Problems
of Institutional Instability and Green Revolution Bureaucracy in Ethiopia
Allow me to take the
liberty to respond to the concerns of two authors, Berhanu Tesfaye and Wonemhunegn
Ezezew, who underlined the importance of institutional stability/change when
considering green revolution and industrial decentralization in Ethiopia. In my
previous postings I mentioned the need for institutional reforms passing. To bring
the on-going discussion to another level I find it necessary to suggest ways of
accommodating their concerns.
For the sake of avoiding unnecessary misunderstanding, I would like to
summarize Berhanu Tesfaye discussion in terms of the concept of policy implementation
style. This concept combines several characteristic of a policy making: policy
goals, policy content, policy tools, justification for choosing and combination
of tools and techniques, and modes of operation during the implementation
phase.
Through illustrative examples Berehanu tried to point out that the Derg
regime and EPDRF have similar policy implementation style, even if they differ
in choice and combination of their policy instruments (the Derg being socialist
while EPDRF being neo-liberal). Berehanu sees policy implementation styles as
core problems of the governments in Ethiopia. According to him this problem
should first be addressed in order to avail green revolution and industrial
decentralization.
From a rather political approach, Wondemhunegn Ezezew in his article titled “Green Revolution: A
Multipronged Approach”, pointed out the
institutional impediments in realizing green revolution. “Without both internal
and external peace Ethiopia will never be able to solve its chronic food
insecurity problem, let alone join the club of middle income countries in the
coming two decades. Either we democratize, improve our governance institutions,
make peace with our people and our neighbors, or keep this country in eternal
poverty and political instability.”
Brehanu from the economic aspect and Wondemhunegn from the political raised such issues which I
understand as features of institutional instability in Ethiopia. To understand the
types of institutional instability that relate to the design and implementation
of green revolution and industrial decentralization programs, it is important I
briefly discuss what I think as sources of institutional instability in
Ethiopia.
Indeed we have seen
various forms of institutional instability in Ethiopia ever since the first attempt for structural transformation
of the economy as planned in the first ten-year industrial development program
of 1945. Since then an elaborated sectoral programs were worked out to bring
about a structural transform of the economy and the country has since then experienced
institutional changes at different levels and degree (For an overall discussion
see Tsegaye 2007).
In Ethiopia one observes an obsession with
radical and battle speed development since the 1974 revolution. To bring about
a speedy end of poverty the Derg nationalized all lands and industries; formed
co-operatives, carried out villagization, etc. During EPRDF there was a
sweeping decentralization reforms and liberalization of the economy, among
other things. Revolution and decentralization, though they constitute a
sweeping, fundamental change in the political organization and economic
property control, they have not yet precipitated a synchronous transformation
of the socioeconomic system. It may be so that not all radical situations end
in structural transformation.
Whatever that might be, since 1945, however,
we observe growth of public bureaucracy. As I see it the
Ethiopian bureaucracy did not grow as the society become richer and more
complex needing for formalization and rationalization of all institutions. The
public bureaucracy grew due to some formalization and by transforming the
household, community and market functions to public utilities. In Ethiopia mostly
the public bureaucracy grew as a result of controlling the civil society and
the market. Regulation of the economy has become one of the major functions of
the Ethiopian state.
As a result of non-participatory and top-down
development that we have seen since 1945 we see parallels in boiling up of
internal opposition. Most often development strategies and programs are
designed by the Ethiopian state without the participation of the beneficiaries.
Planning procedures are not based on the understanding of the critical
ingredients of participation; namely participation in decision making,
participation in implementation, participation in benefit sharing and
participation in evaluation. During the time of Derg, the power elite suffer
from top-down ism characterized by vertical political structure, centralized
and monopolized policymaking, the absence of institutionalised checks and
balances, and a uni-directional flow of power and influence that discourages
bottom-up policy feedback.
The development programs of the various
regimes in Ethiopia differ in their objectives, choices of strategies and mode
of state intervention some being market friendly and some not. At risk of
generalization, I may say that obsession with radical and battle speed
development, growth of public bureaucracy and top-down development are
essential characteristics common to all regimes in Ethiopia since 1945. Indeed
the organizational set up of EPRDF is radically different from the previous
governments by its principles and practice of decentralization. Yet the federal
government has the fiscal string and due to lack of own regional analysis,
local governments adopt the five year development program of the EPDRF party.
My purpose here is not to do historical and
comparative analysis among the various regimes in Ethiopia. Rather, by way of
refreshing your memory, I wanted to give you the institutional context and
background to green revolution and industrial decentralization in Ethiopia.
Given the swift practice and unstable institutional change traditions in
Ethiopia how can we design successful institutional models of green revolution
and industrial decentralization? I want to approach this problem by looking at sources of institutional
instability in Ethiopia. Without going into details, I can mention three major
sources of institutional instability that may contribute to bad performance of
green revolution and industrial decentralization.
The first factor is related to instabilities that can come as a result
of a policy or limit of the reform. I call this policy factor instability and
from the management point of view such instabilities are under direct
government control, i.e., they can be managed. A policy factor becomes an inherent part of
the causal mechanism when top management of development helped set the stage
for failure by ignoring the lessons from past performance assessments and
evaluations. Policy-factor
instabilities results mainly from the formal distribution and co-ordination of functions and
resources. How to use the available resources in a legitimate way is the main
source of conflict and this is manageable if there is a complete understanding of
the needs and objectives of green revolution and industrial decentralization in
Ethiopia.
The second one is non-policy factors related to the collective behavior
of the majority of Ethiopian political elite (obsession with ideology, local identity, suspicion on claims and
zero-sum cognition). The third source
of instability is external enemies of the country (natural catastrophe, international
commodity prices) and wars caused by geo-political factors such as the Red Sea
coast, the Nile water and religion. The geo-political situation of the country
has caused external aggression and threat since the second half of the
nineteenth century. So long us the given geo-political situation exists, it is
unavoidable to be preoccupied in building the fiscal and military base of the
state and this will reinforce state functionality. From the management point of
view, external enemies are beyond central government control.
To embark on the program of green revolution
and industrial decentralization, it is sufficient to find solution to the
policy factor alone. There is no need to wait until such time that one finds
solution to the second and third sources of institutional instability in
Ethiopia. The
non-policy factors are beyond the control of the government.
Changing the collective behaviour of the
majority of the political elite in Ethiopia takes time. It is related to the
growth of critical thinking in our society. Education has to expand at the expense of
ideology. Ideology is a belief that one’s viewpoint on
an issue is always right while others seems simply to be wrong. It rejects
innovation, is intolerant to other views and promulgated in an affective way.
In the Ethiopian society there is too much use of ideology because of lack of
expansion of education and knowledge development. I am hoping that the current
expansion of education in the country serve as a basis for the growth of critical
thinking in the country.
The use of too much ideology (partly
mentioned by Brehanu) instead of scientific management is mainly related to the
expansion of education and it is something whose effects will be minimized as
critical thinking grows in Ethiopia. Local identity and zero-sum culture, which
are rooted in the land tenure system of Ethiopia (see Hoben 1973) will
disappear if urbanization expands rapidly at its current rate (4,7%).
My point is that green revolution and
industrial decentralization should be conducted within the limits of the
collective behaviour of the Ethiopian political elites and geo-political
situation of the country. To ensure its’ implementation and performance we must
focus mainly on what I called policy related factors of institutional
instability. To all intents and purposes, the policy factor should not be
generalized. When we discuss the model we should also be specific in
identifying the appropriate organizational structure and management functions
(see my example below). We should also consider the second and third factors of
institutional instability since they constitute the context in which green revolution and
industrial decentralization are expected to perform.
In our discussion there seem to be consensus
that green revolution in Ethiopia should be location specific and selective. If
we agree on this the next step is to identify the type of organization
structural necessary to carry out green revolution. Considering the factor of
human capability in the country (management skills are scarce in Ethiopia), I
am in favour of a bureaucratic structure which co-opts farmers’
representatives. The term bureaucracy should not be understood in its negative
connotation. I am using it in the sense of providing the needed expertise, skills
and organizational capacities and clear-cut lines of authorities to manage
green revolution technologies.
At the national level, green revolution can
fall within the responsibility of three ministries: Ministry of Irrigation
responsible for the provision of and maintenance of dams and major canals, Ministry
of Agriculture and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. At the project
level, namely, at the identified location of green revolution, there should be
a single body of management (corporation) responsible for the co-ordination of
various department activities. The corporation consists an irrigation
department responsible for arranging the delivery of water and making it
available up to the minor canals used by farmers. A mechanical and electrical
department responsible for ensuring the mechanical and electrical equipment,
plants and vehicles. An earthmoving department responsible for undertaking the
clearance of sediments from canals. An agricultural research department and
farmers’ organization which participates in the decision making process. In
other words, there should be an organizational structure to provide and
facilitate specialization in work tasks. It is beyond the scope of this article
to discuss the specific functions and relationships within such system of
organization. What I want to show is that it is possible to initiate green
revolution if we agree on its objectives and system of organizational structure
and requirements. I know that the collective behaviour of the Ethiopian political
elite crops up in the management functions and organizational structure
affecting performance. But if one has the appropriate green revolution and
industrial decentralization system in place it may not be difficult to water
down its role. The collective behaviour of the majority of the political elite cannot
withstand for long challenges of a systematic development speed.
Hoben, A. (1973). Land Tenure
among the Amhara of Ethiopia. Chicago.
Tsegaye Tegenu (2007), “Breaking
the Path Dependent Development in Ethiopia: An Overview of Historical Origin,
Features, Mechanisms, Incentive Structures, Lock-in Factors and Agents of
Change” paper presented at Tsehai Conference July 2007, Dallas, USA.