Putting the Developmental State in a New Limelight: with governance at the centre
By Getachew Mequanent
The September 2007 issue of the Journal of Development Policy Review has as a theme “developmental states in the new millennium”. I want to review (for the purpose of this commentary) the introductory article by Verena Fritz and Alina Rocha Menocal (editors) of the Overseas Development Institute, entitled Developmental States in the New Millennium: Concepts and Challenges for a New Aid Agenda (pp. 531-552), and another relevant article by Merilee Grindle of Harvard University, entitled Good Enough Governance Revisited (pp. 553-574). The remaining five articles in this issue also have topics related to the subject of development state, which are referred to by Fritz and Menocal in their article.
The two articles reviewed here appear to target mostly the donor community and for a good reason. Donors’ efforts to promote democratic governance in developing countries through support for public sector reforms, national elections, judicial reforms and related initiatives encounter difficulties. When elected governments are not effective, parliamentary elections are marred by controversies and violence or public sector reforms are stalled, one needs to step back a bit and understand the whole situation, part of which then brings “the developmental state back at the center of the international policy debate (p. 531)”.
I have previously written commentaries on the developmental state. Although I had explored this subject during my student days, I began having a renewed interest in it after I reviewed Meles Zenawi’s paper (Aigaforum.com and Ethiopiafirst.com), and therefore, after I realized that, in Ethiopia, there might be a thinking going on – at least within the EPRDF party circle – on the subject of developmental state. This commentary is then a continuation of my previous discussions.
The debate about the developmental state focuses on state intervention in society to initiate and support fundamental socio-economic changes. According to Fritz and Menocal, the developmental state exists “when the state possesses the vision, leadership and capacity to bring about a positive transformation of society within a condensed period of time (p. 533)”. Successful developmental states that are often mentioned in the literature include South Korea, Chile, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Botswana, Malaysia, Cuba (despite post-Cold War decline), Mauritius, Costa Rica, China and Vietnam. These states have pursued different development strategies at different times; for example, first they pursued agrarian reforms, and then shifted their attention to industrialization and to the technology and service sectors. In Africa, I can mention countries like Ghana, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Senegal and Mozambique as examples of developing developmental states that are continuously acquiring capacity and governance experiences. Libya (despite the erratic political behaviour of its leader Colonel Gadaffi) can also be a model state for the Arab world, considering the level of investment in agriculture and infrastructure and support for radical social changes, especially the enhancement of the role of women in society.
These days state intervention in the society and economy can be quite common, as we can see it even in matured liberal democracies like Canada which, for example, has a government department dedicated to the protection of its cultural heritage (by regulating cultural industries), or America (the land of capitalism) which has in the past few weeks alone pledged to provide a hundred billion dollar funds as credit for staggering financial institutions in the country. Yet, state intervention in developing countries remains problematic for a number of reasons including 1) state capacity is weak which means that state intervention can create a mess (aggravating problems) instead of supporting development; 2) political and bureaucratic elites take advantage of state intervention to promote their own welfare (through appropriations of economic resources); 3) state elites become too authoritarian and unaccountable; and 4) these effects combined reduce state effectiveness and arrest developent. The search is then for state models that are democratic, accountable and effective – which is why governance issues have increasingly become central to the discourse of developmental state.
What do we mean by governance? We do not mean only free speech, free elections, freedom of association, freedom of movement and all those fundamental human rights as enshrined in international conventions, for example. In the context of development, governance also means the existence of state capacity to deliver quality public services for citizens; protect the rights of children, women, people with disabilities and other vulnerable groups in society; generate revenues and be accountable and transparent in how budgetary decisions are made; police a territory to maintain public security (so that every community has access to public services); involve citizens in decision-making processes; and so on. The small Asian country of Bhutan had “national happiness” as a 2008 national election agenda (making a nation happy is a governance issue).
As Grindle rightly points out, donor agencies do not have the same approach of intervention and priorities to promote governance. Nonetheless, they agree that there is a relationship between governance and social, economic and political development. For example, countries with good governance have achieved higher economic growth and political stability, whereas those with poor governance continue to suffer from poverty, political instability, corruption and so on. At a political level, political elites who are committed and have a good vision will formulate pro-poor economic and political reforms, whereas elites who are concerned with their own welfare show no intent of supporting such policies. Grindle says that governance interventions should “be questioned, prioritised, and made relevant to the conditions of individual countries. They need to be assessed in the light of historical evidence, sequence, and timing, and they should be selected carefully in terms of their contributions to particular ends such as poverty reduction and democracy (p. 554)”.
Actually, the developmental state and governance agenda often overlap, according to Fritz and Menocal. We are concerned with developmental states because they support participatory and equitable development. We are concerned with good governance because states must have democratic systems, practices, procedures, processes, standards, etc, that guide their actions and shape their values, such as facilitating multi-stakeholder participation in decision-making processes; respect for human rights; and apply rule of law. To ensure these processes and outcomes, states must have institutional capacity to articulate and aggregate popular demands; be governed by politicians who are disciplined and committed; and draw the support of civil society organizations to engage citizens’ in decision-making processes; among other things. In the absence of these conditions, according to these authors, “demanding [states] ‘good governance’ may be asking too much (p. 548)”. They suggest the ‘good enough governance’ approach (p. 538) (initially proposed in Grindle’s earlier work):
The ‘good enough governance’ agenda emphasises the minimal conditions of improved governance that are necessary to enable further political, social and economic development. Compared with the good governance agenda [of neo-liberalism], it is less normative and more ‘situational’ and pragmatic. It is less concerned with setting general (often idealised) benchmarks of governance. It directs attention instead to the next steps to be taken, given the current state of affairs and the political opportunity structure in the country. The ‘good enough’ governance concept thus bridges key concerns of both the developmental state agenda (achieving results on social progress) and the good governance agenda (the development of fair and humane rules of the game).
The “good enough governance” approach can be accepted by donor agencies which are often accused of imposing a western version of democracy on developing countries and placing unrealistic expectations. Hence, in deciding to support a country, donors can assess whether that country has created or has potential to create the “minimal conditions of governance”, and more importantly, if it has a capacity to advace broad development goals. This includes parliamentary elections and the implementation of fundemantal reforms focused on, for example, decentralization, anti-corruption and protection of the rights of vulnerable groups in society. Donors ask whether the country has the capacity to make effective use of aid resources and achieve MDGs, as measured by ongoing efforts to support initiatives in the areas of education, health, food security and other MDG goals.
Furthermore, the “good enough governance” approach allows developmental states, especially those that I have referred to as “developing developmental states”, to continue acquiring capacity and governance experiences; for, in the absence of adequate capacity, placing demand on states to demonstrate “good governance” can bring about the reverse effect of losing of control of the institutional building and democratization process.
How does one know if states are creating minimal conditions of governance and promoting development, i.e., how does one measure results? This is challenging, especially in the area of governance where results are normative, process oriented and long-term. But it is not impossible if one employs the right methodology. I can make a contribution here by bringing the Ethiopian experience. In rural Ethiopia, you would think that most of the people are still poor, even though their income has risen. Why? Because, you see them still living the old ways (wearing the same cloth everyday for the whole year, eating twice a day, living in medieval-type houses, and so on), whereas you would expect them to eat, dress, live, and so on, like urban dwellers – the “modern” way. Or, assume that, while you were at the bank, you saw a farmer depositing money to his/her savings account. Then you were driving in the countryside when you found that farmer walking on foot back home. If you had not seen him at the bank depositing money, certainly you would have concluded that the man was walking on foot because he had no money to pay for transportation. Perhaps my younger brother can be much better off than the average urban residents in Gondar, yet I don’t think he has more than two changes of clothes. Surely he wore the same cloth every day during my stay (one week) with him. My point: if you want to measure the result (increased income in rural Ethiopia), you should assess the value of assets that people possess and not be misled by their “poor” appearances. Previously Kebele and Woreda agencies simply enclosed land without paying compensation for owners. Today farmers take government officials to courts to demand and negotiate better compensations (this is a governance result). If what I observed in Gondar was true across Ethiopia, the government has achieved its goal of protecting the rights of Ethiopia’s children by banning early marriages, female circumcision and providing them with access to universal education (another very important governance result). Setting up a shemageles (elders) or citizens committee to check the power of Kebele cadres can be still another governance result, as is creating a political environment where a group of middle class and intellectual elites conceive (while drinking at Hilton or Sheraton hotel) the idea of creating yet another political party. All these are examples of how results can be easily detected and measured if governments and development agencies adopt the right methodology, and more importantly, if they put the right people on the job.
I think I have achieved my purpose in this commentary. Except to conclude by saying that, despite daunting challenges, donor agencies remain committed to helping developing country states develop their capacities. The onus will be on developing country elites to provide political and policy leadership to produce good results.
Getachew Mequanent
Ottawa, Canada
April 2008