May 15, 2008 

The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratisation, DemocraticTransition and Consolidation: A Point of View

by Tesfaye Habisso 

            Since the past twenty-five years or so, a wave of democratisation has occurred throughout the international system. This wave has been heralded by scholars and policymakers alike, who hope that it will promote peace and prosperity throughout the world.  It is believed that democracy, than any other system, allows for the voice of the people to be heard.  A democracy also has never gone to war against another democracy.  Further, democracies do not abuse human rights, and they generally allow for basic freedoms such as that of speech and other fundamental rights such as civil and political rights, and social and economic rights.  They are also generally more stable and have fewer crises than other forms of government.  

      This does not however mean that democracy is a perfect system; it is not . As one of its major defects, democracy has failed to eliminate poverty, food insecurity and social inequality, and this seems a permanent and structural failure. In fact, the level of poverty and social inequality within nations as well as amongst the countries of the world has been on an ever increasing trend for quite a long time.  In addition, failure to protect the right of minorities and despised communities is perhaps the most recognized defect of democracies.  Hence, democracy does not deserve the semi-sacred status that many scholars and politicians often fret to accord it.  Democracy may only be, as Churchill put it, the best form of government except all the other alternative forms of governance that have been present throughout human history.

            While the world would undoubtedly be more peaceful, as it is believed, if all states became more mature democracies, the problem of getting from here to there, that is, making a successful transition from a backward authoritarian system of rule to a democratic political system and consolidating the latter, is easier said than done.  And thus the process of becoming a democracy is most often fraught with more dangers than is usually acknowledged.  In poor multi-ethnic and divided societies, transitions to democracy have proved to be mostly rocky and violent, and this often gives rise to warlike nationalism and violent ethnic conflicts.  In such societies, a peaceful transition to democracy is exceptional, and the certainty that democracy will prevail is in question.

            Democratic movement in the first place was born out of a unique set of conditions prevalent in the Western world.  Some of the ingredients necessary for the evolutionary birth of a democratic order are believed to be: (a) industrialization; (b) rise in literacy levels; (c) abundance of resources; (d) isolation from negative outside influences and,  (e) political theoreticians whose vision spans the past, present and future and who have a grasp of the physical disciplines required in that particular age  [http: //www.hujra.com/democracy_not_work. hym].

            For many scholars, democracy is a delicate flower that requires a host of social and institutional prerequisites.  One scholar suggests that democracy requires a populace endowed with nine psychological traits, among which are tolerance, realism, flexibility, and objectivity, and further, that the country must have economic well-being, economic equality, and an educated citizenry [Carl Cohen, Democracy, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1971].  Another political scientist names seven conditions necessary for democracy, including a " strong concern for the mass of people" and " high social mobility" [Alfred De Grazia, The Elements of Political Science, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1952, pp.546-547].  Robert Dahl describes three essential conditions for a multiparty democracy to function; these are: (a) extensive competition by contestants including individuals, groups or parties for government; (b) political participation that provides the choice for the electorate to select candidates in free and fair elections; and (c) civil and political liberties that enable citizens to express themselves without fear of punishment [Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, p.221].

            Two other scholars claim that democracy rests on seven basic beliefs, including "respect for individual personality", "belief in rationality," and "equality of opportunity." [J.A. Corry and Henry Abraham, Elements of Democratic Government, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 29,33,35].  Further, political theories suggest that it is especially difficult to sustain a democracy in a society where political parties, interest groups, media of communication, schools and voluntary associations are determined along " religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic lines. [Alan M. Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratisation, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994, p.31].  In a similar vein, but a little more precisely, Smooha has argued that for non-democratic states in societies that are deeply divided along ethnic lines, "the transition from a non-democracy [to a full-fledged mature democracy] is too big a jump."  As a result, these states, he argues, might opt for the model termed "ethnic democracy." [Sammy Smooha, " The Model of Ethnic Democracy:  Characterization, Cases and Comparisons," a paper delivered at the Multiculturalism and Democracy in Divided Societies conference, Haifa University, 1998, p.43].   In his evaluation of the "third wave of democratisation" of the seventies and eighties, the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington concludes that states become particularly susceptible to democratisation when they have reached a certain minimal level of social and economic development. [Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, 1991, p. 59ff].   If these democratic conditions have not been fulfilled, he argues, the onus lies on the local ruling classes to behave in a very responsible way and in a manner supportive of the democratisation process in the respective countries.  Although some of the aforementioned views are meant to describe the so-called perfect context for democracy or to give an incentive and a much-needed fillip to the promotion of democracy, they are largely irrelevant to the task of understanding real-world democracy, which is always compromised and flawed.  In short,  "democracy has never been a transferable blueprint for political control but simply the name given to a style and form of government evolved out of experience."

            Most often, democracy has come to be equated with mere superficial and easily recognizable mechanical processes, the most recognized of which being regular elections.  Elections indeed are a necessary but by no means a sufficient condition for the completion of a democratic transition.   The mere casting of a vote does not make a democracy even when the elections are indeed free and fair.  It is believed that a country has completed the transition to democracy when "the government resulting from election--- [has] the de jure as well as the de facto power to determine policy in many significant areas." [Linz and Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," pp.14-33].  Be this as it may, a democratic transition is a long and difficult process that may take many, many years to complete.  But even if a country has transitioned to a democratic system, the journey towards democracy is not completed.

            Then, at what moment does a successfully democratising state become a mature democracy?  When can its democracy be termed consolidated?  Some scholars use the "two turnover rule" to define democratic consolidation: that is, a democracy is considered consolidated when power has changed hands twice as a result of free and fair elections.  Others say that democracy is considered consolidated when it is " the only game in town:" that is, when no significant political party or group seeks to come to power by means other than winning a free and fair election.  Others measure the degree to which the country has achieved the institutional and legal characteristics of a mature democracy, using indicators such as competitive politics, regular elections, broad participation, constraints on arbitrary use of executive power, free speech, and respect for civil liberties, including minority rights.  Once a country has completed a democratic transition, it is left for that democracy to be consolidated, a necessary condition for a lasting democratic regime.

            According to Linz and Stepan, a "consolidated" democracy is a "political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase, the only game in town."  Haggard and Kaufman state, "a democratic consolidation is a process through which acceptance of a given set of constitutional rules becomes less directly contingent on immediate rewards and sanctions and increasingly widespread and routinized." Consolidation is essentially a more important process than transition.  A government may be able to transition to democracy, but if it does not consolidate said democracy, it may relapse into authoritarianism or other non-democratic forms of government.

            Additional factors must be in place if a democracy is to be considered "consolidated."  First, the conditions must exist for the development of a free and lively civil society.  Second, there must be a relatively autonomous political society.  Third, throughout the territory of the state all major political actors, especially the government and the state apparatus, must be effectively subjected to a rule of law that protects individual freedoms and associational life.  Fourth, there must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government.  Fifth, there must be an institutionalized economic society [Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic

Though we most often argue and subscribe to glowing statements about the virtues of a democratic political system, democracy can be quite destructive in many least-developed and ethnically divided transition societies.  In Sri Lanka in the 1950s, and in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus in the 1980s, political elites pandered to ethnic nationalism of the dominant group to bolster their electoral prospects.  Eventually, the antagonisms they had aroused, or evoked, between the majority and minority became uncontrollable and their countries collapsed in ethnic violence and civil war.  In these cases, democracy was not a panacea but a disaster.  This is why the democracy we see around the world today often has a distinctly ugly face. 

            On the eve of the 1996 elections in Bosnia, the architect of the Dayton peace accords, American diplomat Richard Holbrooke, fretted: "Suppose the election was declared free and fair and those elected are racists, fascists, separatists, who are publicly opposed to [peace and re-integration].  That is the dilemma." [Newsweek, October 1997].  Indeed it is, not only in the former Yugoslavia, Algeria, Rwanda, Afghanistan and Iraq but increasingly around the world, including Ethiopia today.  I don't really know what would have occurred, for example, if those who were unabatedly sowing the seeds of discord and ethnic hatred during the public debates in the run-up to the third national elections on May, 2005 in Ethiopia had secured a landslide victory at the national and regional parliamentary elections and thus gained widespread acceptance and following among the Ethiopian masses who are already ethnically divided and politicised along ethno-linguistic lines and also adhering to various religious affiliations or denominations.   I indeed shudder to imagine what would have ensued in Ethiopia if those who were whipping up ethnic hatred and making hate speech and the sinister call of " chasing away the Woyanes (TPLF members) back to where they came from---", etc. , had gained the upper hand in the current Ethiopian politics and among the population at large.  It is sad that visionary political leadership, inability to manage differences, civility in public debates and a tolerant political culture are still scarce commodities among the political elites in Ethiopia today.

            I strongly believe and argue that we need stringent and severe laws against hate speech, and if we already have them and I know we have, then, we must strictly and urgently enforce them.  Even one of the oldest democracies in the world, the United Kingdom (UK), for example, has such laws.  In the UK, hate speech has been banned under the Public Order Act since 1986.  In it, a person is guilty of an offence, and can be arrested on the spot, if he/she "uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress" thereby. If mature and well-established democracies such as the UK need laws against hate speech, then, newly democratising nations such as ours need them most desperately and more urgently than the former for the obvious reasons. Above all, nobody likes to hear or to become a victim of hate speech or ethnic and/or religious slurs, and these offences must be punishable by law. And hate speech and similar innuendoes   must absolutely be banned by law.

            It is a well recognized principle, for instance, that one of the most important conditions for the existence and sustainability of a democratic society is respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, and among these freedoms, freedom of expression is considered the most precious and, indeed, the very foundation of such a society.  But in newly democratising societies, media manipulation often plays a central role in promoting nationalist and ethnic conflict, and thus, promoting unconditional freedom of speech and public debate in such societies is, in many circumstances, likely to make the problem worse.  Historically and today, from the French Revolution to Rwanda, sudden liberalizations of press freedom have been associated with bloody outbursts of popular nationalism.  As Vera points out, the most dangerous situation is precisely when the government's press monopoly begins to break down [Van Evera, " Hypotheses, "p.33; Human Rights Watch, Playing the " Communal Card", p. VIII ].  "During incipient democratisation, when civil society is burgeoning but democratic institutions are not fully entrenched, the state and other elites are forced to engage in public debate in order to compete for mass allies in the struggle for power"  [Van Evera, "Hypotheses," p.33].  Under those circumstances, governments and their opponents often have the motive and the opportunity to play the nationalist/ethnic card.

            When this occurs, unconditional freedom of public debate or free speech is a dubious remedy.  Just as economic competition produces socially beneficial results only in a well-institutionalized market-place, where monopolies and false advertising are counteracted, so too increased debate in the political marketplace leads to better outcomes only when there are mechanisms to correct market imperfections[ R.H. Coase, "The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas," American Economic Review, Vol. 64, No. 2, May 1974, p.p. 384-391]. Many newly democratising states such as Ethiopia lack institutions to break up governmental and non-governmental information monopolies, to professionalize journalism, and to create common public forums where diverse ideas engage each other under conditions in which erroneous arguments will be challenged.  In the absence of these institutions, an increase in the freedom of speech and unconditional public debate can create an opening for ethnic demagogues and nationalist mythmakers to hijack public discourse.  This was in fact what we sadly witnessed in Ethiopia during the run-up to the recent national elections, which subsequently plunged the nation into unnecessary and regrettable bloodletting and chaos in Addis Ababa on June 8,2005.

            One of the most critical problems in many new democracies around the world today is the absence of an independent and responsible media that enjoys reasonable financial and political independence.  Another problem is that journalists who once had to toe the single-party line equate independence with opposition.  Because they speak out against the government, they say they are independent and fail to realize that they have just traded one affiliation for another.   There is little room for untarnished truth in a partisan press.  Of utmost necessity, therefore, is that objectivity is not at all a luxury in societies that have only recently begun to enjoy the freedom to voice their opinions, although journalists in emerging democracies are constrained by lack of professionalism and financial resources.  There is a need today--perhaps more than ever--for true journalists to identify sense amidst the nonsense, to sift the important from the trivial, 'the grain from the chaff', as they say, and yes, for telling the truth.  Those goals still continue to remain the best mandate for free press and independent mass media in a democracy worthy of the name.

            When talking about truth the question that arises sometimes is whether the truth always serves the public.  At times, the truth can do harm.  If the truthful report of a small communal conflict in, say, Gambella or Ogaden, leads to more civil unrest throughout the region, is the public really being served?  The journalistic purists--often those sitting in comfortable chairs far away from conflict--say it is not their job to "play God" in such matters, and that one should not "shoot the messenger for the message."

            If, however, one takes the rigid view that freedom and the truth always need to be controlled--or Lenin's dictum that " freedom is so precious that it must be rationed," or that truth is partisan--the door is wide open for enormous abuse, as history has demonstrated time and again.  Hence, truth in the service of the public is unquestionable and unchallengeable.  It will be the duty of true journalists to weigh all the possible outcomes of their journalistic products and use their judgment to produce credible press output or piece of news in order to serve the public good.  Hence, self-censorship becomes the ultimate tool and wisdom for a true, professional journalist especially in newly democratising nations or states.

            After all, there are also other equally important freedoms, just as press and mass media freedom, that call for prudential judgment and the act of balancing between compelling and competing interests for the sake of the public good and the nation's security and welfare.  The question of national security and safety, for example, is one such concern that cannot be overlooked or compromised for the sake of press and media freedom.  Restrictions provided for by law, in particular those enacted in the interest of health, ethics and the rights and freedoms of others, cannot be infringed upon in the name of media freedom, or on any other pretext.

            Whatever the reason behind the transition, the earliest phases of democratisation since the French Revolution have triggered some of the world's bloodiest nationalist struggles.  Indeed, the road to democratic transition and consolidation has always been tortuous and windy.  Developing appropriate institutions, techniques and mechanisms to manage these problems is among the most important challenges facing policymakers in particular and the political society in general in emerging democracies today. One of the most difficult concepts for some to accept in new democracies, for example, is that of the "loyal opposition". This concept is a vital one, however. It means, in essence, that all sides in a democracy share a common commitment to its basic values, rules and procedures. Political competitors don't necessarily have to like each other, but they must tolerate one another and acknowledge that each has a legitimate and important role to play. Moreover, the ground rules of the society must encourage tolerance and civility in public debate. When the election is over, the losers accept the judgment of the voters. If the incumbent party loses, it turns over power peacefully. If the opposition party (or parties) loses, it accepts its defeat gracefully and plays the important role of the "loyal opposition" thus checkmating the incumbent government and party up until the next elections. No matter who wins, both sides agree to cooperate in solving the common problems of the society. The losers, now in the political opposition, whether it consists of one party or many, can continue to participate in public life with the knowledge that their role is essential in any democracy. They are loyal not to the specific policies of the government, but to the fundamental legitimacy of the state and to the democratic process itself. Sadly, such a civilized political culture and tradition is lacking in newly democratising societies. In many so-called 'transitioning' societies, opposition parties are presented as anti-people, anti-democracy and enemies of the nation, and face severe persecutions, harassments and even liquidations. Thus the concept of "loyal opposition" in such societies is still an unpalatable alien idea that must necessarily be learned by all of us if we indeed want democracy to take hold in our societies. This learning process is of course bound to take some time and energy, and we must all be prepared for it.   Without due consideration of these critical problems, naively pressuring poor and ethnically divided authoritarian states, especially nations such as ours where the transition of power has historically taken place at the point of the gun, to hold instant elections and to become mature democracies overnight can lead to disastrous consequences.   Whether we like it or not, it is not going to happen instantly. Creating a democracy in poverty-ridden and illiterate societies--societies that have not yet fully embraced democratic values and are not yet familiar with democratic concepts, rules, procedures and ways of life--is bound to take a long time and to exact huge costs.  The most critical factor for a democracy to succeed under these circumstances is undoubtedly a restraint in the use of violence in domestic affairs, respect for the rule of law, and civility and utmost tolerance in our political culture and our everyday life.  It is now abundantly clear that democracy cannot thrive in a highly violent society.  This must be our democracy's minimum requirement if we indeed have a deep and unflinching commitment towards the rule of law and a democratic transition and consolidation, and to become mature democracies in the end.  There is no other way.  No revolution, 'popular' or 'rose', or whatever adjective may be tagged to it, as currently being advanced by the CUD coalition of opposition parties in Ethiopia, will ever succeed to bring about a peaceful and democratic political system. Violence begets more violence and bloodshed, even civil war, not peace and democracy.  The road of violence will only succeed in tearing down the rule of law and the social fabric of the nation, and squelching us into anarchy, nothing more.  Above all, "the success of democracy and democratic institutions has been organic and not mechanical.  They work only if they can live and grow in the common acceptance and rooted affection of the community from which they take their form".  Which means, though democracy embodies universal human values of freedom and liberty, we have to recreate our democratic models based on our cultures, values, norms, and traditions instead of making futile and costly attempts to copy Western models of democracy.  Homegrown democracies based on our values and traditions (values and traditions of consensus building through dialogue and communal welfare over and above atomised individualism and belligerent opposition) are the only variants that can insure a free society and guarantee our civil and political liberties, and that can also be sustainable.   We indeed need to move away from democratic models that have been imported from outside and models of government that are introduced by the political elite. They will not work for us.

The most bedevilling malady, rather misfortune, that has been afflicting a large number of African countries for the past several decades, and still now, is the fact that they have been ruled for so long by "militant liberation movements which have been characterized by forms of personalized power, violence and gross human rights violations, lack of institutionalised good governance, centralized command and control structures, and many other ills thus becoming the burden of national liberation processes. When former liberation movements come to power they are mostly characterized by structural flaws which impede the building up of democratic institutions and  the rule of law. When these liberation movements took control of the state machinery and reorganized themselves as political parties and when the command structures of the militarily organized movements were simply transferred to civil society, these most often resulted in a rejection of democratic change, personal dominance including in the business sector, rent-seeking and corruption. The liberation movements claimed their legitimacy to rule stemmed from the decolonisation process or from toppling oppressive national regimes and thus assumed themselves as democratically elected representatives of the majority of the people. Since then, with varying results (and sometimes accepting the use of further physical violence), they have been able to strengthen their political dominance and to maintain control over the state. Most of these liberation movements have so far failed miserably to tackle the problems confronting their nations constructively and self-critically, which sadly has led to a situation where victims in the role of liberation fighters have become perpetrators." [H. Melber, Liberation Without Democracy?: 2002, pp. 18-20]. This is one of the most troubling maladies affecting the pace and progress of democratisation in most African, Asian and Latin American countries today. The history of the Sandinista Party, FSLN [Nicaragua], the ZANU-PF [Zimbabwe], FRELIMO [Angola], EPRDF [Ethiopia], etc. is not far from this reality. Hence, all liberation movements must realize that their ultimate objective is not only to liberate oppressed peoples from the yoke of colonial masters or brutal national regimes but to bring liberation with democracy and development, peace and prosperity to their once destitute and dehumanised subjects. They must undertake successful transformations from militant movements to peaceful and democratic political parties, respecting civil and political liberties of citizens and accepting the positive role of other opposition parties in the nations' political arenas for implanting democracy in their respective countries. This is one of the most formidable challenges, in addition to abject poverty and socio-economic deprivation, facing incumbent parties, which were formerly liberation movements, in Africa today.

            Then there is the frequently touted argument that we should adopt the so-called " development-first, democracy-later" strategy.  This is absolutely erroneous and untenable. Contrary to the highly influential argument by many scholars that poor countries must develop economically before they can democratise, historical data have convincingly proved otherwise.  There is now abundant evidence that poor democracies have grown at least as fast as poor autocracies and have significantly outperformed the latter on most indicators of social well-being. They have also done much better at avoiding catastrophes.  Dispelling the "development-first, democracy-later" argument is critical not only because it is wrong but also because it has led to atrocious policies--indeed, policies that have undermined [national] and international efforts to improve the lives of hundreds of millions of people in the developing world.  Those who believe that democracy can take hold only once a state has developed economically preach a go-slow approach to promoting democracy.  But many who believe that countries often remain poor because they retain autocratic political structures believe that a development-first strategy perpetuates a deadly cycle of poverty, conflict and oppression [Joseph T. Siegle, Micheal M. Weinstein, and Morton H. Halpern, "Why Democracies Excel,"  The New York Times, Sept./Oct. 2004 issue of Foreign Affairs, p.1].  

Moreover, we must be cognizant of the glaring fact that democracy is a learned and not an inherited system.  It can be learnt if we all want to learn it.  It can neither be imposed nor imported. It is measured over time, it is not acquired overnight or in a short period of time.  This indeed requires building and strengthening democratic institutions as well as assuming a great responsibility, promoting an active and constructive participation, cooperation, patience, tolerance and civility amongst all society members, especially the political elites in the democratisation struggle, if democracy is to take hold and blossom in newly transitioning nations. 

We must also dispel any illusion regarding the positive role to be played by responsible opposition political parties (‘loyal opposition’ or legal opposition) in the democratisation process. No society can become democratic because those in power allow the country to be ruled by politicians who have the same or similar political and denominational convictions as they have themselves. “Just as freedom cannot be measured by the fact that it permits conformity, but only by the degree in which it allows deviation from the standards, so democracy cannot be measured by the fact that it permits politicians of a limited range of political creeds to rule, but only by the fact that it allows politicians of any political creed (in which people’s moral right to personhood is respected) to rule when the people so prefer. It is not until the majority of the people elect representatives whose ideology significantly deviates from the beliefs of those in power that it may turn out that a country has never been a democracy. The powerful conspirators behind the screens, who take on the rule of the country themselves in such a case, only remove the last resemblance of the democratic system. In their exclusionist opinion it had never bee acceptable to permit politicians with certain political or denominational ideals essentially different from their own to have a major say in the country’s affairs.” This misguided mentality will not augur well for the pace and progress of democratisation and democracy at all.

If we take the case of Ethiopia, for instance, we have borne the yoke of authoritarian and brutal regimes for so many generations in the past, and embarked upon the process of democratisation only some 17 or so years ago.  Our society as a whole is new to the new concept of democracy.  As I have argued in one of my previous articles, "we are all learners in democracy.  In this learning process, some learn fast; some take more time to learn; some simply do not want to learn.  This naturally affects, to some degree, the smooth transition of our country and our peoples to fuller and functioning democracy.  In time, however, we are all convinced that all will come to appreciate the fact that democracy can survive only if the duties and aspirations of living together in one human society are given proper consideration and respect, and on our genuine commitment to regular and respectful dialogue with all parties and interest groups.  No democratic right is absolute, and one major limitation of such a right is respect for the rights of others.  Ignorance or neglect of this interconnection between democratic rights and duties endangers the very basis of democracy." [Tesfaye Habisso, " From Adversarial Relationship to Respectful Dialogue:  A Step in the Right Direction for Opposition Politics in Ethiopia,"  The Ethiopian Herald, Tuesday 01,February 2005, p.8]

Finally, we must all recognize democracy as the shared value of our peoples.  And as the shared value of our peoples, we must be able to embrace, nurture, guard and protect it for it is now clear that if we fail to practice and promote democracy as the common value of our peoples and if we fail to protect it, we will revert to a situation where conflicts are resolved by the use of force, which means reversion to the primitive procedure of self-help and back to the state of nature.  And in the present era, returning to the state of nature, may, at worst, lead to the total liquidation of a people, a nation or a state; or it may, at best, lead to the imposition by force of the rule of dictatorship.  Assumption of power by force and the rule of dictatorship can never lead to the prevalence of peace and security.  Power assumed by force can only be sustained by force, and groups or factions which gather sufficient counter-force can sooner or later claim it.  Seizure of political power by force and attempts to seize power by force are, therefore, the major symptoms of endless social and political upheavals, intractable  strife and conflicts.  This procedure of assuming power must be brought to an end by the concerted efforts of all peoples of the newly emerging democracies and the international community. It is only promoting and sustaining the democratic procedure of assuming power from the ballot box through free, fair and credible periodic elections and of arriving at decisions affecting peoples through respectful and all-inclusive dialogue that can pave the way for a successful democratic transition and a mature democracy in the end.  All other options are destined to fail.  As Edmund Burke correctly observed:

"The use of force alone is but temporary.  It may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again: and a nation is not governed, which is perpetually to be conquered." [Edmund Burke, "The Thirteen Resolutions," Second Speech on Conciliation with America].