other entity. In particular, it provides a
solution that addresses the two contradictory requirements of ballot secrecy
and ballot verifiability. The live broadcast showed us that it was not possible for
anyone to modify a ballot, or remove it from the ballot box, nor should it be
possible to add ballots not coming from legitimate voters. The votes represent the
(anonymous) will of the voters (at least at the moment of casting), and any modification would
alter that will. We saw how they check the ballot box is to be empty before
starting the election, and the ballot box remained in a publicly visible place.
It is undeniable that all votes remain secret until the end of the
voting session.
First, revealing partial results early would violate the secrecy of the ballot
for those who voted already. Second, knowing the partial result might influence
the vote of someone who votes later. Moreover, exclusive access to this
information during the voting period could provide advantage in terms of
allocation of electioneering resources or even trigger disruption of the voting
process.
The tallying of votes happens in a public and verifiable way. For higher credibility of
the result, party representatives and neutral observers were present and able to verify the
process. All
valid ballots encountered in the ballot box, and only those, were included in
the count.
It is undeniable that last Sunday, May 23, 2010, in the process of
Ethiopian election, we clearly observed:
1. Only persons on the valid
voter list, called voters, can create a ballot and deposit it in the ballot
box.
2.
A voter can cast at most one vote.
3.
Filling in the ballot and putting it in the ballot box was a
confidential act, and under no circumstance, not even with the connivance of
the voter, should an outsider be able to deduce for whom or for what the voter
casted her/his vote.
4.
The voter can verify that she/he created a valid vote, can revise her/his
vote before casting it, and can convince herself/himself that her/his vote is included in the set of
votes tallied.
5.
During the voting session it was not possible neither to see the vote
on any ballot deposited in the ballot box, modify a
ballot, remove a ballot from the ballot box, nor add ballots not coming from
voters.
6. All valid votes
encountered in the ballot box, and only those, were included in the count.
Congratulation all winners!