We Must feel their Pain

Inter-regional boundaries that divide the Somali region from its neighbors (Oromia and Afar) are ill defined and there are violent conflicts along these borders. In some cases, resource conflicts involving Somali, Afar and Oromo clans transformed into more protracted boundary and territorial conflicts. In fact, conflict over the borderline area has been going on for many decades before the country adopted a federal structure. However, the federal arrangement has brought new actors who wish to shape and reflect the conflict (rent seekers) as intra-federal boundary conflict.

The two regions now participate in this otherwise old and protracted conflict as both parties to the conflict and agents of conflict management. This has somehow made the drawing of inter-regional boundaries between the two regions more difficult.

Puzzled by what I see at the backdrop of this conflict, I try to learn the insights of the scholars who have studied the problem. As these scholars have noted the Somali, the Oromo and the Afar belong to the eastern Cushitic linguistic group of the Horn of Africa. They relate to each other in terms of language and culture.

Sociologically, they are all organized in patriarchal clan structures. Both the Afar and the Somali practice Islam almost exclusively and are predominantly engaged in nomadic pastoralism. In contrast, the Oromo practice Islam, Christianity and traditional religion. Nevertheless, those Oromo clans who reside coterminous with the Afar and the Somali largely follow the Islamic faith and are predominantly engaged in pastoralism. While Islam could serve as an instrument of integration, pastoralism, which depends on the mobility of livestock, brings them into frequent resource conflicts.

Under the new regional administrative structure, the Somali and the Oromia regions share a long boundary that stretches for more than 1000 kilometers from the Jijiga highlands in the northeast to the Ethio-Kenyan borderlands in the southeast. As neighboring ethnic communities, the Somali and the Oromo have longstanding relationships. The Borana, Garre and Gabbra over the years developed complex relationships in the Borana region. All of the clans speak Afaan-Oromo.

The reorganization of the country into an ethnic federation also affected Borana, Garre and Borana relations. It brought them different challenges and opportunities. For instance, for the Garre, the formation of the Somali region gave them the opportunity to identify themselves as Somali and join that region with whatever territory they managed to seize from the latter. It also gave them new allies from the Somali region. The newly established Oromia region on its part emerged as the major player in the territorial dispute among the three clans representing the Borana Oromo.

The formation of the ethnic regions required these ethnic groups living around the border to take on either their Oromo or Somali identity. Principles of ethnic self-determination, which constitutes the key ethos of Ethiopian ethnic federation, brought a huge challenge to ethnic communities with dual Oromo and Somali identities. In this situation, the question of which group belongs to such wider ethnic categories as Oromo or Somali is not only a question of scholarly enquiry but also an instrument of inclusion and exclusion.

The response of the Garre and the Gabbra to the new demand, choosing their ethnicity as either Oromo or Somali, was varied. While the Garre ethnic entrepreneurs decided to take on a Somali identity, the Gabbra remained divided. The former seemed to realize that they had to negotiate which ethnic identity to take on after the collapse of Somalia and the change of the military regime in Ethiopia at the beginning of the 1990s.

During the transitional period, when the OLF was the most important political force in the country, the Garre and their associates reinvented their political front from Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF) to Oromo Abbo Liberation Front (OALF). The Borana were suspicious of this move as they saw more of a similarity between the two in terms of ethnic symbols and clan constituency.

In addition to the re-branding of the SALF into an Oromo organization at the early days of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), the traditional leader of the Garre, Haji Mohammed Hassen Gebaba, sought to take the office of the OLF representative of the Moyale woreda. OLF officials then based in Addis Ababa seemed to accept the wish of the Garre leader to represent them, as they were then promoting wider Oromo nationalism on the basis of Afaan-Oromo.

The Borana elders saw this as a skilful machination of the Garre, intended to bolster their territorial claim against them by taking advantage of the power vacuum created after the downfall of the Derg. However, Garre overtures to Oromo ethnicity ended when the politics of post-1991 Ethiopia began to take shape and after the formation of the ethnic regions, which included a separate region for the Somali.

The withdrawal of the OLF from the transitional government and its resumption of armed insurgency caused a dramatic shift in the relationship of these three clans. The Borana traditionally considered being the allies of the Ethiopian government and thus became a suspect in the eyes of the EPRDF.

In contrast, the Garre and other Somali clans became allies of Addis Ababa in its anti-insurgency activities against the OLF. This dramatic change of policy bewildered and alienated the Borana while at the same time tilted the balance of power in favor of the Garre. The other key factor that seemed to give an additional incentive for the Garre to demand their inclusion into the Somali region was the large influx of Garre and other Somali clansmen to the Moyale town and its surroundings as ‘returnees’ through controversial refugee repatriation programs during the 1990s.

With these important changes, there appeared to be little incentive for the Garre to emphasize their Oromo identity. Thus, their ethnic entrepreneurs chose to join the Somali region. This decision transformed inter-clan conflicts between the Borana and the Garre into a boundary conflict between the newly created Oromia and Somali regions. Soon after their decision to join the Somali region, the Garre laid claim over territories either jointly used by them and the Borana or considered traditional turf of the latter.

Since 1991, internal divisions and vacillation between Oromia and Somali mark Gabbra’s response to the need to negotiate its ethnic identity within Ethiopia’s federal structure. For instance, after the 1992 violence, the Gabbra with the help of the Oromia region reinstituted a gada institution, weakened over the years by Gabbra adherence to Islam. Hassan Kella, one of the prominent leaders of the Gabbra, was elected Abba Gada (head of the gada) and later became a member of the Oromia regional council.

After the reinstitution of the gada, when the idea of joining the Somali region apparently got the upper hand among some of their ethnic entrepreneurs, the Gabbra in the Moyale area reinstituted a traditional administrative institution called Teliya. This institution emphasizes Islam and resembles Somali traditional clan administration. In a surprising move, Hassan Kella, installed earlier as the Abba Gada of the Gabbra, became head of the Teliya.

Hassan’s position change accompanied his change of allegiance from Oromo to Somali ethnicity. He presently advocates Gabbra identification with the Somali and the assignment of Moyale town to the Somali region. When asked why he changed his allegiance, Hassan stated that ‘he was involved in the restoration of the gada and became member of the Oromia regional council in order to provide security for his people.’ He alleged that these actions had not brought security to the Gabbra. In addition to these high profile cases, allegiance switching by Gabbra local and regional officials appears to be a recurrent phenomenon in the Moyale woreda.

For instance, in March 2007, the top local news in the Moyle town was the defection of two members of the Moyale Oromia woreda cabinet to the Somali region. The unresolved dispute over the status of Moyale town could explain why the Somali region provides positions to the Gabbra. Indeed, if the dispute is going to be resolved through a local referendum, prominent Gabbra appointed by the Somali region could mobilize their clansmen in favor of the Somali region.

According to an official from Oromia, “Whenever Gabbra officials in the Oromia region are sacked from their positions either because of lack of competence or of alleged criminal activities, they flee to the Somali region and the Somali region gives them political appointments.” Individuals who are involved in such activities despite their claim of ‘providing security to their people’ appear largely motivated by personal gain. These are rent seekers who suck the blood of the people whom they claim to defend.

The dispute between the Borana (Oromo) and the Garre (Somali) over Moyale town has been festering for close to 16 years now. The federal government attempted to resolve the conflict through both political and legal instruments without success. The most frequently used instruments in this regard include the organization of the ‘peace, development and democracy conference,’ interposition of the army between rival groups and joint peace committees (JPC). Despite the contribution of these efforts to de-escalate conflicts, they have not led to significant results.

The main impediment regarding the resolution of the Moyale dispute relates to the immense polarity that prevails among the parties to the conflict. The federal constitution provides that when regions fail to resolve territorial disputes through negotiation, the federal government should organize a referendum to enable people at the local/kebele level to decide democratically, which region they would like to join. While the Somali region seems to accept the principle of holding a referendum, the Borana oppose it vigorously. They argue that holding a referendum would only endorse the unjust expansion of the Garre and other Somali clans on Borana territory.

After the failure of the referendum, the federal government once again let the problem fester. Still, it deployed federal police to deter violence. As the situation remains tense, a minor incident could trigger violence. Hence, we need to be creative and accommodative and urgently solve the problem.