How should the war terminate from the perspective of Tigray?

 

Part Two

Kidane Abraham 08-14-21

 

 

The 'right moment,' 'right substance' and the 'right process' for sustainable peace

Excellent contents for peace agreement could be in the air floating without concrete results because the conditions are not ripe. Compelling circumstances could be lost or elongated because of formulating the proper substances for negotiation. A flawed process could be a hindrance for peace agreements to materialize. The objective and subjective conditions for ripeness (context), the possible substances for negotiation (content), and the process gaged in the current war for positive-sum solutions.

2.1 Ripe moments' mutually hurting stalemate' (MHS)

"Stalemate is the most propitious condition for settlement" Henry Kissinger

In war, the defeated and the winner are in immense pain because of vast human and material costs. Ripeness is a condition where all/most essential participants are in a 'mutually hurting stalemate. Circumstances develop for "all sides realize that they cannot escalate to victory and the current deadlock is painful." [1]

During a war, though, the main objective pains stem from a military stalemate; all aspects of that phenomenon, i.e., the political, economic, external dynamism etc., hurting conditions, are not to be underestimated. These objective indicators are first examined to be followed by subjective factors of MHS.

2.1.1 The Military stalemate:

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There is one thing stronger than all the world, and that is an idea whose time has come. Victor Hugo

Military balance is about the immediate relative strength of the leading opponents and the potential to maintain it.     Tigray Defense Force (TDF) of the Government of the regional state of Tigray have rooted out the ENDF and forced the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF) to withdraw from most parts of Tigray. Except, the Tsegede-Wolkayet region of western Tigray, all places occupied by ENDF and Amhara forces have been liberated. TDF is marching towards the Djibouti-Addis Abeba Highway in the East and to the South and Southwest, probably to the Amhara capital, and maybe Addis Abeba, who knows.

Instead of war between two conventional forces, both the federal and regional governments of Amhara called for 19^th like war and demanded militias to the war front with arms and logistics. Later, they called for regional special forces. These forces do not know the area of combat, local languages, and what the war is about. They might have a contradictory perception of the country's fundamental problems. For example, the special forces of Oromia were trained that all problems of Ethiopia emanate from the Amhara to reverse the constitutional system and the main enemies are the Amhara. The massive peaceful demonstrations in the Amhara region were against "Oromuma," which meant superiority of the Oromo in the Ethiopian state. How the command structure is being organized is all so intriguing.

Out of desperation and weakness, the Federal Government and their henchmen try to externalize their causes of defeat. Their hallucinations said that the "terrorist Junta" are feeding drugs called 'Hashish" for its members to fight. Based on the Prime Minister and other officials' testimony, almost all Tigrayans fight the ENDF. Imagine how hysterical it is to testify in front of camera millions being drugged.  So "Hashish' defeated ENDF, EDF, and the Amhara forces. The foreign ministry also accused the humanitarian agencies working in famine-hit Tigray of arming TDF without any evidence and threatened to halt some groups' operations.

      Low-level wars in other parts of the country are not to be underestimated. Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) is steadily building itself and is expanding to other areas outside Western Oromia.  The Oromo youth who think the ruling elites have betrayed them are rolling to join the OLA. The not ending clashes in the Benshangul region and other armed conflicts are intermittently repressed but may explode at any time. What happening in the war in Tigray would directly affect the conditions in these areas and vice-versa?

According to senior commanders of the Tigray Defense Forces, about 40 out of 44 Eritrean divisions were bogged down in Tigray. Whatever a division may mean in that country's standard. They also claim that Eritrean commanders employ the ENDF as 'fodder cannon' before engaging their forces in the first months of the war. However, these forces were fully involved in the last three months against the TDF before they withdrew. How much they have maintained or lost is unknown. Moreover, their early withdrawal from most of Tigray is mysterious. Is it because of military strategy calculations, pressures from TDF on the ground, or the West's demands is to be seen? 

The Federal and Amhara governments led by Bilizigna seem to produce their destruction. With no vision and security policy accompanied by lies, dependence on massive force with low quality, reliance on foreign powers and technologies might have brought temporary victory but are not sustainable. Above all, alienating all nations of the Federation with one or other actions, especially Tigray's people, maybe driving them to their grave.  There are credible reports that the Oromo and Amhara officers of ENDF are deeply divided, as are the O-PP and A-PP with no unity of grand purpose. New soldiers meant to replace the massive loss are being recruited by deception and force.  Though of low morale, ENDF may be superior in logistics and technologically based intelligence.  The 19^th century-like campaign is not expected to bring change in the military balance.

On the other hand, the Tigray forces seem to adopt the 'Clausewitzian trinity paradigm.' The synergy of the people, command of the army, and government. Massive march to join the insurgency, incredible resistance of people in the occupied cities, towns, and rural areas, unprecedented diaspora participation witnesses the full involvement of Tigray peoples as a unit for a just cause. Africa's most experienced strategic and operational command could alter the strategic miscalculation and start from "Rock bottom"[2] to reach the mountain top, as observed in the past months, especially after the third week of June 2021. A regional government unflinching and entrenched in the center of the fire, mobilizing its people. A people's war with a clear purpose, clear strategies, and organization are destined to prevail. TDF is becoming the most reliable force in the Horn of Africa to be considered trustworthy for the international community to deal with.

 Are there enough organized forces to stop TDF's trooping to Addis Abeba and the Amhara cities?  Is it advisable for the TDF alone to control Addis Abeba, even if it has the capacity from an operational perspective? With a hostile and, at best neutral environment in the Amhara region and Addis Abeba, can it form a transitional government by dislodging the federal or Amhara regional governments and force them to surrender? What is the role of the Eritrean forces who might have been weakened but who are supposed to be still intact? Militarily, is it time for or against the TDF if the war drags on? The military situations may stimulus the two belligerents. However defiant they may be, they have pains they have to endure, which can create a 'mutually hurting stalemate and influence them to negotiate. 

2.1.2 The political landscape is radically changing

Ethiopian state pillars are crumbling. The national armed forces are in disarray. The regional forces may be relatively intact and are metamorphosing to war-lord-like civil war. The security forces have been depleted, and the civil service is going from bad to evil entities. Diplomatically. Ethiopia is being defeated in all aspects and has abdicated its leadership of the Horn. State collapse appears in the making.

The office of the Prime Minister is perceived as a mass media pundit.  The Interview conducted On June 21, on Election Day with all other appearances, reveals the personality of the person of the PM

BBC Journalist: Why haven't Eritrean troops left? Who is in charge? Is it you or President Isaias?

Prime Minister Abiy: How can you ask me about other countries? I am responsible for Ethiopia; I cannot be responsible for other

BBC Journalist: Why haven't the troops left?

Prime Minister Abiy: Eritrean and Sudanese are there, but we are working with both to finalize our issue peacefully. We are not pushing them out, but we are making it peacefully. I am sure it will happen.

The Prime Minister of Ethiopia is not ready to negotiate with the peoples of Tigray and its Legitimate representative, the Government of Tigray but with countries who invaded the country. The Eritrean military dreadful atrocities in Tigray are issues of another country?  In line with his earlier statements and concentrated actions, the head of the Government is still leading the genocidal war with no repent.

A country invaded by two neighbors, a full-scale war in Tigray, beyond reach in some parts of Oromia, devastating conflict in Benshangul region, etc., has conducted regular elections. Some regional vote is postponed. Internally, the vote's credibility is already in dispute, with most key opponents and thousands of supporters imprisoned, killed, and decapacitated, especially in Oromia. The election was meant to earn international legitimacy; however, it appears to be the contrary. At least, Western powers are demanding some kind of national dialogue to solve the political impasse. Despite the morass, Bilzigna might have won the June 21 election. But, will this endeavor help bring peace and harmony or exacerbate the current divisions beyond control? 

Tegaru are continuously pushed out. Many think they are no more part of the country called Ethiopia, physically, psychologically, and institutionally.  The reality is Tegaru were snatched off their self-rule and are not part of shared rule. The elected Government was strapped out to be institute by force.  Many Tegaru perceive Ethiopia as an invading enemy country. Many think that a Tigraway, who also claims that he is an Ethiopian, is a traitor.

 

Before the military clashes started, many parts of the country were in deep conflicts. Moreover, the war in Tigray has accelerated these conflicts.  The doctrine of anger and fear combined with the 'divided and rule' strategy is continuously employed by the ruling party (Bilzigna) and its collaborators to squash the people's quest for self-determination.

 The political landscape is increasingly polarized intentionally.  Culturally diverse societies are more deeply divided in these three years than in the past 50 years. This strategy is continuously being used against the peoples of Ethiopia in general and the two largest nations, the Oromo and Amhara in particular, to disagree and fight with one another so that they will not join together against the abuses of the ruling elites. Some Oromo elites might have abandoned the quest for independence to give unity a chance based on the multi-national federal system. There are indications that what has hibernated is reviving.

The ultra-Ethiopian nationalist ornament is fading from elites, and Amhara nationalism is developing at an unprecedented pace. Starting from denial of the existence of the Amhara nation, though, one can take it as a positive step from a long-term perspective. However, it is led by amorphous rightists and dangerous in the short term. The attempt to change regional boundaries by force and illegal means is a dangerous precedent that may lead to uncontrolled violence and expedite the threatening state collapse if it regenerates in Oromia, Amhara, Afar, Somalia, and the South. These conditions may increase the authorities for dialogue and peaceful settlements with Tigray and other political entities.

2.1.3 The economic Pains:

           War is a costly endeavor; it drains state finances—the expenditure upsurges when you pay hundreds of millions to a mercenary Eritrean army.  The nine-month plus war has shuttered many firms operating in Tigray. The economy is reported to grow just 2 percent this year after consistently topping 10 percent before the pandemic. Man-made famine in Tigray, drought, and conflicts in other parts of Ethiopia has made about 25 million people need humanitarian assistance. Unemployment is very high and daunting.  Because of crippling foreign exchange crunch, unabated inflation that consistently exceeds 20 percent, the problems in productivity and inefficient trade system prices of vital necessities are skyrocketing and making living unbearable. 

           In addition to the wide-ranging sanctions on Ethiopia, Biden's administration advised the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other multilateral lenders to pause their engagement with the country. At the same time, it is in heavy debt.

These conditions may force the federal authorities to stop the expensive war and to negotiate. The devastation of the economic, financial, transportation, communication, etc. infrastructure of Tigray and the need for fast recovery coupled with the urgent humanitarian assistance might intensity the impulse for the Regional Government of Tigray (RGT) to negotiate despite the military victories, a condition for 'mutually hurting stalemate.'

2.1.4 The external dynamism:

 The recent Afar and Somali conflicts in Djibouti that over flawed from the armed conflicts in Ethiopia between the two national groups are alarming.  The Afars and Somalis live in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Kenya. Ethiopia being at the center, in its weakest position, and abdicating its leadership in the Horn of Africa may trigger the re-alignment of national groups in the region.

 The conflicts in Ethiopia are encouraging neighboring countries to meddle in the internal affairs of the country. Eritrea is becoming the kingmaker where the A-PP and the prime minister are bowing to, separately, for their existence. Sudan has invaded a significant crunch of disputed territories that may escalate to full-scale war.  Kenya is trying to substitute the diplomatic place of Ethiopia. Egypt has made security agreements with most countries of the Horn. Ethiopia and the lower riparian countries (Sudan and Egypt) are at a deadlock over Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The Arab League has decided that the GERD issue is a matter of national security for Arab states.

        The conflict-prone Horn is in bad shape. The long arm of authoritarian governments in the region and beyond, i.e., UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and their broker Eritrea is reaching any corner of the region. Reconfiguration of the relations within and to the Horn of Africa is in the making. China, the U.S., and European powers' conflicting strategic economic, political, and military interests make the new alignment challenging to predict. Ethiopia's fate is to receive whatever others make with internal divisions at the highest pick and without a clear foreign and security policy, weak institutions, and lack of leadership.

         As is with almost everything (except recreational parks whose budgets are uncontrolled), the diplomatic engagements are blindly led, without steady guidance, inconsistency, and full of lies. The Ethiopian Government is alienating allies and frightening off investors.  It is natural for the Federal Government to lose the diplomatic front because of genocidal warfare in Tigray and atrocities in many corners.  However, the diplomatic effect might have been minimized had there been better leadership. It is to be remembered how the Government messed up the Renaissance Dam-related negotiations when it invited the Americans and the World Bank to be involved, the Ethio-Eritrean peace agreement, and its abdication of the leadership of IGAD among many.

The U.S., European Union, NATO, G7 (Japan in mind), U.K., etc., have condemned the horrors in Tigray and called for unfettered humanitarian assistance, withdrawal of Eritrean forces, ceasefire, and accountability of crimes of all sorts with different warnings.  The Ethiopian Government's 'bravado' and immature reactions have steadily soured the relationships. Bilzigna denies almost all reports of the atrocities (to admit some of them later) and try to accuse the Western world with fake news and smear campaign against the integrity of Ethiopia.

As contradicting and backward as their political ideology is, Bilzigna leaders are hiding in 17^th century 'Westphalia sovereignty' and 19th-century nationalism, disregarding the ideas of internationalism and Globalization. Human rights recognitions and accords have been in ascendance after the Second World War. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda was pivotal for U.N. members to unanimously adopt a declaration for human beings to be protected where ever they are. The principle embraced was Responsibility to Protect (R2P). States are primarily responsible for protecting their citizens and anybody in their country, which should help each other fulfill that responsibility. This principle renders the international community to respond by all means, including through coercive actions if all attempts by peaceful means fail. The African Union has adopted this principle as 'From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference.' There is no right for the Ethiopian Government to conduct a genocidal war, and the international community has the duty to protect.

However, the West is very clear about the unity and territorial integrity of Ethiopia. Because the disintegration of the country could have a disastrous effect on the explosive Horn of Africa, which might have an extended impact on the Red Sea. Mass displacement and refugee crises might have far-reaching implications and also become fertile ground for extremist groups. RGT, whatever its intention regarding the Ethiopian state may be, needs to keep the momentum of diplomatic success and align its political movement with the West's interests (unity and territorial integrity of Ethiopia) for the demand of substantial humanitarian and recovery programs and recognition. This may induce it to sit and negotiate with the Federal Government as far it exists. Thus, the persistence of war-making is painful because of internal dynamics and international to all sides. Thus, the state for "mutually hurting stalemate" may be realized.

To sum up:  Tigray is depleting but at the time victories. The anti-Tigray coalition does not have the military capacity to stop the TDF. The land mines in the political landscape, the impending economic catastrophe, the international dynamics regarding the region are creating an 'objective' reality for ripeness.

2.1.5 The Subjective Factors: Perceptions

The perception of the maturity of the objective reality is arduous to measure because of subjectivity and the capacity of the leaders. This is complicated by the number of parties involved and their style of leadership, i.e., the existence or non existence of clear vision, strategies and tactics, and personalities who can negotiate and compromise where necessary.

 It is assumed that the greater the objective evidence is, the grander the possibility of the appropriate subjective perception of deadlock and its consequential pain is. The pains could be soundly felt, but the perception of a 'mutually enticing opportunity,' i.e., motivation for their future political place, is another quantity to be observed. They call it a 'perception of a way out’.

Despite fundamental problems that forced the Tigray resistance to launch from "rock bottom," relatively, the Central Command under the Tigray regional government has a clear vision and strategies regarding the war's aim and destination as exhibited by the conditions for negotiations and ending the war. The tradition of collective leadership and the full backing of the population, especially the intellectuals, may also enhance a valid spokesperson, i.e., communicating with one voice.

As mentioned above, the rightist group led by Bilizigna, controlling the federal and all regional states except Tigray, is very amorphous and unstructured. It is very challenging to roam around their perception of pains and the way out. They could not understand how the people of Tigray, with a just cause, could rally around their leaders and change the situation after they declared an "extraordinary victory."  The Federal Government declared a "unilateral ceasefire," but at the same time, the Amhara Regional Government announced the opposite. Contradictory statements were released regarding the "unilateral ceasefire." 

Though it is challenging to state that they don't vibe the pain of the military defeats, political fervors outside Tigray, the economic agonies, and external pressure, they don't appear to back down. From the statements and practices, one can observe that they intend to alter the military stalemate by massive newly recruited soldiers, militias, and special forces and technologies. One can also notice their thought of changing the situation if the war drags on because of humanitarian crises. They also perceive that the Amhara and Afar regions are hostile territories and safe in Addis Abeba and Bahirdar at writing. This could alter before this article is published.

The fears of appearing weak internally, in the face of TDF, and the world might take some time to chew. The fragile unity is also a hindrance. If the Prime Minister accepts some of the demands, especially the withdrawal of Amhara forces from Western Tigray, he will lose the support of the Amhara. For those Amhara Bilzigna who were "ተላላኪ" from 1991-2018 and tried to gain their legitimacy by annexing Raya and Wolkait Tsegede, they are "giving their neck to the sword" if they subdue to the pressure and withdraw from lands that belong to the people of Tigray.

TDF may need to make more remarkable military gains and the West to employ concentrated "soft power" to entice the group led by Bilzigna or its replacement to sit down and negotiate.

2.2 Substances for negotiation (the content)

The possible contents for negotiation considered in this paper are not fully terms of surrender.

2.2.1 The need for a framework

Political warfare, especially civil war in a multi-national federation like Ethiopia, requires a supreme framework to manage conflicts and attain sustainable peace before detailed negotiations. In this aspect, RGT has designed conditions for dialogues based on the FDRE constitution. However, there are some Tegaru who argue that the framework should be international law. Their dispute is that immediate independence of Tigray and the return of ancestral territories up to Alawaha and up Lemalmo in the South and West of Tigray respectively  could not be satisfactorily solved by the existing constitution.

The FDRE constitution is more progressive and recognizes more fundamental rights than international law as far as self-determination is concerned. FDRE constitution acknowledges the right to self-determination up to and including secession and realizes that right unconditionally.  International law is state-centric and is more concerned about the sovereignty of states than rights of nations within a state. Though it appreciates group rights and autonomy (self-determination), it is not familiar with the "right up to and including secession”.  The international community is usually unwilling to accept new states outside the colonial context. The West is concerned about the territorial integrity of the country. International law should also be perceived from this background. 

At the same time, the constitution has a full-fledged substance and mechanism to solve identity and boundary issues. Setting boundaries should be guided by the values and long-term interests of the people of Tigray.  The question of "Risti" by illegal means and by force is the cause of the downfall of the Amhara expansionists, and it would be the same for Tegaru elites who want to conquer disputed territories by force and illegal means.

Pursuit of the Supreme Law is also very appealing for the nations of Ethiopia and the international community. Taking the FDRE constitution as a framework, integrated power, security, self-determination, and justice could be tabled for negotiations.

2.2.2 Self- determination (territories)

As enshrined in the constitution, the fundamental aspect of self-determination is not for compromise. That right cannot be implemented without appropriate territories. According to the supreme law, boundaries were organized according to the people living in that area as the home of that community. Accordingly, all occupying forces should withdraw from all territories of Tigray recognized by the constitution.

Until the people of Tigray decide on their fate after necessary time and preparation, self-determination should be interpreted based on the essence of the constitution, which is consensus.  The multi-national Federation has deliberately blurred stae sovereignty as is known in the Westphalia concept when it declared:

1. All sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia.
 2. This Constitution is an expression of their sovereignty." (Article 8)

It is in line with the emergence of a "new law of hybrid self-determination." When the state's legitimacy is in question, the binary either/or options of unity or secession should be resolved as a required space of conflict management. As such, self-rule and the shared rule should be fully adjusted so that the Tigray people can decide their fate without significant obstacles. This will be more elaborated in the security and power sections.

2.2.3 Security: The transition from war to peace is a process accompanied by abundant uncertainty and vulnerability. It is susceptible when negotiation begins after the genocide, fundamentally different from collateral damages during the civil war. The security of the people could be guaranteed if a friendly federal government is instituted. Another option is if the enemy of Tigray for that matter the enemy of all nations is incapacitated enough to be of no immediate danger and is escorted by international assurance with credible monitoring functions.

The usually implemented notion of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) or joint command after civil wars are out of the question in these circumstances, at least until the people of Tigray decide on their fate.  Until plausible trust is built, TDF will remain intact and ready for any eventuality.  The total security of Tigray should be in the hands of RGT.

 How about the security of the rest of the country? It would depend on circumstances and the proposals of all stakeholders, especially the Nations of the Federation who are the holders of the country's sovereignty. The Arada elites who deny belonging to any nation and claim they follow the politics of "citizenship" may have some say but should not significantly affect the decisive role of the nations.

2.2.4 Political and Economic Power and Foreign Affairs

Assuming that Ethiopia will not descend into chaos after the final blow of the TDF and the encroaching Oromo Liberation Army, a transitional government shall be formed from the possessors of the sovereignty, i.e., the nations of the Multi-National Federation. The participation of the criminal Bilizigna party may depend upon the balance of forces. Circumstances may force to negotiate with such elements.

The transitional Government is tasked with carrying "hybrid self-determination" to create an environment of peace by managing the tension between the binary either/or options of unity or secession within its term and construct a system whereby nations will decide on their fate. Implementing the constitution, including Article 39, may produce a solid unity or a peaceful breakaway.

It is a power-sharing government with limited but complicated authority and with the right of a minority group to veto issues that can violate their interests. It is tasked to begin a rigorous trust-building process among nations, facilitate referendums for nations who demand it, and render recognition for those who vote for independence.  A general election with parity of representations for all or those who remain in the Federation is also within its authority. The coalition government may agree upon all security issues, including the Federal Defense Forces, understanding that regional states will hand their internal security. Its term could range from 3-5 years.

Economic stabilization is one of the missions of the transitional Government. Moreover, solving the humanitarian crises and the recovery and rehabilitation of Tigray and other war-torn areas are also daunting tasks that would be achieved mainly with the international community's support. In case of a referendum and the quest for independence, the transitional Government should arrange for a just partitioning of resources.

Altering the "bravado" and anti- Ethiopia foreign policy should be the task to be shouldered by the Government of transition.  Minority veto rights should always be preserved. Furthermore, regional states should have special and parallel relationships with neighboring states based on trans-border conflict dimensions. Tigray and Afar with Eritrea, Amhara, Benshangul Gumuz, and Tigray with Sudan, etc., to name some sensitive interactions. If a member of the Federation votes in a referendum and ascribes to independence, the Government has to facilitate the exit.

2.2.5 Justice

"Justice, peace, and democracy are not mutually exclusive, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives" Kofi Annan

Peace agreements that don't address human rights abuses are doomed to failure in due course because such kinds of accord lack internal and external legitimacy. Appropriate provisions of human rights cement the integrity of the process. Genocide burdens accountability.  Justice is not about the guilt of leaders and other suspected criminals only; it is also about compensating the victims and creating an environment of repetency of those societies that directly or indirectly supported the invasion. Usually, international human rights institutions and mediators push the call to address human rights abuses in agreements. In our case, it is home-grown and in light of the constitutional order that needs the international community's support.

The transitional Government should organize independent human rights, peace and reconciliation, recovery and rehabilitation commissions, and an impartial judicial system to warrant justice. First, the government needs to release all political prisoners and those languishing in concentration camps because of their nationality.  There is a need to coordinate with the International Court of Justice to hand over suspected criminal leaders and organize tribunals in the country. 

2.3 The Processes

This section is not about the technical issues of the process of the impending peace agreements. It is not about how or by who the negotiations are conducted; neither is it about whether secret or open nor who the mediators and or their backers are. It is about peacemaking and build it to be sustainable.  It is a suggestion based on how to maintain the values and interests of Tegaru in the long term. So that whatever settlements we make as military victors are sustainable in the short term and keeps the momentum of stability to Tigray and the region, whatever our status is. So, it is mainly about building forces for negotiation.

2.3.1 An inclusive process

Extraordinary unity and the wisdom of our people and our leaders have enabled us to start from the "bottom rock" to the edge of victory. To keep the momentum, we need to maintain that unity and wisdom—a continuous unity of purpose that would assure peace and prosperity. We have to support our legitimate Government fully. But that authority needs to be inclusive to maintain its legitimacy. We need a consensus grounded governance system. For that purpose, there should be a mechanism by which all stakeholders would participate by their representatives in articulating the peace agreement and a road map for the transition. With the understanding that self-determination is the bedrock, the process, duration, and alternative results, i.e., independence, the Ethiopian context, Great Tigray (ዓባይ ትግራይ) or any other arrangement that there may be, should be extensively discussed without any stigma for the people of Tigray to decide during a referendum.

2.3.2 The need to create a coalition of real federalist and other democratic forces

With many differences and biases, Tigray needs to take the initiative and reach out to federal and democratic forces who have legitimacy within their people and are willing.  It could begin with notable political organizations like OLF, OFC, ANM, ONLF, SLM multi-national organizations like EDP, etc. like organization. The fate of Bilzigna and associates may be conditional. Preliminary arrangements based on the constitution form a transitional government in exile as soon as possible and before controlling Addis if there is the intention and the capacity. The recent announcement of an alliance between TDF and the Oromo Liberation Army is encouraging.

We need to “avoid victory’s arrogance” in dealings with new problems as well as new opportunities considering confidence-building gestures take time. All compromises necessary are not “gifts” render by the victor that could be taken according to the behaviors of the “weak partners.”

2.3.3 Involve the international community and neighbors on time with maximum intensity. The country is in a break-or-break stage, and they have to act without delay. To prevent the country from catastrophe, they need to work earnestly and help formulate transitional government without imposing their biases, understanding that every political warfare has its unique history, culture, and complicated alignment of forces.     

Conclusion

  The balance of forces is radically changing indicating the demise of the Bilzigna group. The presence of Eritrean troops and political, economic, and diplomatic dimensions of war implies both victor TDF and the anti-Tigray coalition are in objective pain. The subjective perceptions are mixed and varied wildly from the ruling party.  They may come to their senses after they throw the last massive and incompetent force. Whether Bilzigna survives or not, there is a need to organize substantive schemes of power, security, self-determination, and justice based on the constitutional framework for negotiation and formation of transitional governance.